Literature about the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. Georgia and Abkhazia: conflict, causes. Historical course of events

In 1810, Abkhazia, without direct connection with the Georgian principalities, made an independent decision to join the Russian Empire. In the empire, Georgia and Abkhazia did not exist as administrative units, but there were two provinces, Kutaisi and Tiflis. As soon as the Russian Empire collapsed, Georgia became an independent country for some time, and a Menshevik regime was established in it. The first thing the newly independent Georgia did was to intervene in Abkhazia. The events of those times, in my opinion, are most objectively described in Denikin’s memoirs “Essays on the History of Russian Troubles.” In 1918, the Georgian army occupied Abkhazia and arrested members of the Great Council of a kind of gathering of the Abkhaz people. Robberies and murders began. However, they did not rest on this, and in the same 1918 they captured the Sochi district, which then included Gagra. Faced with such behavior from Georgia, Denikin refused to create a common anti-Bolshevik coalition with it.

Of course, in Soviet times, Abkhazians were suspicious of Georgia's intention to rule Abkhazia. Abkhazia was part of Georgia for a long and painful time. First it was called an independent Abkhaz Republic, then a treaty Abkhaz SSR within Georgia, then, finally, an autonomous republic. With the final establishment of the Stalinist and Beria regime in Georgia, the creeping colonization of Abkhazia and the elimination of the attributes of self-government began, starting with the physical destruction of its leaders. All this was accompanied by the displacement of the Abkhaz language and Abkhaz ethnonyms, invisible to Moscow.

As a result, the Abkhaz people have formed an opinion: everything that is good for Georgia is bad for Abkhazia, and everything that is bad for Georgia is good for Abkhazia.

Let us recall that, having adopted on April 9, 1991 the “Act of Restoring the State Independence of Georgia” and recognizing itself as the legal successor of the Georgian Democratic Republic of the 1918-1921 model. the new Georgia made a choice in favor of a state that protects and expresses exclusively Georgian ethnic interests and revived the illegitimacy of its own state and interethnic conflicts on a new level. The question of Abkhazia joining it remained in 1918-1921. open, and The Abkhaz ASSR (as well as the South Ossetian Autonomous Okrug) was included in the Georgian SSR already in the Soviet period.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which lasted more than a year (August 14, 1992 September 30, 1993), burdened by historical, political and ideological contradictions, quickly moved into the stage of military confrontation, which quickly escalated into a full-scale regional war - the Abkhaz-Georgian war.

Mahajirism, i.e. exile is what Abkhazians call this one of the most tragic pages of their history, which they still experience very painfully and hard. Mahajirism dealt a severe blow to the ethnocultural development of the Abkhazians, to their territorial, economic and demographic potential. After the Mukhadzhir era, a powerful stream of immigrants - Georgians, Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Estonians, etc. - rushed to the deserted Abkhaz lands. From almost monoethnic, Abkhazia quickly began to turn into a multinational, multilingual region. The long-term consequences of the Mukhadzhirism played a role in tightening the tight knot of contradictions that led to confrontation and military conflict in the region at the end of the 20th century.

An integral part of the Georgianization policy was a targeted resettlement policy. During the period of the 1940s and early 1950s, tens of thousands of Georgians were resettled from the interior regions of Georgia to Abkhazia, whose relocation was carried out by the specially created organization "Gruzpereselenstroy", which was generously supplied from the state budget even during the Patriotic War. As a result of the migration “infusion”, the Georgian community became the largest in Abkhazia. From 1926 to 1979, the number of Georgians in Abkhazia increased from 68 to 213 thousand people.

In 1989, the following people lived in Abkhazia: 93,267 Abkhazians, 239,872 Georgians, 76,541 Armenians, 74,914 Russians, 14,664 Greeks. A total of 525,061 people. (Crucified Georgia. -SPb.: 1995 P.31)

Over a hundred years, the number of Georgians has increased 58 times. So, if in 1886 there were 4,166 Georgians living in Abkhazia, then in 1989 there were 239,872 (45.7% of the total population of the republic) people. At the same time, the Abkhaz population increased from 58,963 people in 1886 to 93,267 (17.9% of the total population of Abkhazia) in 1989.

