The main content of the military reform 1924 1925. Encyclopedia

After finishing Civil War and foreign military intervention For a number of political and economic reasons, the Soviet state was forced to reduce the size of its armed forces. By the summer of 1924, the personnel army had been increased to 562 thousand people, i.e. was reduced by almost 10 times compared to 1920.

The armed forces consisted of personnel units and territorial police formations. The territorial police formations consisted of 16 - 20% of the personnel, and 80% of the assigned personnel, called up for regular training.

The need to solve complex defense problems of the country with a reduced number of armed forces gave rise to the need for their comprehensive reform.

Military reform 1924 - 1925 was carried out in accordance with the Action Plan to radically improve the situation of the Red Army, developed by the military commission of the Central Committee together with the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the USSR and approved by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 6, 1924.

The main objectives of the military reform were:

1. optimization of the maintenance of the armed forces;
2. technical equipment of the armed forces,
3. reorganization of the administrative apparatus;
4. improvement of the conscription system, training of enlisted personnel and command personnel;
5. transition to unity of command;
6. creation of a legal framework for military service;
7. development of national military construction.

In accordance with the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated April 15, 1924, revolutionary military councils were created in military districts and armies as the highest authorities in the districts and armies. The RVS and their respective commanders were directly subordinate to the RVS of the USSR.

On January 9, 1925, by the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the reorganization of local bodies of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs" territorial departments were established (with the rights of departments of executive committees)

1. corps territorial administrations - in the provinces where the corps was located;
2. divisional territorial administrations - in the provinces where there were divisions;
3. provincial territorial administrations - in provinces where there were no military units.

Corps territorial directorates were subordinate to the corps commander, divisional ones - to the division commander, and provincial ones - directly to the commander of the military district.

In order to train command personnel in the country, the following were created:

• regimental schools for training junior specialists with a training period of 7-10 months (order of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council of December 58, 1924);
• military schools with 3-4 years of training for the training of mid-level military specialists (in 1925, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved the Regulations on military schools of the Red Army);
• retraining and improvement courses;
• military academies and military faculties at civilian universities;
• higher advanced training courses for specialists after graduating from military academies

On March 2, 1925, M. Frunze signed the order of the Revolutionary Military Council “On the introduction of unity of command in the Red Army.” It was introduced in two forms:

• complete unity of command - was established where the commander was a member of the party and met its requirements. A political assistant was appointed under him;
• incomplete unity of command - presupposed the presence of a commissar who was responsible for party and political work and assisted the commander in combat training.

On September 18, 1925, the first all-Union Law “On Compulsory Military Service” was adopted. The law determined universal military service, but only working people were trusted to serve with weapons in their hands.

The service of men of worker-peasant origin lasted from 19 to 40 years. It consisted of:

1) pre-conscription training of all citizens from 19 to 21 years of age;

2) active military service (for a period of 5 years), which could take place:

• in personnel units;
• in a variable composition of territorial formations;
• non-military order;

3) conditions in stock for up to 40 years.

National military construction was aimed at attracting all the peoples of the USSR to participate in defense.

By the end of 1924, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR developed a 5-year plan for the national construction of the Red Army. Already in 1925, the national formations of the Red Army accounted for 10% of its strength.

In 1928 and 1930 New versions of the law “On Compulsory Military Service” were adopted:

• a new type of active service was introduced - military production service (on-the-job);
• For students, pre-conscription training was replaced by higher non-military training for reserve command personnel.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/1991

WE DISCUSS PROBLEMS OF MILITARY REFORM

Experience of military reform of 1924-1925

Lieutenant GeneralL. G. IVASHOV ,

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Colonel of JusticeA. S. Emelin ,

Candidate of Legal Sciences

The MILITARY reform carried out in the USSR in 1924-1925, according to the authors, is the most successful in its results for Soviet military development. During its implementation, unique experience has been accumulated, which is taken into account and used abroad, for example, the development theoretical model and testing in practice the mixed system of the Armed Forces. Great importance it also applies to the implementation of modern military reform in the USSR.

After the end of the civil war, in an atmosphere of severe devastation of the national economy, difficult internal and foreign policy conditions, the Soviet state was faced with urgent tasks in the field of military development, which, due to their versatility, scale and significance, determined the need for military reform. First of all, it was necessary to transfer the Armed Forces to a peaceful position, reduce their numbers, bring defense spending in line with the limited material opportunities country and its needs reliable protection, determine the ways of development of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. An analysis of documents from that time shows that the highest state and party bodies of the country paid a lot of attention to the problem of military development. Thus, only from November 1920 to November 1922, military issues were discussed 9 times at plenums of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), 26 - at meetings of the Politburo, 6 - in the Council of People's Commissars, 17 - in the Council of Labor and Defense. They were considered at the VIII and IX All-Russian Congresses of Soviets, the III (1925) and IV (1927) Congresses of Soviets of the USSR, the X-XII Party Congresses, the February and April (1924) plenums of the Central Committee, etc.

The situation was complicated, firstly, by the fact that leading military officials lacked unity of views on fundamental issues of the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, and, secondly, in the activities of the military department, headed by L. D. Trotsky, there were many serious shortcomings that negatively affected the country's defense capability. The commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which examined the state of the Armed Forces at the beginning of 1924, reported that “in its present form, the Red Army is not capable of combat.” In this situation, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) proposed that the Military Commission of the Central Committee, together with the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, develop an action plan for a radical restructuring of the Red Army. In March 1924, they were approved by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and formed the basis of the military reform of 1924-1925. Its main objectives were: the creation of a system for organizing the Soviet Armed Forces that would provide reliable cover for the state borders of the USSR and make it possible to train the entire conscript contingent of the country in military affairs; development of the most saturated branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces with sophisticated military equipment while simultaneously reducing defense spending; reorganization and strengthening of military command and control bodies in the center and locally; system improvement vocational training command personnel; transition to unity of command while simultaneously strengthening political and educational work in the army and navy; creation of solid legal foundations for a new recruitment and service system; technical re-equipment, increasing the level of combat training of troops (forces).

The work on the reorganization of the Armed Forces was headed by M. V. Frunze, who was appointed by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of March 11, 1924, as Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, and from April 1, 1924, at the same time as the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. The January (1925) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) declared it impossible for L. D. Trotsky to continue to hold leadership positions in the army. Based on this decision, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on January 26, 1925 appointed M. V. Frunze as Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, under whose leadership the main measures of military reform were successfully implemented.

The most important task was the creation of a system for organizing the Armed Forces that corresponded to the internal and external conditions of the development of the Soviet state. “We must have such an army,” said M.V. Frunze, “which could, in the event of a serious conflict, guard the borders of Soviet land in all areas and directions. In practice, this means the need for a defense system that would ensure access to the battlefields of the entire mass of workers capable of holding weapons in their hands.”

