Sinop battle. A battle with unusual results. What time was the Battle of Sinop?

It is considered the last major battle of the era of sail. It happened in 1853, November 18.

The situation in the Black Sea basin worsened back in May. At that time, between Russia and Turkey, the Russian army entered the territory of the Danube principalities. At the same time, the English and French squadrons arrived at the Dardanelles.

Türkiye at the end of September demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops, giving Russia an ultimatum. However, without waiting for the end of his term, military action began.

A detachment of the Danube flotilla in October 1853 was fired upon from the Isakcha fortress. On October 16, the post of St. was unexpectedly attacked. Nicholas, which was located between Batum and Poti on the Black Sea coast. Thus, military operations at sea began between Russia and Turkey.

Under the command of Slade (English adviser) and Osman Pasha (Turkish vice admiral), the Turkish squadron proceeded to the Poti area and from Istanbul for the landing. It (squadron) consisted of two armed steamships, seven frigates, two brigs, two corvettes, sloops and had 500 guns. In Sinop Bay, the Turks took refuge from the storm under the protection of thirty-eight coastal guns.

On November 8, the Turkish squadron was discovered by the squadron of P. S. Nakhimov (Russian vice admiral) and blocked. The Russians had three 296 guns (including 76 bomb guns) and a frigate.

On November 16, F. M. Novosilsky’s squadron, consisting of three battleships and a frigate, arrived at Sinop. Nakhimov, who assumed that the Turks would be strengthened at sea by the British, decided to attack them in the bay. On November 18, the Battle of Sinop began.

Nakhimov, knowing the techniques of the Turks, foreseeing in advance that enemy fire upon approach would be concentrated not on the decks, but on the spars, decided to anchor without fastening the sails. All sailors remained below during the shelling. Thanks to this, the lives of many soldiers were saved and the combat effectiveness of the Russian squadron was preserved at one of the most critical stages of the battle.

Russian ships broke through fairly strong defensive fire from coastal batteries and Turkish ships. Entering the bay in two wake columns, they anchored with springs.

The Sinop battle continued with crushing fire from the Russian squadron on one side from a distance of 300-350 meters with 312 guns. During the battle, which lasted two and a half hours, all coastal batteries and Turkish ships were destroyed. The Battle of Sinop ended with the capture of Osman Pasha, the commanders of two ships and another two hundred people. The Turks lost about four thousand soldiers killed and wounded.

Slade (English adviser), one of the commanders of the Turkish squadron, fled in disgrace in the midst of the battle on the twenty-gun steamer Taif. Nakhimov's Russian squadron did not lose a single ship.

The Battle of Sinop summed up the centuries-long development of sailing ships, which were replaced by steamships. In addition, combat experience in the bay influenced the subsequent formation of fleets in many states.

The Battle of Sinop, the victory of the Russian squadron in it, was a clear result of the advanced system of education and training of Black Sea sailors, which was carried out by the best naval commanders of Russia. The high skill that the sailors showed during the battle was achieved by them through persistent campaigns, studies, and training. Thousands of fighters, who possessed all the qualities necessary for the complex and difficult profession of a sailor, but who did not initially have sufficient knowledge of maritime affairs, acquired invaluable experience during training and during military operations, and their moral fighting qualities reached a high level.

Text: Sergey Balakin

162 years ago, on November 30, 1853 (November 18, old style), the famous Battle of Sinop took place, considered one of the largest naval victories in the history of our country. The words of Vice Admiral Kornilov are widely known, who said about the battle of Sinop: “The battle is glorious, higher than Chesma and Navarino... Hurray, Nakhimov! Lazarev rejoices at his student!” And Emperor Nicholas I awarded Vice Admiral Nakhimov the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, and wrote in a personal rescript: “By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.” However, these enthusiastic assessments are dominated by emotions. In reality, the results of the Battle of Sinop are far from clear...

Historians know two opposing views on the Battle of Sinop. According to one of them, this battle is the greatest and indisputable victory of our fleet. But there is another point of view: they say that Sinop is a skillfully placed trap into which the clumsy “Russian bear” fell, and which predetermined the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War. Let's try to analyze the arguments of both sides.

At first glance, everything seems obvious. On November 18 (old style), 1853, a Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov, consisting of six battleships and two frigates, entered Sinop Bay and defeated the squadron of Osman Pasha stationed there. Of the twelve Turkish warships, eleven were sunk, 2,700 enemy sailors were killed, more than 550 were wounded and 150, including Osman Pasha himself, were captured. Our losses were 38 killed, 232 wounded; all ships, despite the damage received, returned to Sevastopol on their own.

Such impressive results are explained, first of all, by the quantitative and qualitative superiority of our fleet over its enemy. For example, in terms of the total weight of a broadside salvo, the Russian squadron was two and a half times larger than the Turkish one. Moreover, the Russian ships were armed with 76 heavy 68-pound guns that fired explosive bombs, deadly for wooden ships. If we also add that the training of personnel in the Turkish fleet was extremely poor, then Admiral Nakhimov could only wisely use all his advantages. Which he did, and he did it brilliantly. Figuratively speaking, the Battle of Sinop put an end to the centuries-old history of sailing fleets and anticipated the onset of a new era - the era of armor and steam.

It is not surprising that a triumphant meeting awaited Nakhimov in Sevastopol. At that moment, few people thought about how this victory would turn out for Russia...

On the eve of the Crimean War, the weakened Ottoman Empire found itself completely dependent on the Western powers - primarily on England. The strained relations between St. Petersburg and Constantinople led to Nicholas I ordering troops to be sent to Bessarabia and Wallachia. These principalities formally remained vassals of Turkey, and Sultan Abdul-Mecid declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. At the same time, he counted on military assistance promised by London and Paris. It should be borne in mind that the British were quite happy with the existing state of the Ottoman Empire, but they sought to prevent the strengthening of Russia. Therefore, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston openly stated that in the event of an attack by the Russian fleet on Turkish ports, England and France would use force against the “aggressor.” But in St. Petersburg they clearly underestimated the seriousness of this threat.

The decision to attack the Turkish squadron in Sinop was extremely risky. After all, it gave the West an excellent reason to “teach a lesson” to the unyielding Russian emperor, whose foreign policy London really did not like. In general, the thought involuntarily arises that the Sinop massacre was planned in advance and not without the participation of English advisers. After all, the most combat-ready Turkish ships, including all the battleships, and almost all experienced sailors remained in the Bosphorus. A squadron of weak and outdated ships was sent to Sinop, moreover, staffed with inexperienced recruits - yesterday's peasants. The presence of ground forces on Osman Pasha's squadron, allegedly transported to the Caucasus (this was repeatedly mentioned in various publications), is not confirmed by documents. That is, everything suggests that the squadron destroyed in Sinop was just a bait, obviously sent for slaughter...

