Economic policy of the Bolsheviks during the war. Economic policy of the Bolsheviks. And building socialism

communist party socialism revolutionary

The content of the policy of "war communism", its consequences

With gain civil war The Bolsheviks pursue a special, non-economic policy called “war communism.” During the spring-autumn of 1919. surplus appropriation, nationalization, curtailment of commodity-money circulation and other military-economic measures were summarized in the policy of “war communism”.

War communism was even more than a policy; for a time it became a way of life and a way of thinking - it was a special, extraordinary period in the life of society as a whole. Since he was at the stage of formation Soviet state, on his “infancy”, he could not help but influence great influence for its entire subsequent history.

The main features of war communism are the shift of the center of gravity of economic policy from production to distribution. This occurs when the decline in production reaches such a critical level that the main thing for the survival of society becomes the distribution of what is available. Since the resources of life are replenished to a small extent, there is a sharp shortage of them, and if distributed through the free market, their prices would jump so high that the most necessary products for life would become inaccessible to a large part of the population. Therefore, an egalitarian non-market distribution is introduced. On a non-market basis (possibly even with the use of violence), the state alienates production products, especially food. Money circulation in the country is sharply narrowing. Money disappears in relationships between enterprises. Food and industrial goods are distributed on ration cards - at fixed low prices or free of charge (in Soviet Russia at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921, even payments for housing, the use of electricity, fuel, telegraph, telephone, mail, the supply of medicines, consumer goods, etc. .d.). The state introduces universal labor conscription, and in some industries (for example, transport) martial law, so that all workers are considered mobilized. All this - general signs military communism, which, with one or another specific historical specificity, manifested themselves in all periods of this type known in history.

IN last years a number of authors argue that war communism in Russia was an attempt to accelerate the implementation of the Marxist doctrine of building socialism. If this is said sincerely, then we are faced with a regrettable inattention to the structure of an important general phenomenon of world history. The rhetoric of the political moment almost never correctly reflects the essence of the process. In Russia at that moment, by the way, the views of the so-called. The “maximalists,” who believed that war communism would become a springboard into socialism, were not at all dominant among the Bolsheviks. A serious analysis of the entire problem of war communism in connection with capitalism and socialism is given in the book of the prominent theoretician of the RSDLP (b) A.A. Bogdanov "Questions of Socialism", published in 1918. He shows that war communism is a consequence of the regression of the productive forces and the social organism. In peacetime, it is represented in the army as a vast authoritarian consumer commune. However, during great war consumer communism is spreading from the army to the whole society. A.A. Bogdanov gives precisely a structural analysis of the phenomenon, taking as an object not even Russia, but a purer case - Germany.

An important point follows from this analysis: the structure of war communism, having arisen in emergency conditions, does not disintegrate by itself after the disappearance of the conditions that gave rise to it (the end of the war). Exiting war communism is a special and difficult task. In Russia, as A.A. wrote. Bogdanov, solving it will be especially difficult, since the Soviets of Soldiers’ Deputies, imbued with the thinking of war communism, play a very important role in the state system. After the end of the war, numerous protests by workers and peasants against the policy of “War Communism” showed its complete collapse; in 1921, a new economic policy was introduced.

The components of "war communism" were:

In the economy - the liquidation of private property and the curtailment of commodity-money relations, complete nationalization, nationalization of industry, and the introduction of surplus appropriation in the countryside.

In the social sphere - the dominance of the state distribution system, equalization of wages, the introduction of universal labor conscription.

In the sphere of politics - the establishment of a regime of one-party Bolshevik dictatorship, terror against real and potential opponents of Soviet power, command-administrative methods of management.

In ideology - cultivating faith in the bright future of humanity, inciting class hatred towards the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat, establishing the idea of self-sacrifice and mass heroism.

In the cultural and spiritual-moral sphere - opposition to bourgeois individualism of collectivism, the Christian faith - an atheistic understanding of natural history, propaganda of the need to destroy bourgeois culture and create a new, proletarian one.

In the field of trade and distribution, the period of “war communism” was characterized by several unique features: the introduction of the card system, the abolition of commodity-money relations, the prohibition of free trade, naturalization wages. In addition to rations in 1919-1920. Utilities, passenger and freight transport were free. 6 million children were fed free of charge. The distribution of food and industrial goods was organized through a system of consumer cooperation.

Naturalization of the economy and centralization of management entailed a corresponding organization of the labor force . Its essence was the rejection of the labor market and “capitalist methods of hiring and regulating it.” In 1919-1920 A system of labor mobilization developed, enshrined in the decree on universal labor service, explained not only as a necessity dictated by the war, but also as the establishment of the principle “He who does not work, neither shall he eat.”

The basis of universal labor conscription was the mandatory involvement of the urban population in various jobs and the militarization of labor, i.e. attaching workers and employees to enterprises. A number of military formations in 1920 was temporarily transferred to a labor position - the so-called labor army.

Held March 29 - April 5, 1920. The IX Congress of the RCP (b) outlined a plan for economic restoration and creation of the foundations of a socialist society in accordance with the principles of “war communism”, excluding market, commodity-money relations. The main emphasis in solving economic problems was placed on non-economic coercion.

Decisions of the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920. introduced a state sowing plan and established sowing committees, which meant a decisive move towards state regulation of agricultural production. But after the end of the civil war, the policy of “war communism” came into conflict with the interests of the peasantry, and by the spring of 1921. actually led to an acute economic and political crisis.

As soon as the main fighting, the peasantry rose up against surplus appropriation, which did not stimulate the interests of the peasantry in the development of agriculture. This discontent was intensified by economic ruin. The policy of "war communism" had exhausted itself and led to increased social tension in the village. Having analyzed the situation in the country, the X Congress of the RCP (b) (March 1921) decided to immediately replace the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind - a key link in the new economic policy.

The policy of “war communism” was assessed ambiguously by the Bolsheviks themselves. Some considered "war communism" logical development policies of the previous period, the main method of establishing socialist principles. To others, this policy seemed erroneous, reckless, and did not meet the economic tasks of the proletariat. In their opinion, “war communism” was not progress along the road to socialism and was only a forced action in the emergency circumstances of the civil war.

Summing up the controversy, V.I. Lenin in April 1921 wrote: “War communism” was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is the exchange of grain for industrial products needed by the peasantry." Thus, "war communism" became a certain stage in the history of the new socialist society in extreme conditions foreign intervention and civil war.

Can the policy of “war communism” be called effective? Without a doubt. In the conditions of the crisis of market relations, the civil war, the RCP (b) managed to create such economic model, which made it possible to use all the country’s available resources to achieve victory.

"War Communism"

Economic situation of the country in 1917-1920. was extremely difficult. This was aggravated by the fact that neither Lenin nor the party had any developed economic concept of socialism. By October 1917, the Bolsheviks had the most general ideas about the economics of socialism, stemming from the works of Marx and Engels.

In traditional Soviet historiography, the activities of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War are usually called the policy of “war communism.” The origins of this policy lay in the Bolsheviks' declaration of a grain monopoly. The grain monopoly itself - restricting the grain market and obligatory delivery of it to the state according to allocation, leaving the peasant a minimum for feeding and sowing - was not an invention of the Bolsheviks. The Tsarist government in the fall of 1916 and the Provisional Government in March 1917 made decisions on a grain monopoly that were unpopular among the peasants, citing wartime difficulties. However, the Bolsheviks most consistently pursued the policy of “forced economy” in all spheres of production, in the rationing and distribution of raw materials, goods and products (rations, ration cards) with universal labor conscription and the prohibition of free trade in 1918-1920.

The contradictory situation in the economy, when in parallel with free trade there was a forced confiscation of products from peasants, did not last long. Observing the collapse in the economy, Lenin in the spring of 1918 finally chose the path of state capitalism, and demanded that the main blow be struck not at big capital, but at small owners. For him it was a way of fighting net capital, private property and free trade.

In May-June 1918, a series of decrees were adopted that marked the beginning of a food dictatorship, which went beyond the scope of food legislation and determined the course of further events in the construction of a comprehensive system of war communism. In June 1918, committees of the poor appeared. The center, building its relations with the village in a new way, artificially incited social struggle in the village. Carrying out the predatory surplus appropriation policy with the help of food detachments, creating lawlessness and tyranny in the countryside, was entrusted to the poor committees. The resistance of the mass of peasants to this policy strengthened the position of the counter-revolution. The Bolsheviks deliberately created vertical political structures that were closed to the committees. The policy, aimed at inciting a social war in the countryside, forced the peasants to rush between the Reds and the Whites, drawing them into a struggle for power that was alien to the peasants.

Having transferred the center of gravity of the class struggle in May-June 1918 to the countryside, the Bolsheviks consistently built the building of war communism. On June 28, 1918, a decree was issued on the nationalization of all large and medium-sized industries. However, the revolutionary impulse of the Bolsheviks to establish state capitalism in the country met with massive resistance. The “armed campaign” to the village failed - in 1918 they managed to collect only 30 million pounds of grain. Worker dissatisfaction grew; due to the deterioration in supplies to cities, frequent strikes and anti-communist protests occurred. The emergence of spontaneous “black markets” spoke of the economic failure of the Bolshevik policy, and terror and mobilization spoke of its anti-people nature.

On January 11, 1919, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars introduced the allocation of grain and fodder. According to this decision, peasants were obliged to hand over to the state all surplus grain and fodder crops. The surplus appropriation system allowed the Soviet government to concentrate the main food resources of the country in its hands and deal a serious blow to the wealthy peasantry, for it was carried out according to the class principle: “from the poor peasants - nothing, from the middle peasants - moderately, from the rich peasants - a lot.”

The meaning of this essentially predatory policy was that the peasants had to supply the city and the Red Army with bread and fodder for free, and the Soviet government ensured the protection of rural workers from the restoration of pre-revolutionary orders in the countryside.

It was not only the village that became victims of this policy. Private trade was prohibited everywhere. All private shops and trading establishments were nationalized in November 1918. The Soviet state took the food supply of the Red Army, the working class and the urban population directly into its own hands and introduced a rationing system, thereby making the urban population directly dependent on the Bolshevik regime. The size of food rations was determined on a class basis. The advantage in supplies was given to soldiers of the Red Army, workers in the defense industry and then workers employed in all other areas of material production. Only children received the same rations, regardless of the class affiliation of their parents. However, even the largest rations did not exceed 300-400 grams of bread per day.