From a military point of view, it was advisable to have a personnel army of about 2 million people. But the Soviet state could not support it. Therefore, by the summer of 1924 it was reduced to 562 thousand people, i.e., 10 times higher than in 1920. Such an army could hardly cover the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in the event of war and provide normal training to only 30 percent. conscript contingent, i.e. the state would not have the necessary military-trained reserve. “We find a solution in a combination of a personnel army with a police system,” pointed out M.V. Frunze. - The presence of territorial formations allows us to increase the number of contingents passing through the ranks of our army. Apart from this consideration, we consider And with the fact that this system allows military service without a long break from the economy, this is a big win for the population, and finally, with the fact that it adequately provides for the interests of training. That is why, in the matter of the structure of our armed forces, we have taken the point of view of a standing army plus militia formations.”

Territorial militia formations were created mainly in the rifle troops in relation to the administrative division of the country. For example, a division, as a rule, was formed within the boundaries of a province, a regiment - a district, a company - a volost. The personnel composition of such formations amounted to only 16-20 percent. It included the entire senior, senior, part of the middle and junior command and political personnel and, in addition, some of the Red Army soldiers necessary for organizing the training of variable personnel, performing guard duty and economic maintenance of the material base in the period between training camps. The rest of the territorial police formations (“variables”) were recruited from adjacent villages and towns. By 1928, territorial units and formations accounted for over 70 percent. rifle troops and 12 percent. cavalry of the Red Army.

Branches of the Armed Forces and types of troops that had sophisticated military equipment (Navy, Air Force, armored forces, etc.), as well as a significant part of the rifle and cavalry divisions border military districts remained personnel.

The transition to a mixed system of organizing the Armed Forces constituted the essence and main content of the military reform of 1924-1925. The construction of the army and navy on a mixed basis was legally enshrined in the first all-Union Law on Compulsory Military Service, adopted by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on September 18, 1925 in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR of 1924. The 1925 law summarized all previous legislation on fundamental issues of the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, taking into account the practical experience of its implementation. It seems that this is the most developed law of the Soviet state on the issues of building the Armed Forces in its entire history. For example, in our opinion, a legal formula was successfully found that established general organization Armed Forces of the USSR: “The organization of the armed forces of the working people is the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is divided into land, sea and air force. The Red Army also includes troops special purpose: troops of the United State Political Administration and the Convoy Guard of the Union of the USSR” (Article 2).

REFERENCE

Troops of the Main Political Directorate (GPU)- special units and units designed to perform tasks to ensure the internal security of the Soviet state and protect state borders. Formed by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922 from the troops of the All-Russian Cheka. In November 1923, in connection with the formation of the USSR, the GPU troops were transformed into the troops of the United Main Political Directorate (OGPU).

Convoy guard of the USSR- a special armed formation designed to perform tasks related to the activities of law enforcement agencies, initially subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Justice. By decree of the STO of the RSFSR dated September 27, 1922, it was transferred to the GPU troops. On June 26, 1924, it was allocated as an independent branch of the military, subordinate first to the NKVD of the union republics, and from October 30, 1925- Central Administration of the USSR Convoy Guard. Its recruitment and supply with all types of allowances was entrusted to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR (Narkomvoenmor).

Further organizational changes in the troops of the OGPU and the Convoy Guard were associated with the formation of the NKVD of the USSR (resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee of July 10, 1934), which was entrusted with: ensuring revolutionary order and state security, protecting socialist property, protecting state borders and other tasks. The NKVD of the USSR included the OGPU, transformed into the Main Directorate of State Security (GU GB), as well as the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security (GUPVO), subsequently transformed into the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Troops. By a resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 17, 1934, convoy troops were transferred to the subordination of the Main Directorate of Air Defense.

The USSR Law “On General Military Duty” of 1934 established a new general organization of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which began to consist of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Workers' and Peasants' Navy, border and internal troops (Article 4).

One of the objectives of the reform was reorganization of the country's defense management system. It needed to be rebuilt in relation to the peaceful conditions of life and activity of troops, the mixed system of organizing the Armed Forces. The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced fundamental changes in the management of the country's defense. According to Art. 1 of the USSR Constitution of 1924 V The jurisdiction of the Union (represented by the supreme bodies) included “the organization and leadership of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The supreme bodies of power and administration included: the Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Together With However, it did not specify the powers of the above bodies in the management of the construction of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In 1923, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in order to improve the leadership of the People's Commissariats of the Union both in the field of economic and military activities itself, established under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR (SLO). The Chairman of the STO was the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the members were appointed personally by the Council of People's Commissars. Although the STO of the USSR was not provided for by the Constitution of the USSR, it was endowed with great powers, in particular, it could issue “resolutions, orders and instructions that are binding on all central and local authorities of the Union.”

Based on Art. 11 of the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, an all-Union People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, in charge of the construction of the Armed Forces, their management And supply. At the head of the People's Commissar of Military and Marine Affairs of the USSR was the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, he was also the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR - the board of the People's Commissar of Military and Marine Affairs. In emergency circumstances, his competence included making decisions and carrying out activities within the military or naval department that exceeded the direct rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR. The People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, under personal responsibility, acted to protect and protect the interests of the USSR by all available means, immediately reporting to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR about the measures taken and the reasons for their urgent implementation by his order.

Worthy of attention in organizing the management of the country's defense from the point of view of possible prospects for the new Union Treaty is the institution of representatives of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR under the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics, established in order to ensure unity in the construction of the Armed Forces and take into account national characteristics and the capabilities of the republics. The commissioners were entrusted with: representation in the republic on all issues within the competence of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR; coordination with the relevant authorities of the republic of orders of the People's Commissariat of Military and Marine Affairs of the USSR, draft resolutions of the government of this republic concerning defense needs; monitoring the implementation of the military legislation of the USSR and the orders of the People's Commissariat of Military and Marine Affairs of the USSR based on it, as well as appealing to necessary cases actions of the authorities of the republic that violate the interests of defense; informing the government of the republic on behalf of the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs of the USSR about the activities of the military department and the state of defense on its territory.

Commissioners of the People's Commissariat of Military and Marine Affairs of the USSR were approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR after receiving preliminary consent from the Central Executive Committee of the union republic on the nominated candidacy. They were members of the government of the union republics with a decisive or advisory vote and reported on their activities both to the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs of the USSR and to the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the corresponding union republics. The representatives of the USSR People's Commissariat of Military and Marine Affairs did not have the right to issue orders to military units and local military authorities located on the territory of a given union republic.

The procedure for recruiting and serving personnel of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The 1925 law declared the defense of the USSR the responsibility of all Soviet citizens (Article 1). At the same time, when recruiting personnel for the Armed Forces, the class principle was still in effect: the defense of the USSR with arms in hand was trusted only to the working people. Non-labor elements were assigned other military responsibilities: they were not drafted into the Armed Forces, but served compulsory service in the so-called rear militia, which performed various types of construction and other auxiliary work. According to this law, compulsory military service for working male citizens began at the age of 19 and consisted of: pre-conscription training; active military service; service in reserve. By including pre-conscription training in compulsory military service, the law expanded its content. This was its peculiarity, apparently of interest from the point of view of the current problem of improving the quality of training of young people for military service. The voluntary entry of working citizens into the ranks of the army and navy was also allowed. Women were also accepted into military service on a voluntary basis. During wartime, the law allowed the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, at the request of the People's Commissariat of Military and Marine Affairs of the USSR, to conscript working women into the Red Army to perform special service.