Reference. At the end of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993, the overwhelming majority of the Georgian population left Abkhazia, leaving 15 thousand Georgians in the republic, mainly in the Gali region. Moreover, for the most part these were people who did not participate in the war against the Abkhazians. However, the consistent and moderate policy of the Abkhaz leadership allowed about 50 thousand Georgians to return to the Gali region in subsequent years. Thus, up to 170 thousand Georgians who previously lived in Abkhazia found themselves outside its borders. At the same time, approximately 70 thousand people from the above number left Georgia for various reasons. Of the remaining 100 thousand, 40 have already settled their lives and most likely are not going to return. Consequently, now in Georgia there are about 60 thousand people who are not settled, offended and angry with both the Georgian authorities and the Abkhazians.

Kustov Oleg Abkhazia Tbilisi is still too tough // Independent Military Review. – October 6, 2006 Original: http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2006-10-06/1_abhazia.html

The ideological basis for the Georgianization policy was a theory put forward by a number of Georgian historians, who declared Abkhazia to be the ancestral territory of Georgia, and the Abkhaz one of the ethnic divisions of the Georgians.

Protests by individual representatives of the Abkhazian intelligentsia against the course of the authorities were heard back in the Stalin era, but the emergence of organized forms of resistance to assimilation dates back to the period after Stalin, when in the late 1950s it was led by patriotic representatives of the intelligentsia. Mass rallies and demonstrations demanding Abkhazia secede from Georgia and join the RSFSR took place in 1957, 1964, 1967, 1978.

National movements that have been gaining strength since the 1950s have developed their own ideology. In Georgia, the idea of ​​achieving independence with the subsequent unitarization of the republic became increasingly popular; in Abkhazia, a break with Georgia, separation from it, which, under the conditions of perestroika freedoms in the late 1980s, resulted in open demands to grant Abkhazia the status of a union republic of the USSR.

On March 18, 1989, in the village of Lykhny, a gathering of thousands of Abkhaz people took place, at which an appeal was made to the highest authorities of the USSR to return Abkhazia to the status of a republic of union significance that it had once lost. This was the reason for the bloody Georgian-Abkhaz clashes on the banks of the Galizga River, near Ochamchira, during which 14 people died (9 Georgians and 5 Abkhazians). Since that time, tension has hardly subsided. Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia took on an increasingly confrontational character, which was aggravated by the growth of chauvinistic and unitarist tendencies in the socio-political life of Georgia.

Georgia: realities and lessons. Events in Abkhazia unfolded against the background civil war in Georgia, overthrow of Georgian President Gamsakhurdia.

In January 1992, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was overthrown by armed force, and the winners (Jaba Ioseliani, Tengiz Kitovani, Tengiz Sigua) invited Eduard Shevardnadze to return to Georgia, hoping to take advantage of his authority and influence both internationally and within the country.

The reason for the start of the military operation was the statement of the State Council that the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia Roman Gventsadze and 12 other people were taken hostage and held on the territory of the republic, as well as the need to protect the railway, which was used as the only route for transporting goods from Russia to Armenia, already at war with Azerbaijan. The Abkhaz side categorically rejected accusations of hostage-taking and called what was happening “a prepared occupation of sovereign Abkhazia.”

August 14, 1992, but at dawn of that day Georgian troops crossed the Inguri. Initially, success accompanied the Georgian troops. By the middle of the first day of the war, they entered Sukhumi, capturing government buildings, a television center, and the most important communications. The government and the Supreme Council were forced to move to Gudauta.

On August 15, the Georgians landed an amphibious assault in the Gagra region, pushing a small detachment of the Abkhaz coast guard into the mountains that was trying to resist.

