Academician of brewers biography. Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich: biography, nationality, scientific activity. Y. Pivovarov about Russian saints

Investigative Committee accuses "historian" Pivovarov of fraud as part of an organized group March 31st, 2017

When the infamous ex-director of INION RAS Yuri Pivovarov appeared on TV screens (before that, he had temporarily subsided), there was no limit to bewilderment. Fuck! After the so-called "fire", the individual must sit, a fact, but the pseudo-historian radiates calmness and confidence in his own well-being.

The music played for a short time. Against Yuri Sergeevich, a new criminal case under part 4 of article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (fraud as part of an organized group).

"Investigators informed me about the initiation of a criminal case, today they came to my apartment with a search. They confiscated my foreign passport, and also took samples of handwriting", Pivovarov told Interfax.
Also, he added, searches were carried out at other addresses."I accidentally heard that my deputy, Professor Parkhalina, was taken away from work and taken home, and this lady has nothing to do with financial matters, she has only been engaged in science all her life", - said Pivovarov.

The Investigative Committee scrupulously checks the financial activities of INION RAN. Searches are currently ongoing.

According to Pivovarov, " This(his criminal prosecution - approx.) - Kafka absolute", and " complete arbitrariness and violation of the presumption of innocence". "First they kept me in charge of the fire for two years. . Then, when it turned out that I was not responsible, they began to look for something else. This is absolute political bullying.. For what, I don’t know - I’m not Navalny, not Nemtsov, but a modest researcher and teacher, I have never been a politician or public figure ", he stated.

Pivovarov Yury Sergeevich, 66 years old, Muscovite. In his own words, among the direct ancestors were the Decembrists and the Bolshevik Trotskyists, who were repressed under Stalin. In his youth, he was detained by state security agencies for distributing NTS anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets, which did not prevent him from graduating from MGIMO and graduate school at IMEMO. He is considered "the most prominent domestic political scientist, one of the most famous Russian historians", "the father of Russian political science", "the author new concept History of Russia". Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, AcademicianRussian Academy Sciences, scientific adviser, ex-director and head of the department of political science and jurisprudenceINION RAN, Deputy HeadHistory sections of the Department of Historical and Philological Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Bureau Information and Library Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences, vice-chairmanScientific Council for Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member Bureau of the Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences for work with compatriot scientists living abroad, Honorary PresidentRussian Association of Political Science(RAPS), head of the section "Scientific and cultural policy, education"Expert Council under the Chairman of the Federation Council, member Scientific Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, one of the leaders international project "European Information Network on International Relations and Regional Studies", lecturer Moscow State University, MGIMO And RSUH , Laureate Rokkan Prize 2015 (awarded to "outstanding social scientists for their contribution to the development of methods scientific research and for obtaining important scientific results"). The son is a functionary of the Ministry economic development Russian Federation, daughter - businesswoman, citizen of the Czech Republic, nephew - journalist, former head of NTV evening news programs, liberal opposition leader Alexei Pivovarov.

Personality about yourself:
"... At the age of seven or eight, I was an unconditional anti-Stalinist, a person who understood a lot of things. And what else was very important for me, oddly enough, when I was sent to kindergarten, the whole group of us was taken to the factory. And when I saw the plant, I said to myself, - I was six years old, they sent me to kindergarten late, - I told myself that I would never work here.
...of course, as a child I was taught music, a teacher came to my house. My sister studied at a music school, and a teacher just came to me, and I studied the piano. And the language teacher came, and then, having matured, I began to go to classes myself. Of course, I had a happy childhood, which not every Soviet child had, since my grandmother was given back all her regalia. It was a well-to-do Soviet family in a large apartment, and so on.
... my grandmother was a completely unrestrained person, namely, she raised me more, because my parents worked. The grandmother was fast on the tongue and did not know how to hide anything. But for all that, she was a communist. That is, it was not a Stalinist spill, but rather a Leninist, cultural one.
... It became a habit for me (in the USSR, in 1967!), - it became a habit to read foreign magazines and newspapers, which I do to this day.
... I got into science by accident, because after graduating from MGIMO I was hired for military-diplomatic work, but not in the Foreign Ministry, but as a military attache in Potsdam, since my first language was German. ...But I didn't want to go to any military-diplomatic work, and went to graduate school. It was a way to go somewhere on the sidelines, to be free, to do nothing.
... I wrote my first work at the age of 22: "The Philosophy of the History of Chaadaev." Of course, this work is not scientific, this is nonsense, but this is the first touch on what I do. And in parallel, which was also very important for me - already at 18-19 I was an absolute anti-Soviet, anti-communist, although until the age of 18 I still loved Lenin, my grandmother raised me like that. We at MGIMO created underground circles, prepared the assassination of Brezhnev, but I was not supposed to kill.
...once the MGIMO radio station was seized, it was in my second year, and I turned to students and teachers with a stormy speech. We were not kicked out, oddly enough, they left us. And then, in my fifth year, I was arrested for the first time. In 1972, I was arrested with a suitcase of samizdat at the Yaroslavl railway station. I was summoned for interrogations at the KGB, I thought that they would put me in prison, but not only did they let me graduate from the institute, but they also took me to diplomatic work.
... I was a parasite, and for this I could simply be imprisoned. Thank God my parents could feed me...
... At that time I didn’t think about any science at all, I thought about literature, about dissent, several times I went with a friend to see the camps in the northern subpolar Urals, and I realized that I was scared. I was afraid that I could not stand it physically. In winter and summer we went to see how the convicts live. It seems like hunting, fishing, but in fact they wanted to watch and communicate with the escorted convicts, and I got scared. Just because I did not want to go to the camp, to prison, I was physically afraid of all this, I was afraid. All this seemed terrible to me.
... As a matter of fact, in a sense, I have never been engaged in science either, because, for example, a historian does not consider me a historian, because I do not sit in the archives, I simply do not know some things, because they did not teach at MGIMO . But I was elected to the Academy of Sciences in the department of "History" and in the specialty " Russian history”, first as a corresponding member, then as an academician. But I do not think that I have written something classically historical.
...actually, it is impossible to get much help from me - I don't know how to do anything.
... I do not go to the theater or to the cinema - nowhere.
...I'm deaf, I think I'm pretty dumb with music...
...I have no professional interests, in the truest sense of the word.
...My son works for the Ministry of Economic Development in Moscow. He is not interested in politics, he is interested in the state, Russia and so on, because he is not an intellectual at all. ... By the way, I don't force my son to read books, he doesn't know anything, he never read any poetry, he doesn't need it - and for God's sake.
... I am an absolutely tolerant person, but I am not tolerant of people who preach racism, Hitlerism, Stalinism - there can be no convention here, with me, at least"

Pivovarov's statement in the program "The Court of Time":
" Bogomerzny Stalin created a disgusting cult of Alexander Nevsky"

From Pivovarov's book "Total death in earnest":
" The essence of Russian life is unchanged: contempt for the individual, in one form or another, violence against a person and his - ultimately - enslavement, theft, the ability to organize himself only for an evil deed"

From a conversation between Pivovarov and the staff of Polis magazine:
« Yu.P.…In a sense, Comrade Kant's idea of ​​a world government is actually being realized today. And if someone is an opponent of the mentioned structure, then I personally have nothing against it. Because I don't give a damn about all sorts of Russian-non-Russian systems: it is important for me that people live like human beings, and if the world government will contribute to this, then please. In addition, in Kant's reasoning about world government, as we remember, there is one very important idea: Kant said that Russia would not be able to govern Siberia. This is very close to me. I am convinced that Russia will leave Siberia in the next half century: depopulation processes will be so strong that Russia will geographically shrink to the Urals...
Russia needs to lose... Siberia and the Far East. As long as we have mineral resources, as long as there is something to eat up, as long as ... salaries are issued like this: oil prices have risen - they have been issued, nothing will change ...
The question is who will control Siberia and the Far East? Here for the Russians there is a chance in the future, a great chance to profitably dispose of this territory - after all, the Russians lived and live there, the Russians know it better than others, etc. Let the Canadians and Norwegians come and, together with the Russians, try to manage these territories. ... In case of abandonment of Siberia and Far East Russia will turn out to be comparable with Europe, then in the distant future one can count on integration into some Western European structures. Although in terms of territory we will remain large - but not so large. As for the population, all demographers say: now we have 140 million, minus 700,000 every year. It will reach 100 million, up to 90-80 ... In Germany - 80 million, comparable ... "

Historian, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Director of the Institute for Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Pivovarov talks about the formation of the Russian state, the parallels of the past and the present, the history of government institutions, the most important documents and the people behind them.