The selection of conscripts for the Armed Forces was distinguished by the fact that citizens who refused military service for religious reasons were given the opportunity to serve the so-called alternative civilian service. It should be noted that the Soviet state, long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, decreed the right of citizens to alternative service. Was this done at the height of the civil war and intervention - January 4, 1919? Yes, V.I. Lenin signed the corresponding decree of the Council of People's Commissars.

Pre-conscription training was mandatory, without interruption from production and study, for all working citizens who were fit for health reasons to serve in the army and navy and had reached the height of service, during the 2 years preceding conscription for active military service.

On active military service According to the 1925 Law, citizens were drafted upon reaching 21 years of age. Persons who were in active military service were called military personnel and bore the “honorary title of a red warrior (Red Army soldier or Red Navy man).” According to their service position, military personnel were divided into privates and commanding officers. In turn, the commanding personnel, according to their official status, were divided into 4 groups and 14 categories: the first group - junior commanding personnel (categories 1-2 - from squad commander to company sergeant-major inclusive); the second group - middle command (categories 3-6 - from platoon commander to commander of an individual company and corresponding positions, inclusive); third group - senior (7-9 categories - from battalion commander to regiment commander and equals); fourth - highest (10-14 categories - from assistant division commander and above). There were no personal military ranks. The service category of command personnel was assigned simultaneously with appointment to the position and determined the specific scope of rights and responsibilities. This approach ensured a certain democracy in official relations.

For privates and junior commanders of conscript service, the law established three the type of its passage: in personnel units, in a variable composition of territorial formations, in non-military order. The total period of active military service was set at 5 years. In the personnel units of the Red Army it consisted of continuous service from 2 to 4 years (depending on the type of Armed Forces and type of troops) and a stay on long-term leave lasting from 1 to 3 years. Active service in a variable composition of territorial formations was carried out in the following order: in the first year, military personnel undergoing three months of training. Over the next four years, they were called up for training camps with a total duration of 5 to 8 months (depending on the type of troops), but no more than two months a year. All the time during the period between training camps, the variables were considered to be on vacation.

Non-military order of active military service consisted of undergoing periodic training sessions with a total duration of no more than 6 months for all 5 years of service, but no more than 2 months V year. Non-military training sessions were held at training points as close as possible to the place of residence of the trainees.

At the end of their active service, military personnel (private and junior command personnel) were enlisted in reserve, which was divided into two stages: the first - up to 34 years of age and the second - up to 40. This division meant the order of conscription in the event of mobilization. In order to improve military knowledge and skills, reserve personnel could be involved in verification training for a total duration of no more than 3 months during the entire stay V in stock

The procedure for military service for middle, senior and senior commanding personnel of the Red Army differed in some features. The 1925 law established that middle and senior commanding personnel of the Red Army had to perform active military service: in personnel units, in territorial formations, or in the reserve of the commanding personnel of the Red Army (Articles 172-178).

Age limit for active military service for middle commanding officers the age was set to 50 years, for the senior - up to 55, for the highest - up to 60 years, upon reaching which the commanders of the Red Army were subject to dismissal and transfer to the reserve. Along with resolving issues of defense capability, the leaders of the state, party and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs took care of improving the financial situation of the Red Army military personnel. Thus, speaking at the Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR, M. V. Frunze drew the attention of deputies to the fact that “the situation of our command staff is worse than in the army of any bourgeois country. In general, the norm wages the command staff in relation to the norms of the old tsarist army is only 30 percent. If we remember that the position of the working class and other categories of labor has risen significantly during this time... then in the field of pay for military personnel we are still far behind, and I consider it absolutely necessary that in the next budget year the standard of pay for our command personnel should be raised. This is an essential requirement, and I think the congress will do it.

To imagine the actual situation of our command personnel, we must take into account a number of other negative elements of their life. Firstly, the housing issue. Only 30 percent. Our command staff is somewhat tolerably arranged in terms of housing, but 70 percent. Our accommodations are extremely bad... Next, comrades, we must take into account that often our command staff has to live in two houses due to working conditions. They have to live and work both in their personnel unit, at its location, and at the same time in the area where the variable composition is located. We have to go there for two or three and sometimes even more months in a row, and we receive extremely low pay for the work done by commanders outside the units. With such an insignificant standard, of course, it is difficult to impose strict demands on our command staff and receive from them what is required to raise the combat effectiveness of units to the proper height.

Finally, the last question is the question of pension provision. I consider it absolutely necessary that the Congress of Soviets give instructions to the Union Government on the speediest positive resolution of this issue. It is necessary for the serviceman to be absolutely sure that when he leaves the ranks of the Red Army, he will have sufficient security.”

A concrete example of the state’s concern for the material needs of military personnel was the first “Code of Benefits and Advantages for Military Personnel of the Red Army and the Red Army and their Families,” approved by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on October 29, 1924. At the end of the 20s, a course was set for the technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In connection with this, an austerity regime was introduced, which also affected the standard of living of military personnel, which gradually declined. Therefore, to date, the only benefits and advantages provided for by the Code of 1924 remain: for officers - a preferential procedure for paying for occupied living space, and for privates and sergeants of conscript service - free sending of postal correspondence (letters).

Analyzing the progress and results of military reform in the USSR in 1924-1925, it should be especially emphasized that “the entire Soviet people helped build the army and navy and strengthen the defense of the USSR.” One of the forms of manifestation of workers' concern for the Armed Forces of the USSR was the creation of voluntary mass defense public organizations. The first to emerge was the Society of Friends air fleet"(ODVF). It was born in the spring of 1923. The ODVF had as its task to help the state create a modern Air Force. Using funds collected by the ODVF from the population, over 200 aircraft were built in 1926-1928 and transferred to the army. In 1924, on the initiative of the workers of Moscow, Leningrad and other cities, a new voluntary society, “Friends of Chemical Defense” (Dobrokhim), arose. Since 1925, military scientific societies (VNO) began to be created in the army and navy in order to organize widespread propaganda of military knowledge. M. V. Frunze was elected Chairman of the Central Council of the VNO. Due to the entry of workers into the VNO, it gradually turned into a mass organization and in 1926 was renamed the “Defense Assistance Society” (OSO). In January 1927, all defense public organizations united into the “Society for Assistance to Defense and Aviation Chemical Construction of the USSR” (Osoaviakhim), whose activities to realize the desire of the Soviet people to make a feasible contribution to strengthening the defense of the USSR took on a large scale and was of great importance.

It should also be noted that this form of public participation, including the army, in the construction of the Armed Forces during the period under review, is the establishment of military cooperation, designed to help better meet the everyday needs of military personnel and members of their families, especially those serving in remote areas. For this purpose, it was allowed to create cooperative trading enterprises, tea houses, canteens, hairdressing salons, sewing workshops, etc. at individual military units, formations, and garrisons. By Order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR AG& 183 dated February 18, 1925, the “Regulations on Military Cooperation” were approved, which established the principles of organization and activity of cooperatives in the Red Army. To guide the cooperative movement in the army and navy, in accordance with the Regulations of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a Central Cooperative Commission was established under the chairmanship of the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. In the districts and in the fleets (separate armies), district cooperative commissions operated under the chairmanship of the head of the political department of the military district (fleet). In military units, cooperative commissions were elected at general meetings of military personnel, whose tasks included: taking measures to most fully meet the needs of military personnel and members of their families through cooperatives; the prompt organization of the necessary cooperative enterprises; monitoring the activities of already operating military cooperatives, finding appropriate workers to occupy positions in cooperatives; clarification of claims and consideration of complaints about the work of cooperatives; organization of loans for military personnel, etc.