The first tank of the Abkhazian militia was captured on the very first day of the war, August 14, 1992. Several more armored vehicles were captured from August 31 to September 2, 1992 during the failed tank breakthrough of Georgian troops towards the city of Gudauta. More than 40 armored vehicles became trophies of the Abkhaz army after the defeat of the Gagra group of Georgians.

However, further events began to develop not according to the Tbilisi scenario. Having retreated from Sukhum, the Abkhaz units entrenched themselves on the left bank of the Gumista River, which marked the line of the Western Front. In the rear of the Georgian troops, mainly in the territory of the Ochamchira region, the Eastern Front was formed, which became a hotbed of the partisan movement. The most important factor was the volunteer movement in defense of Abkhazia that arose from the very first days of the conflict and was gaining strength. The composition of the volunteers was international: Kabardians, Adygeis, Circassians, Abazas, Chechens, Armenians, Russians, etc.

Every day the conflict increasingly took on the character of a real war, which became an unpleasant surprise for the Tbilisi leadership, which was counting on a show of force or a blitzkrieg.

In agreement with Tbilisi, Russia came up with a peacekeeping initiative. On September 3, 1992, a meeting between Boris Yeltsin, Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba took place in Moscow. Difficult negotiations ended with the signing of a final document, which provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops, the exchange of prisoners of war, ensuring the return of refugees, who by that time numbered several tens of thousands of people, and the resumption of the activities of Abkhaz authorities throughout the republic. However, not a single point of the agreement was fulfilled; Georgian troops continued to remain in their previous positions. The fighting resumed.

On October 2-6, the Gagrinsky bridgehead was liquidated. The Georgian troops were defeated, the Abkhaz units reached the Russian-Abkhaz border on the Psou River, thereby breaking through the military blockade around Gudauta. By the end of 1992, the situation worsened with the high-mountain mining town of Tkvarcheli, which, with the outbreak of the conflict, found itself practically cut off from the rest of Abkhazia. Communication with Gudauta was maintained only with the help of a humanitarian air corridor, but after the Georgian side shot down a helicopter carrying refugees from the blockaded city on December 14, 1992, all communication with the outside world was interrupted. The residents of Tkvarcheli were saved from hunger and suffering by an unprecedented humanitarian action by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, carried out in the summer of 1993.

Summer 1993 fighting intensified. On July 2, the Abkhazians landed an amphibious assault on the coastline of the Eastern Front. On the western front, having crossed Gumista, Abkhaz troops, one after another, liberated the settlements on the right bank north of Sukhum, approaching the near approaches of the city.

The desperate situation in which the Georgian troops found themselves forced the Russian government to put pressure on the Abkhaz side. On July 27, a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Sochi.

However, on September 16, 1993, hostilities resumed. They began on the Eastern Front, where Abkhaz units attacked Georgian positions. At the same time, Abkhaz units entered into battle with the Georgians on the Western Front, taking control of the heights dominating Sukhumi. Continuing the offensive here, on September 20 they completely surrounded the city, on September 22 they captured the airport, on September 27 Sukhum fell, and Eduard Shevardnadze, who was there, escaped. Eduard Shevardnadze, on the direct orders of Boris Yeltsin, was taken out of besieged Sukhumi with the help of the Black Sea Fleet. Sukhumi was taken from the battle, and the Abkhazians reached the border of the republic along the Inguri River, and most of the Mingrelians, innocently guilty of living in the eastern regions of Abkhazia, moved in panic to Georgia. The Georgian-Abkhaz war lasted 413 days and ended on September 30, 1993.

The war froze on the banks of the river, which the Abkhazians call Ingur, and the Georgians call Inguri. Since 1994, 1,500 Russian peacekeepers have been stationed in this zone. After the start of the peacekeeping operation of Russian troops, 60-65 thousand refugees returned to the border Gali region of Abkhazia. There are 100-120 thousand refugees left in Georgia who are waiting to return to Abkhazia or are no longer waiting for it.