Transcript of the 1st lecture by Yuri Sergeevich Pivovarov, aired on the Kultura TV channel as part of the ACADEMIA project:

Let's start our lecture. Today it is devoted to the topic "Traditions of Russian, Russian statehood and modernity." Why did I choose this topic for the lecture? Well, if you look at Russian history as a whole, like this, for all its thousand-year development, we will see that the state, power, various institutions of power have played and are playing a huge role in our history. And in this sense, I could call our culture - imperious, political, legal culture - "power-centric". Power-centric, that is, power is in the center. In contrast, for example, from Western, from European, which I could also call such a tricky word "anthropocentric". Anthropos is a man. That is, there is a person in the center. Man is the measure of all things. Everything starts from the person. We are from power. How did it happen? At what stage of Russian development? After all, at first it didn't seem so. This is interesting to look at, and we will talk about it today.
Why traditions? Because tradition is not a museum that we come to and look at: yeah, here is a fourteenth-century painting. They don't draw like that anymore. And let's move on. Tradition is something that lives forever. Valid. Mimics, hides. We sometimes do not even see that this is a tradition. And sometimes it seems to us that this is an innovation. But the historian will explain to you that already five hundred years ago, maybe it was in some other form, but in fact it already was. It is very important. In general, when we talk about historical processes... History is a science. This we know. We must remember that this is a special science. Unlike, say, physics, chemistry or such natural sciences. This is my point of view, of course. There are no laws. There are no laws of historical development. When I was at a young age, we were taught in universities that, behold, there are laws of correspondence of something. Or some mismatch. And as a result, something happens. So, for many decades I have been engaged in historical science, political science. And I am both a historian and a political scientist rolled into one. I came to the conclusion that there are no objective laws of historical development. History is an open process. The process is open. There are patterns, there are traditions. They need to be studied. And here I emphasize - traditions. Because we are going to talk about it. But there are no iron laws according to which, say, the October Revolution should have taken place in Russia and people would have begun to build a socialist society. There was no such historical law of development. Why? Because man is a being with free will. And he can choose one way or another. And this is above all economic conditions, social, climatic, and so on. It is very important. What else is very important when we talk about Russian or Russian history? We must remember that we are not a backward country. And that our development is not diviant. You know this word "diviance", deviation, right? No no. We are going our own way, just like Poland, Portugal, Spain, Cambodia and any other country. And we are not far behind anyone. We are not chasing anyone.
Our development is what it is. Within this development there is a corridor of opportunity. It can be better, it can be worse, it can be successful or less successful. But we are certainly not far behind anyone. And our development is not somehow defective. That is, we are going, as we have been, along our own historical path, which we can criticize or admire, or do both. But, nevertheless, this is also a very important prerequisite. But let's get back to the main topic of the lecture - "Traditions of our statehood and modernity." Why did I put "and modernity" at the end? Well, "modernity" in Russian has several meanings. These are today's years. Or, there, the years that were ten years ago. But this is also a special era. You know there is English word. I'm sure a lot of people are learning English language. modernity. Modernity. This is a historical era that began at the end of the eighteenth century. Times of the French Revolution. And continues now. That is, this is a modern society over the past two centuries.
And so it is always interesting for me to compare Russian traditions, Russian traditions of the power of statehood with the fact that. With that. With what is modern world. This is what I think is very important. And much of what is happening with us, we can explain if we know. And I already spoke about it. But I will emphasize again. What happened before. And here it is very important to take some position, some initial point of view. In science, in general, the point of view is very important. I once read a major German philosopher who wrote that physicists (and I don’t do physics, I don’t know) noticed that when they observe an object for a long time, the object begins to change. I mean, it's kind of mystical. Yes? It is difficult to believe in this for a person who is not a physicist. But, here, the position from which we will look at the historical process is very important. Because, indeed, it depends on this position, on this view, how it will appear to us. Here is my position is to look at Russian development through the twentieth century. What happened in the twentieth century? It ended quite recently, ten years ago. And his breath is still palpable. Do you understand? Its air, its effects and consequences, they still work. And now we need to understand what happened in the twentieth century.
Every century, every century in any country, and here in Russia, of course, is peculiar. The twentieth turned out to be quite unusual. Well, it turned out to be unusual for the whole world, if only because people have invented a weapon that can destroy the whole world. This was not the case before. Frantic progress of science and technology. Well, you are witnesses to this, people of the beginning of the twenty-first century. But for Russia there were many other things. The great Russian writer Alexander Isayevich Solzhenitsyn, laureate Nobel Prize, somehow already in his old age, shortly before his death, he remarked: Russia lost the twentieth century. Russia lost the twentieth century. And this man was not a pessimist. On the contrary, he was a man of such severely optimistic will. And yet, he states. And I agree with him. His younger contemporary. I agree with him. We have lost the twentieth century. Even though it started out amazing. At the beginning of the twentieth century... Well, many people know about it. Development of the Russian economy. The development of Russian democracy, Russian education, culture. Yes, I have to tell you, it's fantastic. Now it is hard to believe that in the sixteenth year, during the war, throughput Russian railways was higher than American. Imagine that the capacity of today's highways in Russia would be higher than in America. This is how Russia developed. There was rapid economic growth. And Russia was moving towards democracy. Russia was moving towards prosperity, everyone noticed it. Of course, not everything was perfect, otherwise there would not have been a terrible revolution. And there were many unresolved issues. And others grew. But, nevertheless, the general tone, such a general upsurge was felt by everyone. And suddenly - a terrible revolution. And then more revolutions followed. First February, October. Another revolution of the fifth, seventh year.
And the end of the century. These are probably times when many of you were born. The end of the eighties - the beginning of the nineties, another revolution. Four revolutions in one century. And they were all different from each other. Their nature must be understood. And we need to explain why they happened. Why so many revolutions? Previously, it was not in Russia. What else about the twentieth century? Twice completely collapsed system. In the seventeenth year, the Russian Empire. Despite her great successes. We were the only country during the First World War, from the big countries, who did not introduce the card system. Where did the economy develop? And there was no hunger. And at this time, famine was already beginning in Germany. And here the country suddenly collapsed. You know how the wind blew and the house of cards crumbled. Although there was a powerful bureaucracy, a powerful army. Huge working country. And suddenly everything fell apart. Inexplicably. But the same thing, for example. It has already happened before my very eyes. Late eighties - early nineties. There was no such stormy, of course, flourishing as at the beginning of the twentieth century. But it is also impossible to say that everything is breathing its last. And suddenly, in an instant, in a few days, the country instantly crumbled in three or four days in August of the ninety-first year. It is necessary to understand what kind of institutions of power, which, on the one hand. And I'm telling you that Russia is a power-centric country. Here the power determines everything and dominates everything. And suddenly the institutions of power crumbled. And the country turned out to be ownerless. Anarchy has begun. We need to understand this too.
What else is very important for the twentieth century? An anthropic or anthropological catastrophe occurred in Russia. What I mean? A huge number of people died in Russia. Wars, revolutions, famine, Stalin's, unprecedented in history, terror. Stalinist terror in relation to his people. I think the most terrible of those that knew the history of large countries. Well, maybe somewhere in Kampuchea or Cambodia, as it was called, you can compare. But I have not seen anything similar in large countries, even in Germany, even in China. So, terrible terror.
And what did it lead to at the end of the century? To a sharp drop in the population in our country. demographic disaster. Everyone is talking about this, both President Medvedev and others. The population of Russia is terribly declining. But the anthropic, anthropological catastrophe was also because the best were killed. The elites were knocked out, as they say in science. What is royal, what is then Soviet. And so on. Through terror, through some social changes, when the best people were simply thrown out of the control system. ..... For centuries, starting, well, from the end of the fifteenth century, Russia lived by expanding its territory. Already by the year 1600, the territory of the Muscovite kingdom was equal to the territory of Western Europe. And even surpassed her. Each year there was an increase of about one Holland. And just like that, we expanded, expanded, swelled. And suddenly the contraction began.
Moreover, three times during the century we lost our best territories. First, according to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the eighteenth year that the Bolsheviks signed. Russia has lost about a million, well, a little less, square kilometers and about forty-five million people. Moreover, this is a European cultural population. These are lands with a good climate. This is the current Ukraine, Belarus. There Don, Crimea and so on. Then the forty-first year. A million square kilometers are occupied by the Germans. Seventy-five million of the population, forty-two percent, were under the fascists for several years. We played this case again. And, finally, the ninety-first year, the collapse of the USSR. And about the same Sami territories are leaving. That is, by the end of the twentieth century, Russia finds itself in a completely new situation. The population is shrinking. And before it grew. Russia in the late nineteenth - early twentieth century experienced a population boom. And then she started to fall. And the same with the territory. We expand, we expand... and suddenly we shrink. Today the territory of Russia is the territory of about the middle of the seventeenth century. Roughly, it never happens. These are the times of the reign, the initial reign of Alexei Mikhailovich the Quietest, father of Peter the Great, before the annexation of the left-bank Ukraine. That is, we have gone to the middle of the seventeenth century. And this is a completely new situation for Russia. But all the institutions of power, in general, the entire system of governance, political, political culture were built on territorial expansion and on demographic expansion. Now the contraction has begun. And we need to look, although they have been modified, to work further. This is a huge task for historians and political scientists. And we must definitely do it. Otherwise, we will not understand where we should go next. Another such, well, essentially, though, and introductory remark, that to the people. People tend to exaggerate novelty. When I was young, like you, it also seemed to me that I live in a completely new world, my generation will explain to the old people how to act. And today, against the background of the fantastic electronic revolution, against the backdrop of the fantastic information revolution, with all the computers and so on, it seems that the world has completely changed. They talk about nanotechnologies, an innovative way of development, about some completely different economy, social structure, globalization is underway. But, at the same time, very much, and in part I have already spoken about this, has not changed. There is such a wonderful American sociologist Emmanuel Laverstein. He was once asked: what has changed? He replied: "Everything, - a comma - nothing." And it's not a game, so to speak. This is not the coquetry of such a great scientist, intellectual coquetry. This is indeed an indication of dialectics. That yes, on the one hand, rapid changes. Yes? Well, for example, what we haven't talked about yet. The twentieth century. Early twentieth century. Russia is a peasant country. Russia is a peasant country. Up to eighty percent of the population lives in the countryside. The end of the twentieth century is the opposite. Russia is an urban country. And they moved to the cities. And they live in big cities. And, on the contrary, the village is empty. Yes? And Russia is becoming an empty country as people are drawn into the cities.