Universal labor conscription was introduced and the principle “he who does not work, neither shall he eat” was consistently implemented. All citizens between the ages of 16 and 50 were required to participate in so-called socially useful labor. Former “exploiting elements” were widely involved in clearing snow drifts from railway tracks, collecting firewood, loading and unloading wagons, barges, etc. Those who avoided labor were deprived of food rations.

In the spring of 1919, the Communists were forced to soften their policy towards the peasantry, which was reflected in the cessation of “armed campaigns” into the countryside and the dissolution of the Poor Committees. The VIII Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1919, making concessions to the peasantry, proclaimed an alliance with the middle peasants.

The policy of “war communism” led to the fact that the national economy was turned into one huge factory controlled by government authority. As a result, industrial enterprises have become government agencies, which, ignoring economic laws, became completely controlled by party structures. All this eliminated the personal interest of workers and employees in increasing labor productivity. Wages were replaced by rations, the size of which was determined not by the intensity and qualifications of the worker’s work, but by the size of his family. Twenty million peasant farms could not be nationalized, but all the products of their labor were nationalized.

According to the new political course of the Soviet leadership, all heavy industry, the main sectors light industry and transport were militarized. Enterprises began to work mainly to supply the Red Army with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and food. Transport was therefore loaded with military supplies. Strict centralization of management of all spheres of life was introduced. Procurement, distribution of raw materials and fuel, organization of production and distribution of finished products - everything was concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Economic Council. Each branch of industry was controlled by a special central board. Extraordinary commissioners were appointed to particularly important enterprises.

Researchers suggest that the introduction of the policy of “war communism” was dictated not only by the conditions of the civil war, but also by the attempt of Lenin and his circle to realize a utopia according to Marx in Russia, with all the ensuing negative consequences.

The ceased exchange of goods between city and countryside led to the destruction of the entire economic system. Famine broke out, claiming more than 5 million lives. Instead of looking for a way out of the crisis, Lenin strengthens the policy of war communism: money is abolished, food rations are introduced, payments for housing, medical care, fuel, telephone, and telegraph are canceled. The beginning of the nationalization of small enterprises accelerated the outcome. At the beginning of 1921, the country was struck by a deep economic crisis. Railway transport stopped, firewood collection was disrupted, pogroms and riots began. Peasant uprisings in Western Siberia, the Tambov region, the Volga region and, finally, the uprising in Kronstadt somewhat cooled Lenin’s ardor. The looming threat of losing power forced Lenin to switch to a new economic policy.

A stable concept of economic policy in the first decade of Soviet power has emerged in Soviet historical literature. Only certain details changed due to changes in the political situation. The starting point was the inviolability and comprehensive significance of Lenin’s plan for building socialism, which the party carried out consistently and steadily. “War communism” was viewed as a temporary retreat from Lenin’s plan, forced during the civil war, and the new economic policy was the only true path to building socialism that applies to all countries. By implementing Lenin's ideas, the party had built a basically socialist society by the mid-1930s. The political history of the 20s was interpreted as the party’s struggle against anti-Leninist groups for the implementation of Lenin’s ideas. Within this concept, which is obligatory for every historian, valuable research has been carried out Scientific research on certain problems of the country's economic and social development in the 1920s. The contribution of historians of Siberia and other regions is significant in this regard.

In recent years, research topics have become more diverse, and many “blank spots” in the history of the 1920s have opened up. The problems of NEP are of interest to modern historians and publicists as a concrete experience of a market economy under the Soviet system and the history of the formation of a totalitarian society. A complete and correct understanding of the events of the 20s, the rise and fall of the market economy, and political discussions around the NEP is impossible without understanding the previous stage, which is known as “war communism.”

21.1. Economic policy of the Bolsheviks during the civil war. The essence of "war communism"

Having come to power, the Bolsheviks received an economy deformed during the World War. Inflation and food shortages grew, normal railway traffic was disrupted, and many enterprises stopped due to a lack of raw materials and other reasons.

The Bolsheviks did not have a clear plan to combat the collapse National economy, economic recovery. The economic program, published on the eve of October 1917, provided for a radical disruption of the existing economic system - the nationalization of land, banks, the main sectors of the national economy, and the establishment of workers' control over production and consumption. After October 1917 Russia became the object of a utopian experiment in the accelerated construction of a socialist society, called “war communism.”

The implementation of this plan began immediately after October 1917. without taking into account the development of the civil war. By decisions of the central and local authorities, the nationalization of many enterprises, railway and water transport, and banks began.

By the end of the spring of 1918, there were 512 factories and factories under state control. The legislative introduction of workers' control paralyzed the normal production activities of the remaining private enterprises. In December 1917, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was formed, which was intended to exercise centralized management of the entire economy. The Bolsheviks failed to stop the collapse of the economy and famine, which worsened after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the occupation of the most important industrial and agricultural areas by Germany. In the spring of 1918, the proposals of V.I. were discussed. Lenin about some weakening of the so-called “Red Guard attack on capital” in order to focus on the organization of production and management. At the center of this plan are state accounting and control, the attraction of bourgeois specialists, the fight against petty-bourgeois elements, the establishment of labor discipline, and the creation of joint private-state enterprises with a predominance of state capital. The latter failed, and the nationalization of industry took on a systematic and general character.

At the end of 1918, a decree was issued on the nationalization of all large and medium-sized industries. In August, 9,744 nationalized enterprises with 1,175 thousand employees were already registered. In the fall of 1920, nationalization extended to small handicraft establishments using hired labor. Handicraftsmen who did not use hired labor had to unite into artels and submit to the centralized leadership of the Supreme Economic Council. The foundations of entrepreneurship and market relations in industry were undermined. In the spring of 1918, a broad offensive against small-peasant farming began. At the end of May, decrees were issued giving emergency powers to the People's Commissariat of Food. The peasants were ordered to hand over all surplus food within three weeks. The bread concealers were declared enemies of the people and were subject to trial by a revolutionary tribunal.

To influence the peasants, food brigades began to be formed from workers in industrial centers. Summer 1918 The food army moved to the grain-rich provinces of the Black Earth center and the Volga region. Part of the confiscated food was distributed locally among poor peasants.

The activities of village and volost councils elected by the entire population were suspended. Instead, committees of the poor were created from village communists, urban workers, and Red Army soldiers demobilized for this purpose. the main task Kombedov - confiscation of bread from wealthier peasants, the so-called kulaks, redistribution of land and equipment in favor of the poor. The word “kulak” became commonplace to designate the more successful and working peasant and anyone who was not pleasing to the local authorities.

The massive resistance of the peasants forced the liquidation of the poor committees at the end of 1918 and the restoration of elected Soviets in the villages. But the policy of confiscating surplus food continued even more consistently. In January 1919, an allocation for the procurement of bread, and then other food products, was approved. The People's Commissariat of Food established a firm procurement plan, which was distributed among the provinces, districts, and volosts. Each territorial unit had to fulfill at all costs established by the center allocation plan regardless of the presence or absence of surplus. Responsible for the implementation of the allocation were the rural society and local Soviets. Essentially, the rural community and mutual responsibility were restored. The requisitioning made it possible to increase procurement. In the 1918/1919 agricultural year (the agricultural year began on October 1), 108 million poods of grain were harvested, in 1919/1920 - 212.5 million, and in 1920/1921 - 283.3 million poods. The growth occurred mainly due to new territories liberated from the white armies. The main burden of food requisitions fell on the central grain-producing provinces. The accumulated reserves in case of crop failure and natural disasters, as well as seed grain, were confiscated from the peasants. Dairy cattle and young animals were seized for meat allocation. Thus, the economic foundations for the normal functioning of peasant farming were undermined.

The establishment of complete state control over the entire economy led to the elimination of the labor market, free hiring and dismissal of workers. Adopted in 1918, the Labor Code established compulsory labor service for the “non-working classes”, which were used in the most difficult physical work: digging trenches, clearing snow, loading and unloading on railways and water transport. Labor conscription soon extended to industrial workers. By decision of the IX Congress of the RCP(b) (April 1920), labor armies with military organization and military discipline began to be created. The RCP(b) program, adopted in 1919, considered forced labor and the right of the state to dispose of labor as the most important component of a socialist planned economy and social rationing of labor. Freedom of labor was declared a relic of the exploitative system.

The role of public organizations in regulation was reduced to nothing labor relations. The factory committees created by workers in the spring of 1917 were gradually liquidated. Trade unions have become an appendage of the state to enforce labor discipline, conduct labor mobilizations, and punish careless workers. The central and local trade union bodies were under the tireless control of the party.

In 1918-1919 the existing trading system was completely eliminated and replaced by government distribution. A cumbersome bureaucracy and a complex system for distributing rations along class lines were created. The entire population of cities was divided into more than 20 supply categories. Beyond all categories was the party and state elite who received the Kremlin rations.

Despite all the prohibitions, the illegal “black” market continued to exist. Hundreds of thousands of people went to villages to exchange household items for bread. This mass phenomenon was designated by the specific term “bagging”. Government authorities were forced to allow 1-1.5 pounds of food to be transported by rail. Without this additional supply, the majority of the population could not survive.

The liquidation of money was carried out just as steadily. The first steps towards this were the nationalization of banks at the end of 1917, the removal of jewelry from personal safes, and the restriction and control of the state over the issuance of money to depositors. The word “money” fell out of use and was replaced by the term “Soviet signs” (sovznaki), printed on gray paper in ordinary printing houses. Payments for food rations, apartments, and public transport were abolished. A decree was being prepared to completely abolish money.

Thus, the Bolsheviks in a short time created a gigantic state economy that united all spheres of economic activity and material support for all members of society. The usual incentives for economic progress - property, entrepreneurship, competitiveness and competition, material interest - have ceased to work. They were replaced by state coercion, brutal violence, and incompetent command of government officials. In socio-psychological terms, it was an attack against a person, his individuality, inclinations, tastes, habits, and abilities. The human individual dissolved into the social group to which he belonged. The feeling of egalitarianism, universal equality in a half-starved existence, the fatal dependence of each person on the state and its institutions were introduced into the consciousness of millions of people. Hard work, skill, talent and knowledge as a guarantee of personal well-being have ceased to exist.