The difficulty of Russian mediation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is that it is one of the tests for Russia’s right to be the arbiter of destinies in its neighboring countries. We hope for such recognition from the Western powers. The West, in turn, expects Russia to slip in its relations with Georgia and Abkhazia, and then direct Western intervention in the Caucasus with the participation of NATO troops, along the Bosnian model, will become possible. Shevardnadze keenly sensed this opportunity and constantly increased pressure on Moscow, demanding immediate and incredible results from them.

Following Georgia's lead, at the beginning of 1994 Russia established an economic blockade of Abkhazia, wanting to get the republic to recognize its inclusion in Georgia.

Abkhazia found itself, as it were, through the looking glass: there is no financial and monetary system, no sources of income, there is no more rigid border in the CIS than the border on the Psou River between Abkhazia and Russia. The border was closed under the pretext of events in Chechnya. Through the efforts of certain circles in the Russian leadership, this regime was preserved all the time. It was only in 1995 that children, old people and women were allowed to cross the border.

Pursuing the disorderly retreating Georgian troops, the Abkhaz army on September 30 reached the Abkhaz-Georgian border on the Ingur River, where the war began a year ago.

After the Georgian troops stopped on the Inguri River, a warning followed from the Russian Foreign Ministry that Russia would not allow the parties to resume the conflict.

Negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable settlement between Georgia and Abkhazia began two months after the end of hostilities. Their first round took place in Geneva, where a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on December 1, 1993. The parties pledged “not to use force or the threat of force against each other during the period of ongoing negotiations to achieve a full-scale political settlement of the conflict.” An agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners of war on the “all for all” principle, on obligations to resolve the refugee problem, and on the start of the work of groups of experts to develop recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia.

At the final stage of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in September 1993 alone, the Abkhazians captured 70 armored vehicles. In addition, in the same month, more than 80 artillery mounts of various calibers, 5 BM 21 Grad mounts, 42 mortars of 120 and 80 mm caliber, as well as ZU 23 and S 60 anti-aircraft guns and a huge amount of ammunition for them were captured as trophies.

However, the Abkhaz military did not hide the fact that reserve officers of the former Soviet army provided great assistance in training the artillery personnel of the Abkhaz army in 1993.

Abkhaz pilots made more than 400 combat missions during the war. In addition, they delivered military supplies to the Eastern Front, took out the wounded, women, children and old people from besieged Tkvarcheli. Troops were landed. They worked mainly at night, landing on unpaved surfaces and taking off from it.

In September 1992, in Pitsunda, an initiative group, headed by civilian captain L. Katiba, began to form the Abkhaz Navy from the few vessels that ended up in the hands of the militia. These were the pleasure ships "Komsomolets of Abkhazia", ​​"Sukhum", the boats "Raduga 5" and "Raduga 08", as well as a self-propelled sea barge.

The first operation of the Abkhaz Navy can be called participation in the liberation of Gagra and its environs. The further period of formation of the Abkhazian Navy is closely connected with the names of R. Nanba and Yu. Achba. The first was a midshipman in the Russian Navy. The second, before demobilization in 1985, served as captain 2nd rank in the USSR Navy, commanded a combat unit of a nuclear submarine of the Northern Fleet. After he managed to escape from occupied Sukhumi in January 1993, he headed the Abkhaz Navy. Despite the fact that there were a larger number of watercraft on the Georgian side, it was the Abkhaz naval sailors who dominated the waters of Abkhazia.

The conflict brought many surprises for the leadership of official Tbilisi. No one, and, above all, the initiators of the campaign, the Shevardnadze-Kitovani-Ioseliani triumvirate operating at that time, expected that the campaign would not be limited to two or three days of skirmishes with the subsequent suppression of Abkhaz separatism, but would end only a year later with defeat and a disorderly flight from Sukhumi.