In Moscow, according to some estimates, lives up to one-seventh of the population of the entire Russian Federation. Let this be some exaggeration. And maybe not an exaggeration. But this means that Russia, so to speak, Moscow and large cities are pulling the population out of the provinces. Which was absolutely not the case at the beginning of the twentieth century. And then there was overpopulation in the countryside, and now there is a clear overpopulation in the city. We all come across in the subway, and in traffic jams, and so on and so forth. This is due to the surplus of people in big cities. That is, of course, the situation has changed. She changed a lot. And, at the same time, we can find a number of constants. That is what does not change. that still define our lives. Let's start from the beginning, shall we? What is the key factor for the development of our political institutions, power institutions, political culture, right? Here is the term "political culture", it was introduced into science by political scientist Gabriel Amond, an American. This is our attitude to politics. This is what we think about the institutions of power, about the state and so on. Yes? That is, it is the study of what we think about power. Yes? How we imagine it. So what was decisive? ... Adoption of Christianity. We must always remember that Russia is a Christian country. Despite the fact that most of the twentieth century, and my generation - absolutely most of my life - we lived in an atheistic country where religion was persecuted, destroyed, and so on. Although already in last years it was all much softer. We are a Christian country. This is perhaps the only thing that unites Russia with the West and with Europe. On everything else, we disagree. Both with Europe and with the West. West is Christian. And we are Christian. It really brings us together. And what does it mean when your lecturer says that the country is Christian for our topic? And this means the following. I always tell my students in the audience: “Have you been to the Tretyakov Gallery?” Well, the majority nods: yes, of course, there were, they drove at school and so on. And there is a picture of an artist with such a typical Russian surname - Ge. Yes, a typical Russian surname Ge. Such a picture, you know, so oblong. And there stands a young man with his eyes downcast. And in front of him is this man my age. So, with such a short, general's haircut. And he asks him: "What is truth?" That's what the picture is called. And this young man lowered his eyes so dejectedly. They are Pontius Pilate and Jesus Christ. The question is, why is it Christ, the son of God, lowered his eyes and does not say what is the truth. For a long time I could not understand. Then I realized when I started reading books. And in Christianity this question is impossible. In Christianity, the question is possible: who is the truth? Christ is the truth. That is why he does not respond to this general and invader of Judea, Pontius Pilate, Jesus Christ.
Christianity is a personalistic religion. personal religion. Personality Theme. Human theme. From here, then politicians say that human rights and other, other, other, other. And everywhere, therefore, Western Christian civilization, as I told you at the very beginning of our lecture, is anthropocentric, human-centric. And Rus' began with this. And Rus' did not follow the path of other religions, because, say, Islam, Judaism, or some other options claimed. Rus' chose Christianity for itself. That's how it happened historically. And all Russian culture is personalistic. Personal. Here there is the theme of personality, the theme of man. What we will not find, for example, in Chinese civilization, in Indian civilization, in Arabic, and so on, so on, so on. Well, we won't waste time on that, because our topic is different. But with the adoption of Christianity, another thing happened. We adopted Christianity from Byzantium. Not from the West, not from Rome, from Byzantium. And this immediately fenced us off from the pan-European, pan-Western path. They immediately blocked us off. Because Latin - the language of Western Catholicism, the language of interethnic communication, a language similar to today's English, which binds everyone, turned out to be inaccessible to the ancient Russians, our ancestors. Well, maybe only for some bookworms. And we took Christianity from Byzantium not in Greek. Since Byzantine Christianity was predominantly in Greek. And what language did we take? In Old Bulgarian, which became Church Slavonic. Because a century before the adoption of Christianity, Cyril and Methodius, as we know, invented the alphabet and so on. This fenced us off even from the main movement of Orthodoxy in Byzantium. And fenced us off from Byzantine scholarship, culture, from Byzantine law, and so on. That is, on the one hand, we have taken a step into the circle of European Christian peoples. And on the other hand, at the same time they took a step, as it were, into isolation. Like in a ghetto. This, of course, is such a double influence of Christianity that largely determined our further development, the path of development of our culture, including political. And immediately we took the model of power from Byzantium. What people often forget. Not those who are engaged in medieval Russia or, there, simply ancient Russia, but those who today are engaged in the analysis of power structures. That is, they forget that Rus' has such a tradition within which it has been developing for centuries. This is the tradition of the Byzantine understanding of the relationship between the state and the Church. States and the Church - the two main subjects in the medieval world. From their relationship depended, well, what a person's life is. For example, in Catholic Rome and in the West, the concept was called "two swords." Not balls, but swords. Yes? That is, the swords with which they fight. One sword personified secular power. It was the emperor, which means the German Empire. And the second sword, which personified spiritual power, was the Pope. These two swords fought each other. And what did it lead to? This led to the development of pluralism. Each of the Europeans of that time could choose on whom he relies. On that power or on this. He had a choice. And political scientists say: this is one of the reasons, one of the roots of European democracy. Pluralism, the moment of choice, the possibility of different identities. I am for these, I am for others. And there have already been political parties who fought among themselves. That is, such a prototype of the future Western world.
We took the Byzantine model. This model is a symphony. Yes? Symphonies, that is, accords. Symphony, symphony - agreement. The meaning of this model lies in the fact that in all spiritual matters the secular power yields the palm of spiritual power. And, on the contrary, in secular affairs ... And in spiritual matters - secular power. That is, they were inferior to each other, so to speak. Secular in spiritual matters, spiritual in secular matters. Such is the agreement, the symphony. But in practice, of course, in practice it was not so. And the main one was the one who had, in today's language, more resources. And the secular authorities had more resources. It's clear. And therefore, having taken this model, we, as it were, initially submitted to the fact that secular power is stronger than spiritual. Therefore, the influence of the Church and, in general, the spiritual principle in Russian political history is felt less than, for example, in Western, European history. Moreover, it is interesting that in the West the center of spiritual power is in Rome, and the center of secular power is somewhere in the north, beyond the Apennines, in northern Europe almost for Rome. And Byzantium, as then in Moscow, the palace of the emperor and the palace of the patriarch were nearby. And in our country, as we know, the patriarchal power or the metropolitan power has always been located approximately in the same place where the main sovereign, the head of the secular power, was. This is essential for the formation of institutions. And so our institutions began to develop from the very beginning. What else is very important to say about the initial stages of the formation of institutions, which to this day plays a role. Probably, you know, there was such a wonderful Russian philosopher in the first half of the twentieth century. He died, died in exile, in France. Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev. Yes, a very well-known such a beautiful name. And this man once said. He was, in general, a master of aphoristic statements. He said that Russian history was eaten up by Russian geography. What did he mean? The fact is that our ancestors, East Slavs , began to build a civilization in those places where, in general, no one had built before them. If, for example, the Germanic, Aryan peoples, who came from northern India and the Iranian plateau to Europe, they populated the territory of the former Roman Empire, already cultivated and with a good climate, where more than one civilization with very high potential, with great achievements, had already developed, then our ancestors, due to historical features, the historical process, I apologize for the tautology, ended up in this snowy northeastern Europe. Then twelve months is winter, the rest is summer. Where are the bad soils? Snow, forest. And there is nothing. And in this sense, we found ourselves in very poor territories, very difficult to live in, to develop the economy. I will not talk about all this, because on this subject there is, in my opinion, an ingenious book about the recently deceased professor of Moscow University, Leonid Vasilyevich Milov. Academician, professor, "Great Russian Pope and Features of the Russian Historical Process". This is a great book that shows us not to turn up our noses in general. After all, we love, we love to say that the entire periodic table is hidden in our bowels, that we have a third of the mineral resources there, according to UN statistics, of all mankind. Perhaps this is so. But we live in poverty nonetheless. And Leonid Vasilyevich shows how the Russian people and institutions of power were formed in this poor, cold, northern environment. This is the first attempt of mankind to build a civilization in the north. We are neither west nor east. We are north. And no Gulf Streams reach us. It is very cold here, despite all the warming of the climate now. And five hundred and a thousand years ago it was much colder. And these vast spaces with a small population, without a cultural background. That is, no one here has actually been engaged in cultural civilizational work before. All this led to the fact that one of the fundamental qualities of Russian history is its material poverty. And our vast unprotected territories. Huge territories, because the Russian man spread in those directions, in general, where he did not meet any resistance. You know that our ancestors reached the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, without the state, the Cossacks themselves went and reached. Because there was no real resistance. It was only in the West, there was nowhere to go to the north. There we have already mastered everything practically, we have already been there. Arctic Ocean. And our borders are open. Such a yard. And nomads here and there. And nomads here and there. And we are not an island state, there are no mountains. That is, all this taken together gives us a very complex and not always pleasant, not always convenient natural and climatic launching pad for the development of Russian history. We must remember this.
And in these conditions, in these conditions, with general poverty, and despite the fact that we have always been open, and to this day are open to various attacks, since we are not covered by anything naturally, there was a very small surplus product. That is, people produced, but very little remained of what could be divided and invested in further development. And because of this, the role of the state has grown. Since there is little wealth and there are many applicants for it, historically it so happened that the state said: it’s better if I control and distribute. I would rather define the measure of consumption, the measure of distribution, the measure of conservation, and so on. And where to invest small resources. And this is also one of the underlying foundations for the development of such a special state. This special type of power that we have.