In our opinion, the content of the following documents deserves attention, allowing us to judge the assessment of territorial military formations (from the point of view of their combat effectiveness, vitality, interests of the state and society) and the general results of the military reform of 1924-1925.

With regard to territorial military formations, the Report of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, prepared for the IV Congress of Soviets (1927), in particular, said: “Based on the directives of the III All-Union Congress of Soviets, the Revolutionary Military Council during the reporting period paid Special attention territorial-police construction and on this path can state undoubted achievements. Territorial formations were continuously growing: the number of terdivisions since 1923, i.e., since the introduction of the tersystem, has increased fourfold. Last year for the territorial troops was a turning point in the sense that, having resolved the main organizational tasks, we were able to shift the focus to issues of combat training.”

A meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Union with the revolutionary military councils of the districts in January 1927 assessed the training of the territorial troops as follows: “The territorial troops showed sufficient cohesion and training, in general not inferior to the training of personnel units.

Over the past period, the Revolutionary Military Council has finally clarified the economic feasibility of the territorial police system. A comparison of the cost of maintaining one personnel and one territorial rifle division shows that a territorial division costs 1 million rubles less; the maintenance of one terarman for 5 years is about 54 percent. maintenance of one Red Army soldier in the regular troops for 2 years. These calculations do not include indirect savings obtained due to the fact that there is no need to build barracks, bear the costs of transportation, fuel, and remove the variable composition of military troops from productive labor, etc. . . . . .

The territorial system has won unconditional recognition from the worker-peasant masses as the most convenient way to fulfill responsibilities for the defense of the socialist Fatherland... If even during the Third Congress, even among military workers, there were small groups who doubted the advisability of developing a system of territorial troops, then now "At the time, their combat effectiveness is beyond doubt."

As a result of the military reform of 1924-1925 and a number of events carried out in subsequent years, the Red Army began to represent a serious fighting force. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 15, 1929 “On the State of Defense of the USSR”, in particular, stated: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) states that the assessment of the state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and development prospects given by the previous resolution (May 1927) , were absolutely correct, which was reflected in the continuous growth of the combat capability of the Red Army over the past two years. The internal structure of the army changed in the direction of increasing technical troops. Combat training of troops made further progress in mastering modern combat methods. Terstroiteletvo, despite the aggravated class relations within the country, developed quite normally, once again proving the feasibility of the tersystem as one of the organizational forms in the construction of the Red Army. The strengthening of command and political cadres went along the lines of increasing workers and peasants, growing the party stratum, improving the quality of political education and military qualifications. The material and living situation of the Red Army was generally improving.

The main result of the past five-year (1924-1929) planned construction of the Armed Forces is the creation of a strong, combat-ready army, politically completely reliable, technically at the level of development of the country’s productive forces.”

In general, the military reform of 1924-1925 gave our state invaluable experience in building the Armed Forces of the USSR on a mixed basis, which, of course, cannot be mechanically transferred and applied to modern times. However methodological approaches and techniques can contribute to the development of the concept of military reform. Moreover, it seems to us that its internal and external conditions, tasks and content have much in common.

By the end of the civil war and military intervention of 1918-1922, there were 5.5 million people in the Red Army.

Military issues in the course of the history of the USSR. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1986.- P. 134.

CPSU and the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces, - M.: Voenizdat, 1987.-P. 137.

Frunze M.V. Selected works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. - P. 41.

Ibid. - P. 412.

Collection of laws of the USSR, - 1925. - No. 62, -S. 463.

Regulations on the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR. Art. 5//Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the USSR. - 1923 - No. 10. -P. 301.

Decrees of the Soviet government. - T. IV. - pp. 282-283.

Frunze M.V. Selected works.- P. 419-420.

Voroshilov K. E. Defense of the USSR. - M.: Military Bulletin, 1927.- P. 96-98.

CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents 1917-1981. - M. Military Publishing House, 1981. -S. 258.

· Military reform 1924-1928 is a very important stage in the history of the development of the Soviet armed forces. Its main content was the organizational design of the Red Army in accordance with the requirements of that time, arising from the experience of the First World War and the Civil War in the USSR.

The international situation and the internal conditions of development of our state, which emerged three years after the elimination of foreign military intervention and the civil war, largely determined the general nature of military reform and the ways of its implementation.

The socialist revolution was victorious only in our country. In other countries, capitalism resisted the first revolutionary onslaught of the masses, generated by the imperialist war and October Revolution. A temporary, partial stabilization of capitalism ensued, which, however, did not eliminate any of the main contradictions of capitalist society and therefore foreshadowed new crises in capitalist countries.

Taking into account the economic and political strengthening of the Soviet state and under the pressure of the demands of the working masses, the bourgeois governments were forced to end the policy of boycotting the USSR and establish regular diplomatic relations with it. Recognitions by capitalist states strengthened the international position of the Soviet Union, but in no way eliminated the danger of new intervention on the part of the imperialists, a danger that arose from the very fact of the existence of a capitalist encirclement.

The internal situation of the Soviet state was characterized by the heroic struggle of the working masses, led by the Lenin-Stalin party, for the restoration of the national economy on the basis of a new economic policy. During the four post-war years, our workers and peasants, through their selfless labor, achieved decisive success in the economic revival of the country. By the end of 1924, the level of industrial production approached 70% of the pre-war norm, and in agriculture this level by the spring of 1925 was 72% of the pre-war norm 1 . The formation of the USSR in December 1922 created conditions for the further growth of the economic and political power of our Motherland.

When the task of restoring the national economy was basically solved, the party raised and resolved the question of the nature and ways of further economic construction in the USSR. The XIV Party Conference (April 1925), despite the fierce resistance of the Trotskyists and Bukharinites, approved, as an immutable law, the party’s directive to the victorious construction of socialism in our country. The XIV Party Congress (December 1925) outlined specific ways for socialist construction, putting forward as the main task for the coming period the task of socialist industrialization of the country, primarily the construction of heavy industry, which was crucial for strengthening the military power of the USSR. Due to the fact that our country was not rich at that time, and we had to build with our own funds, without any financial assistance from the outside, the party demanded the strictest regime of economy in everything, the rationalization of production, the elimination of unproductive expenses, and the reduction in cost of the administrative apparatus.