The defeat was almost the highest point of public disappointment for Georgia, destroying the last hopes for the expected state and cultural renaissance of the country. The loss of Abkhazia also debunked another, seemingly unshakable constant of public identity, the idea of ​​a single, indivisible, unitary Georgia, within which the only possibility of its independent existence was seen.

A big surprise for the Georgians was the support provided to Abkhazia by the North Caucasian peoples, primarily the Circassians related to the Abkhazians (Kabardins, Adygeans, Circassians), as well as Chechens, Ossetians, Cossacks, etc.

Finally, the very military defeat from the Abkhazians, who were usually treated as a minority (“you are only 17% in Abkhazia and less than 1.5% in Georgia”), painfully wounded the heightened national self-awareness of the Georgians.

To explain to themselves and the world what had happened, the Georgians used various propaganda tricks in order to belittle the contribution to the victory of the Abkhazians themselves, who allegedly enjoyed unlimited support from the “red-brown forces of imperial revenge”, and themselves constituted a minority in their army, recruited mainly from "militants, mercenaries, Chechens-Basayevites, Afghans, career officers of the Russian army, fighters of the Armenian battalion named after Bagramyan and other international rabble."

ONE of the factors that is preventing Georgia today from establishing control over the rebellious Abkhazia is the military power of this unrecognized Black Sea state by many.

Resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia. The Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States, reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, referring to the Declaration of the Lisbon Meeting of Heads of State of the OSCE Member States (December 1996), which condemned “ethnic cleansing, the results of which are the mass destruction and forced expulsion of the predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia” , as well as actions preventing the return of refugees and displaced persons, guided by the provisions of the Memorandum on maintaining peace and stability in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Alma-Ata, February 10, 1995) and the Statement of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth (Minsk, May 26, 1995) on overcoming the threat of separatism as the most important condition for ensuring stability in the Caucasus and resolving conflicts in this region, condemning the position of the Abkhaz side, which is preventing the achievement of agreements on a political resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, the safe and dignified return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of permanent residence, notes that The measures taken in accordance with his Decision of January 19, 1996 to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, contributed to a certain intensification of the negotiation process.

At the same time, differences in resolving key problems of settlement, including determining the political status of Abkhazia, Georgia, have not been overcome. The problem of the safe, permanent return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of permanent residence has not been resolved. The expansion of the scale of sabotage and terrorist actions in the Gali region was of serious concern; violations of the Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces of May 14, 1994 continued. The victims of terror and violence are the local population, refugees and displaced persons, and members of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces.

The Council of Heads of State stated that the member states of the Commonwealth:

1. will strive for the speedy achievement of a full-scale political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of permanent residence;
2. will continue to implement in full the Decision of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States of January 19, 1996 “On measures to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia” and will strengthen control over its implementation;
3. will continue to provide full support to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.

Expressing deep concern about the unsettled political and humanitarian problems caused by the conflict, the Council of Heads of State called on member states of the Commonwealth and the world community to continue providing humanitarian assistance to the population and areas affected during the war.

Done in Moscow on March 28, 1997 in one original copy in Russian. The original copy is kept in the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which will send a certified copy to each state that has signed this document.

The document was signed by: the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ukraine.

Peacekeeping operation. The peacekeeping and separation mission in Abkhazia has been carried out by battalions since the summer of 1994; their mandate should have ended on July 31, 1997, but the resolution of this issue, as one might expect, was stuck. The Georgian side has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the peacekeepers, who, according to Tbilisi, are doing practically nothing to begin the process of the mass return of Georgian refugees and actually serve as border forces. After repeated attempts to draw Russia's attention to the failure to implement the decisions of the March CIS summit, repeated unsuccessful appeals by Eduard Shevardnadze to the leadership of the Russian Federation and the command of the peacekeeping forces, the Parliament of Georgia on May 30, 1997. decided to withdraw Russian peacekeepers after July 31, 1997, if the latter do not fulfill the functions assigned to them, but this decision remained on paper.