One of the greatest influences, of course, on the development of our institutions of statehood was made by the Golden Horde. Mongol invasion. A lot has been written about this. Yes? And earlier in schools we were taught, in the Soviet. I don't know how they teach in post-Soviet countries now. That the Tatar-Mongol conquest stopped the development of Russia, there, and te-te-te-te. Everything is in this direction. Everything is very bad. Later we learned that there is another point of view. What is, or rather, were, they have already died, Russian philosophers, Eurasians, who claim: on the contrary, the Mongols did a great job. They saved us from the corrupt influence of the West. They have shaped our soul. They have shaped our political orders, systems, and so on and so forth. True, there is another point of view. Third. It belongs to the best Russian historian of all time, Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky. Who generally said that do not overestimate the importance of the Mongols. The Mongols influenced only the elite, the top. The people knew nothing. I think that my favorite historian Klyuchevsky is wrong. And in many ways, of course, these two points of view are right, that, yes, the Mongols, of course, stopped our development. Yes, sure. The Mongols, by the way, acted very competently. They took away, as we know, literate people from Russian cities. Because they understood that knowledge is power. They led away the masons, because the wooden kremlin or wooden gates and walls are easier to crack than stone ones. I mean, everything was very smart. But the Mongols really played a huge role in Russian history. That is, the history that is already after Kievan, Moscow Rus. And when, for example, today's Ukrainian historians say that you Muscovites are not the heirs of Kievan Rus, it is we in Ukraine who are the heirs of Kievan Rus, and you are the heirs of the Golden Horde... Well, yes. We are the heirs of the Golden Horde. Yes, in many ways modern Rus', Moscow, then Petersburg, Soviet and today's are, among other things, the heiress of the Golden Horde, although Kievan Rus, too, of course. In this they are wrong. But we must not renounce this heritage, this heritage either. Because we received it.
In the twentieth century, I already told you this, I quoted about Berdyaev. His younger contemporary and no less remarkable philosopher, Georgy Fedotov, Georgy Vladimirovich Fedotov, also lived in exile and died after the revolution, he said. He commented on the end of the Mongol-Tatar yoke. Here's what happened. Yes? One thousand four hundred and eightieth year, as we were taught at school. The end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. Although it actually continued. But it doesn't matter. What phrase did he sum up? "Khan's headquarters was moved to the Kremlin." The Khan's headquarters was moved to the Kremlin. That is, the khan moved to the Kremlin. That is, Moscow became Tatarized, became Mongolized, and the Russian Tsar, the Russian Grand Duke is Khan. In a sense, he is, of course, right. Of course, without a doubt. What's the matter? But the fact is that, being under the Mongols for two and a half centuries, the Russian princes, arriving, well, mainly in Sarai, yes, when there was already the Golden Horde, that is, the western part of the Mongol Empire, they met with some kind of completely an incredible type of power that they had not seen before either in Europe or in Russia. It was an incredible amount of power in one person. Here is the Mongolian type of power, this is when one person is everything, and all the rest are nothing. He can absolutely everything. All the rest - his relatives, his children, wives, there, I don't know who, there, the princes - this is, in general, nobody. Nothing. They don't exist. He is one entity. The rest are nothing. This was not typical for ancient Rus' . But for centuries, having been in such creative political communication with the Mongols, the Russian princes began to get used to this type of power. And it's not just about one volume. Power is a very complex, in general, such a substance. Yes? Power is always violence. Yes? Well, apply power. The same power of parents in the family. Yes? Or, there, I don't know, in some friendly... Older friend and younger friend. His power. The power of the teacher in relation to students. Even here there are elements of violence, and even more so when we talk about the state and politics. But power is also a contract. Here is the modern power in Europe and in the West, it has elements of violence, but also of the contract. When we conclude an agreement: yes, I obey you, but on such conditions. I am a worker, I work at your factory. But here are the conditions. Such payment, such, so to speak, social assistance, and so on. That is, there is a contract. Self-restraint. I give in to you, you give in to me. The Mongolian government completely denies any treaty. Any convention. Any cooperation and agreement between the two. Mongolian power is exclusively the power of violence. And so. They aren't bad either. They are no worse or better than others. And we are no worse and no better than others. But in nomadic empires, it was apparently impossible in a different way. And now the Russians are adopting it. Russian tsars, Russian grand dukes are gradually adopting precisely this culture of power. It is this type of power. It is this political attitude. And it's getting stronger, stronger, stronger. And even later, in times, so to speak, closer to us, in such civilized and beautiful times. There was such an emperor Paul the First. Yes? This is the son of Catherine and the father of Alexander the First, who was killed, who ruled for a short time. He was a wonderful person in his own way. "Our romantic emperor," Pushkin called him. He once, talking with the French ambassador, said to him: “In Russia, only the one with whom I talk means something. And only when I'm talking to him." This is a very accurate formulation of Russian power. That's how it started then, that's how it goes on, on, on. And now, let's see. Well, there is. We look at the twentieth century and see the same thing. This is the type of power that was formed by the Mongol influence, by these natural and climatic conditions, and many others. It has existed and exists. And this is very important to understand. No matter how power changes. The tsarist empire, republic, Soviet or system, or the Russian Federation, nevertheless, we see in changing forms the same content, the same substance.
But, of course, the formation of Russian power was influenced in many ways by the well-known, I think this audience knows this, the concept of "Moscow is the third Rome." Yes? Historians do not know for sure, they did not exactly attribute how it was. Well, this is some late fifteenth - early sixteenth century. This means that the teacher or elder Filofei from Pskov, who formulates the concept of "Moscow is the third Rome", which is not at all exclusively Russian. It is rooted, as we know, in the book of the prophet Daniel, in old testament, where the entire history of mankind is interpreted as the history of successive kingdoms. And in Western Europe this concept was very developed. By the way, such a late replica, a late version of this concept was Hitler's concept of the "Third Reich". Also such a secular and such a fascist form, but, in essence, so to speak, taking from here. So, Filofei, as we know, addresses a number of messages to Tsar Ivan the Third, his son, Vasily the Third, and says that Moscow is the third Rome. What the first is, here is Rome, yes, where the Church begins.
Apostle Peter, the first Pope of Rome, begins to build the Church. But the Romans beat Christians, persecution. And the Church. And the Church, according to Christian mythology, is the bride of Christ. And Christ is her bridegroom. The Church flees to Byzantium, to Constantinople, where it becomes the state religion. Byzantine Empire. But then the Florentine union of 1439, when the weakening Byzantium asks for help from Rome and enters into a union and submits to it. The Church, of course, cannot remain in this "filthy" place where they entered into an alliance with the Catholics. And for the Orthodox Catholics were worse, there, I don’t know what. And where do they run? Well, of course, he ran to Moscow. Here is Moscow. This is Moscow - the third Rome. Last. The fourth will not be, as we know, - says Filofey. That is, it ends here The World History . We are God's chosen people. Although we know that according to the Christian faith, according to the Holy Scriptures, there is one God-chosen people. These are Jews. Yes? God deals with them. And here we are. This is where the story ends. And what did it lead to? This led to the incredible pride of the Russian people. Yesterday we were some kind of backward province and ulus of the Western Horde, and now we are, so to speak, ahead of the rest, since Christianity has found its stronghold here. And we are the guardians of the ultimate truth. Incredible, so to speak, such a proudly ambitious concept. But it's not only Filofei who says this. Philotheus talks about who directly has the key to open this chest with the truth or the door where the truth is stored. Who, so to speak, holds it, who is the key to this truth? Tsar. Tsar. According to the doctrine of Philotheus, the Russian tsar becomes the holder of the truth in the last instance. He becomes a priest-king. In fact, the first spiritual person. That is, on the one hand, you see what a powerful Mongolian tradition is in power as violence. And here is the Christian Orthodox tradition that, firstly, we have the truth. And secondly, the king. That is, the personification of power. That is, remember, "the Khan's headquarters has been transferred to the Kremlin." So to say, the Russian Khan has the ultimate spiritual truth. This is an absolutely amazing idea. And by the way, you historians remember that this coincides with his marriage to Sophia Palaiologos. Niece of the last Byzantine emperor. With the construction of the current Kremlin. And with many such things, when the order of life changes. It's all the same era. Here, the end of the fifteenth - the beginning of the sixteenth century. And amazing things happen. After all, before the Russians ... I will allow myself such a lyrical digression for two or three minutes. Previously, Muscovites, residents of Moscow, saw their Grand Duke or Tsar, as he was later called, quite often. He was, so to speak, the first among equals, in essence, such a Christian headman. Elder in the village. He differed from them, let's say, a little. And then the Byzantine splendor and courtyard. And people began to see their king twice a year. Once at Easter. And Easter, you know, in the spring. Once at Christmas, when the procession was. And this, you know, in winter. Yes? That is, our tsar appeared twice on Red Square. And why, since Moscow is, therefore, the capital of world Christianity and the keeper of truth, they immediately began to go to the Kremlin, many churches began to be built around the Kremlin and in the Kremlin. The relics of the saints were brought there. That is, as if they wanted to magnetize this place with holiness. Why am I telling this? At the beginning of the twentieth century, when the capital of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic returns from Petrograd to Moscow again and the concept of building a communist society is announced, the Third International will be convened. There is the third Rome, and here is the third International. And when the Soviet people declare that they are the custodians of the ultimate truth, since they are the custodians of the Marxist-Leninist truth, which is essentially a secular analogue of what was before, the Kremlin will begin to do the same. When I was little, I went to kindergarten, we were taught such a song for poetry, it seems, by Sergei Mikhalkov: “Everyone knows that the Earth begins with the Kremlin.” That is, here, the Earth is round, it begins with the Kremlin. And look what the Bolsheviks did. They also began to appear twice a year, to be shown to the people. Once in the spring. It's the first of May. Close to Easter. And another time in winter. Well, the seventh of November, but it's already winter, close to Christmas. About the same. And in the same way they began to magnetize their relics, the relics of saints. And today you can come to their secular temple, called the mausoleum. By the way, architecturally brilliant work. Where lies the main saint. Yes? Moreover, he, indeed, is alive for them. Because, remember, if they still teach Mayakovsky: “Lenin is still more alive than all the living.” But Lenin died a long time ago. And why did he say that? Because Christ died, but then he was reborn. Do you understand? And around the whole graveyard, the whole cemetery, where the relics of other saints lie. This is not at all accidental. This is a continuation of these traditions that work, work, work. And in this sense, I must say that if you look through the centuries at Russian political culture, at Russian power culture, I would call it autocratic. Autocratic or power-centric. The power of one. The power of one autocrat who always personifies it in himself. This is a specific person. This is a specific person. And it has all the power. And spiritual, and political, and economic, and any other. And this hasn't changed much over the centuries. It can weaken, appear less intensely. It always depends on the person. For example, Ivan the Terrible or Peter are cool characters. And they sharply strained their power. Well, for example, some Alexei Mikhailovich Quiet. Well, the quietest was a man, so to speak. When they were late with a report, he killed, so to speak, they killed on his orders. Not scary. Yes? And if it was some other person, he would have killed terribly. Well, there were tyrants, but there were not tyrants. But the essence of this did not change. And she passed through the ages. And this is neither our failure nor our shortcoming. You may like it, you may not like it. Let's just say I don't like it. But, again, this is already a taste, there are no comrades for the color. But in principle, as a historian and political scientist, I see that yes, it all happened under certain conditions. Yes, it works in different forms, in different guises. And we must, of course, thinking about what will happen next, in the near future, especially you young people, thinking about what is happening now, of course, we must definitely keep this in mind. What else can we say about our institutions of power, about their traditions? Of course, one of the most important elements... And that's all, what I'm going to say now follows from what has already been said. This is the existence of the phenomenon of the power of property. There is such a word, there is such a term in science, when the word "power" and "property" are combined into one, into one word, and "power property" is written. This is also, when historians say, the type of power in Russia. They say "patrimonial" or "patrimonial". Remember the ancient Russian word"patrimony" or "patrimonial"? Ownership of power. What does it mean? This is when property and power are not two separate phenomena, not two separate, two separate substances, but these are together. You can't even separate them. This means that the one who has the power has the property. That the property does not walk by itself. Moreover, the word "property" is not entirely accurate, because ... Although, we do not have time for this. Property is a special legal institution. And here, rather, we are talking about property. About material substance. In the course of Russian political evolution, it turned out that practically the controlling and disposing person over this material substance has always been power. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, when these wonderful reforms were already underway, which I told you about, which you know about. Under Nicholas II, during the first census, Nicholas, as you know, in the column "profession" wrote "master of the Russian land." Master. He is both a ruler and a master in an economic sense. Moreover, this was when, it would seem, this trend is not particularly evident. But to this day in our country, whoever has the power has the disposal of property. And this, again, is connected with the course of Russian historical evolution. And property as a separate institution did not grow here. What else is such an important element of Russian power traditions? They always say: in Russia there is no law, no laws. And if they do, they don't work. They have courts, there, bribes and so on. You will hear this not only today by turning on, there, NTV or REN-TV. This happened a hundred years ago, and two hundred years ago they talked about this topic. Written a lot of works of wonderful Russian classical literature. Why did this happen? And here, too, is an absolutely amazing, unique thing.