21.2. The crisis of “war communism” and the transition to a new economic policy

The policy of “war communism” brought the country’s national economy to complete collapse. In 1920, the volume of industrial production decreased by 8 times compared to 1913, and the smelting of iron and steel decreased to 2.5-3%. Annual sugar production decreased to 2.3 pounds per person against 20 pounds in 1913, and manufacturing - to 1 arshin against 25 in 1913. Labor productivity decreased by more than 5 times. Due to the lack of fuel, worn-out rolling stock, and poor condition, the work of the railways was paralyzed. At the beginning of 1921, due to the lack of raw materials and fuel, 200 large enterprises in Petrograd stopped operating. Of the more than 200 tanneries in the Yenisei province, 34 were operating at partial capacity.

Agriculture was experiencing a severe crisis. Cultivated areas throughout the country decreased in 1913-1920. by more than "/z. In the main grain-producing regions, the reduction was even greater. The main reason for the reduction in crops was the forced confiscation of surpluses and the lack of a market. First of all, the production of the main market crops - spring wheat and oats - decreased. Buckwheat crops increased enormously, which in 1920 in the Central Black Earth provinces occupied a quarter of the sown area. In the Pskov province, the area under the main cash crop - flax - decreased by 10 times. The area under sugar beets decreased by 3.5 times, and under cotton - by 7 times.

Due to poor cultivation of the land, deterioration of seed material, and lack of fertilizers, productivity decreased. In 1920, the gross grain harvest was 2 times less than the annual average for 1909-1913. The crop failure of 1921 became a real disaster in this situation, claiming the lives of another 5 million people. Dry statistical figures have preserved for us a terrible picture of population extinction. In 1920, in Moscow there were 46.6 deaths per thousand inhabitants compared to 21.1 in 1913, in Petrograd 72.6 and 21.4, respectively. The highest mortality rate was among men of working age. The most active part of the population, on which the future of the country depended, was dying out. To this should be added more than 2 million emigrants, among whom were the greatest scientists, writers, composers, and the flower of the Russian intelligentsia. The losses of the country's gene pool were irreparable and affected further development its intellectual potential and culture.

However, the most dangerous thing for the Bolsheviks was the political crisis - the threat to power. Already in the summer of 1920, the authorities were faced with a massive peasant movement. In the autumn and spring of 1921, it intensified and covered the largest regions of the country - the Central Black Earth provinces (Antonovshchina), the Volga region, the North Caucasus, and the Don. One of the largest was the movement of peasants in Western Siberia. The uprising covered a vast territory from Petropavlovsk to Tobolsk, from Omsk to Kurgan and Tyumen. The rebels captured Petropavlovsk and Tobolsk, cut the Siberian Railway, along which Siberian grain was delivered to the center of the country. In January - February, mass strikes of workers began in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities. The pinnacle of the anti-Bolshevik movement was the performance of the Kronstadt sailors, which began on March 1, 1921. The country's main naval base was in the hands of the rebels. The opponents of the Bolshevik regime were the sailors of Kronstadt, who played a major role in October 1917 and fought on the most important fronts of the civil war.

The unification of anti-Bolshevik movements would be disastrous for the Soviet regime. Despite the fragmentation and social heterogeneity, the lack of a developed political program, there were visible common reasons discontent, general demands of the rebels: abolish food surplus and restore freedom of trade, small production, eliminate the arbitrariness of the Cheka, restore free elections of the Soviets with the participation of all parties by universal and secret ballot, restore freedom of speech, press, assembly, convene the Constituent Assembly.

The Soviet authorities used the most brutal measures to suppress the uprisings. But for the party leaders and many ordinary communists it was clear that it was impossible to suppress the popular movement through military measures alone. The threat of complete economic collapse and loss of power caused hesitation and uncertainty. The leading party bodies received letters from many local workers with a proposal to change food policy. Only in the spring of 1921, when the crisis became general and the threat of losing power was real, V.I. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership decided to change economic policy.

The resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) “On replacing surplus appropriation with a food tax” was adopted based on the report of V.I. Lenin on March 16, 1921 at the last meeting of the congress, when some of the delegates were already leaving. There was almost no debate on this issue. V.I.’s clear, sobering words had an effect. Lenin: “Basically the situation is this: we must economically satisfy the middle peasantry and go for freedom of turnover, otherwise it is impossible to maintain power in Russia while the international revolution is slowing down, it is economically impossible.”

The resolution of the 10th Congress of the PKK(b) announced the abolition of food appropriation and its replacement by a firmly established tax in kind, which should be less than the appropriation. The amount of the tax is established and announced to the peasants before the start of spring sowing. The tax, in contrast to the appropriation, was established for each peasant farm. The peasant received the right to dispose of the surplus remaining after payment within the limits of “local turnover.”

The initial goal of this decision was to calm the peasantry and worried workers, stop the catastrophic decline in agricultural production, and strengthen the shaky government.

At first, the Bolshevik leaders still hoped to limit themselves to minimal concessions to the peasantry. It was supposed, without restoring the free market, to sell the surpluses remaining with the peasants after paying the tax through cooperation, in exchange for industrial goods at the equivalent established by the state. It was planned to collect 240 million poods from the tax and approximately 160 million poods to receive through barter. But this attempt was unsuccessful. By the autumn of 1921, a little more than 5 million poods of bread had been prepared in this way. The spontaneous market developed very quickly. In October 1921 V.I. Lenin publicly admitted that the private market was stronger than the Bolsheviks. The restoration of private trade and market relations became inevitable.

In the summer of 1921, a decree was adopted allowing every citizen over 16 years of age to obtain a license to trade in public places, markets and bazaars. At the beginning of the NEP, three types of trading establishments emerged - state, cooperative and private. Already at the end of 1921, more than 80% of retail trade was accounted for by private traders. Of the 2,874 trading establishments registered at the end of 1921 in the Novonikolaevsk province, only 85 were state-owned. In wholesale trade turnover, the public sector was predominant. Its share accounted for 77%, private - 14, cooperative - 9%. The normal functioning of the peasant market was impossible without the free development of small industry. In the summer of 1921, the nationalization of small industry was suspended. Nationalized small enterprises were returned to their owners. It was also allowed for private individuals to open small industrial establishments without a mechanical engine with up to 20 workers and with a mechanical engine - 10 people. Small state-owned enterprises were allowed to be rented out to private owners.

There are different opinions about the essence of NEP. Most foreign historians see the transition to the new economic policy as a successful maneuver by V.I. Lenin in order to retain power, as well as an example of the coexistence of a market and planned economy. The NEP experience confirms the advantages of a market economy and the possibility of such coexistence. However, the NEP revealed a fundamental contradiction between the ideology of the party, its program for building socialism and real economic reality, the strengthening of the position of market capitalist relations. The multi-structured economy of the NEP was also not compatible with a one-party totalitarian political system.

In the official party ideology, the NEP was viewed as a temporary retreat, a change in tactics to achieve the main goal - building socialism. It was not possible to build socialism at an accelerated pace, without intermediate steps. Therefore, this problem had to be solved at a slower pace, approaching it in roundabout ways.

IN AND. Lenin viewed the NEP as a retreat, but not from the idea of socialism, but in the method and approaches to its construction. Retreat for what? For the sake of strengthening the political and social base of the existing government, satisfying the peasantry, creating an incentive for the development of the peasant economy. How long did the Bolsheviks have to continue this retreat? The resolution of the Xth Party Conference (May 1921) stated that the NEP was designed for a number of years. IN AND. Lenin repeatedly repeated “seriously and for a long time.” But these concepts themselves emphasized that this was a temporary policy, albeit a long-term one. The first successes of the private sector caused alarm, and already in March 1922 at the XI Congress of the RCP (b) V.I. Lenin called for stopping the retreat, developing state industry and trade, and going on the offensive against private capital. For now, the offensive was supposed to be carried out only by economic methods. The main slogans were:

learn to trade, learn to manage. This was not the end of the NEP, but only a warning. Allowing for the development of market relations and private capital in small industry and trade, V.I. Lenin explained that large-scale industry, transport, and finance are in the hands of the state. Using unlimited political power, the party has the ability to regulate and limit private business activities, and, if necessary, completely eliminate the private sector in the economy. In relation to private capital, a three-term formula was applied: admission, restriction, crowding out. Which part of this formula to apply at a given moment was decided by the party and the state, based on political considerations.

21.3. NEP economy. Successes and controversies

The famine of 1921-1922 became an immeasurably difficult test for the country. The state was unable to cope with the enormous disaster on its own. For the first time in the history of Russia, the government asked for foreign help and was forced to accept the conditions of foreign charitable organizations and provide them with the necessary conditions to distribute aid to the hungry. During the year, about 50 million pounds of food, clothing and medicine were imported from abroad, 83% of this amount came from the American Relief Administration (ARA). During the worst period of the famine, in the spring and summer of 1922, foreign charitable organizations fed more than 12 million people. More than 40 million poods of food were imported, 10 million poods were collected in the form of charitable assistance among the population of the country. Millions of people were saved from starvation.

The famine aggravated the already difficult situation of the country. It was not possible to fully collect the planned amount of tax in kind. Across the RSFSR, 130 million poods were collected, of which more than 35 million poods (27%) were donated by Siberian peasants. When collecting taxes in more productive provinces, coercive measures were used. In many areas, including Siberia, crop reduction continued. But at the same time, the first positive changes in agriculture emerged. The peasant developed an interest in farming. In 1922, the average harvest was harvested, which basically satisfied the country's needs, the market was filled with food products, and chronic hunger was overcome.

