The shooting of the White House and a complete list of the dead. Communist Party of the Russian Federation Crimean Republican branch 1993 coup d'etat

The topic of “bloody October 1993” is still under seven seals today. No one knows exactly how many citizens died in those troubled days. However, the figures cited by independent sources are terrifying.

Scheduled for 7:00

In the fall of 1993, the confrontation between the two branches of power - the president and the government, on the one hand, and the people's deputies and the Supreme Council, on the other - reached a dead end. The Constitution, which the opposition so zealously defended, tied Boris Yeltsin’s hands and feet. There was only one way out: to change the law, if necessary - by force.

The conflict entered a phase of extreme aggravation on September 21, after the famous decree No. 1400, in which Yeltsin temporarily terminated the powers of the Congress and the Supreme Council. Communications, water and electricity were cut off in the parliament building. However, the legislators blocked there were not going to give up. Volunteers came to their aid and defended the White House.

On the night of October 4, the president decides to storm the Supreme Council using armored vehicles, and government troops converge on the building. The operation is scheduled for 7 am. As soon as the eighth hour countdown began, the first victim appeared - a police captain, who was filming what was happening from the balcony of the Ukraina Hotel, was killed by a bullet.

White House victims

Already at 10 am, information began to arrive about the death of a large number of defenders of the residence of the Supreme Council as a result of tank shelling. By 11:30 a.m., 158 people required medical attention, 19 of whom later died in hospital. At 13:00, People's Deputy Vyacheslav Kotelnikov reported large casualties among those who were in the White House. At approximately 2:50 p.m., unknown snipers begin shooting at people crowded outside the parliament.

Closer to 16:00, the resistance of the defenders was suppressed. A government commission assembled in hot pursuit quickly tallies the victims of the tragedy - 124 killed, 348 wounded. Moreover, the list does not include those killed in the White House itself.

The head of the investigation team of the Prosecutor General's Office, Leonid Proshkin, who was involved in the seizure of the Moscow mayor's office and the television center, notes that all the victims are the result of attacks by government forces, since it was proven that “not a single person was killed by the weapons of the White House defenders.” According to the Prosecutor General's Office, cited by deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, a total of 148 people died during the storming of parliament, with 101 people killed near the building.

And then, in various comments on these events, the numbers only grew. On October 4, CNN, relying on its sources, said that about 500 people had died. The newspaper Argumenty i Fakty, citing soldiers of the internal troops, wrote that they collected the remains of almost 800 defenders, “charred and torn by tank shells.” Among them were those who drowned in the flooded basements of the White House. Former deputy of the Supreme Council from the Chelyabinsk region Anatoly Baronenko announced 900 dead.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article by an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who did not want to introduce himself, who said: “In total, about 1,500 corpses were discovered in the White House, among them women and children. All of them were secretly taken from there through an underground tunnel leading from the White House to the Krasnopresnenskaya metro station, and then outside the city, where they were burned.”

There is unconfirmed information that a note was seen on the desk of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, which indicated that 1,575 corpses were taken out of the White House in just three days. But what surprised everyone the most was Literary Russia, which announced 5,000 dead.

Difficulties in counting

Representative of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Tatyana Astrakhankina, who headed the commission to investigate the events of October 1993, found that soon after the shooting of the parliament, all materials on this case were classified, “some medical histories of the wounded and dead” were rewritten, and “dates of admission to morgues and hospitals” were changed. . This, of course, creates an almost insurmountable obstacle to accurately counting the number of victims of the storming of the White House.

The number of deaths, at least in the White House itself, can only be determined indirectly. If you believe the assessment of Obshchaya Gazeta, about 2,000 besieged people left the White House without filtering. Considering that initially there were about 2.5 thousand people there, we can conclude that the number of victims definitely did not exceed 500.

We must not forget that the first victims of the confrontation between supporters of the president and parliament appeared long before the White House attack. So, on September 23, two people died on the Leningradskoye Highway, and since September 27, according to some estimates, casualties have become almost daily.