Mid-eleventh century. Eleventh century. Kievan Rus. Metropolitan Hilarion. Yes? Metropolitan - the head of the Russian Church within the Patriarchate of Constantinople. One of two ethnically Russian people, metropolitans of the Kyiv era. Monk, later metropolitan. Writes the work "The Word of Law and Grace". It is even carried out in schools. This is one of the first classical works. It is artistic, legal, philosophical, foreign policy, whatever. Yes? And it has always been a mystery to me. A few decades ago, the Russian people were illiterate. That is, there was no Christianity, so there was no alphabet, they did not know how to write, read. And suddenly, after a few decades, a thinker is born, a person is born who, well, as if after millennia he saw where Russia would go. This is absolutely amazing.
I can't imagine, and I don't know of any analogue, at least not in Russian history. Well, you know, this piece is pretty simple. He writes that there are different options, so to speak, of management. Well, I will speak today's language, of course. Society. There is a law that guides us here in life, but it does not concern our internal structure, because it does not climb into the soul. Follow the law and you'll be fine. Dostoevsky's "Crime and Punishment" was written on this topic. Yes? He wanted to kill the old woman, already a criminal. The criminal, when already killed. Here, the law - only if he killed. Well, there is grace. Grace is something that descends from God, but not for everyone, because, again, according to Christian mythology, few will be saved. And on those on whom grace will descend, but it is not known on whom. Who will acquire. This thing is so exclusive, rare, so to speak. Again, speaking in today's, not very beautiful language. And apparently... I'm trying to reconstruct. Illarion thought about how to connect. Because somehow this is not enough, and that is rare for social life. And he introduces the category "truth". Is it true. Yes, the truth is becoming a key term, which partly includes the law, and these legal principles. It also includes some elements, perhaps grace, as well as justice. Includes social justice, equality and so on. That is, the word "truth". The term "truth" is loaded with huge meanings. Or, as they say in science, connotations. And, for example, this word is very difficult to translate into English, French, German, because there are no these contents, these connotations. And again, remember? It is wonderful that the code of Russian laws in the first century of the existence of Russia was called "Russian Truth". Yes? That is, it is, as it were, flying in the air. We also remember, for example, that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, an ambitious officer who wanted to make a revolution in Russia wrote a work also called Russkaya Pravda. Pavel Pestel. He thought Russia would live. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, one ambitious political emigrant called his newspaper Pravda. Yes? Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. And it became the main newspaper of the twentieth century. That is, this term remained in Russia for a thousand years.
"Pravda" is a key term in Russian political culture. Why am I saying this? And to the fact that the presence of this term for the presence of this concept, a phenomenon within which Russian culture fits, blocked the possibility of law. That is, our ancestors built a state of truth. Where there is justice, and equality, and law, and grace. And whatever. But our European brothers built a state of law. Well, right, the law, which in their life does not particularly pretend to anything. Therefore, in our culture, there was not even a desire to have a right. In general, the word "right", in the legal sense, appeared in Russian when it was translated from German. Feofan Prokopovich at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Yes? The German word "das recht", "right", was translated into Russian - "right". They have too right hand- “reht”, and the right is the same with us. Yes? That is, it is a translation, in fact, a word. That is, our ancestors did not even imagine that there is law as the main regulator of social life, but there is truth. And this explains Russia's inclination towards communism, for example. Since this is also an attempt at some truth on earth. And this explains why our courts are so weak. Why is our legal system so weak in general. Of course, in Russian history one can find some other traditions that can be qualified as legal ones. But we won't talk about it now. Do not have the time. But in general, this phenomenon of truth, I will tell you again, has blocked the possibility of Russia's development along some legal paths. But I would like to end our lecture here today. At the next lecture, tomorrow, when we gather, we will continue talking about the development of Russian political institutions and their traditions. What is left, what is gone. Thank you.
QUESTION: At the beginning of your speech, you put forward one such position that the history of Russian statehood is power-centric. But, you see, if you describe everything else through power, whether property, or relations with the Church, then it turns out that there is nothing but power. And if there is nothing but power, and everything is described through power, then it turns out that there is absolutely nothing. Here is the first question. And the second question. You said that Moscow is the heir to the Golden Horde, in this sense it is an ulus. This is debatable, of course. But this is the situation. This means that the situation persists in the sense that indeed, since that time there has been a suppression by the supreme bearer of power of the rest of the population. And that the population itself, spreading, colonizing the rest of the territory, it actually fled from this center. And settling in new territories, it calmly managed, for some time, at least, without state power. And the state power subsequently caught up with them. What do you think about this? Thank you.
Pivovarov: I can answer. Yes? The questions are very correct, understandable and interesting. That is, you study well, then. First question. Yes, of course, I am forced to somewhat stylize the approach in the lecture in order to more clearly show what I want to say within the time given to me. Of course, it is impossible to completely reduce everything to power. It `s naturally. But, look. I said: our culture, including the political one, is power-centric. He immediately said: Western is anthropocentric, human-centric. Consequently, we can say: why, in Europe, in the West, everything comes down only to man, through man? Of course not. But if we want to understand the peculiarities of the Russian political state legal development, we must nevertheless mention some of the most important features. From the point of view of this professor, this is power. And once, together with one of my colleagues, when we wrote one work on the methodology of Russian history, we called the Russian government "a mono-subject of Russian history." The only subject in Russian history. Knowing full well that, of course, there are other actors, there are other figures. But we had to emphasize this part. And to look. In general, this question that you asked is of great methodological importance. So I formulated for myself how to approach history, in general, to social phenomena. I called it. Well, everyone is now learning English, - "possibilistic approach." Possibility. Possibility approach. That is, Professor Pivovarov will look through the authorities. Professor Milov - through the situation with the Russian plowman. Professor Yanin - through some archaeological things. And genius - through the European concept. Another - through some other. In a dispute, for example, a well-known one, which to this day excites and drives Russian historians to a heart attack with a Norman origin, not a Norman one. I am for having different points of view. And possibilitist in that this is an opportunity, these are different points of view. And only then, you know, there are different cameras to see better. Yes, here? I am a football fan. Yes? And we see the match better. So is the historical process. Yes? But now I can just look through all the eyepieces at once. Today in this lecture I look through this eyepiece and emphasize it. Well, if you still can’t escape a little irony, really, I don’t know any other social history Christian countries, where the power would play such a role, and where the power would be such. Now, as for the Golden Horde. And this is also a very interesting question. And, you know, where is the most interesting? That they were walking. They walked by themselves. Yes. Of course. Moreover, at first, as we know, the authorities somehow did not quite understand where they were going, why they were going and, in general, what was happening. But there is an absolutely remarkable modern anthropologist - Svetlana Lurie, who writes. She investigates the issue. And which writes that the communities of the Cossacks, which, behold, advanced and were engaged in colonization, they reproduced. And the Cossacks are those who fled from the central regions of Russia. They reproduced the social relationships they brought with them. That is, they were conquering, but they were building the same social power relations that they had before they got there. And then the power came. And then it all finished. Although, of course, a certain Cossack autonomy, the specifics were left. I mean, yes, they did it themselves. But they reproduced Russia and the Russian social structure, and the political power, economic structure on these lands. How. Well, golden horde, this, in general, did not particularly connect, in fact. It has nothing to do with the Golden Horde. Because, well, they carried tribute, of course, and elements of this Horde tradition in Russian history. But, in general, you say: it is debatable whether we were an ulus or not. This is not a topic at all. Rather, the real theme is the theme that, of course, we are the successors of many traditions. This is completely obvious. Moreover, here it is necessary not to be proud, not to cry. It is a fact. And after all, any country is the successor of various traditions. Here we are painfully talking about the Normans and so on. Well, okay, the Battle of Hastings. One thousand sixty-six. Remember William the Conqueror. The Normans are taking over there. And they make this country different. Yes? And no one refuses it. Normans sail, capture Sardinia. And all, for example, the Italian aristocracy wears such? completely Italian surnames, like Belinger. This is the leader of the once Italian Communist Party, the Marquis of Belinger. Do you understand? That is, they are everywhere, they are everywhere. Italy has Norman traditions. They don't refuse. That is, Swedish, Scandinavian. We have Horde. Why not?
QUESTION: At the suggestion of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, there is a very popular term " Feedback". That is the response of the people to the actions of the authorities. In your opinion, is there a feedback between the people and the authorities in the Russian political historical tradition? Thank you.
PIVOVAROV: Thank you. I just have to, with all due respect to both Vladimir Vladimirovich and Dmitry Anatolyevich, say that they, of course, did not come up with the phrase “feedback”. It has been in existence for a long time. And it's just that they, like Russian people, use it. Yes? This is the same as it is sometimes said that the term "Aziopes" (from Eurasia - Aziopes, on the contrary) was invented by Yavlinsky. No, thought up the historian and politician Milyukov. Feedback exists. Remember, there was such a poet Pushkin? He said: "Senseless and merciless rebellion." For example, Razin, Pugachev, peasant revolutions and so on. This is one feedback. When a people, driven to despair, to horror, to the horror of exploitation, both economic and moral, and all kinds of physical, physiological, and so on, rises in terrible ... There were other riots. For example, the city uprisings of the first years of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, when the townspeople very reasonably demanded the law. And hence the cathedral code, which was printed in two thousand copies. A grandiose circulation for those times, not only for Russia, but for the whole world. That is, there were such feedbacks. There were also feedbacks in local government. And this is not only the Zemstvo of the time of Alexander II, in which there were not only enlightened nobles and educated merchants, but also peasants. And this after all and zemstvo movement before. Was there no feedback when power fell? For example, popular movements to restore the state in times of unrest, for example. In ancient Rus', in general, people's self-government, and in Novgorod - until the end of the fifteenth century, we know. Feedback - not only when people voted with their feet, as they say now. That is, the Cossacks. The Cossacks fled, it was also feedback when they ran away and did not give. Feedback is when the Old Believers, not wanting to become Peter's recruits, burned themselves. This is also feedback. Your question, really, is what influence the people, the populace, had on this. Huge, of course. Huge influence. At the same time, I already told you that, together with my colleague, we called the authorities such a mono-subject of Russian history. But we called the people a population. Special biological term. We didn't want to offend people. We specifically did not call either the nation or the people, since these terms are already taken. They have their own meaning. A population is a population devoid of subjective energy. When speaking in such a strictly scientific language. Here is the subject of history, its energy, the people have been deprived. And this is especially in times of serfdom, when people were turned into nothing. The same thing happened, by the way, in the most terrible years of Stalinism, when people were reduced to nothing. No wonder the CPSU (b), as the ruling party was called, was deciphered by the people: "the second serfdom of the Bolsheviks." All-Union Communist Party. Not by chance. That is, Russian history is the history of the most severe suppression of Russian hedgehogs by Russians. Not the Mongols of the Russians, not like the Germans killed the Jews, but the Russians of the Russians. Russians, Tatars, everyone who lived here. Yes? Ukrainians, and others, and others, and others. And in this sense, the history of both popular resistance and the history of popular struggle, it is very important. Yes, and people's self-government. You know, for example, that in the northern districts of Russia, for example, especially in the first half of the sixteenth century, this is before Ivan the Terrible, an absolutely remarkable time of economic upsurge and relative, so to speak, calmness to the atrocities of this fanatic, let's say, which he began in the sixties years. Prosperous, for example, provincial self-government. Lip elders. Even prototypes of jury trials. This is public self-government. And it certainly was. Incidentally, the fact that the people can, shows the history of the occupation. Here, the forty-second year, the forty-first, the forty-third. The people in the partisan territories were recreating power structures. It was then that Chekist partisans, emissaries, and so on, flew in from the center. With weapons, there, with directives and so on. But the people themselves restored self-government and did not die out. And entire vast areas, including in some forest regions of Russia. Well, first of all, in Belarus, in the north of Ukraine, and so on and so forth. That is, the role of the people is grandiose. And, in general, I must tell you that the people ... The revolution of the seventeenth year is a people's revolution. And the role of the people - please. On August 19, 1991, ten thousand people gathered near the White House, where Yeltsin was, and so on. Of course, they could have been tanks of all of them, but they stood up and said: no. And the tanks didn't move. And the people overthrew this government. It was also a popular revolution. That is, the role of the people is enormous, but we must know that in Russian history the population, the people, that is, you and I, were endlessly suppressed. As, perhaps, nowhere among Christian countries.