In the first half of the 1920s, flexible policies were pursued that contributed to the rise of agriculture. In 1922, the tax system was improved. Instead of many taxes, a single tax in kind was introduced, which could be paid in any product. In 1924, the tax in kind was replaced by a cash agricultural tax. The Land Code adopted in 1922 confirmed the inviolability of the nationalization of land, but established freedom to choose the form of land use - community, individual farm. Free exit from the community was allowed, land rental and the hiring of labor in agriculture were legalized. At the same time, the amount of agricultural tax and prices for agricultural implements and machinery were reduced. Agronomic assistance was expanded. All-Russian and local agricultural exhibitions were opened to introduce advanced methods. Official party propaganda proclaimed the slogan “Facing the Village.” The diligent peasant was declared the main support of the party in the village.

The peasant's interest in expanding his farm became the main factor in the rapid and steady rise of agricultural production. For 1922-1923 grain production increased by 33%, livestock products - by 34%, and

sugar beets - almost 5 times. About 3 million poods of bread were exported abroad. By 1925, the area under cultivation had almost reached pre-war levels. The number of livestock increased by 34.2% compared to 1913, and in Asian Russia - almost 2 times. During the first five years of NEP, yields increased by 17% compared to the average harvest in 1901-1910. In 1925, the multi-field farming system spread to 25 million dessiatinas compared to 2 million dessiatinas before the revolution. Autumn plowing was carried out on 1/3 of the sown area for grain, and early fallow was used on 1/4 of the winter wedge. In 1923, agricultural machinery was sold for 18 million rubles, and in next year- by 33 million rubles. The beneficial influence of the market economy very quickly affected the development of industry. The denationalization of industry affected mainly small enterprises producing consumer goods. According to the industrial census of 1923, there were 1,650 thousand industrial establishments in the country. Of these, 88.5% were private or rented, 8.5% were state-owned, and 3% were cooperative. But state enterprises employed 84.5% of all workers and produced 92.4% of all industrial products. The decisive branches of industry, all large enterprises, railways, land and its subsoil remained in the hands of the state.

However, under market pressure, management methods in state industry also changed. Already in the autumn of 1921, large state enterprises began to be transferred to commercial or economic accounting. At the same time, decentralization of management was carried out. The most common form was the formation of self-supporting trusts. One of the first to be formed was the flax trust, which united 17 large enterprises of the flax processing and textile industry. By August 1922, 421 trusts were functioning, of which 50 were in the textile industry, and the same number in the metallurgical and food industries. The largest were the State Association of Metallurgical Plants (GOMZA) and Yugostal. The trusts transferred part of the profits to the state, and used the rest at their own discretion.

In February 1922, labor conscription was officially abolished, the labor market was restored, and differentiated monetary wages were established. People's interest in the results of labor increased and its productivity grew, and the swollen staff of enterprises was reduced. The number of workers and employees on the railways decreased from 1240 thousand to 720 thousand people, and the flow of goods increased. In the textile industry, the number of workers and employees per 1000 spindles decreased from 30 to 14 (before the revolution it was 10.5). The consequence of this was the emergence of a reserve army of labor and an increase in the number of unemployed.

The most important achievement of the new course of economic policy was financial reform and the restoration of the pre-war exchange rate of the ruble. The initiator and conductor of the improvement of the monetary system was the People's Commissar of Finance G.Ya. Sokolnikov, who attracted the greatest specialists to the work - Professor Yurovsky, former comrade of the Minister of Finance in the government S.Yu. Witte, N.N. Kutlera et al.

The reform began with the restoration of financial institutions liquidated during the period of “war communism”: banks and savings banks. Since 1922, the state budget began to be compiled again, which was calculated in pre-war gold rubles. The tax system was restored. Gradually, three main types of taxes were established: single tax in kind, and since 1924, an agricultural tax on peasants; trade tax, paid by traders and owners of industrial establishments; income tax from salary paid by all employees. The system of indirect taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco, mineral water and other consumer goods.

In April 1922, the denomination of banknotes began. Simultaneously and in parallel with paper notes, a full-fledged currency unit was put into circulation - the chervonets, backed by gold and commodity reserves. In 1923, the next stage of denomination was carried out: 100 rubles. issue of 1922 were exchanged for 1 ruble. new sample. In this way, the amount of paper money in circulation was reduced a million times. In the spring of 1924, all old banknotes were withdrawn from circulation and replaced by state treasury notes. The main unit was the chervonets (10 rubles). The new Soviet money received international recognition. The English pound sterling was exchanged for 8 rubles. 34 kopecks, US dollar - by 1 rub. 94 kopecks, the Italian lira cost 8 kopecks.

The worst consequences of the devastation were behind us. For 1921-1928 The growth rate of industrial production averaged 28%. National income increased by 18% per year. Such a rapid rate of growth occurred mainly due to small and light industry and the launch of inactive enterprises. Large industry needed new capital investments to update the technical base, develop the energy and raw materials industries, highly qualified personnel, and sales markets. At the end of the 1920s, the total volume of capital investments was higher than in the pre-war years, but the volume of construction work, especially in housing and communal construction, did not reach the pre-war level.

The successes of the market economy have affected the lifestyle and well-being of the majority of the population. The market was filled with all kinds of goods that could be bought at affordable prices. From 1923 to 1926, per capita meat consumption increased 2.5 times, dairy products - 2 times. In 1927, per capita meat consumption was 39-43 kg per year in rural areas and 60 kg in cities; in Moscow - 73 kg, in Irkutsk - 90 kg. Became a wide choice and affordable prices for industrial consumer goods. The successes of the restoration processes clearly demonstrated the advantages of a market economy. But at the same time, the difficulties and contradictions of the new economic policy appeared. First of all, this is the contradiction between the state, planned economy and the private sector, which was gaining strength. Most large state-owned enterprises were unprofitable. Their inability to adapt to the market, their cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus, and administrative-command methods of management had an effect. VSNKh tried to find a way out of this by arbitrarily raising prices for industrial goods, while market prices for bread were declining due to its excess on the market. In the fall of 1923, the so-called “scissors” of prices arose. Peasants were unable to buy industrial goods. A crisis of overproduction arose. Warehouses were filled with goods that could not be sold. However, soon, according to the laws of a market economy, administratively increased prices for industrial products were brought into line with supply and demand. The crisis was overcome.

The next crisis arose in the autumn and winter of 1925. The reason for it was the policy of accelerated development of heavy industry (metallurgy, fuel industry, mechanical engineering). This required large capital investments. The three-year plan for the development of the metal industry, adopted in the spring of 1925, required allocations of 350 million rubles. It was supposed to find these funds through agriculture. Fixed and directive prices were established for bread, lower than those prevailing on the market by that time. Peasants boycotted state procurement organizations, sold grain to private buyers who paid more, or held back their surpluses in anticipation of better conditions. The failure of the grain procurement plan again forced the government to take into account the laws of the market, abolish guideline prices, and increase the supply of industrial goods.

The third crisis of the NEP economy in the winter and spring of 1928 was caused by the same reasons. But a way out of the crisis situation with state grain procurements was found in a different way - by eliminating the NEP and returning to the old methods of forcibly confiscating surpluses and artificially exacerbating the class struggle in the countryside. Farms that had surpluses were subject to extraordinary taxes, markets were closed, and intense agitation against the kulaks began in the press. But as a result, there was a further decline in supplies. In 1928, a card distribution system was introduced in Moscow and Leningrad, and then in other cities.

The New Economic Policy quickly ended the appearance of social equality. Social stratification and the contradictions associated with it became characteristic. Under the NEP, the standard of living of all segments of the population increased. But the level of material well-being did not depend on the state distribution system, but on the personal qualities of a person - his attitude to work, qualifications, talent, and entrepreneurship.

In the village, a layer of diligent peasants stood out and was gaining strength. Adapting to the market, they developed their economy. At the other pole, a layer of rural poor continued to exist. It was heterogeneous in its composition. After the division of the landowners' lands, it was no longer possible to assume that poverty in the countryside existed due to a lack of land. Most of them were otkhodniks who returned from the cities to get land. But they had already lost interest in peasant labor. This included demobilized Red Army soldiers who found themselves surplus labor on their farms. They usually formed the backbone of rural party organizations and the leadership of local councils. There were large families left without workers, farms that went bankrupt as a result of crop failures and natural disasters. This also included various losers, quitters, drunkards, village lumpen, “grandfathers of Shchukari.” Under “war communism,” they lived off state assistance and the redistribution of food taken from the wealthy part of the village. This rather numerous village stratum looked with envy at their successful neighbors, dreamed of a return to the old order, and waited in the wings to deal with their fists. Anti-kulak agitation found favorable soil among them. Using their influence in local Soviets, they discriminated against successful owners, enrolled them in kulaks, deprived them voting rights, expelled their children from schools, etc.

A new social stratum appeared in the city - the Nepmen. It included private traders, tenants, owners of small industrial establishments, and more prosperous artisans. This was the new Soviet bourgeoisie, resourceful and energetic people. Many of them got rich quickly. But the bulk consisted of owners of small shops selling in the markets by hand and peddling. Nepmen included cab drivers who earned their bread through hard work.

Already in the first half of the 20s, measures to limit and oust the Nepmen became predominant. For this purpose, tax policy was used, as well as methods of political pressure.

Employees of Soviet institutions became a unique social stratum. A certain part of them were old officials who returned to their homes. And mostly these were former professional revolutionaries, participants in the civil war, and workers who had advanced to leadership positions. Most of them were incompetent and had low level education. The lack of knowledge and experience was compensated by the power and ability to command in their hands. Civil service provided high wages and many privileges - improved apartments, personal cars and horse riding trips, trips to resorts, etc. A high level of corruption was characteristic. Nepmen bribed high-ranking Soviet officials in order to achieve tax cuts, obtain lucrative loans, enter into a commercial deal with a state enterprise, and enroll their children in schools and universities.

The position of the scientific and technical intelligentsia, whose representatives were officially called bourgeois specialists, was special. The government could not manage without them. But a hostile environment, mistrust, and bullying were created around them. In terms of their political status, they were equal to the Nepmen. Old professors were expelled from universities. There were constant purges of students. Specialists were blamed for accidents and production problems. At the end of the 20s they were organized trials and extrajudicial killings of major scientists and specialists in the field of technical and human sciences.

The transition to the New Economic Policy led to a change in the social appearance of the working class. A gap appeared in the living standards of skilled workers and unskilled workers. Growing unemployment had a hard impact on the situation of young people, who did not yet have qualifications and found themselves superfluous in the labor market.