According to Rutsky and Khasbulatov, by mid-day on October 3, the death toll reached 20 people. In the afternoon of the same day, as a result of a clash between oppositionists and Ministry of Internal Affairs forces on the Crimean Bridge, 26 civilians and 2 policemen were killed.

Even if we look up the lists of all the dead, those who died in hospitals and those missing in action during those days, it will be extremely difficult to determine which of them became victims of political clashes.

Ostankino massacre

On the eve of the storming of the White House on the evening of October 3, responding to Rutskoi’s call, General Albert Makashov, at the head of an armed detachment of 20 people and several hundred volunteers, tried to seize the television center building. However, by the time the operation began, Ostankino was already guarded by 24 armored personnel carriers and about 900 military personnel loyal to the president.

After trucks belonging to supporters of the Supreme Council rammed the ASK-3 building, an explosion occurred (its source was never determined), causing the first casualties. This was the signal for heavy fire, which began to be fired by internal troops and police officers from the television complex building.

They fired in bursts and single shots, including from sniper rifles, just into the crowd, without distinguishing whether they were journalists, onlookers or those trying to pull out the wounded. Later, the indiscriminate shooting was explained by the large crowding of people and the approaching twilight.

But the worst thing began later. Most people tried to hide in the Oak Grove located next to AEK-3. One of the oppositionists recalled how the crowd was squeezed into a grove on both sides, and then they began to shoot from an armored personnel carrier and four machine gun nests from the roof of the television center.

According to official figures, the fighting for Ostankino claimed the lives of 46 people, including two inside the building. However, witnesses claim that there were many more victims.

Can't count the numbers

Writer Alexander Ostrovsky in his book “The Shooting of the White House.” Black October 1993" tried to sum up the victims of those tragic events, based on verified data: "Before October 2 - 4 people, on the afternoon of October 3 at the White House - 3, in Ostankino - 46, during the storming of the White House - at least 165, 3 and on October 4 in other places of the city - 30, on the night from October 4 to October 5 - 95, plus those who died after October 5, in total - about 350 people.”

However, many admit that official statistics are several times underestimated. To what extent, one can only guess, based on eyewitness accounts of those events.

Moscow State University teacher Sergei Surnin, who observed the events not far from the White House, recalled how after the shooting began, he and about 40 other people fell to the ground: “Armored personnel carriers passed by us and from a distance of 12-15 meters they shot the people lying down - one third of those lying nearby were killed or injured. Moreover, in the immediate vicinity of me there are three killed, two wounded: next to me, to my right, a dead man, another dead man behind me, at least one killed in front.”

The artist Anatoly Nabatov saw from the window of the White House how in the evening after the end of the assault a group of about 200 people was brought to the Krasnaya Presnya stadium. They were stripped, and then near the wall adjacent to Druzhinnikovskaya Street, they began to shoot them in batches until late at night on October 5th. Eyewitnesses said that they had previously been beaten. According to deputy Baronenko, in total at least 300 people were shot at the stadium and near it.

A well-known public figure, who in 1993 headed the “People's Action” movement, Georgy Gusev, testified that in the courtyards and entrances of the detainees, they were beaten by riot police, and then killed by unknown persons “in a strange form.”

One of the drivers who transported corpses from the parliament building and the stadium admitted that he had to make two trips in his truck to the Moscow region. In a forested area, corpses were thrown into pits, covered with earth, and the burial site was leveled with a bulldozer.

Human rights activist Evgeniy Yurchenko, one of the founders of the Memorial society, which dealt with the issue of secret destruction of corpses in Moscow crematoria, managed to learn from the workers of the Nikolo-Arkhangelsk cemetery about the burning of 300-400 corpses. Yurchenko also drew attention to the fact that if in “regular months,” according to statistics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 200 unclaimed corpses were burned in crematoria, then in October 1993 this figure increased several times - to 1,500.

According to Yurchenko, the list of those killed during the events of September-October 1993, where either the fact of disappearance was proven or witnesses to death were found, is 829 people. But obviously this list is incomplete.

1993 putsch

After the collapse of the USSR, in 1991. a new state appears - Russia, the Russian Federation. It included 89 regions, including 21 autonomous republics.