“How and why historians lie - IV, or Yu.S. Pivovarov. Part 1

Sergei Bukharin, KM website

IN hiding the goals and mechanisms of the information-shock operation "De-Stalinization of Russia", carried out in the interests of Russia's geopolitical rivals, we continue the series of articles under the general title "How and why historians lie", forming the "top" 5 domestic historians, assessed as falsifiers.

Today we will talk about Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.S. Pivovarov.

Today, the falsification of history has become a systemic political work. Purposeful distortion of the past, mockery of the lives of our fathers and grandfathers is one of the components of the strategic information war waged against Russia in order to disintegrate it and establish an external control regime. Corrupt bureaucracy, business, science, and education contribute to the achievement of this goal. The US State Department, through the system of non-governmental organizations, funds Russian universities, academic institutions, departments, individual "independent" scientists and experts ... As a rule, humanitarian and economic universities, departments, academic institutions use foreign financial support. It is these areas that have a decisive influence on the sustainability of Russia's development.

In the process of learning, students and graduate students are selected, the most proven ones are sent to study "over the hill", to the "metropolis" to continue their education. Then these masters and doctors, with the help of a lobbying system, are introduced to key positions in Russian business, politics, and education.

These young people can be found on the most high levels authorities. They are part of a cohort of individuals representing the interests of Russia's geopolitical competitors and transnational corporations. This same cohort also includes our “historians”, who, out of selfish interests, malicious intent or stupidity, contribute to the erosion of the value system and the intellectual degradation of Russians. As a result of the activities of falsifiers, domestic science and education are dying before our eyes.

Threats from such "historians" also lie in the fact that they are admitted to the process of teaching our children, write textbooks, introduce general educational standards, represent Russia at the international level, after which Resolutions are born, similar to the OSCE PA Vilnius resolution "Reunification of a divided Europe" of July 3, 2009.

Liberal professors talk a lot about "freedom" and "pluralism". However, "freedom" and "pluralism" exist only for them, not for students. For example, what grade will the “historian” Y. Pivovarov give to a student if a student at an academician’s lecture declares that he confuses Hindenburg with Ludendorff, incorrectly names dates, invents events and, in general, he is not a historian at all, but an ignoramus and a liar?

Russia is losing "state immunity", so the falsifiers have completely lost their sense of proportion. In particular, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.S. Pivovarov:

- is not afraid to propagate his ideas of the disintegration of Russia and the reduction of its population;

He is not afraid of legal responsibility for insulting the honor and dignity of our fathers and grandfathers and damage to the business reputation of the Red Army;

- not afraid to show their ignorance;

- is not afraid that someone will have the courage to tell him that he is not a historian or a scientist!

“June 10-11, the Hungarian Center for Russian Studies of the Budapest University. Loranda Eötvös (Prof. Gyula Svak) and Department of History of Eastern Europe(Prof. Tomasz Kraus) held an international scientific conference in Budapest on the topic “The Great Patriotic War- 70 years of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. The Hungarian news agency MTI has given two short messages on the pages of its portal about each day of the conference.

Of all the reports of the conference participants, only two speeches seemed particularly noteworthy to the MTI correspondent: the senior researcher of INION RAS Irina Glebova and Director of INION RAS Academician Yuri Pivovarov. Thus, in his report, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Pivovarov noted: “The cult of the Soviet victory in the World War is the main legitimate basis for modern Russia. It is loudly voiced by television, newspapers, and other media. On this basis, the consciousness of twenty-year-olds is built. This victory is everything for us, we will never refuse it, only we can win - these are the main components of the myth. After 1945, the myth of victory in the World War, which had forgotten millions of victims, became the main basis for the legitimation of the second edition of the communist regime in the USSR, and then in present-day Russia.” So, for Yu. Pivovarov, as well as for the employees of the academic institute he heads, the Great Patriotic War is not the Great and not the Patriotic War, but the “so-called” war, and victory in it is a myth. The Hungarian correspondent of MTI liked the last definition so much that he repeated it 15 times in his short message! »

The Russian historian Alexander Dyukov commented on the report of Academician Pivovarov as follows: “As for the speech at the conference by Director of INION RAS Yu.S. Pivovarov, then it, being devoted not to the problems considered at the conference, but to a general view of the history of the Soviet Union, clearly stood out against the general background. Listeners could see that Yu.S. Pivovarov created the concept not by summarizing facts and creating a consistent concept on their basis, but by using facts (including unverified ones) to illustrate an already formulated concept. This led to the presence in the speech of Yu.S. Pivovarov a significant number of factual errors, which I pointed out in the course of the ensuing discussion. The report of the Director of INION RAS was also met with skepticism by the Hungarian colleagues. In any case, as stated by Yu.S. Pivovarov, the controversial historical concept deserves careful scientific criticism »…

Let's take a critical look life path and "scientific creativity" of Academician Pivovarov.

Yuri Sergeevich Pivovarov(born April 25, 1950, Moscow) in 1967 entered the Moscow State Institute international relations(MGMIMO) USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he graduated in 1972. To enter the Institute of International Relations from school was almost unbelievable in those days. “Mere mortals” could enter this university (as a rule) after military service in the Soviet army, if they managed to join the CPSU there and get a referral from the political department of the military district to this prestigious university or on the recommendation of the district committee of the CPSU (for Moscow) or the regional committee CPSU for the provinces. This was a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining a MGIMO student card.

In 1975, Yuri Sergeevich completed his postgraduate studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He became a doctor of political sciences, professor, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) since 1997 (during the “democratic period”), academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 2006.

How similar they all are, these now successful "historians". All of them, without exception, made their careers under the communist regime. All without exception, justifying themselves for this, call themselves dissidents. So Yuri Sergeevich, the grandson of a fiery revolutionary, Ilyich's comrade-in-arms, told us: “Today is February 13, 2002. On February 13, 1972, exactly 30 years ago, I was arrested by the KGB for the first time. I was arrested at the Yaroslavl railway station early in the morning on February 13th.” “First time arrested”, i.e. it is assumed that the young dissident was repeatedly repressed: he was imprisoned, exiled, etc.