The presence of capitalist encirclement and the associated threat of new capitalist intervention confronted the Soviet Union with the need to intensively strengthen its defense capability. The issues of building and improving the Soviet Armed Forces, based on the experience of recent wars, acquired, along with issues of economic development, paramount importance. Back in 1921, when our country, having won a historic victory over the interventionists, was just embarking on peaceful construction, Lenin demanded that the entire party and all workers give unremitting attention to the issues of defending the country and strengthening the Red Army. He said: “...having taken up our peaceful construction, we will make every effort to continue it continuously. At the same time, comrades, be on your guard, take care of the defense capability of our country and our Red Army like the apple of your eye, and remember that we have no right to allow any weakening in relation to our workers and peasants and their conquests even for a second.” 2

However, the state of our armed forces and the progress of military development in 1921-1923 did not ensure the country’s combat readiness and did not justify the hopes of the Soviet people regarding the external security of their homeland. The main obstacle in the construction of the Red Army was the subversive work of the Trotskyists who were entrenched in the military department. These seasoned enemies of the party, enemies of socialism, tried to take advantage of the difficulties recovery period for camber military work and weakening of the Red Army. It was primarily their fault that the demobilization of the Red Army, which began in 1921, dragged on until 1924. It kept the army in a state of continuous turnover of personnel and instability of organizational forms, preventing the transition to systematic work. Demobilized sentiments had a negative impact on the morale of soldiers and commanders and on the combat effectiveness of the army as a whole.

The capitulatory “theory” of the Trotskyists about the impossibility of building socialism in our country in the context of a capitalist encirclement, which was also shared by the Zinovievites and Bukharinites, caused enormous harm to the cause of socialist construction in the USSR and the strengthening of its defense capability. The enemies sought to infect the party and people with disbelief in the possibility of the victory of socialism in our country, they sought to morally disarm the Red Army, poison its cadres with defeatist ideology and, thus, clear the way for capitalist restoration in the USSR.

The founders of our socialist state, Lenin and Stalin, worked tirelessly to strengthen the Soviet workers' and peasants' army and improve its knowledge of military affairs. They believed that the proletariat, fighting for its liberation, must create its own military science, consistent with its revolutionary role and class interests. Proletarian military science was considered by Lenin and Stalin as the most important part of the Marxist teaching on the conditions for the victory of the socialist revolution in the era of imperialism. During the Civil War, Lenin demanded from members of the Party's Central Committee a “thorough study of military affairs.” The Great Stalin, directly directing the military operations of the Red Army against the interventionists and White Guards, created the foundations of Soviet military science. The brilliant instructions of Lenin and Stalin were masterfully carried out on the battlefields by outstanding proletarian commanders - Frunze, Voroshilov, Budyonny and others. After the end of the civil war, Frunze and Voroshilov led a group of those communist army workers who fought for the restructuring of the Soviet Armed Forces in accordance with the general and military tasks of the victorious proletariat and on the basis of Stalin’s provisions on military issues, formulated in a number of works of Comrade Stalin during the civil war and in his 1923 classic “On the Question of the Strategy and Tactics of Russian Communists.” The most important and a necessary condition For the success of military development, M. V. Frunze considered the development of a unified Soviet military doctrine, understanding by it “a certain range of ideas covering the main issues of military affairs and providing ways to resolve them from the point of view of the interests of our proletarian state” 3 .

M. V. Frunze exposed the hostile “theorists” of the Trotskyists who denied the applicability of Marxism in military affairs and denied the existence of military science in general. M.V. Frunze, Voroshilov and other army Bolsheviks fought against the Trotskyists’ attempts to discredit the valiant path of the Red Army and ignore the combat experience of the Civil War. In contrast to the Trotskyists, who argued that the Red Army was only capable of waging a defensive war, M. V. Frunze put forward the slogan “Everything for the offensive,” considering all defensive measures possible in war only as conditions for preparing an offensive. The Party and its Central Committee repeatedly suppressed the hostile activities of the Trotskyists, aimed at the collapse of political work and the liquidation of political bodies in the army.

It is clear that while the enemies of the people sat in the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the military department, the work of military development was limping on both legs. The level of combat and political training was low. The task of summarizing the experience of recent wars in new regulations and instructions did not find its solution: in the three years that have passed since the end of the civil war, the Military Department has not issued a single charter or instruction. There was inconsistency in the programs and methods of combat training of troops.

The shortcomings of combatant command and control and political leadership, the protracted demobilization and the associated colossal and continuous turnover of army personnel negatively affected the state of military discipline. In the central apparatus of the military administration, the predominant position was occupied by old military specialists, many of whom were disguised enemies of Soviet power, but enjoyed the unlimited patronage of Trotsky. The apparatus itself had a complex and cumbersome structure, was cut off from the lower ranks of the army, and there was no business contact with civilian governing bodies.

An acute problem was the issue of training command personnel. The ensuing period of peace placed new demands on the commander: the commander had to become a comprehensively trained instructor, teacher and educator of the Red Army soldiers. But the system and forms of training of command personnel left over from the times of the Civil War in the form of courses for Red commanders did not and could not resolve the problems, firstly, because the short period of study in these courses (up to 1 year) did not provide the opportunity to deeply and to the required extent study military sciences, and, secondly, because the courses did not have a single plan, uniform training programs and the necessary teaching aids, written taking into account the latest achievements in military affairs.

The issues of recruiting the army, organizing the branches of the military, weapons, combat training, supplying the army, and others also required new resolution. But the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, until the enemies of the people were expelled from there, was not able to solve the problems of military development that faced the Soviet state during the years of transition to peaceful work. “The civil war had long passed, and yet the Red Army did not feel any fresh air, any creative work,” is how Comrade Voroshilov characterizes the pre-reform period in the history of the Red Army. A real danger has arisen that the Red Army, under such “leadership” of the Revolutionary Military Council, will not only not strengthen itself, but, on the contrary, will lose its combat effectiveness, its combat experience accumulated during the years of the civil war.

The Central Committee of the Party, having conducted a deep and comprehensive examination of the state of the Red Army at the beginning of 1924, took decisive measures to eliminate the existing situation and improve the situation in the army. Trotsky and his associates were expelled from the army. A group of combat workers - communists, renowned participants in the civil war, led by the most prominent figure of our party and the outstanding commander of the Red Army, M. V. Frunze, was appointed to the pestle of the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the People's Commissar for Military and maritime affairs. The Party's Central Committee outlined specific measures to reorganize the Armed Forces and strengthen their combat power. The military reform of 1924-1928 was the implementation of these measures.

The premature death of M. V. Frunze (October 31, 1925) prevented him from completing the reorganization of the Red Army. Frunze’s work was continued and successfully completed by his worthy successor as head of the Soviet Armed Forces, Comrade K. E. Voroshilov. All activities of M.V. Frunze and K.E. Voroshilov to implement military reform took place under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Lenin and Stalin more than once pointed out that the most important and necessary condition for the victory of socialism in our country in the context of capitalist encirclement is the country's constant readiness for defense, the comprehensive and systematic strengthening of all our armed forces. Lenin said: “... the ruling class, the proletariat, if it wants and will rule, must prove this with its military organization” 5 . Lenin demanded an immediate transition to military training following the demobilization of the Red Army, in-depth study and mastery of the combat experience of the imperialist and civil wars, and the continuous improvement of Soviet military science. Comrade Stalin, in his historic speech at the meeting of the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, dedicated to the memory of our great leader, took a great oath on behalf of the party and the people to sacredly fulfill Lenin’s covenant to strengthen the Red Army and Red Navy 6 . In his report “Once again on the social-democratic deviation in our party” at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in December 1926, Comrade Stalin, among the main factors that determined our peaceful respite and saved our country from new intervention of the imperialists, named the strength and power of the proletariat of the USSR, the successes of his socialist construction, the strength of organization of his Red Army 7.