Economic and social contradictions have caused instability and tension in the life of society. Economic difficulties and the presence of social groups dissatisfied with the new economic policy, created objective conditions for its failure. But the main reason for the failure of the NEP was the contradiction between the multi-structure market economy and the existing one-party political system in the country, hostile to capitalism in general and private enterprise. As the market economy progressed, the party moved further and further away from the goal that seemed so close under the conditions of “war communism.” Therefore, the turn in economic policy at the end of the 20s did not meet with serious resistance and seemed a natural movement towards the cherished goal.

21.4. Political life of the country in the 20s. Economic liberalization and one-party dictatorship

The Bolshevik leaders agreed to the abolition of the surplus appropriation system in order to strengthen the shaky power. The unexpected successes of the market economy were fraught with new dangers. The mixed economy and social changes brought about by the NEP were not compatible with a one-party political and ideological dictatorship. It was possible to preserve the political regime unchanged only by strengthening and tightening party unity and discipline. Immediately after the introduction of NEP, arrests and persecution of Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and intelligentsia began. The offensive against dissidents within the party intensified.

In the summer of 1922, an open trial was held of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, accused of terror and counter-revolutionary activities. The largest revolutionary party, which made a significant contribution to common struggle against autocracy. And although provocations and perjury were used, the guilt of individual defendants and the leadership of the Socialist Revolutionary Party could not be proven. Nevertheless, they were sentenced to death. Execution of the sentence was postponed until the first appearance active actions Socialist Revolutionary organizations.

In the summer of 1922, on the instructions of V.I. Lenin, a number of scientific journals (“Economist”, “Agriculture and Forestry”, “Russia”), which retained an independent political position, were closed. The largest action to suppress dissent was the forcible expulsion from the country of a large group of leading scientists, philosophers, historians, and writers. Among those expelled were philosophers N.A. Berdyaev, S.N. Bulgakov, P.A. Sorokin, historian A.A. Kiesewetter, writer B. Zaitsev and others. The suppression of free thought was served by the Glavlit (special censorship committee) formed in 1922, designed to strictly control all printed products, not allowing any deviation from the ideas of Marxism and statements objectionable to the authorities.

The largest action was the attack on the church. The Church had enormous influence on millions of believers. In January 1918, a decree was issued on the separation of church and state and schools from church. The church lost the right to dispose of its buildings and property, which were transferred for temporary use to groups of believers. The teaching of religious disciplines was prohibited in educational institutions, monasteries were closed. All means of propaganda were used to combat religion. All religious denominations were persecuted. But the most sensitive blow was for Orthodox Church, which united the bulk of the population and had a centralized organization headed by Patriarch Tikhon (S.I. Belavin), elected in 1918. During the civil war, the confrontation between the church and the Soviet government reached its highest point. Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the atheistic power of the Bolsheviks and excommunicated the Communists from the church.

The next, pre-planned blow to the church was dealt in 1922. Under the pretext of fighting hunger, the forcible confiscation of religious objects and the persecution of the clergy began: 77 senior hierarchs of the Orthodox Church were sentenced to death. Patriarch Tikhon was also sentenced to death. But due to his advanced age, the sentence was not carried out. The patriarch was placed under house arrest and died in 1925. A small group of senior clergy broke with the patriarch and created the so-called “living church” obedient to the authorities.

At a difficult moment of change in economic policy, V.I. Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders were concerned about the tense situation in the party.

On the eve of the Tenth Congress, the party was rocked by a discussion about trade unions. At the center of the discussion were the proposals of the “Workers' Opposition” (A.G. Shlyapnikov, A.M. Kollontai, S.P. Medvedev, etc.), which advocated expanding the rights of trade unions and transferring the management of enterprises to democratically elected workers' committees subordinate to the trade unions. These demands did not affect the monopoly dominance of the party in the trade unions, but were supposed to strengthen their influence and independence.

The main opponent of the “Workers’ Opposition” turned out to be L.D. Trotsky, who opposed the democratization of the internal life of trade unions and the election of their governing bodies, demanded a further “tightening of the screws” of the iron discipline that was established during the Civil War.

At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), the views of the “Workers’ Opposition” were declared anti-Marxist and incompatible with remaining in the party, and a year later, at the XI Congress, its leaders were removed from the leading party bodies.

The presence of differences of opinion in the party itself prompted V.I. Lenin presented the resolution “On Party Unity” to the Tenth Congress, which was adopted without discussion. The resolution declared dissolved all groups that arose during the discussion about trade unions. Subsequently, the creation of groups and factions that contradicted the official ideology and criticized decisions made. The 1921 resolution was in force until the end of the existence of the CPSU and served as a justification for the suppression of dissent and reprisals against those who disagreed with the official course.

At the same time, the congress decided to purge the party, which lasted about 2 years. Of the 732 thousand members of the RCP (b) in the spring of 1921, by the spring of 1923, 386 thousand remained. About 40% of the party members and candidates left; Some of them left the party ranks voluntarily, due to disagreement with the new economic policy, or, on the contrary, having taken up their own farming, they considered it impossible for themselves to continue to remain in the party. The bulk of communists were expelled for passivity, bourgeoisism, preaching alien views, and having belonged to others in the past. political parties and so on. The main goal - to intimidate all dissenters and strengthen the unity of the party ranks - was only partially achieved.

On the basis of the NEP, some party functionaries became confident in the need to take some steps to change the political system and democratize it. The most consistent were the proposals of a party member since 1906, the Ural worker G. Myasnikov. IN AND. Lenin responded with sharp criticism of “butcherism.” G. Myasnikov was arrested, then reinstated in the party and sent to work at the Soviet embassy in Berlin, then he was arrested again and died in prison.

Other prominent party functionaries expressed the same ideas in a more restrained form. T. Sapronov proposed introducing non-party peasants into central and local government bodies. N. Osinsky" proposed weakening censorship in the press. The democratization program was broader political life country, proposed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin. He justified it by the need to strengthen the international authority of the Soviet government and create conditions for receiving foreign assistance. IN AND. Lenin gave a sharp rebuke to such an initiative. The matter did not come to the discussion of these proposals.

The authority of V.I. Lenin was adamant. He had an extraordinary ability to convince and defeat his opponents, to carry out the political line he developed and ensure unity in the political leadership of the party. But already in the spring of 1923, when V.I. Lenin was mortally ill, the struggle between various factions in the party leadership grew into an irreconcilable confrontation and became the main content of the country's political life until the end of the 20s. It was a struggle for leadership between party leaders - L.D. Trotsky, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev. Personal confrontation took the form of a struggle for Lenin’s legacy, the fulfillment of V.I.’s political will. Lenin, which each of the opposing groups interpreted in its own way, accusing their opponents of retreating from Leninism. Under the will of V.I. Lenin understood his last articles and letters to the Party Central Committee, which he dictated from December 1922 to March 1923. Articles by V.I. Lenin were published in print, and the letters were kept strictly secret until 1956. Even in the recent past, the ideas of these works were proclaimed by Lenin’s plan for building socialism, which the Stalinist group in the party leadership defended against the enemies of Leninism and put into practice during the period of mass collectivization and industrialization in the 30s. If we discard ideological schemes, in the latest works of V.I. Lenin can be seen in the anxiety and thoughts of the seriously ill party leader, attempts to find some solutions to the complex problems of the country's development and internal party life. Confusion and concern V.I. Lenin was caused by processes in the economy and social development countries, the successes of the market economy and small-scale farming in the countryside, the difficulties of developing the public sector. At the beginning of the 1920s, the situation in capitalist countries stabilized. Crisis situations were overcome. Hopes for a quick victory of the world socialist revolution have disappeared. Russia was left alone for a long time surrounded by the capitalist world. But V.I. Lenin draws optimistic conclusions that a new explosion of revolutionary struggle will inevitably come and that from “NEP Russia will become socialist Russia.” However, the seriously ill party leader could no longer, as in 1917 and 1921, find the main lever by pressing which he could achieve his goal.

Companions and students of V.I. Lenin was mired in irreconcilable confrontation. IN AND. Lenin foresaw and felt this. In an arch-secret letter to the next party congress, he warns that personal hostility between I.V. Stalin and L.D. Trotsky, as well as between other leaders, could lead to a split in the party and undermining the political system. IN AND. Lenin gives negative characteristics to all members of the Politburo. He sees a way out in expanding the composition of the Central Committee, replenishing it with ordinary workers who could objectively resolve disputes that arise in the top leadership of the party. He proposes to replace I.V. Stalin at his post Secretary General Central Committee of the RCP(b). I.V. Stalin received this high post in April 1922 with the consent of V.I. Lenin. At the same time, he remained People's Commissar for National Affairs and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). The newly elected General Secretary immediately showed his negative traits: rudeness, lust for power, treachery towards his comrades on the Central Committee, abuse of authority. This worried V.I. Lenin.

Characteristics of the members of the Politburo, which were given in the last letters of V.I. Lenin turned out to be correct. His fears about mutual hostility and struggle within the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Party came true. Internal party disagreements, which took the form of acute confrontation, shook not only the party, but the entire country in the second half of the 20s and ended with the establishment of the authoritarian power of I.V. Stalin and the breakdown of the NEP. Events began with the unification of I.V. Stalin, L.B. Kameneva, G.E. Zinoviev with the support of N.I. Bukharin against Trotsky, whose authority was very great. L.D. Trotsky was removed from the post of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and then removed from the Politburo. After the overthrow of Trotsky I.V. Stalin took up arms against his former allies Kamenev and Zinoviev. Having dealt with L.D. Trotsky, L.B. Kamenev, G.E. Zinoviev and their like-minded people, I.V. Stalin directed a blow against his main ally N.I. Bukharin. In 1929, N.I. was accused of “right deviation” and removed from party and government posts. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky, who opposed the hasty implementation of emergency measures of 1927-1929. and the breakdown of NEP. Thus, from the Politburo, elected at the end of V.I.’s life. Lenin, only I.V. remained. Stalin. It was replaced by a new leadership, selected by I.V. Stalin and obeyed him unquestioningly. This is, in a very brief summary, the history of the internal party struggle of the 20s, which ended with the establishment of the sole power of I.V. Stalin in the party and state. The main subject of debate was the fate of the new economic policy and market relations. L.D. Trotsky, E.A. Preobrazhensky and others accused Stalin’s group of slowing the pace of socialist transformations and unjustified concessions to capitalist elements, and demanded that the pace of industrialization and collectivization of the countryside be accelerated. I.V. Stalin put forward the thesis of building socialism in one country, since the prospect of the victory of the revolution in other countries was becoming less and less realistic. The opposing side accused him and Bukharin of opportunism and deviation from Lenin’s theory of socialist revolution.