« He was familiar with dissidents, transported samizdat literature, was once detained with reprints, and persecution came down to the fact that after graduate school he was not hired and was unemployed for a year. I studied at MGIMO on the same course with Lavrov, Torkunov, Migranyan, with the ambassador to America Kislyak in the same class at school - they were already making a career, and I went in a padded jacket, in kirzachs with footcloths, with a cigarette in my teeth "(from here). It is necessary to be able to do this: in the USSR, for a whole year, "with a cigarette in your mouth" without work, blabbed. At that time, the article in the Criminal Code was “for parasitism”, which was defined as a long-term, more than four months in a row (or for a year in total), the residence of an adult able-bodied person on unearned income with evasion from socially useful work. Under Soviet criminal law, parasitism was punishable (Article 209 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). By the way, I. Brodsky was convicted under this article. But Yuri Sergeevich gets away with everything, after a year of parasitism he is hired at a prestigious academic institute.

Thus, in the winter of 1972, the "dissident" Pivovarov was arrested by the KGB, in the spring of the same year he graduated from the prestigious MGIMO of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the fall of the same year he was admitted to full-time postgraduate studies at the no less prestigious IMEMO of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Since 1976 Yury Sergeevich has been working at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Since 1998 - Director of INION RAS, at the same time head of the Department of Political Science and Jurisprudence of INION RAS. Since the early 1990s reads a number of lecture courses at Moscow State University and Russian State Humanitarian University. President of the Russian Association of Political Science (RAPN) since February 2011, honorary president of RAPS since 2004

Deputy Head of the History Section of the Department of Historical and Philological Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Bureau of the Information and Library Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Chairman of the Scientific Council for Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Scientific and Cultural Policy, Education Section of the Expert Council under the Chairman of the Federation Council, Member of the Scientific Council under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, etc.

Y. Pivovarov about Russian saints

Is it possible to publicly spit on an icon in the presence of 83,000 people, or, surrounded by the same number of Muslims, defiantly step on the Koran? “What a stupid question,” anyone will answer normal Human. But why is it possible to offend Orthodox saints? For example, the holy noble Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky. Here is how historian Yu. Pivovarov, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, speaks of the prince: “The same Alexander Nevsky is one of the controversial, if not stinking figures in Russian history, but you can’t debunk him. ... And Nevsky, relying on the Horde, became its hired warrior. In Tver, Torzhok, Staraya Russa, he cut the ears of fellow believers who rebelled against the Mongols, poured boiling water and lead into their mouths. ... And the Battle of the Ice is just a small border conflict in which Nevsky behaved like a bandit, attacking a handful of border guards in large numbers. He acted in the same ignoble manner in the Battle of the Neva, for which he became Nevsky. In 1240, having made his way to the headquarters of the Swedish jarl, the ruler of Birger, he himself knocked out his eye with a spear, which among the knights was considered not comme il faut. From an interview with Y. Pivovarov to the magazine "Profile" No. 32/1 (circulation 83 thousand copies).

The events Yu. Pivovarov is talking about happened a very long time ago. There are no documents that could confirm the correctness of the conclusions of the academician. For this reason alone, one can say that he is wrong, since here the point is already in subjective assessment activities of the holy noble prince, and not in science. Evaluation is business free will."

The "free will" of the academician determines his conclusion regarding the activities of Alexander Nevsky. Yu. Pivovarov is not original in his reasoning; even under Nicholas I, a little book about Russia “La Russie en 1839” by Marquis de Custine was published in Paris. In his "travel notes" Custine does not confine himself to attacks on contemporary Russia, he seeks, on occasion, to debunk the Russian past, to undermine the historical foundations of the Russian people. Among Custine's attacks on the Russian past, ironic words dedicated to the memory of the holy noble prince Alexander Nevsky attract attention. Custine says: “Alexander Nevsky is a model of caution; but he was not a martyr either for faith or for noble feelings. The national church canonized this sovereign, more wise than heroic. This is Ulysses among the saints." And pay attention: even this cave Russophobe does not allow himself to stoop to the level of that dirty abuse that the historian Yu. Pivovarov releases against the Russian saint.

There are several points of view on the acts of Alexander Nevsky. Yu. Pivovarov represents the point of view of Western liberals. The evaluation of the activities of the Grand Duke by Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov is exactly the opposite. And we have no reason not to trust L.N. Gumilyov, since he is wise, tactful and does not “distort” the facts.

In the same way, Y. Pivovarov insulted the Russian Orthodox Church in his interview: “Do you know when Dmitry Donskoy was canonized as a saint? You will laugh - by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1980, when the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo was celebrated, they discovered that Donskoy was not canonized, and the Central Committee of the CPSU “recommended” the church to “correct the mistake,” says the “historian” Pivovarov. It turns out that the academician is a “historian” (mostly Yu. Pivovarov was engaged in a strange science of political science, but he recommends himself to everyone as a historian) does not know that Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy was canonized in June 1988, during the celebrations in honor of the 1000th anniversary of Christianity in Rus'. For information (Yu. Pivovarova and others): at that time the intervention of the “Central Committee of the CPSU” in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was simply impossible. So here our Yu. Pivovarov manifests himself as an ignoramus and at the same time slanders - which is "not comme il faut" for a historian.

Y. Pivovarov about Russian national heroes

Our historian is consistent, he has few saints, and other Russian national heroes get from him. In particular: “The real Kutuzov has nothing to do with us, but the fictional one (L. Tolstoy in the novel War and Peace. - S.B.) is the embodiment of the deep Russian spirit. But Kutuzov was a lazy person, an intriguer, an erotomaniac who adored fashionable French actresses and read French pornographic novels. This is how the academician characterizes desperately a brave warrior who made a career not on the floor in St. Petersburg, but in bloody battles, where he was seriously wounded three times .

In the battle near Alushta on July 23, 1774, Kutuzov, commanding the grenadier battalion of the Moscow Legion, was the first to break into the fortified village of Shumy, while pursuing the fleeing enemy, he was seriously wounded by a bullet in the temple. For this feat, the 29-year-old captain was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree. During the 2nd Turkish War, during the siege of Ochakov, Kutuzov was seriously wounded twice (1788). Note that he received these injuries, being a general, that is, "lazy and erotomaniac" M. Kutuzov did not hide behind the backs of his soldiers. In 1790, participating under the command of Suvorov in the assault on Izmail, Kutuzov, at the head of the column, captured the bastion and was the first to break into the city. Here is how Suvorov assessed his subordinate: « Major General and Cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed new experiences of his art and courage ... he, serving as an example of courage, held his place, overcame a strong enemy, established himself in the fortress and continued to defeat enemies ". Kutuzov was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commandant of Ishmael. Then there was participation in the war in Poland, diplomatic and administrative work, and in the final - the most active participation in the victorious war with Napoleon. Or are they myths?

Suffice it to say that Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov is Full Knight of the Order of Saint George. Such in history Russian Empire was only four(!). A significant part of the military service of Mikhail Illarionovich took place on the battlefields, in the most difficult conditions. War is, first of all, hard work, wear and tear and the highest responsibility for the lives of subordinates and the Fatherland. Later, this tension and numerous injuries did their job: the body was completely worn out, the field marshal did not live to be seventy years old.

Why does Y. Pivovarov believe that M. Kutuzov has nothing to do with us (probably Russians)? Maybe because foreign languages they were given to him very easily, and he knew many of them. Or because there was a most tender father and husband ? He had six children. The only son died in infancy. There are five daughters left. Liza, the ugliest and most beloved, was married to an officer in his army, a war hero. When his beloved son-in-law died on the battlefield, Kutuzov sobbed like a child. “Well, why are you killing yourself like that, you have seen so many deaths!” they told him. He replied: “Then I was a commander, and now I am an inconsolable father.” He hid from Lisa for a month that she was already a widow.

Or M. Kutuzov was not Russian because he was the greatest strategist who surpassed Napoleon himself? The field marshal was against the march on Paris and the liberation of Europe, hostile to Russia, from Napoleon. He saw for many years to come and, in the end, was right. The brothers Alexander and Nikolai "were the first" to fight the revolutionary contagion in Europe, and she responded with aggression (the war of 1854-1856) .

So, is Kutuzov too good or still bad for the Russians? What does Yu. Pivovarov mean when he says: “The real Kutuzov has nothing to do with us”?

A few years ago, Yu. Pivovarov discovered, by his own admission, “a completely astonishing ... historical fact”: “In 1612, when Kuzma Minin was gathering a militia to drive the Poles out of Moscow, he sold part of the population of Nizhny Novgorod into slavery. And with this money he formed a militia for Prince Pozharsky. This was reported in a remarkable place - in the Gorbachev Foundation, at the round table "The Formation of Democracy in Modern Russia: from Gorbachev to Putin" with the participation of titled foreign colleagues.

What does Kuzma Minin have to do with it, if our academician was called to speak about Gorbachev and Putin? And here's what: “Russia,” Yuri Sergeevich explains, as if drawing a line from the slave-owning habits of Kuzma Minin to today's plunder of national wealth by those in power, “always used its natural resources. Once upon a time they were people…

materials round table got into print. And now V. Rezunkov, the host of the Radio Liberty radio station (also on the budget of the US State Department), on November 4, that is, on the day of the celebration of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God, as well as on National Unity Day, smartly broadcasts throughout the country: “Famous Russian scientist ( !? - S.B.), historian Yuri Pivovarov discovered an amazing historical fact. In 1612, when Kuzma Minin was gathering a militia to drive the Poles out of Moscow, he sold part of the population of Nizhny Novgorod into slavery and with this money formed a militia for Prince Pozharsky.

To be continued…

Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich was born on April 25, 1950 in Moscow. This academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences is best known as an outstanding historian and political scientist.

Biography

Yuri Pivovarov (he was educated at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), graduating in 1972. In 1981, he became a candidate of historical sciences. The young specialist defended his thesis on the socio-political organizations of workers in Germany. In 1995- m Pivovarov Yuri - already a doctor of political sciences.

Since the age of 25, the scientist has been working at INION - the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences. Pivovarov was the director of this institution in 1998 - 2015. At the same time, he was in charge of the political science and jurisprudence department of INION. The historian lectures at the Russian State University for the Humanities and Moscow State University.