Well, what happened next is well known. A coalition of Western states (Great Britain, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia) declare war on Russia. The Anglo-French fleet enters the Black Sea and troops land in Balaklava. Then - the battle on Alma, the siege of Sevastopol, the self-sinking of the Black Sea Fleet, the death of admirals Nakhimov, Kornilov, Istomin... The Paris Congress, at which Russia admitted its defeat... By the way, in the ranks of the anti-Russian coalition under the flags of the Zaporozhye Sich, the “Slavic Legion” marched under the command of Mikhail Tchaikovsky, or Sadyk Pasha, as the Turks called him...

So, what is the Battle of Sinop? In our opinion, his most balanced assessment looks like this: in tactical terms, this is an indisputable military victory, in strategic terms, this is a blunder that led to Russia’s defeat in the war. However, this is by no means a mistake of Russian sailors or Admiral Nakhimov. This was a mistake of the then Russian politicians and diplomats, who in the field of intrigue were unable to resist their sophisticated colleagues from London and Paris.

We must not forget about one more result of the Battle of Sinop - the moral effect it produced. The defeat of the Turkish squadron caused an unprecedented rise in morale among Russian soldiers, sailors and officers. Without this, the subsequent defense of Sevastopol would hardly have been so stubborn, and the losses of the attackers would have been so great.

So the Russian fleet can rightfully be proud of the Sinop victory.

The brilliant victory of the Russian squadron in the Battle of Sinop was achieved thanks to the unparalleled heroism and excellent combat training of Russian sailors, the high naval skill of Admiral P. S. Nakhimov and the decisive, proactive actions of the commanders of Russian ships.

The brave cohort of Black Sea heroes clearly demonstrated the strength and invincibility of advanced Russian naval art; The Black Sea people continued and strengthened the glorious military traditions of the Russian fleet, and the Sinop victory took one of the first places of honor in the historical chronicle of the heroic exploits of Russian sailors.

The Battle of Sinop clearly demonstrated the results of combat training carried out in the Black Sea Fleet before the Crimean War. The many years of educational activity of the leading representatives of the Russian fleet withstood the difficult test with honor and received the highest rating in the fire of battle. The unparalleled heroism and excellent combat training of the sailors, who achieved the maximum rate of fire and artillery accuracy and showed, in Nakhimov’s words, “true Russian courage” in the face of fierce opposition from the enemy, clearly testified to the high moral and combat qualities of Russian soldiers.

The Sinop victory once again showed the enormous importance of the moral factor in war. In this battle, the indisputable fact was confirmed with exceptional force that it is not a weapon, but a person who skillfully wields a weapon, achieves victory. The unsurpassed art of Russian naval commanders triumphed over the art of Anglo-Turkish admirals; the skill, will and dexterity of Russian sailors turned out to be superior to the training of Turkish sailors and officers.

The high morale of Russian sailors in the Battle of Sinop was due to the advanced system of military education and a sense of national military pride.

The rise in morale immediately before the battle was explained by the fact that the squadron was aware of the full responsibility of the upcoming battle, knew about the machinations of the Turks in the Caucasus, and understood that defeating the Turkish ships in Sinop meant preventing a blow to the Russian troops in the Caucasus.

The Battle of Sinop demonstrated with particular force the high level of tactics of the Russian fleet. By successfully carrying out an attack on the enemy, who was under the protection of coastal batteries, Russian sailors made a great contribution to naval art. The techniques used in the Battle of Sinop clearly demonstrate Nakhimov’s creative approach to solving the most complex problems of naval tactics of that time.

To characterize the actions of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Sinop, it is necessary first of all to recall those tactical methods that were recommended at that time for attacking the enemy fleet in its own base. Guides from the mid-19th century provided the following: “Assuming that the fleet (of the enemy) lying on the spring is in perfect safety on the shore side and that no attack can be expected from there, his ships can only be attacked in the following three ways:

First, by attacking the enemy under sail;

Secondly, anchored on the beam of the fleet standing on the spring;

And thirdly, board him.”

The first method of attack was considered the slowest and least decisive. The second method was considered “more decisive than the previous one, but also more dangerous for the attacker, if only the terrain favors the enemy and he has taken all the necessary precautions.” In this case, the flagship was recommended to take into account the following important circumstance: the attacking fleet “will never be able to maneuver under enemy fire with sufficient speed and accuracy so that, when anchored, it will be as well closed and in the same order as the line (of the enemy) built in advance. It should be expected that some ships either will not get to their places, or will take them late, while being exposed to severe enemy fire.”

Tactical manuals suggested a thorough assessment of the situation before choosing the appropriate method of attack, but at the same time, clear preference was given to the third method, which was to get close to the enemy and board his ships. “Attack considerations necessarily depend on circumstances and terrain. But we can positively say that if the ends of the fleet standing on the spring are well protected and it cannot be attacked except from the front, which will be accessible, then the best, perhaps even the easiest and most decisive method of attack is boarding; for, approaching the enemy with the wind, which we consider favorable, it is impossible for most of the ships not to fall on board with the anchored ships* (of the enemy).”

Thus, in official tactical documents until the middle of the 19th century, boarding was recognized as the main method of attacking an enemy in his own base, and artillery bombardment of the enemy fleet in this case was considered a risky and difficult matter. The battle of Sinop, following the outstanding victories of Ushakov, Spiridov, Senyavin, Lazarev, once again brilliantly proved that a successful outcome of a battle at anchor can be achieved not by boarding, but through the skillful use of artillery weapons.

In the Battle of Sinop, the choice of method of attacking the enemy was determined by the desire for the complete destruction of the entire Turkish squadron, and the Russian sailors achieved a decisive victory over the enemy, making a bold breakthrough into the enemy raid and suppressing their resistance with powerful artillery fire from short distances. The commander of the Russian squadron consciously and deliberately refused to board enemy ships, despite the fact that this particular method was recommended as the best when attacking the enemy fleet in his own base.

During the preparation of the battle, the advantages of one or another method of attacking the enemy were extremely correctly assessed, based on the specific situation at the time of the battle. Boarding was rejected primarily because this method of attack did not ensure the full use of artillery weapons of Russian ships, including bomb guns. In addition, when boarding an enemy squadron, 8 Russian ships could not simultaneously paralyze the resistance of all Turkish ships, which would allow the enemy to use the numerical superiority of their squadron. Finally, to board, Russian ships had to approach a minimum distance to the shore, in shallow water, which would be an unjustified risk. Therefore, the method of attacking the enemy was chosen through artillery shelling from short distances. Although this method was considered the most complex, it created the possibility of full use of all the artillery weapons of the Russian squadron, constrained the enemy’s actions and gave the battle the most active and decisive character. The results of the battle fully confirmed the correctness of this plan.