The issue of internal party democracy also became the subject of fierce dispute. In speeches by supporters of L.D. Trotsky contained fair criticism of the authoritarian regime of Stalin's autocracy that had established itself in the party and the persecution of any dissent. The opposing side, which relied on the majority of the Central Committee, accused the Trotskyists of violating the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) “On Party Unity,” Lenin’s organizational principles on the subordination of the minority, and the prohibition of factions within the party. On this basis, the Trotskyists were expelled from the party and accused of betraying Leninism.

In the modern situation, when all labels and unfounded accusations against the Trotskyists have been removed, it is possible to give a more objective assessment of the events of 70 years ago. It is impossible to agree with the assertion of many historians that there were no fundamental differences between Stalin’s group and his opponents, that there was only an unprincipled struggle for power. There were fundamental disagreements. The presence of different currents in the ruling party, the discussion of pressing issues in the life of the country and the party weakened the dictatorial regime and opened up opportunities for democratization.

Therefore, discussions in the party aroused the sympathy of the non-party masses within the country, as well as the foreign public. Opponents of the regime were attracted not by the dogmatic arguments of Trotsky, Stalin and Bukharin, but by the very presence of discussion, a comparison of opinions. However, hopes for the weakening of the dictatorship and the democratization of intra-party relations did not materialize.

Tomsk State University Control Systems and Radioelectronics (TUSUR)

In the discipline "History"

Economic policy of the Bolshevik Party in

years of civil war and the construction of socialism .

Economic policy of the Bolshevik Party during the civil war and the construction of socialism

The essence and goals of the new economic policy (NEP), its results.

The objective need for industrialization of the country

Complete collectivization of agriculture, its results and consequences

Economic Party Bolsheviks during the civil war and the construction of socialism.

Civil war (preconditions and consequences). A civil war is an armed struggle between various groups population having different political, ethnic moral interests. In Russia, the civil war took place with the intervention of foreign intervention. Foreign intervention - in international law violent intervention of one or more states in the internal affairs of another state. The peculiarity of the civil war is:

1.Uprising,

3.Large-scale operations,

4. Existence of the front (red and white).

Nowadays, the reordination of the civil war from February 1917 to 1920 (22) has been established.

February 1917-1918: A bourgeois-democratic revolution took place, dual power was established, and the violent overthrow of the autocracy; strengthening socio-political contradictions in society; establishment of Soviet power; Terror is a policy of intimidation and violence, reprisal against politicians. against; the formation of white and red forces, the creation of a red army; and in six months the number of the Red Army grew from 300 thousand to 1 million. Military command cadres were created: Budanov, Furorov, Kotovsky, Chapaev, Shchors...

Second period (March - November 1918) characterized by a radical change in the balance of social forces within the country, which was the result of the foreign and domestic policies of the Bolshevik government, which, in the context of a deepening economic crisis and “the rampant petty-bourgeois element,” was forced to conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population, especially the peasantry.

Third period (November 1918 - March 1919) became the time of the beginning of real assistance of the Entente powers to the White movement. The allies' unsuccessful attempt to launch their own operations in the south, and on the other hand, the defeat of the Don and People's armies led to the establishment of the military dictatorships of Kolchak and Denikin, whose armed forces controlled significant territories in the south and east. In Omsk and Yekaterinodar, state apparatuses were created according to pre-revolutionary models. Political and material support for the Entente, although far from meeting the expected scale, played a role in consolidating the Whites and strengthening their military potential.

Fourth period of the Civil War (March 1919 - March 1920) was distinguished by the greatest scope of armed struggle and fundamental changes in the balance of power within Russia and beyond, which predetermined first the successes of the white dictatorships and then their death. During the spring-autumn of 1919, surplus appropriation, nationalization, curtailment of commodity-money circulation and other military-economic measures were summarized in the policy of “war communism”. A striking difference from the territory of the “Sovdepia” was the rear of Kolchak and Denikin, who tried to strengthen their economic and social base using traditional and similar means.

The policy of “War Communism” was aimed at overcoming the economic crisis and was based on theoretical ideas about the possibility of directly introducing communism. Main features: nationalization of all large and medium-sized industries and most small enterprises; food dictatorship, surplus appropriation, direct product exchange between city and countryside; replacing private trade with state distribution of products based on class (card system); naturalization of economic relations; universal labor conscription; equalization of wages; military order system for managing the entire life of society. After the end of the war, numerous protests by workers and peasants against the policy of “War Communism” showed its complete collapse; in 1921, a new economic policy was introduced. War communism was even more than a policy; for a time it became a way of life and a way of thinking - it was a special, extraordinary period in the life of society as a whole. Since it occurred at the stage of formation of the Soviet state, at its “infancy,” it could not but have a great influence on its entire subsequent history, and became part of the “matrix” on which the Soviet system was reproduced. Today we can understand the essence of this period, freed from the myths of both official Soviet history and vulgar anti-Sovietism.

The main signs of war communism- shifting the center of gravity of economic policy from production to distribution. This occurs when the decline in production reaches such a critical level that the main thing for the survival of society becomes the distribution of what is available. Since the resources of life are replenished to a small extent, there is a sharp shortage of them, and if distributed through the free market, their prices would jump so high that the most necessary products for life would become inaccessible to a large part of the population. Therefore, an egalitarian non-market distribution is introduced. On a non-market basis (possibly even with the use of violence), the state alienates production products, especially food. Money circulation in the country is sharply narrowing. Money disappears in relationships between enterprises. Food and industrial goods are distributed on ration cards - at fixed low prices or free of charge (in Soviet Russia at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921, payments for housing, the use of electricity, fuel, telegraph, telephone, mail, the supply of the population with medicines, consumer goods, etc. were even abolished. d.). The state introduces universal labor conscription, and in some industries (for example, transport) martial law, so that all workers are considered mobilized. All these are general signs of military communism, which, with one or another specific historical specificity, manifested themselves in all periods of this type known in history.

The most striking (or rather, studied) examples are war communism during the Great French Revolution, in Germany during the First World War, in Russia in 1918-1921, in Great Britain during the Second World War. The fact that in societies with very different culture and completely different dominant ideologies in emergency economic circumstances, a very similar structure with egalitarian distribution arises, suggesting that this is the only way to survive difficulties with minimal losses human lives. Perhaps in these extreme situations, instinctive mechanisms inherent in humans as a biological species begin to operate. Perhaps the choice is made at the cultural level; historical memory suggests that societies that refused the solidary distribution of burdens during such periods simply perished. In any case, war communism as a special economic system has nothing in common with communist teaching, much less with Marxism.

The very words “war communism” simply mean that in a period of severe devastation, society (society) turns into a community (commune) - like warriors. In recent years, a number of authors have argued that war communism in Russia was an attempt to accelerate the implementation of the Marxist doctrine of building socialism. If this is said sincerely, then we are faced with a regrettable inattention to the structure of an important general phenomenon of world history. The rhetoric of the political moment almost never correctly reflects the essence of the process. In Russia at that moment, by the way, the views of the so-called. The “maximalists,” who believed that war communism would become a springboard into socialism, were not at all dominant among the Bolsheviks. A serious analysis of the entire problem of war communism in connection with capitalism and socialism is given in the book of the prominent theoretician of the RSDLP (b) A.A. Bogdanov’s “Questions of Socialism,” published in 1918. He shows that war communism is a consequence of the regression of productive forces and the social organism. In peacetime, it is represented in the army as a vast authoritarian consumer commune. However, during a major war, consumer communism spreads from the army to the entire society. A.A. Bogdanov gives precisely a structural analysis of the phenomenon, taking as an object not even Russia, but a purer case - Germany.

From this analysis follows an important proposition that goes beyond the framework of historical mathematics: the structure of military communism, having arisen in emergency conditions, does not disintegrate by itself after the disappearance of the conditions that gave rise to it (the end of the war). Exiting war communism is a special and difficult task. In Russia, as A.A. wrote. Bogdanov, solving it will be especially difficult, since the Soviets of Soldiers’ Deputies, imbued with the thinking of war communism, play a very important role in the state system. Agreeing with the prominent Marxist and economist V. Bazarov that war communism is a “bastard” economic system, A. A. Bogdanov shows that socialism is not one of its “parents.” This is a product of capitalism and consumer communism as an emergency regime that has no genetic connection with socialism as, first of all, a new type of cooperation in production. A.A. Bogdanov also points to big problem, which arises in the sphere of ideology: “War communism is still communism; and its sharp contradiction with the usual forms of individual appropriation creates that atmosphere of a mirage in which vague prototypes of socialism are taken for its implementation.” After the end of the war, numerous protests by workers and peasants against the policy of “War Communism” showed its complete collapse; in 1921, a new economic policy was introduced.

The result of “war communism” was an unprecedented decline in production: at the beginning of 1921, the volume of industrial production amounted to only 12% of the pre-war level, and the output of iron and cast iron -2.5%. The volume of products for sale decreased by 92%; the state treasury was replenished by 80% through surplus appropriation. Since 1919, entire regions came under the control of rebel peasants. In the spring and summer, a terrible famine broke out in the Volga region: after the confiscation, there was no grain left. About 2 million Russians emigrated, most of them city dwellers. On the eve of the X Congress (March 8, 1919), the sailors and workers of Kronstadt, a stronghold October revolution.