One of the guiding provisions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army is the position on the dependence of the principles of military development and methods of waging war on the socio-political system, production capabilities and cultural level of a given state. M. V. Frunze expressed this position in the following words: “The nature of the armed force... is strictly determined by the general economic and cultural level of development of the country, its national wealth, its mobilization and budgetary capabilities. The character of the army is also determined general condition military affairs primarily in the countries of potential opponents. But despite all this, there can be no doubt that military policy strongly depends on the general “policy that in the same country, at the same cultural and economic level, governments different in their class essence will build the army differently” 8.

M. V. Frunze associated the question of organizing the army with the nature of possible military clashes between our socialist state and the capitalist world. He argued that the war, if the imperialists imposed it on the Soviet Union, would be tense and uncompromising, arising from the opposing and irreconcilable interests of the fighting worlds. Considering the possibility and probability that the Soviet Union in a future war would have to have against itself the combined force of all or several imperialist states, M. V. Frunze foresaw the enormous scale of this war and the participation in it of multimillion-dollar armies on both sides.

From all this, M. V. Frunze concluded that it is necessary for us to find such forms of organization of the armed forces that would allow us to prepare militarily the entire contingent of the population liable for military service in peacetime. Another conclusion concerned the need to prepare our entire rear for war, that is, to create conditions that would ensure at any moment the rapid mobilization of all the forces and all the resources of the country for the needs of war. Along with With With these two tasks, M. V. Frunze set the task of organizing widespread propaganda on defense issues among the entire mass of the country's population.

M. V. Frunze considered the basis of the combat tactics of the Red Army to be a maneuver, the content of which is primarily offensive actions against the enemy. M. V. Frunze determined this not only by purely objective factors (for example, the enormity of the theater of military operations), but also by the internal properties of the Red Army, its revolutionary spirit and fighting impulse, as manifestations of the class nature of the proletarian elements leading it and the very nature of the class war, as such. Frunze did not exclude positional forms of war and defense as a type of combat, but he considered them in the general plan of combat operations as means, one way or another subordinate to the goals of the offensive. “The tactics of the Red Army were and will be imbued with activity in the spirit of brave I energetically carried out offensive operations. This follows from the class nature of the workers’ and peasants’ army and at the same time coincides with the requirements of military art,” said M. V. Frunze 9 .

The military reform of 1924-1928 was the practical implementation of the party line on issues of military development, expressed in the works of Lenin, Stalin, their outstanding student and talented proletarian commander M.V. Frunze and the decisions of party congresses. It solved the problem of transforming the Red Army into a well-coordinated and highly combat-ready organism, operating at the level of modern requirements and ready to carry out any combat missions that meet the interests of the socialist state. The reform consisted of the following major activities:

1. In accordance with the decisions of the IX and X Party Congresses, a mixed - cadre-militia - system of organizing the Red Army was introduced: along with a small cadre army, retained as the main core of our armed forces. Territorial police units were created, the variable composition of which was recruited on a territorial basis and served military service in the order of periodic short-term training. This system of military organization was the only expedient system for our state during the period under review. Under the international conditions of that time, it ensured the country's readiness for defense, and from the point of view of internal conditions, it was the most acceptable, as an inexpensive system that corresponded to our economic and budgetary capabilities. The victory and strengthening of the Soviet system in our country, the political and economic union of workers and peasants while maintaining the leading role in this union for the working class, the unbreakable friendship and cooperation of the peoples of the Soviet republics, united in 1922 into a single union state - the USSR, ensured political success territorial police system. On the other hand, the use of police principles in military development was justified by the fact that the military equipment that was in service with the main branches of the Red Army at that time was simple and accessible for mastering during short-term training.

This mixed system of recruiting and organizing the armed forces was enshrined in the law on compulsory military service of 1925 and lasted for over ten years.

2. The organizational structure of all branches of the military has undergone significant changes. The infantry received a monotonous organization and was reinforced with artillery. The cavalry was increased in number and transferred from a three-squadron to a four-squadron regiment organization. In connection with the significant replenishment of the artillery fleet of the Red Army with new guns, all types of military artillery were quantitatively strengthened and reserve artillery of the main command was created. The structure of the armored parts has been simplified and brought into line with material base these parts. Sapper and railway units were consolidated into larger military units in order to create better conditions for their training. The organization and technical equipment of the signal troops have improved. In all branches of the military, service personnel were reduced and the combat strength of units and units was increased. The brigade link in the organization of combined arms formations was eliminated, and the divisions were disaggregated and transformed into more mobile and manageable tactical units. Much work began to restore and strengthen the Navy and construction of the air fleet began.

The Red Army received new regulations and instructions, developed taking into account the painful experience of the world imperialist war and the civil war in our country. In accordance with the requirements of the new regulations, the system, forms and methods of combat training of troops were rebuilt.

3. An important link in the reform was the organization of national military units in all union and autonomous Soviet republics, undertaken at the suggestion of Comrade Stalin and the decision of the XII Party Congress. This was the practical implementation of Soviet national policy - the policy of fraternal alliance and cooperation of the peoples of the USSR - in the field of military-defense tasks. At the same time, national military formations served as a school for general political and cultural education of the working people of the national regions of the USSR and as conductors of socialist construction in these regions.

4. The entire apparatus of military command from top to bottom was reduced and simplified structurally. A number of bodies that had been preserved as relics of wartime and had become unnecessary in peacetime conditions were eliminated, while others of these bodies were rebuilt in relation to new tasks. The supply management of the army and navy was reorganized in the direction of its decentralization. The introduction of the territorial police system entailed a restructuring of the registration and mobilization apparatus, which consisted in the liquidation of the provincial military registration and enlistment offices and the transfer of their functions to the newly organized departments of the territorial districts, subordinated directly to the command of the territorial military formations. Paper reporting by management bodies has been reduced enormously, replaced by live communication and control. The reform made the military apparatus flexible and capable of quickly solving the problems of military development, strengthened its connection with the army masses and business contacts with civilian bodies and organizations.

5. The system of training command personnel was changed in accordance with the requirements and tasks of the new period in the life of the Red Army. The main event in this area was the transition from short-term command courses, which until 1924 were the main form of military educational training for mid-level command personnel, to a normal military school with a longer duration and a unified training program. Another important measure was the creation of military schools in all personnel and territorial units for the training of junior command personnel. The network has expanded and the work of higher military educational institutions has improved. To retrain and improve the military qualifications of practicing commanders, advanced training courses for commanding personnel were organized for all branches of the military and service. The training of reserve command personnel was established.

Of great importance was the establishment firm rules regulating the service of commanding personnel. These rules ensured the stability of the legal status of command personnel and opened up the possibility for them to calmly and confidently perform their official duty.