The Battle of Sinop, thus, once again showed the dependence of methods of naval combat on the development and improvement of the fleet's combat assets. With the increase in the firepower of ships, in connection with the introduction of bomb guns and the quantitative increase in artillery weapons to 120 naval guns, boarding the enemy finally lost its former significance

The development of fleet tactics in the Battle of Sinop is characterized by correct accounting of friendly and enemy forces, thoughtful choice of the time of battle, careful preparation for it, detailed development of an attack plan, and persistence in achieving the goal. The Russian squadron attacked the enemy when the situation at Sinop was more favorable for the Russians. The formation of ships in two columns when breaking through to an enemy raid, the exemplary disposition of ships, the distribution of targets, the occupation of the most advantageous tactical position, taking into account the weaknesses and strengths of the enemy, comprehensive instructions on the conduct of artillery fire - all this played an extremely important role in achieving victory over the enemy .

The linear forces of the Russian squadron were skillfully positioned in the battle, which determined their best use. Russian sailors correctly assessed the situation, guessed the enemy's plan and provided an artillery strike on the enemy at a distance that Western European naval commanders never dared to use. They made excellent use of the artillery weapons of their ships and showed examples of cooperation and mutual assistance in battle. The most important guarantee of victory was that the outstanding Russian naval commander P. S. Nakhimov gave broad initiative to the ship commanders in battle.

The Battle of Sinop was a new, highest stage in the history of naval art of the 19th century, for Russian sailors practically proved the unsuitability of the dogmas of Western European theorists about attacks on fortresses from the sea and achieved victory in such conditions under which not a single Western European admiral would even dare to attack.

The military clashes that took place in the first half of the 19th century between ships and coastal fortifications especially clearly demonstrated the powerlessness of the “vaunted” Western European admirals in the fight against coastal artillery. Even with a significant superiority of naval artillery, the duel between ships and coastal fortifications often ended ingloriously for the attacking side. So, in 1805, the English admiral Sidney Smith, Nelson's comrade-in-arms, with an 80-gun battleship and two frigates attacked the Martell Tower, located on the coast of the island. Corsica. For several hours, the English squadron fired at the tower, armed with only two guns, but was unable to cause any harm to it. The return fire of two coastal guns, on the contrary, was much more effective, and the English flagship received 40 holes and lost up to 35 people killed and wounded.

In 1849, four years before the Battle of Sinop, during the Schleswig-Holstein War, a duel took place between a Danish 80-gun battleship and two Holstein coastal batteries. The battleship spent the whole day shelling two open earthen batteries armed with eight guns. Not a single cannon was shot down at the batteries, and there were only 5 people killed or wounded; the battleship was severely damaged by the fire of coastal guns and flew into the air towards the end of the battle.

The actions of large naval formations against coastal fortresses have always been characterized by the fact that Western European admirals, even speaking against an incomparably weaker enemy, demanded a multiple numerical superiority in naval artillery, a landing force of many thousands, a huge supply of shells, the presence of bombards, gunboats, boats, floating batteries, etc. They they did not dare to oppose coastal fortifications if the number of guns on the ships was only two to three times greater than that of the enemy; they needed eight to ten times superiority.

Battle on the Sinop roadstead. From a painting by I.K. Aivazovsky.

The Sinop victory showed the complete superiority of advanced Russian naval art over the naval art of Western European countries and Turkey. In the Battle of Sinop, all the features that characterize the backwardness of the enemy’s naval art were manifested to one degree or another: a complete inability to use new ships (steamers) and new artillery weapons (bomb guns), indecisiveness and lack of initiative of commanders, servility to outdated and incorrect military dogmas. - naval specialists, the use of stereotyped techniques in the use of artillery weapons, the inability to correctly assess the situation, lack of interaction, inability to fight an active and determined enemy.

It must be emphasized that in the Battle of Sinop it was not so much the Turks who suffered bankruptcy as the British.

It was they who built and armed the Turkish fleet, led it, developed plans for its combat use, educated and trained personnel and, finally, directly participated in the fight against the Russian fleet.

It was the English advisers who carried out the backward “theories” about the impregnability of coastal fortifications during attacks from the sea.

It is characteristic that before the war the British “predicted” the Turks complete success in the upcoming naval battles, highly appreciating the merits of the English artillery of the Turkish ships. A few years before the war, for example, the officers of Admiral Parker’s English squadron self-confidently and authoritatively declared that “at anchor the Turks would have fought a good battle.” Reality did not justify the British's calculations. It was in the battle “at anchor” that the Turkish squadron was completely defeated.

The Battle of Sinop showed the extremely low level of naval art of the British and Turks. Neither Slade nor Osman Pasha were able to organize the defense of their base and did not take the necessary measures to protect the roadstead and strengthen the coastal batteries. During the battle, as Slade later admitted, the ammunition supply on many Turkish ships was paralyzed. The Turks did not provide a fight for the survivability of their ships. Most of the commanders of Turkish ships showed an example of cowardice, shamefully deserting in the midst of battle. The Turkish sailors fought only out of fear of punishment. These were the results of many years of activity of Western European advisers in the Turkish fleet, where formal conversations about the importance of the moral factor were combined with a whip and a stick, with the transformation of sailors into an unconscious automaton. The defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Sinop is an excellent illustration of Engels’s thought: “How much talk is made about the decisive importance of moral factors during war! What else do they do in peacetime if not almost systematically destroy them?” .

The Sinop victory of the Russian fleet had big influence for the further development of naval combat assets and their tactical use. The defeat of the enemy fleet in a protected harbor proved, on the one hand, the possibility of successful active actions fleet against coastal fortifications, and on the other hand, necessitated further development of issues of defense of naval forces from the sea. The Battle of Sinop clearly showed that to defend the base, along with strengthening coastal artillery, it was necessary to use other defensive means.

This lesson from Sinop was taken into account by the Black Sea Fleet during the defense of Sevastopol.

In the Battle of Sinop, for the first time in history, a new weapon of war was successfully used - bomb artillery. In the hands of the enemy, the use of bomb guns (available, as we have already indicated, in both the English and Turkish fleets) did not lead to any noticeable results. The use of bomb artillery by Russian sailors in the Battle of Sinop was one of the turning points in the development of the fleets of all countries. The Sinop victory showed that wooden ships were powerless against new artillery, and that fundamental innovations were required to ensure the survivability of ships. Immediately after the Battle of Sinop, the construction of the first experimental armored ships began.