During this period, the country was in an economic and political crisis, therefore it was necessary to create new governing bodies and form Russian statehood.

By the end of the 80s, the Russian state apparatus consisted of a two-tier system of representative bodies of the Congress of People's Deputies and a bicameral Supreme Council. The head of the executive branch was President B.N., elected by popular vote. Yeltsin. He was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The highest judicial authority was the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The predominant role in the highest structures of power was played by former deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From among them, presidential advisers V. Shumeiko and Yu. Yarov, Chairman of the Constitutional Court V.D. were appointed. Zorkin, many heads of local administrations.

The essence of the conflict

In conditions when the Russian Constitution, in the opinion of supporters of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, became a brake on the implementation of reforms, and work on the new edition was carried out too slowly and ineffectively, the President issued Decree No. 1400 “On step-by-step constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” which ordered the Supreme The Council of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies (according to the Constitution, the highest body of state power of the Russian Federation) cease their activities.

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, convening for an emergency meeting, came to the conclusion that this decree violates the Russian Constitution in twelve places and, according to the Constitution, is the basis for the removal of President Yeltsin from office. The Supreme Council refused to obey the unconstitutional decree of the president and qualified his actions as a coup d'etat. It was decided to convene the X Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies. The police units subordinate to Yeltsin and Luzhkov were ordered to blockade the White House.

After the failure of negotiations through the mediation of Patriarch Alexy in Novo-Ogaryovo, a blockade of the Supreme Council began by the riot police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Electricity and water supply were turned on for a while in the Supreme Council building, then they were turned off again.

At 14:00, a rally authorized by the Moscow Council in support of the Supreme Council took place on Oktyabrskaya Square. When several thousand people gathered, information was received that at the last moment holding a rally on Oktyabrskaya Square was prohibited by the Moscow mayor's office. Riot police attempted to block the square. There were calls to move the meeting to another location.

In such a conflict-prone situation in Russia, what are the ways and means of finding political compromises and agreement? Today, their achievement depends to a large extent on the positions of opposing leaders and elites. The fate of the country largely depends on whether they are able to take into account the already existing socio-political pluralism, and not the dichotomy of society, to satisfy its basic needs, to sacrifice some power and property in order to mitigate and eliminate the main threats to society, and to implement the compromise agreements reached. Legitimation of state-political institutions and the policies pursued by them can also be significantly facilitated by truly free, equal and competitive elections in a multi-party system, which presuppose at least the absence of a monopoly on the media, abuse of financial and political power resources, and the conviction of the majority of voters that political parties , candidates for elective positions, election commissions and other participants and election organizers have equal rights and fully comply with election laws and instructions, and these laws and instructions themselves are fair.

In this regard, it should be noted that the results of the 1996 elections and, most importantly, their assessment from the point of view of fairness and equality, are undoubtedly influenced by the disparate difference in the volume and nature of the resources available to the contenders for the post of President of the Russian Federation. Leaving aside the revealed imperfections of the electoral legislation, sharp criticism from some voters was caused by the virtually complete monopoly of one of the candidates on the most influential types of media - television and radio. Some voters were also irritated by the transformation of leading members of the government, starting with its Chairman, into the central headquarters, and the heads of administrations of many regions and their subordinates into actual regional headquarters for the elections B.N. Yeltsin. In addition to the conspicuous extreme high cost of his own election campaign (the lack of reliable data on its cost is another source of dissatisfaction among some citizens), the multibillion-dollar distribution of debts and subsidies from the state budget by the current President of the Russian Federation, which were carried out essentially within the framework of his election campaign.

Such recipes for resolving political conflicts and achieving stability, which are regularly offered to society as postponing or even canceling elections, dissolving the opposition parliament, banning political parties, establishing a “democratic dictatorship” or a regime of personal power in the name of “order and the fight against crime,” can result in a tragic outcome. This is indisputably evidenced by the data of a study commissioned by the Central Election Commission in May 1996 on a representative all-Russian sample (authors of the research project: V.G. Andreenkov, E.G. Andryushchenko, Yu.A. Vedeneev, V.S. Komarovsky, V.V. Lapaeva, V.V. Smirnov). Almost 60% of Russians consider elections as the main means of forming government bodies. The fact that elections have become one of the basic political values ​​for the majority of Russian society is confirmed by the fact that only 16.4% of respondents approve of the use of refusal to participate in elections as a means of influencing the authorities. While 67.1% do not approve of voter absenteeism.