The essence and goals of the new economic policy (NEP), its results;

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, adopted in the spring of 1921 by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b); replaced the policy of “war communism”. It was designed for the restoration of the national economy and the subsequent transition to socialism. The main content: replacing the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind in the countryside; use of the market, various forms property. Foreign capital was attracted (concessions), and a monetary reform was carried out (1922-24), which led to the transformation of the ruble into a convertible currency. It quickly led to the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war. From ser. 20s The first attempts to curtail NEP began. Syndicates in industry were liquidated, from which private capital was administratively squeezed out, and a rigid centralized system of economic management was created (economic people's commissariats). J.V. Stalin and his entourage set a course for the forced confiscation of grain and the forced “collectivization” of the countryside. Repressions were carried out against management personnel (the Shakhty case, the process of the Industrial Party, etc.).

Russia on the eve of the First World War was an economically backward country. In 1913, labor productivity in Russia was 9 times lower than in the USA, 4.9 times lower in England, and 4.7 times lower in Germany. Russia's industrial production was 12.5% of America's, 75% of the population was illiterate[i] .

On the eve of the First World War, a note from the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Trade was sent to the tsarist government, which noted that questions about the most correct economic policy were beginning to increasingly occupy the attention of society, the press and the government; It is becoming generally accepted that without raising the main productive forces of the country, agriculture and industry, Russia will not be able to cope with its enormous tasks of culture, state building and properly organized defense. To develop a program for the industrialization of Russia, a commission was created under the leadership of V.K. Zhukovsky, which in 1915 presented the program “On measures to develop the productive forces of Russia”, it was written in it: “... first of all, the point of departure for all judgments about the future economic program The development and achievement of economic independence in Russia should be driven by the conviction that in a country that is poor, but has developed into a powerful world power, the task of balancing between economic weakness and political power should be placed in the foreground. Therefore, issues of accumulation, issues of extraction, issues of increasing labor productivity must come before issues of wealth distribution. Within 10 years, Russia must double or triple its economic turnover, or go bankrupt - this is the clear alternative of the present moment.”

First World War led Russia to even greater backwardness and ruin. Nevertheless, the tasks formulated in the program did not disappear; they became more acute and relevant. It is no coincidence that I. Stalin, a few years later, formulated this problem as follows: we are 50 to 100 years behind the developed countries. We need to overcome this gap in 10–15 years. Either we do this, or we will be crushed. This is the original economic situation Bolsheviks in the 20s from the point of view of productive forces. But it was even more difficult from the point of view of industrial relations.

The “war communism” that preceded the NEP was characterized by brutal centralization in management, equal distribution, surplus appropriation, labor conscription, restrictions on commodity-money relations, etc. This policy was dictated by the conditions of that time - post-war devastation, civil war, military intervention. The country practically turned into a military camp, into a besieged fortress, which allowed the country to survive.

After the end of the civil war and the intervention of the Entente, the task of establishing economic management in peaceful conditions arose. And the first steps of this establishment showed that the policy of “war communism” needs to be changed.

The country was 80% peasant, small-scale, and without a market it could not only develop, but could not exist. Therefore, from the first steps of transformation, the Bolsheviks were faced with this irresistible tendency (trait) of the peasantry. A contradiction inevitably arose between the tasks of building socialism, which the Bolsheviks adhered to (based their policy) and the essence of peasant Russia. Since the policy of “war communism” limited commodity-money relations, it limited (prevented) the bulk of the Russian population from functioning, managing and living normally, which led to military uprisings (the Kronstadt uprising, the uprising in the Tambov region and others).

The objective need for industrialization of the country.

Industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in all sectors of the national economy and primarily in industry.

Prerequisites for industrialization: In 1928 the country finished recovery period reached the level of 1913, but Western countries have gone far ahead during this time. As a result, the USSR began to lag behind. Technical and economic backwardness could become chronic and turn into historical, which means: the need for industrialization.

The need for industrialization – major economic productivity and primarily group A (production of government funds) determines economic development countries in general and agricultural development in particular. Social – without industrialization it is impossible to develop the economy, and therefore the social sphere: education, healthcare, recreation, social security. Military-political – without industrialization it is impossible to ensure the technical and economic independence of the country and its defense power.

Conditions for industrialization: the consequences of the devastation have not been fully eliminated, international economic ties have not been established, there is a lack of experienced personnel, the need for cars is satisfied through imports.

Goals: Transformation of Russia from an industrial-agrarian country into an industrial power, ensuring technical and economic independence, strengthening defense capabilities and raising the well-being of the people, demonstrating the advantages of socialism. The sources were internal savings: internal loans, pumping out funds from the countryside, income from foreign trade, cheap labor, the enthusiasm of the working people, and the labor of prisoners.

The beginning of industrialization: December 1925 -14th Party Congress emphasized the unconditional possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and set a course for industrialization. In 1925, the recovery period ended and the period of reconstruction of the national economy began. In 1926, the practical implementation of industrialization began. About 1 billion rubles were invested in productivity. This is 2.5 times more than in 1925.

In 1926-28, the large batch increased by 2 times, and gross productivity reached 132% of 1913. But there were also negative aspects: commodity hunger, food cards (1928-35), lower wages, lack of highly qualified personnel, population migration and aggravation of housing problems, difficulties in setting up new production, massive accidents and breakdowns, hence the search for those responsible.

Results and significance of industrialization: 9 thousand large industrial enterprises equipped with the most advanced technology were put into operation, new industries were created: tractor, automobile, aviation, tank, chemical, machine tool manufacturing, gross productivity output increased by 6.5 times, including group A by 10 Once, in terms of the volume of industrial production, the USSR came to first place in Europe, and to second place in the world, industrial construction spread to remote areas and national outskirts, the social structure and demographic situation in the country changed (40% of the urban population in the country). The number of workers and engineering and technical intelligentsia increased sharply, and industrialization significantly influenced the well-being of the Soviet people.

Significance: industrialization ensured the technical and economic independence of the country and the defense power of the country, industrialization transformed the USSR from an agrarian-industrial country into an industrial one, industrialization demonstrated the mobilization capabilities of socialism and the inexhaustible capabilities of Russia.

Complete collectivization of agriculture, its results and consequences.

At the XV Party Congress (1927), the policy of collectivization of agriculture was approved. At the same time, it was resolutely stated that the creation of collective farms should be a purely voluntary undertaking of the peasants themselves. But already in the summer of 1929, the collectivization that began took on a far from voluntary character. From July to December 1929, about 3.4 million peasant households were united, or 14% of the total number. By the end of February 1930, there were already 14 million united peasant farms, or 60% of their total number.

Widespread collectivization was a necessity, which I. Stalin justified in the article “The Year of the Great Turnaround” (November 1929), replaced emergency measures on grain procurements. This article argued that large sections of the peasantry were ready to join collective farms, and also emphasized the need for a decisive offensive against the kulaks. In December 1929, Stalin announced the end of NEP, the transition from a policy of limiting the kulaks to a policy of “liquidating the kulaks as a class.”

In December 1929, the leadership of the party and state proposed carrying out “complete collectivization” with strict deadlines. Thus, in the Lower Volga region, in the Doma and in the North Caucasus, it should have been completed by the autumn of 1930, in the Central Black Earth regions and regions of steppe Ukraine - by the autumn of 1931, in Left Bank Ukraine - by the spring of 1932, in other regions of the country - by 1933.

Collectivization- This is the replacement of the system of small-holder peasant farming with large socialized agricultural producers. Small and private farms are being replaced by large ones.

Prerequisites collectivization are two problems, to what extent do they correlate? national characteristics Russia (peasant land community) and collectivization and to what extent the construction of socialism presupposes collectivization.

To carry out collectivization, 25 thousand communist workers were sent from cities to villages, who were given great powers to forcibly unite peasants. Those who did not want to join the public economy could be declared enemies of Soviet power.

Back in 1928, the law 2 “On the general principles of land use and land management” was adopted, according to which certain benefits were established for new joint farms when receiving loans, paying taxes, etc. They were promised technical assistance: by the spring of 1930, it was planned to supply 60 thousand tractors to the villages , and a year later - 100 thousand. This was a huge figure, considering that in 1928 there were only 26.7 thousand tractors in the country, of which about 3 thousand were domestically produced. But the supply of equipment was very slow, since the main capacities of the tractor factories went into operation only during the Second Five-Year Plan.

At the first stage of collectivization, it was not yet entirely clear what form the new farms would take. In some regions they became communes with complete socialization of the material conditions of production and life. In other places they took the form of partnerships for joint cultivation of land (TOZ), where socialization did not take place completely, but with the preservation of individual peasant plots. But gradually agricultural artels (collective farms - collective farms) became the main form of peasant association.

Along with collective farms, Soviet “state farms”, that is, agricultural enterprises owned by the state, also developed during this period. But their number was small. If in 1925 there were 3382 state farms in the country, then in 1932 there were 4337. They had at their disposal approximately 10% of the entire sown area of the country.

At the beginning of 1930, it became obvious to the country's leadership that the incredibly high rate of collectivization and the associated losses were harming the very idea of unifying the peasants. In addition, the spring sowing campaign was in danger of being disrupted.

There is evidence that the peasants of Ukraine, Kuban, Don, Central Asia, Siberia opposed collectivization with arms in hand. In the North Caucasus and in a number of regions of Ukraine, regular units of the Red Army were sent against the peasants.

The peasants, as long as they had enough strength, refused to go to collective farms and tried not to succumb to agitation and threats. They did not want to transfer their property into socialized ownership, preferring to offer passive resistance to general collectivization, burn buildings, and destroy livestock, since the livestock transferred to the collective farm most often died anyway due to the lack of prepared premises, feed, and care.

The spring of 1933 was especially difficult in Ukraine, although in 1932 no less grain was collected than in the previous year. In Ukraine, which has always been famous for its harvests, entire families and villages perished from hunger. People stood in lines for bread for several days, dying right on the streets without receiving anything.

Results of collectivization in Russia.

1) everyone who had something was dispossessed and robbed;

2) almost all peasants became collective farmers;

3) the destruction of the age-old ways of the village;

4) grain production has been reduced;

5) famine of the early 30s;

6) terrible death of livestock;

Negative: changes in agricultural production, a radical change in the way of life of the bulk of the country's population (de-peasantization), large human losses - 7-8 million people (hunger, dispossession, resettlement).