The experience of the Battle of Sinop, as well as the entire set of actions of the Black Sea Fleet in the summer campaign of 1853, raised the question of the need to transition from a sailing fleet to a steam fleet. The Battle of Sinop was the last battle of sailing ships. The Sinop victory brilliantly ended the centuries-old era of the sailing fleet.

When considering the tactical features of a particular battle in the history of Russian naval art, it is necessary to remember the relationship between tactics and strategy, for “the actions of tactics, their results should be assessed not in themselves, not from the point of view of immediate effect, but from the point of view of objectives and possibilities of strategy". The Sinop victory is one of the largest military conflicts at sea in which brilliant tactical successes brought important strategic consequences. The significance of the Battle of Sinop lies not only in the fact that it showed a high level of tactics of the Russian fleet and greatly influenced the further development of combat weapons, but also in the fact that it had a serious impact on the strategic situation in the initial period of the Crimean War.

With the defeat of Osman Pasha's squadron, the Turkish naval forces were significantly weakened. A major blow to the enemy was the destruction of 15 ships, which had been built and armed for many years before the war. Having lost 500 guns in the battle, the Turks lost almost a third of all the artillery of their navy. The Anglo-Turkish command lost for a long time the opportunity to use its main equipped base on the Anatolian coast.

The most significant damage to the Turkish Navy in the Battle of Sinop was the loss of personnel. The Turkish navy had always suffered from a severe shortage of trained personnel, and short-staffing of many ships was common. The loss of three thousand sailors was a disaster for Turkey. There were no reserves. Additional mobilization could not give anything. The losses were irreparable.

After the Battle of Sinop, the Turkish Navy could no longer carry out independent actions and interfere with the combat activities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It should be noted that by the end of November 1853, the enemy’s naval forces were weakened not only by the destruction of 15 ships. As is known, on the eve of the Battle of Sinop, the Turks lost two steamships (Mejari-Tedjaret and Pervaz-Bahri); two more ships (Saik-Ishade and Feyzi-Bahri) were seriously damaged as a result of the battle with the frigate Flora. A significant part of the Turkish fleet was repaired in Constantinople, and the rest of the fleet was dispersed: several Turkish warships remained off the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea (Batum, Trebizond), and about ten ships in the ports of the Mediterranean basin. The surviving Turkish ships were in complete disrepair. The defeat in Sinop Bay caused a sharp decline in the enemy's morale. The remainder of the Turkish Navy was demoralized and incapable of combat.

As a result of successful military operations of Nakhimov's squadron, a dominant position was achieved for the Russian fleet in the Black Sea for a certain period. The dominance of the Black Sea Fleet in the theater was of great importance for the development of military operations on land fronts, since the flanks of the Russian and Turkish armies on the Danube and the Caucasus abutted the Black Sea. The Russian fleet received the opportunity to assist the coastal flanks of its ground forces; the Turkish ground forces, located on the Danube and near the Russian-Turkish border in the Caucasus, did not have the help of their fleet.

News of the defeat of the Turks near Sinop began to quickly spread throughout all army units. The Sinop victory caused a huge moral uplift in the Russian army. The moral impact of the brilliant victory of the Black Sea Fleet was enormous. However, the Russian military command in the main Danube theater of operations was unable to use the created situation to intensify the actions of the Russian army.

A completely different situation developed in the Caucasian direction, for which the Sinop victory was especially important. By destroying the Turkish squadron in Sinop Bay, the Russian fleet dealt a serious blow to the aggressive plans of Turkey and the Western European powers, which were accumulating forces to conquer the Caucasus.

In the Battle of Sinop, it was not just a simple collection of enemy ships that was destroyed, but a significant part of the Turkish fleet, intended by the enemy for joint actions with his ground forces and Shamil’s troops in the Caucasus. The Black Sea Fleet did not allow the concentration of significant forces of the enemy fleet in the eastern region of the theater, as a result, the Turkish Eastern Anatolian army was deprived of the support of its fleet. The few Turkish steam ships and a flotilla of landing craft remaining off the Caucasian coast could not play any significant role after the defeat of Osman Pasha's squadron. The enemy's preparations for landings in the area of ​​Poti, Sukhum and Redut-Kale were completely disrupted.

The commander of a detachment of Russian ships off the Caucasian coast, Rear Admiral P. M. Vukotich, on December 2, 1853, in connection with the Sinop victory, wrote to Nakhimov:

“With heartfelt pleasure, I have the honor to congratulate Your Excellency on the brilliant extermination of the enemy Sinop squadron - the great thunderstorm of the entire Caucasus... Your quick and decisive extermination of the Turkish squadron saved the Caucasus, especially Sukhum, Poti and Redoubt-Kale; with the conquest of the latter, Guria, Imereti and Mingrelia would fall into prey to the Turks.”

The Sinop victory influenced the weakening of the enemy’s positions not only on his coastal flank in the Caucasus, but had significantly greater consequences. As a result of the unprecedented defeat of the Turkish fleet, the prestige of England and Turkey was undermined in the eyes of the feudal elite of the highlanders. With each victory of Russian weapons, it became increasingly difficult for the leaders of Shamil’s reactionary movement to intensify the actions of their troops.

The great influence that the Sinop victory had on changing the situation in the Caucasian direction is explained not only by the strength and timeliness of the blow delivered by the Black Sea sailors against the enemy fleet in the Battle of Sinop itself, but also by the fact that this battle was not isolated, but was closely connected with previous actions of the Black Sea Fleet. By successfully transporting the 13th Infantry Division, the Black Sea Fleet contributed to the strengthening of Russian troops in the Caucasus back in September 1853. Detachments of Russian ships cruising directly off the Caucasian coast guarded the coastal flank of the Russian army and impeded enemy actions. Nakhimov’s Russian squadron deprived the enemy of the opportunity to freely transport weapons, ammunition, equipment and reinforcements from Constantinople to the east. In the complex of these fleet actions, the Battle of Sinop was the final blow to the enemy’s aggressive plans towards the Caucasus. Thus, the actions of the Black Sea Fleet throughout the summer campaign of 1853 greatly contributed to the strengthening of Russian forces and the weakening of enemy forces in the Caucasus.