The civic maturity of the Russian voter is confirmed by other data from this study. Thus, the main motive (44.8% of respondents) for voting for a particular candidate is an assessment of what he can do for Russia. The stability of this position is evidenced by the answers to the question about the motives for the participation of respondents in the elections of deputies of the State Duma in December 1995: 42.6% were guided primarily by the fulfillment of their civic duty, and 23% did not want others to decide for them who should be authorities.

At the same time, in the political consciousness of compatriots there are a number of aspects unfavorable for achieving political agreement. First of all, this is a fairly large proportion of citizens who have a negative attitude towards the activities of federal bodies of all three branches of government:

to the Federation Council - 21.6%
to the Constitutional Court - 22.4%
to the State Duma - 38.9%
to the President of the Russian Federation - 42.5%

This means that no less than every fifth (and in the case of the President - almost every second) Russian is a potential supporter of the opposition. The mere presence of those dissatisfied with government and administrative bodies is not dangerous if citizens believe that by participating in elections they can change the situation in the country. However, 25.7% of compatriots do not believe in this to one degree or another.

Another institution of a democratic society that acts as a mediator between the citizen, on the one hand, and government bodies, civil servants and government leaders who ensure non-violent resolution of conflicts, on the other, are political parties. Alas, in our country political parties today are not able to play this mediating and consensual role. Only 20.4% of citizens consider themselves supporters of any political party; a candidate's affiliation with a particular political party ranks only fourth among the circumstances that a voter takes into account when choosing whom to vote for; Only 8.6% of voters are in favor of voting only according to party lists, and another 13.1% are in favor of a mixed electoral system, in which some deputies are elected according to party lists. Thus, we can state that the majority of Russians have a negative and alienated attitude towards political parties.

To achieve compromise and harmony in society, along with using the entire known arsenal of resolving political conflicts, their legalization is necessary. We are talking primarily about resolving conflicts within the framework of constitutional and legal norms and through predominantly judicial and legal institutions and procedures. This, in turn, involves restoring the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches of government. The danger is too great that someday one or another President of the Russian Federation will use the enormous constitutional powers, unprecedented for a democratic society, to establish once again an authoritarian regime for Russia.

As a result of the investigation of the Commission of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for additional study and analysis of the events that took place in the city of Moscow on September 21 - October 5, 1993, the actions of B. Yeltsin were condemned and found to be contrary to the Constitution of the RSFSR, which was in force at that time. Based on the materials of the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, it was not established that any of the victims were killed with weapons at the disposal of supporters of the Armed Forces.

Conclusion

Each of the parties to the conflict intended to achieve the removal of the opposite side from power while preserving and strengthening its power

Also, one of the reasons for the conflict was the issue of changing the current Constitution, amending the law, since the constitution, adopted at the extraordinary seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the ninth convocation on October 7, 1977, did not fit the new state system and many clauses of the constitution became invalid for expiration of time.

Time has passed since October 1993, when the conflict between the branches of power led to battles on the streets of Moscow, the shooting of the White House and hundreds of victims. But, as it turned out, few people remember about this. For many of our compatriots, the shooting death of October merges in their memory with August 1991 and the attempted coup carried out by the so-called State Emergency Committee. Therefore, they are increasingly trying to look for those responsible for the October drama in 1991.

The complex political and socio-psychological situation in Russia not only determines to a large extent the content of conflicts and the forms of their manifestation, but also affects their perception by the population, elites, and the effectiveness of the means of regulation used. The constitutional framework and legal norms for resolving conflicts have not been developed.