6. The work carried out by the party to improve the social composition and political education command cadres, along with the general strengthening of the Soviet state and its armed forces, made it possible to carry out the transition to unity of command in the Red Army, which has always been considered by our party as the best principle of management. The introduction of unity of command played a huge role in strengthening the unity of military command and party-political leadership in the Red Army, which was and is the main condition for its combat effectiveness.

7. Among other parts of the military reform, the measures of the party and government to improve the material and living conditions of military personnel, as well as the expansion of benefits and the establishment of a new, broader system of state support for military personnel and their families, were important for the overall strengthening of our armed forces. Despite the great economic difficulties facing their homeland on the path to restoring the national economy and socialist industrialization, the Soviet people showed enormous and comprehensive material concern for those who guarded their peaceful creative work with arms in hand. “With us...,” said Comrade Stalin in his historical speech “On the Three Peculiarities of the Red Army,” “the people and the army constitute one whole, one family. Nowhere in the world are there such loving and caring relations between the people and the army as we have here.” 10

Along with the organizational restructuring of the Red Army, the problem of its technical re-equipment was acute. But during the period under review, this problem could not be resolved due to the fact that our country did not have the appropriate industrial base for the production of all modern technical means of combat. Under these conditions, work in the field of military equipment took place in two main directions: along the line of better use in the army of the equipment that was available and that our industry could produce, and along the line of theoretical development of issues of technical reconstruction of the Red Army, carried out by the party already in the next period is during the Stalinist five-year plans based on the successful growth of our industry.

Thus, the military reform of 1924-1928 transformed and strengthened the Red Army in organizational and combat terms and prepared the conditions for the systematic implementation of its technical reconstruction, taking into account all requirements modern warfare and modern combat.

“As a result of the work of 1924-1928. - said Comrade Voroshilov in his report dedicated to the 15th anniversary Red Army - Red The army received a modern, stable organization, established regular recruitment of personnel, established terms of service, received all modern regulations, systematized and established combat training for ordinary soldiers and commanding personnel, and developed a network of higher and secondary military educational institutions.

From An organizationally backward army, the Red Army in 1928 turned into a modern army, having drawn for itself all the organizational and training conclusions from the experience of recent wars” 11 .

The enormous work of the Bolshevik Party on the organizational strengthening and technical re-equipment of the Red Army during the years of peaceful construction was the key to its historical victories in the Great Patriotic War. Patriotic War, won under the leadership of the greatest commander of all times and peoples, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin.

Development of union relations of the Soviet republics in 1921-1922. Treaties of the republics with the RSFSR 1920-1921. Diplomatic Union. Development of economic relations. Creation of the TSFSR.

An important stage of the unification movement was the creation of a single diplomatic union , which found expression in the joint speech of all Soviet republics during the Genoa and Hague conferences of 1922. The diplomatic front of the Soviet republics was a necessary addition to the military-political union of peoples in the new conditions of the struggle against external enemies.

On February 22, 1922, plenipotentiary representatives of the Soviet republics: RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara, Khorezm and the Far Eastern Republic signed an agreement on the transfer of their representation to the RSFSR at the Genoa Conference.

The most important reason pushing the independent Soviet republics towards further unification was the needs of the country's economic development.

At the same time, it should be noted that the search for ways to build a multinational state took place in an atmosphere of heated discussions and a clash of different opinions.

Some of the managers Soviet state and parties, including People's Commissar for Nationalities I.V. Stalin, considered the creation of independent Soviet republics to be a temporary political solution, a step towards complete unification.

The Transcaucasian Federation and Turkestan served as examples of such associations.

As for Lenin, he advocated the national-territorial principle of the formation of republics, both autonomous within the RSFSR and future union ones.

Nation-state building on the territory of the former Russian Empire complicated by the actual inequality of economic and socio-cultural development of the peoples inhabiting it.

Some national regions of the country, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and part of Azerbaijan, have passed through the stage of industrial capitalism to one degree or another. However, despite the relatively high level development of capitalism (Ukraine, Baku) in general, these areas were agrarian. Other outskirts of Russia had not yet had time to go through the stage of capitalist development and had no or almost no working class. These included most Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, part of the North Caucasus and areas inhabited predominantly by Turkic peoples. Cattle breeding farms and patriarchal and semi-feudal life prevailed here. The vast and rich lands of the North were inhabited by peoples, many of whom were at the stage of a primitive communal system (Karelians, Komi, Yakuts, Chukchi, Nenets and other nationalities).

Thus, the new historical situation brought to the fore an important task - the elimination of the actual inequality of peoples.

An effective means to solve this problem consisted, first of all, in the industrial development of the national outskirts, in bringing factories and factories closer to raw material areas, as well as in providing material assistance to backward peoples from the center.

To this end, even before the formation of the USSR, the Soviet government developed and carried out a number of measures aimed at providing effective assistance peoples of other republics. This assistance aimed at restoring the economy, was diverse and significant in size. It was expressed in monetary benefits, grants and subsidies, in the delivery of grain to grain-starved areas and supplies industrial equipment, delivered free of charge in most cases.

So, at the end of 1920, the Soviet government issued Belarus an advance in the amount of 1 billion rubles and the necessary materials to supply enterprises. At the same time, trains with bread, meat and butter were sent from Smolensk to the capital of Belarus, as well as Slutsk, Mozyr, Bobruisk. These products were intended primarily for hospitals, shelters, and orphanages. And a year later, Belarus received an additional 10 billion rubles in monetary terms and the same amount of raw materials and equipment. At the same time, the peasantry of Belarus received from the RSFSR a large number of grain for sowing and an additional loan in the amount of 3 billion rubles.

Significant assistance was provided Transcaucasian republics . During May - September 1920 alone, the Russian Federation sent 280 tons of various foodstuffs to Azerbaijan. For the general costs of restoring the oil industry, she transferred 9.5 million rubles there every month. For the purchase of equipment abroad for Azneft, the Council of Labor and Defense allocated 500 thousand rubles in gold from a special fund. In 1921 - 1922, the RSFSR allocated 13 million rubles in gold for the needs of the national economy of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Then these republics were also allocated over 3 million pounds of grain and 8 million rubles in gold for the purchase abroad of draft animals, agricultural machinery and consumer goods. Subsequently, the scale of Soviet Russia's assistance to the peoples of the Transcaucasian republics continued to increase. She supplied them with a significant amount of bread, sugar, and textiles. And in Dagestan , for example, the entire textile and tobacco factories, a celluloid factory and, in addition, necessary equipment for the restoration and commissioning of a number of other enterprises.

Population Buryat-Mongolia was then in dire need of medical care, and the Soviet government agreed; 10 outpatient clinics and kumiss clinics, one resort were opened there, and several teams were organized to combat epidemic diseases.

The political results of effective material assistance from Soviet Russia to national regions were enormous. They were impressive, especially since Soviet Russia itself was in difficult economic conditions.

The workers of the national regions were increasingly convinced that the assistance provided to them was “the greatest proof of the love and selfless self-sacrifice of the Russian proletariat.” Attention to the interests of various nations, caution and consistency in the implementation of national policies helped overcome mistrust and bitterness in relations between peoples. The basis for conflicts was eliminated and close cooperation was established.