The Russian Caucasian Army, which was the best part of the Russian ground forces in terms of its combat effectiveness and experience in combat operations, not only eliminated the enemy’s attempts to attack in the Caucasian direction, but also inflicted a number of serious defeats on it. Despite their numerical superiority, the Turks were unable to resist Russian troops already in the initial period of hostilities in the Caucasus. On November 2, 1853, the enemy was defeated at Bayandur. On November 14, the battle of Akhaltsikhe again ended in a panicked retreat of the Turkish troops. The day after the Sinop victory, November 19, the famous Bash-Kadyklar battle took place 150 versts from Batum. In this battle, the 37,000-strong Turkish corps could not resist the 11,000-strong Russian detachment. Leaving over 8 thousand dead and wounded on the battlefield, the enemy began a disorderly retreat towards Kars. Russian troops captured 24 guns (all English-made), banners, many horses and weapons.

A few days later, at the end of November 1853, two messengers met in the endless steppes of Stavropol: one of them, an envoy from Nakhimov, was hurrying south to tell the Caucasian troops the good news of the Sinop victory; the other rushed to Sevastopol with news of the defeat of the Turkish army at Bash-Kadiklar.

After the Battle of Sinop, it became obvious that the aspirations of the Western European powers to fight Russia only with the wrong hands, using Sultan Turkey and Shamil’s reactionary movement, ended in complete failure. The successful military operations of the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian Caucasian Army led to the collapse of the notorious “foreign hands” strategy and showed the insignificance of Western European strategists and politicians who underestimated the strength of the enemy and overestimated the strength of their allies. In the very first months of the Crimean War, the adventurism of the strategy of England, France and Turkey was revealed.

The military successes of Russian weapons, which contributed to ensuring the security of the southern borders of Russia, the protection of Crimea and the Caucasus from the immediate threat from Western European aggressors and Turkey, had a progressive significance, regardless of the goals that the tsarist government pursued in the war with Turkey. Thanks to the victories of the Russian army and navy, the peoples of the Caucasus were freed from the threat of enslavement by capitalist England and Sultan Turkey. By striking at the Turkish Empire, the Russian army had a great influence on the Balkan peoples, because, according to their objective results, the victories of Russian weapons on land and sea contributed to the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula against the centuries-old Turkish yoke.

(1) Summary of naval tactics, St. Petersburg, 1842, pp. 97-98

(2) Ibid., p. 100.

(3) Ibid., p. 100.

(4) Brief summary of naval tactics, St. Petersburg, 1842, p. 100.

(5) Marine collection, No. 3, 1850, p. 126.

(6) K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, vol. XVI, part II; page 357. 144

(7) I.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 5, p. 166.

(8) TsGAVMF, f. 19, op. 5, d. 69, l. 2.

Forward
Table of contents
Back

Sinop naval battle, a heroic episode in Russian history. The feat of Russian sailors was glorified by the establishment of the Order of Nakhimov in 1944. In 1952, on the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Sinop, Kalashnikovskaya Embankment in Leningrad was renamed Sinopskaya Embankment. The event was marked by the Day of Military Glory on December 1 (Federal Law No. 32-F3 of March 13, 1995)

The USSR, as well as Russia, clearly considered this a heroic episode in Russian history, but this radically contradicted what the classics of Marxism-Engelsism said about the Battle of Sinop. The position of those involved in ideological work was especially ambiguous. For example, military political workers who conducted patriotic propaganda and propaganda of the “only true doctrine”, knowing what the founding fathers of the “only true doctrine” said about the exploits of Nakhimov.

This is what historian S.F. Naida writes about the course of the battle. Quote Naida S.F., Outstanding Russian naval commander Admiral P.S. Nakhimov, M. "Knowledge", ser. 1, No. 71, 1952 (electronic text can be found.)

At 9:30 a.m. the signal went up on the flagship: “Get ready for battle and go to the Sinop roadstead.” The squadron quickly weighed anchor and, with national flags raised, rushed towards the enemy. While on the move, at a signal from Nakhimov, the squadron formed into two columns. The formation of two columns established by Nakhimov was very tactically reasonable. It halved the squadron's exposure to enemy fire when ships entered the Sinop roadstead and accelerated the deployment of the squadron to battle according to the intended disposition. This ensured a quick attack on the enemy and fewer losses from enemy fire. This maneuver was a brilliant success.

The first column consisted of 3 ships - the 84-gun ships “Empress Maria” (flagship), “Chesma” and the 120-gun ship “Konstantin”; in the second there are also 3 ships: the 120-gun ship "Paris" (commander of which was captain 1st rank Istomin, the future hero of the defense of Sevastopol), the 120-gun ship "Three Saints" and the 84-gun ship "Rostislav". The frigates "Kahul", which had 44 guns, and "Kulevchi", which had 52 guns, remained, on Nakhimov's instructions, to guard the exit from Sinop Bay in order to prevent the possible escape of Turkish steamers during the battle.

Around noon the squadron approached the entrance to the bay. Everyone was waiting for a signal from the flagship. A little time passed and one bell rang. At this time, the first cannon shot was heard from the Turkish ship, and after it the famous Battle of Sinop began.

Nakhimov's flagship ship "Empress Maria", firing from enemy ships, steadily moved forward and dropped anchor only when it reached its target - the Turkish flagship "Aunn Allah". He set the enemy ship on fire and forced it to run ashore, and then also destroyed the Turkish frigate Fazli Allah. Despite the fact that the flagship Empress Maria received 60 holes and other damage in the battle, she turned to assist the second column of ships. Nakhimov calmly led the battle. The calmness and restraint of the squadron commander gave everyone confidence in victory.

The ship "Konstantin" on the approach to the place indicated by the disposition was showered with a hail of cannonballs, 4 knippels and grapeshot. However, he pressed forward stubbornly and anchored for battle soon after the flagship. With battle fire on the starboard side at a Turkish battery and two frigates, he first blew up one frigate and with the fire of his cannons temporarily silenced the coastal battery, then opened destructive fire on another Turkish frigate and a corvette. Soon the frigate and corvette were hit and thrown ashore. The ship "Chesma" after the victory over the Turkish frigate accurately destroyed the coastal batteries.

The ship "Paris", on which was the second flagship - Rear Admiral Novosilsky, anchored as if by disposition and, with well-aimed fire from its cannons, sank three Turkish ships, and then fired destructive fire at the coastal battery.

The actions of the ship "Paris" received special approval from Nakhimov. The ship "Three Saints", despite severe damage, forced the enemy frigate to throw ashore with the fire of its cannons and continued to fire until the end of the battle. The ship "Rostislav" sank the corvette with the fire of its cannons and destroyed the battery.

Russian sailors fought the enemy selflessly, with extraordinary tenacity, put out fires, and immediately took the place of the dead and wounded. On the Constantine, at the height of the battle, an exploding bomb smashed the deck and started a fire. The rapidly spreading fire threatened to explode the kruyt chamber (the place where gunpowder is stored). Midshipman Kolokoltsev, disregarding the danger, tightly closing the doors and hatches of the crew chamber, calmly put out the fire and thereby saved the ship from the explosion.