For this reason and due to the lack of experience in civilized and legitimate conflict management, forceful methods are most often used: not negotiations and compromise, but suppression of the enemy. The essentially conflictual methods of reforming Russian society continue to create conditions for continued confrontation. The alienation of the population from power and politics not only leads to a decrease in the legitimacy of the dominant political forces, but also causes instability in the functioning of the political system as a whole.

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MOSCOW, October 4 – RIA Novosti. The October 1993 putsch was not accidental - it was prepared for two years and in the end actually killed people’s trust in power, says Sergei Filatov, president of the Foundation for Socio-Economic and Intellectual Programs, former head of President Yeltsin’s administration.

Twenty years ago, on October 3-4, 1993, clashes occurred in Moscow between supporters of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999). The confrontation between the two branches of Russian government, which had lasted since the collapse of the USSR - the executive represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislative one represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, over the pace of reforms and methods of building a new state passed on October 3-4, 1993 into an armed conflict and ended with tank shelling of the seat of parliament - the House of Soviets (White House).

The tension was rising

“What happened on October 3-4, 1993, was not predetermined in one day. It was an event that had been going on for two years. Over the course of two years, tension grew. And if you trace it at least through the congresses of people’s deputies, it becomes clear that this was a purposeful fight on the part of the Supreme Council against the reforms that the government was carrying out,” Filatov said at a multimedia round table on the topic: “October 1993 coup. Twenty years later...”, held at RIA Novosti on Friday.

According to him, the two top officials of the state - Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov - failed to reach the “normal path of relationship.” Moreover, “absolute and deep mistrust” arose between the two top officials, he added.

Political scientist Leonid Polyakov also agreed with this opinion.

“In fact, the putsch of 1993 is a postponement of the State Emergency Committee of 1991. In 1991, these people, seeing hundreds of thousands of Muscovites who surrounded the White House, the leaders of the State Emergency Committee were simply, as they say, afraid. At first they themselves frightened them by bringing tanks into the capital , and then they themselves were afraid of what they had done. But those forces that stood behind it, and the people who sincerely believed in what turned out to be destroyed in August 91, they did not go away. And two years followed, the most difficult, the most difficult in our history, which included the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the state... By October 1993, this explosive potential had accumulated,” Polyakov noted.

conclusions

Conclusions from the events of 1993, according to Filatov, can be drawn both positive and negative.

“The fact that we eliminated dual power is positive, the fact that we adopted the Constitution is positive. And the fact that we actually killed people’s trust in power and this continued for the rest of the 20 years is an obvious fact that we have to restore to this day We can’t,” he says.

In turn, political scientist Polyakov expressed hope that the events of 1993 were “the last Russian revolution.”

Film about the events of 1993

During the round table, a film about the events of October 1993 was presented, filmed by RIA Novosti specialists in a web documentary format, which has received worldwide recognition due to the fact that the viewer has the opportunity to interact with the content and has greater freedom of action than the viewer of a plot with a linear form of storytelling, where the course of history is predetermined by the director. This is the third RIA Novosti film in 2013 in an interactive format.

“For each of the participants in these events, it was part of his life, part of his inner story. And it was these people we wanted to talk about in our film, interactive video; to make it possible to see through their eyes, through their emotions, through their memories those difficult days. Because now it seems like some rather distant and somewhat unusual event in our country. I really hope that it will continue to be so, because tanks shooting from the embankment at the White House is an absolutely terrible sight. And, probably, for every Muscovite and every resident of Russia, it was something absolutely incredible,” RIA Novosti Deputy Editor-in-Chief Ilya Lazarev shared his memories.

The film contains photographs of people who were later found by RIA Novosti and who spoke about their memories of those events.

“We brought photographs to life and tried to bring some episodes of the video into our present time... Our colleagues, directors, spent three months working on this format - this is a very difficult story. You can watch the film episodically, linearly, but the main story and task is to make it immersive this atmosphere, draw your own conclusions, but rather just get to know the people who lived through this story and let it pass through them,” added Lazarev.