In December 1922, the Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the creation Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (ZSFSR) - the union of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The question of further rapprochement of the republics and the formation of a new state was raised in the spring of 1922, as the question of the unification of the RSFSR and Ukraine. In the summer, the question was raised about concretizing relations between the Transcaucasian republics and the RSFSR.

66. Relations between the republics during the Civil War and foreign intervention took the form of a military alliance, which in 1920 was supplemented by an economic alliance. Relations began to be regulated by bilateral agreements, which became the basis for the creation of a state body. authorities (VTsIK), including representatives of the Soviet republics.

On February 22, 1922, an agreement was signed on the transfer of the right to the RSFSR to represent and protect the interests of all republics at the Genoa Conference and to conclude international treaties and agreements on their behalf.

The economic union of the Soviet republics led to the need for political unification. The question of the formation of the USSR was considered by the Union republics in the summer of 1922. During its discussion, various proposals were put forward on the form of unification of the republics (confederation, unitary state, autonomy).

In August 1922 The Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was created specially. a commission to develop a form of relations between independent republics, which was proposed to unite the republics on the basis of complete equality and form a new state in the form of a federation of independent republics - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The commission drew up a project that served as the basis for developing the provisions of the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR. At the end of November 1922 This agreement was sent by the Commission for discussion to the union republics, which decided to form the USSR and elected their plenipotentiary delegates to the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

From December 23 to 29, the last X All-Russian Congress of Soviets was held, at which the decision was made to create the USSR and the entry of the RSFSR into it as an equal republic, and the Declaration and Treaty on the creation of the USSR were approved. December 30, 1922 The First Congress of Soviets of the USSR was held, at which the Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the USSR were approved, which later became the basis of the Constitution of 1924.

The USSR was created as a state, not an interstate association. However, according to its main features, the state was federal and not unitary.

The USSR included 4 union republics: RSFSR, BSSR, ZSFSR, Ukrainian SSR. The Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics did not become part of the USSR, because were not socialist.

The republics that became part of the USSR retained the right to secede. At the same time, while developing, the USSR was replenished with new subjects

Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR to implement the decision of the First Congress of Soviets at the beginning of 1923. A constitutional commission was created, the competence of which included preliminary work on amendments and additions of the Union republics to the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR. In April 1923 The XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) proposed to the Constitutional Commission, during the formation of the central authorities of the USSR, to ensure equality of rights and duties of all union republics. Equality had to be ensured both between the republics and in relation to the central government.

A proposal was made to establish a special unit in the system of supreme authorities. body of representation without exception of all national republics on the basis of equality. The executive bodies had to ensure through their work the real participation of representatives of the republics in them.

The republics, in their mutual relations, were granted broad financial and budgetary powers. State The organs of the republics were staffed with local personnel.

The Constitutional Commission completed the development of the draft Constitution of the USSR by mid-1923. This project was approved on July 6, 1923. at the II session of the USSR Central Executive Committee of the first convocation, and in January 1924. The Constitution was approved by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR.

The principle of the federal structure of the USSR: the openness of the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR for the entry of new republics.

MILITARY REFORM of 1924-25, transformations in the Armed Forces (AF) of the USSR to bring them into line with peacetime conditions and the economic capabilities of the state after the end of the Civil War of 1917-1922. At the beginning of 1924, the Commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by V.V. Kuibyshev, and later by S.I. Gusev, having inspected the Armed Forces, concluded that in existing form they are incapable of combat. In February 1924, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to carry out military reform and update the military leadership. General management of the reform was entrusted to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (chairman L. D. Trotsky, from January 26, 1925 - M. V. Frunze, from November 6, 1925 - K. E. Voroshilov).

The main directions of military reform were: the transition to a mixed system of building the Armed Forces (a combination of a personnel system and a territorial police system) and unity of command; reorganization of the military personnel training system; creation of national military formations; restructuring of the military command apparatus; changing the structure and system of operation of military logistics agencies, etc. The introduction of a mixed system for organizing the Armed Forces, despite certain shortcomings (the main ones being the insufficient combat training of territorial police formations), made it possible, at lower costs for their maintenance, to have a small personnel army that ensured the security of the country in peacetime, and in case of war, quickly mobilize large military forces. The USSR Law “On Compulsory Military Service” (1925) legally secured the transition to building an army and navy on a mixed basis. It established universal compulsory military service (including 2 years of pre-conscription training) for male citizens from 19 to 40 years of age: 2-4 years in regular army units; training camps lasting 8-12 months over 5 years - in territorial units. Three independent military control bodies were created: the Headquarters of the Red Army, the Main Directorate of the Red Army and the Inspectorate of the Red Army. During the military reform, the system of military professional education was reorganized; instead of 3-6 month military training courses, a network of military educational institutions was created. The composition of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR changed significantly: Trotsky and his supporters were ousted from leading military posts, their place was taken by supporters of I.V. Stalin. The position of commander-in-chief was abolished, the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR was transformed into the Political Directorate of the Red Army as a department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which significantly strengthened the position of political agencies in the troops. During the military reform, the Soviet Armed Forces were brought into line with the new political conditions in the country, economic capabilities and the level of development of military science and technology.

Lit.: Frunze M.V. Izbr. works. M., 1957. T. 1-2; Brekhin I. B. Military reform in the USSR (1924-1925). M., 1958; Ivashov L. G., Emelin A. S. Experience of military reform 1924-1925 // Military Thought. 1991. No. 4.

In peacetime conditions and with the collapse of the economy, there was no need for an army of 5.5 million people. Soon the army numbered 600 thousand. The reorganization of the Armed Forces affected all spheres of army life. It included the following main activities:

• 1. improving leadership and improving the quality of training of command personnel,
• 2. creation of a new system for recruiting the Armed Forces,
• 3. organization of a coherent system of military service for citizens of the country.
• 4. introduction of a mixed system of recruiting the Armed Forces (a combination of personnel and territorial police formations (consisting of people who underwent non-military training for a period of 3 months, and then served short-term training in the troops))

Transformation in order to strengthen the Armed Forces, reduce their numbers in accordance with peacetime conditions and the economic capabilities of the country.”

Universal military service was established for working men aged 19 to 40 years. The term of service in the army is 2 years, in the navy - 4 years.

Pros: The territorial police system made it possible to maintain a large number of military formations with reduced command and control bodies as a core for their deployment in wartime. In general, the system was economically profitable and made it possible to conduct military training of the population.

Disadvantages: The location of territorial divisions was determined, as a rule, by the principle of zoning. Therefore, in the event of war, given the vast space of the USSR and the insufficient railway network, the concentration of these units in one or another theater of military operations presented one of the difficult problems for mobilization deployment.

A system based on short training sessions could not ensure high-quality learning of complex equipment by personnel.

National construction was also taking shape: the creation of single-national units and formations (which was carried out by the peoples of the USSR) or units with a mixed national composition.

Plus: The emergence of national formations to a certain extent increased the mobilization capabilities of the country and contributed to the strengthening of friendship between the peoples of the USSR.

In June 1924, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a resolution on the introduction of unity of command and established a trace. provisions:

• a) operational-combatant and administrative-economic functions were the responsibility of the commander, and the conduct of party-political work remained with the commissar;
• b) the functions of commander and commissar were combined in one person.