By 5 pm on November 18, 1853, the battle ended with the complete destruction of the Turkish squadron and the entire enemy coastal defense. Only one enemy steamship, the Taif, under the command of an English officer, taking advantage of its superior speed against the frigates Cahul and Kulevchi, abandoned the Turks and fled to Constantinople.

In the Battle of Sinop, 13 enemy combat ships and 4 merchant ships were destroyed, up to 3 thousand Turks were killed and many were taken prisoner. Among those captured was the head of the Turkish squadron, Vice Admiral Osman Pasha, along with the commanders of some ships.

The Russian squadron did not lose a single ship. The death toll was: 38 people killed, 235 people wounded and shell-shocked.

In full accordance with this description, the feat of the Russian fleet is approved as, which is awarded, in particular, for “successes in the development, conduct and support of operations, combat operations of groupings of forces (troops) of the Navy independently and as part of groupings of troops (forces) , as a result of which the enemy’s offensive actions were successfully repelled and significant losses were inflicted on him"

Naturally, such a devastating victory could not but “delight” those who supported Turkey in the war against Russia.

Debates began in the English Parliament in connection with the Russian victory at Sinop. The English and French press launched a frantic campaign against Russia, trying to justify the opening of military action against the Russians.

TO frantic campaign in the English and French press The classics of Marxism-Engelsism joined. The tenth volume of the second edition of the Works (see text) represents the broadcast of this campaign to the American press. This is how Marx responds to the Battle of Sinop

Finally, the mystery that shrouded the Sinope battle has dissipated. Judging by published reports on the balance of forces between Russia and Turkey at Sinop, the Russians, compared to the Turkish forces, had 3 more double-decker steam ships, one triple-decker and 680 guns. The Sinop events, thus, added nothing to the power of Russia and did not subtract anything from the power of Turkey; rather, the opposite was true. Here we see a fact that has no precedent even in the history of the English fleet: the frigates line up with the battleships and the commanders throw torches into the powder magazines, sacrificing themselves on the altar of the fatherland. Turkey's main naval forces remained intact; she did not lose a single battleship or steamer. Little of. According to the latest news, one of the best three-deck ships of the Russian fleet, Rostislav, with 120 guns, was sunk by the Turks. This loss, hitherto hushed up under the plausible pretext that the Rostislav sank not during the battle, but immediately after it, and now openly recognized by the Russians, significantly counterbalances the losses of the Turkish fleet. If a three-decker ship really sank, then we can assume that other Russian ships received quite a lot during the battle. serious damage and that in the end the victory at Sinop weakened the Russian fleet more than the Turkish one. As soon as the Egyptian Pasha learned about the Sinope disaster, he immediately gave the order to arm 6 frigates, 5 corvettes and 3 brigs in order to compensate for the losses of the material part of the Turkish fleet.
The Egyptian steam frigate Pervaz Bahri, disabled and captured after a five-hour battle by the much larger Russian steam frigate Vladimir, was so riddled with shells that it was with difficulty taken to Sevastopol, where it immediately sank. It was possible to introduce the Pervaz Bahri into the Sevastopol Bay only thanks to the help of the chief mechanic, the Englishman Bell, to whom Admiral Kornilov promised to immediately grant freedom if he successfully completed this task. Upon arrival in Sevastopol, Bell was not only not released, but, together with his assistants - mechanics and stokers - were placed under strict arrest and put on a meager ration of 3 pence a day, and they were told that they would have to walk 80 miles in inland at this harsh time of year. Prince Menshikov, who commands in Sevastopol, received the approval of the tsar and his ministers, who remained deaf to the representations of the English consul in Odessa and the English ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Surely someone is lying here. Either the Stalinist historian Naida or Marx. According to the description of the battle given by Naida, it can be determined that there were eight Russian ships that took part in the battle, and seventeen Turkish ships were destroyed. Therefore, according to Naida, the advantage was on the side of the Turks. Marx talks about superiority The Russians, compared to the Turkish forces, had 3 more double-decker steam ships, one triple-decker and 680 guns. And the Battle of Sinope, according to Marx, is not a feat of Russian sailors, but treacherous and cowardly massacre, which destroyed the weakest enemy. This is what Marx writes in the article "Western Powers and Türkiye"

To the huge number of diplomatic documents already made public were added a note from the four powers, dated December 12, handed to the Porte jointly by their respective ambassadors in Constantinople, as well as a new circular from M. Drouin de Luis, signed in Paris on December 30, to the French diplomatic agents. By carefully reading the note of the four powers, one can understand why such unrest broke out in Constantinople when it became known that the note had been accepted by the Porte, why an insurrectionary movement arose on December 21, and why the Turkish Ministry had to solemnly declare that the resumption of peace negotiations would not entail any cessation hostilities or their suspension. In fact, exactly nine days after the announcement of treacherous and cowardly Sinope massacre reached Constantinople and was greeted throughout the Ottoman Empire with a single cry for vengeance, the four powers coldly call upon - and the ambassadors of Great Britain and France even force - the Porte to enter into negotiations with the king on the following basis: all previous treaties will be renewed; the firmans relating to religious privileges granted by the Sultan to his Christian subjects would be supplemented by new guarantees granted to each of the powers, and consequently to the king; The Porte will appoint a commissioner to conclude a truce; she would allow Russia to build a church and a hospital in Jerusalem and would commit herself to the powers (and therefore to the Tsar) to improve her internal administrative system. Not only will the Porte receive no compensation for the severe damage caused to it by the piratical actions of the Muscovites, but, on the contrary, the chains that Russia has forced Turkey to wear for a quarter of a century will be forged anew, and the prisoner will be chained even more tightly than before. The Porte must submit to the mercy of the autocrat, humbly guaranteeing him firmans of the religious privileges of its Christian subjects, and solemnly vouching for its internal administrative system. Thus, she must submit simultaneously to the king's protectorate in religious matters and to his dictates in matters of civil government. As compensation for such a capitulation, the Porte is promised “to evacuate the Danube principalities as soon as possible,” the seizure of which Lord Clanricarde called “an act of piracy,” and they also assure her that the preamble of the treaty of July 13, 1841, which turned out to be such a “reliable guarantee” against Russia, will be formally confirmed.
Although in their unheard-of meanness the despicable “powers” ​​reached the highest limit, forcing the Porte, a few days after Sinop, to negotiate on such a basis, yet they will not get rid of their difficulties in such a vile way. The Tsar has already gone too far; he will not tolerate the slightest encroachment on the part of any European power on his defended right of protectorate over the Christian subjects of Turkey.