As a result of the tragic events of October 3-4, 1993 in Moscow, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation were liquidated. Before the election of the Federal Assembly and the adoption of the new Constitution, direct presidential rule was established in the Russian Federation. By decree of October 7, 1993 “On legal regulation during the period of phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” the President established that before the start of the work of the Federal Assembly, issues of a budgetary and financial nature, land reform, property, civil service and social employment of the population, previously resolved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation , are now carried out by the President of the Russian Federation. By another decree of October 7, “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,” the president actually abolished this body. Boris Yeltsin also issued a number of decrees ending the activities of representative authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation and local Soviets.

On December 12, 1993, a new Constitution of Russia was adopted, in which such a government body as the Congress of People's Deputies was no longer mentioned.

The events from September 21 to October 4, 1993 continue to be a hot-button, controversial topic that often causes controversy. Today, researchers of the October putsch adhere to a variety of points of view on what happened, its causes and consequences, as well as its political essence and significance for the state and people. The official interpretation of events comes down to justifying the actions of Boris Yeltsin’s supporters, as evidenced by the numerous awards and titles held by his supporters and criminal cases against members of the opposition.

The most obscure page of the Russian Federation cannot be assessed unambiguously. Today there are two radically opposing opinions about the essence of the dispersal of the Supreme Council. Some believe that the president’s actions can be regarded as a coup d’état and a crime, while others consider him the “savior of Russian democracy” and the inspirer of economic and social reforms. One way to clarify the historical situation is to study documents and legal assessment of events.

On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin issued decree No. 1400 “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” ordering the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation (according to the Constitution, the highest body of state power in Russia) to cease their activities. The head of state invited the deputies to return to work in the institutions where they worked before their election and take part in the elections to the new legislative body - the Federal Assembly. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, convened for an emergency meeting, decided that this decree violates the Constitution of Russia in twelve places. And, according to the Constitution, this is the basis for the removal of President Boris Yeltsin from office. The Constitution clearly defined the competence of state bodies, including the Supreme Council and the President. The Congress of People's Deputies, in accordance with Chapter 13, was recognized as the highest body of state power and was given the right to repeal acts of both the Supreme Council (the country's legislative body) and the President (the head of state and the Council of Ministers). The legislative power was personified by the Supreme Council. The frequency of its meetings was determined from 2 times a year, and extraordinary convocations were also allowed on the initiative of the Presidium or the Chairman. The powers of the Supreme Council were quite broad.

Chapter 13/1 included provisions on the President of the Republic. Its competence was significantly narrower than that of the current edition. Thus, the head of state had legislative initiative and was recognized as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was given the right of veto, but was obliged to report annually on the results of his work to parliament. In addition, deputies had the right to demand an extraordinary report from the President if certain requirements were met. However, the main instrument of influence on the head of state was the right of impeachment, which the people's representatives could put forward at the Congress on the basis of the conclusion of the Constitutional Court. The President did not have the right to dissolve the Supreme Council. It should be noted that from a legal point of view, Russia before the coup and the adoption of the new Constitution should be called a parliamentary republic, since the predominance of power in the legislative assembly is obvious from the analysis and comparison of chapters 13 and 13/1. Article 121/6 openly prohibited the use of presidential powers to change the political system. Upon taking office, Boris Yeltsin took an oath to observe and protect the norms of the Constitution, therefore, he was obliged to respect its provisions.

At the same time, an unspoken conflict arose between the Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov and President Boris Yeltsin. Of course, there is no need to talk about a confrontation between only two officials in the case under consideration, since this was a real dual power, generated by the thoughtless inclusion of the position of a sole head of state in the system of public administration while maintaining the broad competence of parliament. As a result of the struggle between the Supreme Council and the Government headed by the President, the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993 broke out, and the work of government bodies became ineffective. Back in March 1993, deputies, most of whom were leftists - communists, agrarians, Baburin’s “Russia” and the “Fatherland” faction, tried to remove the president from power through impeachment, but this failed.

Despite the fact that the actions of Yelitsin’s opponents were carried out taking into account all the norms and requirements of the law, Boris Nikolaevich did not want to recognize them. Korzhakov’s memoirs can serve as clear evidence of this. A Yeltsin supporter talks about how a plan was developed to use chloropicrin (an irritant chemical) against deputies in the event of a voting result unfavorable to the President. From a legal point of view, this fact alone can be qualified as a crime. After the failure of the impeachment attempt, the Congress scheduled a referendum with 4 questions for April 25 - the referendum gave the most favorable results for the President.