Positions and appointments

In 2001, Yuri Pivovarov was elected president of the RAPN - Russian Association. He was also chairman of the expert council Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. At Moscow State University, the historian heads the Department of Comparative Political Science, which is part of the Faculty of Political Science. He has not only the experience of a teacher, but also an effective manager.

In 2010 - 2012 Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich was a member of the Commission that examined historical falsifications that were detrimental to Russia's interests. He also collaborates a lot with scientific journals (Herald of the Archivist, Political Studies, Philosophical Sciences).

Fire in INION

On the night of January 31, 2015, a terrible fire broke out in the INION library, which destroyed not only the building, but also a significant part of the library's unique book fund. The President of the Institute at that time was Yury Sergeevich Pivovarov. The biography of the scientist and the head of scientific organizations and institutions is generally similar to the biographies of his colleagues, but the fire episode became a unique precedent for him.

More than 5 million publications perished as a result of the fire. The losses amounted to about 20% of the library, which was considered the heart of the country's humanitarian thought. Vladimir Fortov called the fire in INION "Chernobyl" Russian science". Because of what happened, Yuri Pivovarov was removed from the leadership of the Institute. In April 2015, after leaving the presidency, he was appointed scientific director of INION.

Publications

Since childhood, Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich, whose parents supported his interest in science, was interested in political science and history. As a professional scientist, in his work, in addition to these topics, he also touches on issues of Russian statehood and the methodology of humanitarian knowledge. Pivovarov Yuri wrote more than 500 scientific works. They include 8 monographs. A significant part of the political scientist's work is devoted to Russia and Germany.

Also, most of Pivovarov's research refers to the twentieth century in Russian history. This is due to the fact that a real anthropological catastrophe occurred in Russia during this period. An enormous number of people died. Revolutions, wars, famine - all this is trying to comprehend and generalize in his works the scientist. He considers the terrible Soviet terror the most grandiose in the history of mankind, on a par with the terror in Kampuchea.

Scientific style of the author

Russian thought and political culture are two key disciplines that Yury Sergeevich Pivovarov has been and is engaged in. "Married" to theoretical and methodological issues, it touches little on the specifics. The author himself, following the French historian Fernand Braudel, calls the facts "dust".

In raising questions and trying to answer them, Pivovarov turns to creative heritage Russian thinkers, justifying this by the fact that any national thought is a way and experience of collective self-knowledge. The scientist noted that the West is characterized by attention to epistemology and methodology, and in Russia - to historiosophical topics (topics of historical philosophy).

Russian thought

A significant part of the scientific activity of Yuri Pivovarov is connected with the study of the heritage of Russian public thinkers of the 20th century. In the nineties, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the removal of ideological prohibitions, it became possible to restore the intellectual, moral and aesthetic turns of Russian culture. This is what Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich did. The family of the scientist comes from Moscow, and in the era of the USSR it was easier for him to get samizdat publications. Now, however, many forgotten works have come from the special depositories, and there is an unprecedented scope for work.

Soon, Yuri Pivovarov noted that the unexpected appearance of a huge layer of literature had no effect on society. The work of the scientist "Russian Thought" is devoted to this problem. The author also called it "an experience of critical methodology". Pivovarov conducted his research on the example of the legacy of such thinkers as Boris Paramonov, Boris Groys, etc. The scientist identified several key problems of Russian thought. First of all, it is the desire of the national philosophy to be original, using the means developed in the West. Making incorrect demands on Russian thinkers is another important paradox that Yuri Sergeevich Pivovarov revealed (photos of the scientist are presented in the article). Photographically, he noted the key contradictions of Russian sociology of the 20th century.

State nature studies

Yuri Pivovarov continuously connected Russian thought with the Russian authorities. On the pages of his scientific works, he proved and continues to prove that these two phenomena have related close features. This feature, in particular, has led to the fact that our state has always differed from Western European states. The author raised this problem in the work “Russian power and historical types of its understanding”.

In all major European languages, the term "state" means approximately the same thing: "state", "Staat", "stati", etc. It appeared relatively recently - four centuries ago. This happened after the European reformation. Then came the "Constitutional state", in which the choice of religion became a personal matter for each person. This is how the foundations of European democracy were born. The metaphysical and religious were taken out of the social. This is due to the fact that the main subject in Western constitutions is the citizen, society and nation.

Pivovarov Yuri Sergeevich biography, whose nationality and career were continuously connected with Russia, managed to formulate the main inconsistencies Russian state the above European principles. It did not separate the concepts of sovereignty and property. In Russia, both in the 19th and 20th centuries, power was associated with the right to own the whole country and its inhabitants. From this emerged the key cataclysms of Russian history, as well as tsarist despotism and Soviet totalitarianism. This is the key thesis of Pivovarov's scientific works on Russian statehood. For example, it can be traced in the author's collection "The last death in earnest."

Influence of fiction on politics

Exploring the history of the Russian state and society, Pivovarov touched upon the importance of artistic and philosophical literature in their development. As an example, the scientist reassessed the results of Leo Tolstoy's work. In his novel "War and Peace", he created a new reality and personality types, which ultimately determined a new perception of life in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. The system of such artistic myths of Tolstoy Pivovarov called "real Tolstoyism" (as opposed to the religious teachings of the classic).

Fyodor Dostoevsky is another myth-maker of this order, whose works were studied by Yuri Sergeevich Pivovarov. The “children” of the writer are his novels, and in them, among other things, the Russian revolution is predicted. We are talking about The Brothers Karamazov and Possessed. Pivovarov compared the characters of 1917 with the product of Dostoevsky's imagination.

The dependence of domestic policy on foreign

The bibliography of Yuri Pivovarov contains several works on the political culture of Russia (including the monograph "Political Culture of Post-Reform Russia"). This also includes lectures and journalism of the author. One of the key questions that Pivovarov asks is the question of the relationship between the external and internal dimensions of domestic policy.

Russia has been steadily increasing its territory for five centuries, solving various global problems (for example, the problem of access to the seas). The existence of many neighbors and enemies with common borders has been the cause of regular wars in any historical era. Because of this, foreign policy has always strongly influenced and dominated domestic policy. This regularity has long interested Yuri Pivovarov, who devoted many pages of his research to it.

Rejection of historical laws

Yuri Pivovarov considers Russian political and legal culture to be "power-centric" (while, for example, Western culture is "anthropocentric"). In Europe, everything starts from man - there he remains the measure of all things. In Russia, power is at the center. This is a tradition. It can hide and mimic, but it still remains in the public mind.

It is interesting that Yuri Pivovarov in his lectures denies the existence of solid historical laws that would have been instead of traditions. The difference lies in the fact that the latter can change, since the historical process is open in its properties. Against the laws of the Brewers also puts free human will. For example, it was the actions of people that led to October revolution in Russia (rather than economic social and natural-climatic conditions).

Power and Church in Russia

The difference between the Russian state and Western European Brewers is also explained by the medieval connection between Rus' and Byzantium. By adopting Orthodox Christianity from the Greeks, the Eastern Slavs cut themselves off from the rest of the Old World. First of all, they found themselves outside the Latin world, since the church Latin language then served as an instrument of interethnic and scientific communication.

Yuri Pivovarov to some extent touches on the topic of relations between the state and the church. The scientist believes that in their ratio the decisive role is played by the question "who has more resources." In other words, who is more influential, he interferes in someone else's agenda. In Russia, in practice, this led to the fact that the state began to influence the spiritual life. Orthodox Church has never been as independent as, for example, the Catholic Church in the West. The merging of spiritual and secular power influenced the further development of the institutions of Russian society.

Yuri Sergeevich Pivovarov was born on April 25, 1950. In 1972 he graduated from the Faculty of International Relations of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1975 he completed full-time postgraduate studies at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. degree received a PhD in History in 1981. Since 1996 Doctor of Political Sciences. In 1996 he was awarded the academic title of professor at the Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University. Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) since 1997, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 2006.

Since 1976 he has been working at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Since 1998 - Director of the INION RAS, at the same time head of the Department of Political Science and Jurisprudence of the INION RAS. President of the Russian Association of Political Science (RAPS) since February 2001, Honorary President of the RAPS since 2004. Member of the Bureau of the Historical and Philological Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Bureau of the Library and Information Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Bureau of the Council for Eurasian Economic Integration of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Bureau of the Russian Historical Society, member of the Bureau of the National Committee of Historians, chairman of the Russian-Hungarian Commission of Historians. Since 2015 - Scientific Supervisor of INION RAS.

Yu. S. Pivovarov works in the Moscow state university named after M.V. Lomonosov since 1996. In connection with the creation of the Department of Comparative Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, by order of the rector dated January 18, 2010, he was appointed acting head of the Department of Comparative Political Science.

Pivovarov Yu. S. Two centuries of Russian thought. - M.: INION RAN Moscow, 2006. - ISBN 5–248–00265–6.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Russian politics in its historical and cultural relations. - M.: ROSSPEN, 2006. - ISBN 5–8243–0726–1.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Russian political tradition and modernity. - M.: INION RAN, 2006. - ISBN 978524800263.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Total death in earnest. - M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. - ISBN 5–8243–0416–5.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Essays on the history of Russian social and political thought in the 19th - first third of the 20th century place of publication. - M.: INION Moscow, 1997.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Political culture: A methodological essay on the place of publication. - M.: INION Moscow, 1996.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Political culture: Questions of theory and methodology (Experience of Russia and Western science). - M., 1995.
Pivovarov Yu. S. N. M. Karamzin "Note on ancient and new Russia" in its political and civil relations. - M.: Academizdattsentr "Nauka", 1991. - ISBN 5–02–017587–0
Pivovarov Yu. S. Catholic and Protestant Ethics in Bourgeois Law. - M.: INION Moscow, 1987.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Socio-political views of R. von Weizsacker. - M.: INION Moscow, 1986.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Socio-political views of O. von Nell-Breuning. - M.: INION Moscow, 1985.
Pivovarov Yu. S. Positions of the main socio-political organizations of the FRG on the problem of complicity. - M., 1981.