Assessing the activities of Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, we can say the following. The peacekeeper battalions were introduced into the conflict zone eight months after the ceasefire, when the danger of a conflict was already minimal due to the established balance of power between the conflicting parties and the exhausted resources of war-weary Georgia.

The activities of Russian units did not comply with the provisions of the relevant international legal documents, as well as internationally recognized standards of the UN and OSCE in the field of peacekeeping activities. These standards, to which Russia has joined, stipulate:

• the need for a UN or OSCE mandate to conduct peacekeeping operations (PKOs);
• the formation of a peacekeeping contingent as part of a multinational force;
• the presence of political control over the activities of peacekeepers;
• impartiality and neutrality on the part of peacekeepers in the implementation of peacekeeping operations, etc.

None of the above conditions were taken into account during the PKO in Abkhazia. The CIS was not recognized by the international community as having the right to conduct peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Commonwealth in the space of the former USSR, as defined by Section VIII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not have mechanisms to monitor Russia's PKOs. Control over their implementation was carried out by the Russian General Staff, which in itself contradicts the practice of carrying out this activity. The UN Military Observer Mission present in the conflict zone did not have the authority to monitor the activities of Russian peacekeeping forces. The recruitment of the peacekeeping contingent is no less casuistic. For example, the 345th Russian Airborne Regiment, stationed in Gudauta and taking part in hostilities on the side of Abkhazia, performs a peacekeeping function in the Gali sector of the security zone.

A military analysis of the deployment of peacekeeping battalions and weapons in the Gali and Zugdidi sector of the security zone shows their focus on the southern direction. The Gali sector (Abkhazian part) is controlled by airborne battalions, and the Zugdidi sector by motorized rifle battalions, with all the ensuing operational tasks. In confirmation of what has been said, the command of the peacekeeping forces has repeatedly stated that there are sufficient means to prevent attempts by the parties to resume hostilities. It is clear that there is no point for Abkhazia to expand its territory, and it will not attack the neighboring Zugdidi region of Georgia. In this regard, the military power of the peacekeepers is directed towards Georgia and is used to fight Georgian partisans.

The Russian military has once again become hostage to the short-sighted policy of its leadership and is forced to endure accusations of all sins from one of the conflicting parties, which in turn leads to an aggravation of the moral and psychological state of units in the conflict zone. Thus, in May 1997, a contract soldier as part of the Russian peacekeeping forces in the Gali sector shot ten of his colleagues while on guard duty, and then committed suicide.

In general, when one of the parties to the conflict, especially at the level of the local population, loses confidence in the presence of Russian peacekeepers and begins to actively express dissatisfaction with their functions, and local authorities are unable to prevent the terrorist activities of radical elements, this leads to the loss of all meaning of the presence of these forces.

The raising of the question by the Georgian leadership about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers after July 31, 1997 and their possible replacement with a multinational UN contingent caused a negative reaction from the Russian Federation and Abkhazia.

For Abkhazia, the withdrawal of the main guarantors of its security and their replacement with non-Russian forces was an extremely unacceptable step. Therefore, Ardzimba ambiguously made it clear that in the event of the withdrawal of Russian battalions, units of Abkhazia and the “peacekeepers” of the North Caucasus (probably meaning the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and Cossacks) would take their positions. For Russia, this outcome of events was extremely unacceptable, since in this way the international community could recognize the ineffectiveness of peacekeeping operations carried out under the auspices of the CIS in the post-Soviet space and thereby undermine Russia’s “exclusive right” in this matter.

On the other hand, the withdrawal of peacekeepers could cause a negative precedent for similar steps in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian and Moldova-Transnistria conflicts, where there are also Russian peacekeepers supporting the status quo between the conflicting parties. Therefore, as the most acceptable form of frightening the West, the thesis was chosen that in the event of the withdrawal of the “CIS peacekeeping forces,” hostilities could resume between the conflicting parties. In addition to the above, Ambassador-at-Large and representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry for the resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia, Gennady Ilyichev, stated that the peaceful development of the situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone is unlikely to be ensured without the use of Russian peacekeeping forces.