Yeltsin's supporters loudly claim that people's trust was almost absolute. Well, in refutation, let’s just present the numbers. So, the results were as follows:
- trust the President - 58.7% of voters (the figure is huge, but far from absolute);
- approve of the President’s policy – ​​53% of voters;
- early presidential elections were considered necessary - 41.2%;
- 49.5% voted for early elections of deputies to the Supreme Council.

Thus, despite the high percentage of citizens who trust the current president and his policies, a significant proportion were in favor of his re-election. The development of the crisis of public administration is evidenced by almost equal indicators on the issues of re-election of both deputies and the President. However, historically the population of our country has gravitated towards a single leader, and not towards an abstract majority in parliament or another collegial body. The results of the referendum not only allowed Yeltsin to avoid removal, but also predetermined all further events. The President realized that he had the support of the population and with even greater persistence began to seek expansion of powers.

The President openly told the public about the reluctance of deputies to support his socio-economic policies. From a legal point of view, such a claim looks absurd, since domestic and foreign policy, in accordance with the provisions of the current Constitution, was determined by the Congress of People's Deputies. In his address, Yeltsin focused the attention of citizens on his desire to maintain law and order, but at the same time he read out the now well-known Decree 1400, which violated all the legal foundations of the young state.

So, let's pay attention to the text of this decree. In addition to the official accusations of parliament’s delay in making decisions and unwillingness to participate in the economic transformation of the state, the text also contained an indication of the fact that the current Constitution does not contain provisions on introducing amendments to it. An analysis of the document itself confirms this statement; the basic law of the state turned out to be unfinished, and this circumstance became clear at the most critical moment. Boris Nikolaevich considered it possible, and by the way very convenient in his situation, to take on the function of a reformer of the legal basis, which caused the indignation of his opponents. As a result, an attempt to convene a Congress, as well as a meeting of the Constitutional Court.

The main purpose of issuing a decree is to introduce changes and additions to the text of the current Constitution. The decree cites specific constitutional articles to justify the President’s action, but each of these norms is presented only to create the appearance of legality of the decision. Yeltsin attempted a coup d'etat, and, as time has shown, it was a success. We do not undertake to evaluate the actions of Boris Yeltsin, but from the point of view of the law in force at that time, he committed a crime against the foundations of statehood. The insignificance of the decree was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court, but in September 1993 there was no longer any talk of the rule of law in the country. The conflict went beyond the legal framework, and only the strength and support of the crowd were used as arguments.

Describing street clashes, the blockade of the Supreme Council building, and the storming of a television center is hardly appropriate in a short publication. We will limit ourselves to only a brief description of the results of the September unrest and the October denouement.

On September 21, Yeltsin addresses citizens and publicly announces his decision to deprive the Supreme Council of its powers. The deputies were asked to disperse, but the assembled Congress of People's Deputies, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court, terminated the powers of the President and transferred temporary presidential powers to Vice-President A. V. Rutskoy. Considering that the decision to impeach was made in compliance with the requirements of the law, then from the evening of September 21, all Yeltsin’s orders cannot be considered legitimate. They are based solely on the disposition of citizens towards him, as well as power superiority.

On September 22, the confrontation continues. Since the 21st, the supply of electricity, heat and water to the building of the Supreme Council has been cut off, and the sewage system has been cut off. The situation has been heating up all day. On September 23, Yeltsin issues decrees promising material benefits. a large one-time remuneration for deputies, the seizure of the property of the Supreme Council and the appointment of early presidential elections, which was subsequently cancelled. None of these decrees can be called legitimate, since Boris Nikolaevich no longer had legal authority. However, the confrontation is growing, neither side intends to give up its positions, and personal ambitions come into play.

Next, peaceful demonstrators first appear on the streets, and then supporters of both sides arm themselves. The first casualties among the civilian population, barricades on the streets, pogroms, columns with armored personnel carriers and other attributes of an armed conflict are present in the capital until October 4-5.