Positive: freeing up a significant part of the workforce for other areas of production, creating conditions for the modernization of the agricultural sector. Putting the food supply under state control on the eve of the Second World War. Providing funds for industrialization.

The demographic results of collectivization were catastrophic. If during the civil war, during the “de-Cossackization” (1918-1919), about 1 million Cossacks were killed in the south of Russia, and this was a huge disaster for the country, then the death of the population in peacetime with the knowledge of its own government can be considered a tragedy. It is not possible to accurately calculate the number of victims of the collectivization period, since data on fertility, mortality, and the total population after 1932 in the USSR ceased to be published.

Collectivization led to the “de-peasantization” of the countryside, as a result of which the agricultural sector lost millions of independent workers, “diligent” peasants who turned into collective farmers, having lost the property acquired by previous generations, and lost interest in effective work on the land.

It should be emphasized once again that the main goal of collectivization was to solve the “grain problem,” since it was much more convenient to confiscate agricultural products from collective farms than from millions of scattered peasant farms.

Forced collectivization led to a decrease in the efficiency of agricultural production, since forced labor turned out to be less productive than it was on private farms. Thus, during the years of the first five-year plan, only 12 million tons of grain were exported, that is, an average of 2-3 million tons annually, while in 1913 Russia exported without any effort more than 9 million tons with a production of 86 million tons.

The increase in government purchases in 1928-1935 by 18.8 million tons could be achieved without extreme stress and losses associated with collectivization, since the annual growth rate in the second half

1920s was consistently at least 2%. If the country had continued to develop at the same moderate pace further, then by 1940 the average annual grain harvest would have been approximately 95 million tons, but at the same time, the peasantry would not only not have lived worse than in the 1920s, but would also have been able to provide funds for industrialization and feed the urban population. But this would happen if strong peasant farms covered by cooperation remained in the village.

List of used literature:

1. Notes on the book by S.G. Kara - Murza “Soviet Civilization”

2. Gumilyov L.N. “From Rus' to Russia” L 1992

3. Orlov I.B. “Modern historiography of the NEP: achievements, problems, prospects.”

4. Buldalov V.P., Kabanov V.V. “War communism” ideology and social development. Questions of history. 1990.

5.Textbook by T.M. Timoshin “Economic history of Russia. Moscow 2000.

6.Economy of the transition period. Institute of Economic Problems of the Transition Period. Moscow 1998.

Tomsk State University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics (TUSUR)

In the discipline "History"

Economic policy of the Bolshevik Party in

years of civil war and the construction of socialism .

Economic policy of the Bolshevik Party during the civil war and the construction of socialism

The essence and goals of the new economic policy (NEP), its results.

The objective need for industrialization of the country

Complete collectivization of agriculture, its results and consequences

Economic Bolshevik Party during the Civil War and the Construction of Socialism.

Civil war (preconditions and consequences). A civil war is an armed struggle between different groups of the population with different political, ethnic and moral interests. In Russia, the civil war took place with the intervention of foreign intervention. Foreign intervention is in international law the violent intervention of one or more states in the internal affairs of another state. The peculiarity of the civil war is:

1.Uprising,

3.Large-scale operations,

4. Existence of the front (red and white).

Nowadays, the reordination of the civil war from February 1917 to 1920 (22) has been established.

The most striking (or rather, studied) examples are war communism during the Great French Revolution, in Germany during the First World War, in Russia in 1918-1921, in Great Britain during the Second World War. The fact that in societies with very different cultures and very different dominant ideologies, in extreme economic circumstances, a very similar pattern of egalitarian distribution emerges suggests that this is the only way to survive the difficulties with minimal loss of human life. Perhaps in these extreme situations, instinctive mechanisms inherent in humans as a biological species begin to operate. Perhaps the choice is made at the cultural level; historical memory suggests that societies that refused the solidary distribution of burdens during such periods simply perished. In any case, war communism as a special economic system has nothing in common with communist teaching, much less with Marxism.

The very words “war communism” simply mean that in a period of severe devastation, society (society) turns into a community (commune) - like warriors. In recent years, a number of authors have argued that war communism in Russia was an attempt to accelerate the implementation of the Marxist doctrine of building socialism. If this is said sincerely, then we are faced with a regrettable inattention to the structure of an important general phenomenon of world history. The rhetoric of the political moment almost never correctly reflects the essence of the process. In Russia at that moment, by the way, the views of the so-called. The “maximalists,” who believed that war communism would become a springboard into socialism, were not at all dominant among the Bolsheviks. A serious analysis of the entire problem of war communism in connection with capitalism and socialism is given in the book of the prominent theoretician of the RSDLP (b) A.A. Bogdanov's "Questions of Socialism", published in 1918. He shows that war communism is a consequence of the regression of the productive forces and the social organism. In peacetime, it is represented in the army as a vast authoritarian consumer commune. However, during a major war, consumer communism spreads from the army to the entire society. A.A. Bogdanov gives precisely a structural analysis of the phenomenon, taking as an object not even Russia, but a purer case - Germany.

From this analysis follows an important proposition that goes beyond the framework of historical mathematics: the structure of military communism, having arisen in emergency conditions, does not disintegrate by itself after the disappearance of the conditions that gave rise to it (the end of the war). Exiting war communism is a special and difficult task. In Russia, as A.A. wrote. Bogdanov, solving it will be especially difficult, since the Soviets of Soldiers’ Deputies, imbued with the thinking of war communism, play a very important role in the state system. Agreeing with the prominent Marxist and economist V. Bazarov that war communism is a “bastard” economic system, A. A. Bogdanov shows that socialism is not one of its “parents.” This is a product of capitalism and consumer communism as an emergency regime that has no genetic connection with socialism as, first of all, a new type of cooperation in production. A.A. Bogdanov also points to a big problem that arises in the sphere of ideology: “War communism is still communism; and its sharp contradiction with the usual forms of individual appropriation creates that atmosphere of a mirage in which vague prototypes of socialism are taken for its implementation.” After the end of the war, numerous protests by workers and peasants against the policy of “War Communism” showed its complete collapse; in 1921, a new economic policy was introduced.

The essence and goals of the new economic policy (NEP), its results;

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, adopted in the spring of 1921 by the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b); replaced the policy of “war communism”. It was designed for the restoration of the national economy and the subsequent transition to socialism. The main content: replacing the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind in the countryside; use of the market, various forms of ownership. Foreign capital was attracted (concessions), and a monetary reform was carried out (1922-24), which led to the transformation of the ruble into a convertible currency. It quickly led to the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war. From ser. 20s The first attempts to curtail NEP began. Syndicates in industry were liquidated, from which private capital was administratively squeezed out, and a rigid centralized system of economic management was created (economic people's commissariats). J.V. Stalin and his entourage set a course for the forced confiscation of grain and the forced “collectivization” of the countryside. Repressions were carried out against management personnel (the Shakhty case, the process of the Industrial Party, etc.).

On the eve of the First World War, a note from the Council of Congresses of Representatives of Industry and Trade was sent to the tsarist government, which noted that questions about the most correct economic policy were beginning to increasingly occupy the attention of society, the press and the government; It is becoming generally accepted that without raising the main productive forces of the country, agriculture and industry, Russia will not be able to cope with its enormous tasks of culture, state building and properly organized defense. To develop a program for the industrialization of Russia, a commission was created under the leadership of V.K. Zhukovsky, which in 1915 presented the program “On measures to develop the productive forces of Russia”, it was written in it: “... first of all, the point of departure for all judgments about the future The program of economic development and achievement of economic independence of Russia should be served by the conviction that in a country that is poor, but has developed into a powerful world power, the task of balancing between economic weakness and political power should be placed in the foreground. Therefore, issues of accumulation, issues of extraction, issues of increasing labor productivity must come before issues of wealth distribution. Within 10 years, Russia must double or triple its economic turnover, or go bankrupt - this is the clear alternative of the present moment.”

The First World War led Russia to even greater backwardness and ruin. Nevertheless, the tasks formulated in the program did not disappear; they became more acute and relevant. It is no coincidence that I. Stalin, a few years later, formulated this problem as follows: we are 50 to 100 years behind the developed countries. We need to overcome this gap in 10–15 years. Either we do this, or we will be crushed. This was the initial economic position of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s from the point of view of productive forces. But it was even more difficult from the point of view of industrial relations.

The objective need for industrialization of the country.

Industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in all sectors of the national economy and primarily in industry.

Prerequisites for industrialization: In 1928, the country completed the recovery period and reached the level of 1913, but Western countries during this time went far ahead. As a result, the USSR began to lag behind. Technical and economic backwardness could become chronic and turn into historical, which means: the need for industrialization.

The need for industrialization – major economic productivity and, first of all, group A (production of government funds) determines the economic development of the country in general and the development of agriculture in particular. Social – without industrialization it is impossible to develop the economy, and therefore the social sphere: education, healthcare, recreation, social security. Military-political – without industrialization it is impossible to ensure the technical and economic independence of the country and its defense power.

Complete collectivization of agriculture, its results and consequences.

Collectivization- This is the replacement of the system of small-holder peasant farming with large socialized agricultural producers. Small and private farms are being replaced by large ones.

Prerequisites collectivization are two problems, to what extent the national characteristics of Russia (peasant land community) and collectivization are correlated, and to what extent the construction of socialism presupposes collectivization.

There is evidence that the peasants of Ukraine, Kuban, Don, Central Asia, and Siberia took up arms against collectivization. In the North Caucasus and in a number of regions of Ukraine, regular units of the Red Army were sent against the peasants.

Results of collectivization in Russia.

1) everyone who had something was dispossessed and robbed;

2) almost all peasants became collective farmers;

3) the destruction of the age-old ways of the village;

4) grain production has been reduced;

5) famine of the early 30s;

6) terrible death of livestock;

List of used literature:

1. Notes on the book by S.G. Kara - Murza “Soviet Civilization”

2. Gumilyov L.N. “From Rus' to Russia” L 1992

3. Orlov I.B. “Modern historiography of the NEP: achievements, problems, prospects.”

4. Buldalov V.P., Kabanov V.V. “War communism” ideology and social development. Questions of history. 1990.