This passage refers to a note from the four European powers of England, France, Austria and Prussia, which offered Turkey mediation for a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Russia. The demand for Russia was the withdrawal of troops from the Danube principalities, and Turkey had to satisfy Russia’s demands for special rights for Orthodox Christians. This solution to the problem did not suit the war party at all, which sought to drag the European powers into a war against Russia. This passage shows the attitude of the war party towards the proposed treaty and the attitude of Marx towards the war party.

The Battle of Sinop, called a treacherous and cowardly massacre, is presented as an unexpected aggressive action by Russia, which destroyed a peaceful Turkish squadron and several merchant ships in the Sinop bay. Domestic military history thinks differently. The Turkish squadron, torn apart by a storm in Sinop Bay, was preparing for an attack on the Caucasus coast, and the attack on the Turkish fleet was justified by this threat. Moreover, it was undertaken after the declaration of war. Therefore, she was neither treacherous nor cowardly. Here is what Naida S.F. writes about this. in the book about Nakhimov.

On September 14, 1853, Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. England and France took the side of Turkey. True to their policy of raking in the heat with someone else's hands, they in every possible way provoked Turkey into a war with Russia. The Anglo-French fleet entered the Dardanelles into the Sea of ​​Marmara and then arrived at Constantinople. This was an open challenge to Russia.

The Turkish military operations began on October 11 with an attack on the ships of the Danube flotilla in the Galati area, and on the night of October 15-16 - on the post of St. Nicholas on the Caucasian coastline. On the Russian side, a manifesto declaring war on Turkey was signed on October 20, 1853.

Therefore, by October 18, 1853, Russia was already at war with Turkey, so the attack on the Turkish squadron cannot be called a treacherous attack.

Nakhimov received the manifesto on Russia’s declaration of war on Turkey at sea on November 1. The manifesto was delivered to him from Sevastopol by the steamship Bessarabia.

On November 3, Nakhimov transferred to the ships of his squadron a manifesto declaring war and with it his order, in which he stated the following: “The Turkish fleet went to sea with the intention of occupying the port of Sukhum-Kale that belongs to us (general was sent from Sevastopol with 6 ships to search for the fleet -Adjutant Kornilov). The enemy's intention cannot be fulfilled otherwise than by passing us by or by giving us battle. In the first case, I hope for the vigilant supervision of Messrs. commanders and officers, in the second, with God’s help and confidence in my commanders and officers and teams, I hope to accept the battle with honor and prevent the enemy from fulfilling his daring intention.”

The goal of the Turkish squadron was to attack the Caucasian coast and capture the Sukhum-Kale fortress, but the squadron was forced to take refuge in Sinop Bay to wait out the strong autumn storms. The attack by superior enemy forces in Sinop Bay was called cowardly. Marx considered the Russian sailors who attacked the strongest enemy and defended the Caucasian coast from the attack of the Turkish squadron to be cowards and scoundrels.

“By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.” Emperor Nicholas I “Destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron consisting of...

“By the extermination of the Turkish squadron, you decorated the chronicle of the Russian fleet with a new victory, which will forever remain memorable in naval history.”

Emperor Nicholas I

“The destruction of the Turkish fleet in Sinop by a squadron under my command cannot but leave a glorious page in the history of the Black Sea Fleet.”

P. S. Nakhimov

December 1 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia. This is the day of the victory of the Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov over the Turkish squadron at Cape Sinop.

The battle took place in the harbor of the city of Sinop on the Black Sea coast of Turkey on November 18 (30), 1853. The Turkish squadron was defeated within a few hours. The Battle of Cape Sinop was one of the major battles of the Crimean (Eastern) War, which began as a conflict between Russia and Turkey. Moreover, it went down in history as the last major battle of sailing fleets. Russia gained a serious advantage over the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire and dominance in the Black Sea (before the intervention of the great Western powers).

This naval battle became an example of the brilliant preparation of the Black Sea Fleet, led by one of the best representatives of the school of Russian military art. Sinop amazed all of Europe with the perfection of the Russian fleet and fully justified the many years of hard educational work of admirals Lazarev and Nakhimov.

A. P. Bogolyubov. Destruction of the Turkish fleet in the Battle of Sinop

Background

In 1853, another war between Russia and Turkey began. It led to a global conflict involving the world's leading powers. The Anglo-French squadron entered the Dardanelles. Fronts were opened on the Danube and in Transcaucasia. St. Petersburg, which was counting on a quick victory over the Porte, a decisive advancement of Russian interests in the Balkans and a successful solution to the problem of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, received the threat of war with the great powers, with vague prospects. There was a threat that the Ottomans, followed by the British and French, would be able to provide effective assistance to the Shamil mountaineers. This led to a new large-scale war in the Caucasus and a serious threat to Russia from the south.

In the Caucasus, Russia did not have enough troops to simultaneously hold back the advance of the Turkish army and fight the mountaineers. In addition, the Turkish squadron supplied the troops on the Caucasian coast with weapons and ammunition. Therefore, the Black Sea Fleet received two main tasks:

1. urgently transport reinforcements from Crimea to the Caucasus;
2. strike at enemy sea communications. Don't let the Ottomans land large landing to the eastern coast of the Black Sea in the area of ​​Sukhum-Kale (Sukhumi) and Poti to help the highlanders.

Pavel Stepanovich completed both tasks.

On September 13, an emergency order was received in Sevastopol to transfer an infantry division with artillery to Anakria (Anaklia). The Black Sea Fleet was in turmoil at that time. There were rumors about an Anglo-French squadron acting on the side of the Ottomans. Nakhimov immediately took over the operation. In four days he prepared the ships and in perfect order placed troops on them: 16 battalions with two batteries (more than 16 thousand people), and all the necessary weapons and property. On September 17, the squadron went to sea and on the morning of September 24 arrived in Anakria. By evening the unloading was completed. The operation was considered brilliant; there were only a few sick people among the sailors and soldiers.

Having solved the first problem, Pavel Stepanovich proceeded to the second. It was necessary to disrupt the enemy landing operation. A 20 thousand Turkish corps was concentrated in Batumi, which was supposed to be transported by a large transport flotilla (up to 250 ships). The landing was to be covered by Osman Pasha's squadron.