As a result, the Supreme Council was taken by storm and ceased to exist as a state body. Power in the country passed to the strong leader Boris Yeltsin. Thus, the events of September - October 1993 can be called a seizure of power or a coup d'etat. The author will not talk about the appropriateness of Yeltsin’s actions in this article, since a separate publication should be devoted to this issue. In conclusion, we present only one fact that is difficult to dispute. At the next elections, the population again gave their votes to B. Yeltsin, and stability came to the country for several years.

A unique video recording made by an unknown person tells the story of participants in the events of September-October 1993.
From the first frames, the story begins with a participant in the column of the Taman Division, showing where the column was fired upon, what actions were taken, then showing his actions in the current situation, who was wounded where, where they were moving.
In particular, he tells how in the morning in the area of ​​the Krasnaya Presnya stadium, due to lack of coordination of actions, armed clashes occurred between the “Tamans” and the armored personnel carriers of the “Dzerzhinsky” (OMSDON of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the former Dzerzhinsky Special Purpose Division). There were dead and wounded, both among soldiers and among random passers-by.
Moreover, the video recording was made 2 months after the events and traces of that shootout are visible in the video.
A unique video recording, a must watch for anyone who wants to know much more about the events of the shooting of the White House. ()

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Confrontation legislative And executive power in Russia ended with bloody events in October 1993. One of the main reasons for the conflict was the fundamental difference of views on the issue of socio-economic And political course of Russia. The government headed by B.N. Yeltsin and E.T. Gaidar acted as a defender of radical market reforms, and the Supreme Council of the RSFSR headed by R.I. Khasbulatov and Vice-President of Russia A.B. Rutskoi resisted reforms, opposing the market regulated economy.

In December 1992 V.S. Chernomyrdin

replaced by E.T. Gaidar as head of government. But the expected change of course did not happen; only some adjustments were made to the monetarist course, which caused even greater indignation among legislators. The political situation in Russia in 1993 became increasingly tense.

An important reason for the growing antagonism between the two branches of government was their lack of experience in interaction within the framework of the system of separation of powers, which Russia practically did not know.

The Russian president was the first to strike a blow against a political opponent. In a TV appearance September 21 he announced termination of powers of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council. At the same time, the presidential decree “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation” came into force. It actually introduced temporary presidential rule and meant a radical breakdown of the entire existing state-political and constitutional system.

The Supreme Council, located in the White House, refused to obey the presidential decree and equated it to a coup d'etat. On the night of September 21-22, the Supreme Council took the oath of office as President of the Russian Federation Vice President A. Rutsky. On September 22, the Supreme Council decided to supplement the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with an article punishing unconstitutional activities, failure to comply with its decisions and the Congress, and obstruction of its activities “up to and including execution.” On the same day, the White House security service began distributing weapons to civilians.

Over the course of 10 days, the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government developed increasingly. September 27 - 28 The blockade of the White House began, surrounded by police and riot police. On the night of October 3-4, bloody skirmishes took place near and inside the television buildings; television broadcasts were interrupted, but attacks by the Supreme Council detachments were repulsed. By decree of B.N. Yeltsin in Moscow was introduced state of emergency, government troops began entering the capital. Yeltsin declared the White House's actions an “armed fascist-communist rebellion.”

On the morning of October 4 government troops began siege And tank attack on the White House. By the evening of the same day, it was captured, and its leadership, led by R. Khasbulatov and A. Rutsky, was arrested.

As a result of the storming of the White House, there were casualties on both sides, and, undoubtedly, October 1993 became a tragic page in Russian history. The blame for this tragedy lies on the shoulders of Russian politicians, who clashed in the fall of 1993 not only in fighting for their political goals, but also, to no lesser extent, in power struggle.

In September 1993 B.N. Yeltsin issued a Decree, according to which, in July 1994, early presidential elections. In the statement of the President of the Russian Federation dated October 8, i.e. After the defeat of the opposition, it was confirmed that elections to the highest legislative body would take place in December.