At this time, the commander of the Crimean Army and the Black Sea Fleet was Prince Alexander Menshikov. He sent a squadron of Nakhimov and Kornilov to search for the enemy. On November 5 (17), V. A. Kornilov met the Ottoman 10-gun steamer Pervaz-Bahre, coming from Sinop. The steam frigate "Vladimir" (11 guns) under the flag of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Kornilov attacked the enemy. The battle was directly led by the commander of the Vladimir, Lieutenant Commander Grigory Butakov. He used the high maneuverability of his ship and noticed the weakness of the enemy - the absence of guns at the stern of the Turkish steamer. Throughout the battle I tried to stay in such a way as not to fall under Ottoman fire. The three-hour battle ended in Russian victory. This was the first battle of steam ships in history. Then Vladimir Kornilov returned to Sevastopol and ordered Rear Admiral F. M. Novosilsky to find Nakhimov and reinforce him with the battleships Rostislav and Svyatoslav, and the brig Aeneas. Novosilsky met with Nakhimov and, having completed the assignment, returned to Sevastopol.

Nakhimov and his detachment had been cruising between Sukhum and part of the Anatolian coast since the end of October, where the main port was Sinop. The vice admiral, after meeting with Novosiltsev, had five 84-gun ships: Empress Maria, Chesma, Rostislav, Svyatoslav and Brave, as well as the frigate Kovarna and the brig Aeneas. On November 2 (14), Nakhimov issued an order for the squadron, where he notified the commanders that in the event of a meeting with an enemy “superior to us in strength, I will attack him, being completely confident that each of us will do his job.”

Every day we waited for the enemy to appear. In addition, there was the possibility of meeting with British ships. But there was no Ottoman squadron. We only met Novosilsky, who brought two ships, replacing those battered by the storm and sent to Sevastopol. On November 8, a severe storm broke out, and the vice admiral was forced to send 4 more ships for repairs. The situation was critical. Strong winds continued after the storm on November 8th.

On November 11, Nakhimov approached Sinop and immediately sent a brig with the news that an Ottoman squadron was stationed in the bay. Despite significant enemy forces standing under the protection of 6 coastal batteries, Nakhimov decided to block Sinop Bay and wait for reinforcements. He asked Menshikov to send the ships “Svyatoslav” and “Brave”, the frigate “Kovarna” and the steamer “Bessarabia” sent for repairs. The admiral also expressed bewilderment why he was not sent the frigate "Kulevchi", which is idle in Sevastopol, and sent two more additional ships necessary for cruising. Nakhimov was ready to fight if the Turks made a breakthrough. However, the Turkish command, although at that time had an advantage in strength, did not dare to engage in a general battle or simply make a breakthrough. When Nakhimov reported that the Ottoman forces in Sinop, according to his observations, were higher than previously thought, Menshikov sent reinforcements - Novosilsky's squadron, and then a detachment of Kornilov's steamers.

The battle of the frigate Vladimir with the Turkish-Egyptian military steamer Pervaz-Bahri on November 5, 1853. A. P. Bogolyubov

Strengths of the parties

Reinforcements arrived on time. On November 16 (28), 1853, Nakhimov’s detachment was reinforced by the squadron of Rear Admiral Fyodor Novosilsky: 120-gun battleships “Paris”, “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Three Saints”, frigates “Kahul” and “Kulevchi”. As a result, under the command of Nakhimov there were already 6 battleships: the 84-gun “Empress Maria”, “Chesma” and “Rostislav”, the 120-gun “Paris”, “Grand Duke Constantine” and “Three Saints”, the 60-gun frigate “ Kulevchi" and the 44-gun "Kahul". Nakhimov had 716 guns; from each side the squadron could fire a salvo weighing 378 pounds 13 pounds. 76 guns were bomb guns, firing explosive bombs that had great destructive power. Thus, the Russian fleet had the advantage. In addition, Kornilov rushed to Nakhimov’s aid with three steam frigates.

The Turkish squadron included: 7 frigates, 3 corvettes, several auxiliary ships and a detachment of 3 steam frigates. In total, the Turks had 476 naval guns, supported by 44 coastal guns. The Ottoman squadron was led by the Turkish Vice Admiral Osman Pasha. The second flagship was Rear Admiral Hussein Pasha. There was an English adviser with the squadron - Captain A. Slade. The steamship detachment was commanded by Vice Admiral Mustafa Pasha. The Turks had their advantages, the main ones being parking in a fortified base and the presence of steamships, while the Russians only had sailing ships.

Admiral Osman Pasha, knowing that the Russian squadron was guarding him at the exit from the bay, sent an alarming message to Istanbul, asking for help, significantly exaggerating Nakhimov’s forces. However, the Turks were late; the message was transmitted to the British on November 17 (29), a day before the attack of the Russian fleet. Even if Lord Stratford-Radcliffe, who at that time actually led the policy of the Porte, gave the order to the British squadron to go to the aid of Osman Pasha, help would still be late. Moreover, the British ambassador in Istanbul did not have the right to start a war with Russian Empire, the admiral could refuse.

Nakhimov's plan

The Russian admiral, as soon as reinforcements arrived, decided not to wait, to immediately enter Sinop Bay and attack the enemy. In essence, Nakhimov was taking a risk, albeit a well calculated one. The Ottomans had good naval and coastal guns, and with appropriate leadership, the Turkish forces could inflict serious damage on the Russian squadron. However, the once formidable Ottoman navy was in decline, both in terms of combat training and leadership.

The Turkish command itself played along with Nakhimov, positioning the ships extremely inconveniently for defense. Firstly, the Ottoman squadron was positioned like a fan, a concave arc. As a result, the ships blocked the firing sector of part of the coastal batteries. Secondly, the ships were located right next to the embankment, which did not give them the opportunity to maneuver and fire on both sides. Thus, the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries could not fully resist the Russian fleet.

Nakhimov's plan was imbued with determination and initiative. The Russian squadron, in the formation of two wake columns (the ships followed one after another along the course line), received the order to break through to the Sinop roadstead and deliver a fire strike on the enemy ships and batteries. The first column was commanded by Nakhimov. It included the ships “Empress Maria” (flagship), “Grand Duke Konstantin” and “Chesma”. The second column was led by Novosilsky. It included “Paris” (2nd flagship), “Three Saints” and “Rostislav”. The movement in two columns was supposed to reduce the time it took for ships to pass under the fire of the Turkish squadron and coastal batteries. In addition, it was easier to deploy Russian ships into battle formation when anchored. In the rearguard were frigates, which were supposed to stop the enemy’s attempts to escape. The targets of all ships were distributed in advance.

At the same time, ship commanders had a certain independence in choosing targets, depending on the specific situation, while implementing the principle of mutual support. “In conclusion, I will express the idea,” Nakhimov wrote in the order, “that all preliminary instructions under changed circumstances can make it difficult for a commander who knows his business, and therefore I allow everyone to act completely independently at their own discretion, but will certainly fulfill their duty.”