Negotiations between Georgia, Russia and Abkhazia, held during May-June 1997 at various levels, did not lead to fundamental changes in finding acceptable ways to resolve the conflict. At the same time, Georgia’s diplomatic activity intensified, aimed at finding alternative settlement options and preventing possible support for Abkhazia from Chechnya and Russian Cossack formations in the event of negative developments. The Chechens will no longer go to fight on the side of Abkhazia because their paths have diverged. Abkhazia sought to join Russia, and Chechnya to leave it. In addition, Chechnya was interested in establishing friendly relations with Georgia, thereby strengthening its southern borders. The Cossacks will no longer go to war with the Georgians, since the Abkhaz leadership deceived them by not giving them either land or houses as payment for their participation in the events of 1992-1993.

The Georgian leadership took the initiative to hold an international conference to resolve this conflict, as well as to hold a round of negotiations in an expanded format in Geneva. To strengthen his position, the President of Georgia paid a visit to Washington and the UN Headquarters. At the same time, the leitmotif of the visit was Eduard Shevardnadze’s statement that “Russia’s potential for a monopoly to resolve the issue of resolving conflicts in the Caucasus has been completely exhausted.” He called for internationalizing this process as much as possible, since maintaining peace in Abkhazia should not be the function of one country. According to Shevardnadze, the conflict seriously hampers Georgia's economic development and creates social problems. In this regard, Tbilisi is ready for a settlement “in any format,” be it negotiations under the auspices of Russia in Moscow or a regional conference under the auspices of the UN with the participation of the OSCE, as well as countries that are part of the group “Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia,” which includes includes France, Germany, Russia, USA and Great Britain.

The US reaction, for obvious reasons, was restrained. The US President confirmed the United States' support for "the territorial integrity of Georgia and the peaceful resolution of the tragic conflict in Abkhazia." The joint statement stated that “the United States and Georgia support the resumption in the near future of negotiations on Abkhazia under the auspices of the UN with the mediation of Russia and with the participation of the OSCE and other members of the Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia group.”

On July 21, 1997, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and addressed members of the UN Security Council. He outlined his proposal to expand the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia and conduct it on a multinational basis under the auspices of the UN. Speaking at the end of his stay in New York, Shevardnadze said that, in his opinion, the proposal met with a “positive attitude” at the UN. At the same time, the President of Georgia admitted that the implementation of such an operation would require solving both financial and organizational issues.

In general, assessing the results of Eduard Shevardnadze’s overseas visit, we can say that Georgia was made to understand that neither the United States nor the UN would aggravate relations with Russia, which follows from the warning against haste in the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. The United States and the UN took a wait-and-see approach, counting on the Geneva round of negotiations, as well as developments after July 31, 1997.

Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to the United States caused sharp criticism from the leadership of Abkhazia, especially his initiative to expand the peacekeeping operation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and conduct it under the auspices of the UN. In an interview with Reuters, Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba said that Georgia “can make its proposals as much as it likes, but we reject this idea.” In his opinion, it is the Georgian side that “should be most interested in maintaining the presence of Russian peacekeepers, realizing that one spark can renew the war.” The head of the government of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, opposed the replacement of Russian peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict with UN forces. Commenting in an interview with Interfax on the statement of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in the United States about the advisability of replacing the Russian peacekeeping contingent with multinational UN forces, the Abkhaz prime minister emphasized that “in this case, Abkhazia will be divided according to the Bosnian version.”

From July 23 to July 25, 1997, negotiations were held in Geneva between representatives of Tbilisi and Sukhumi, in which, along with the conflicting parties represented by the foreign ministers, representatives of the UN, OSCE and the group “Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia” took part. With all the diplomatic rhetoric dedicated to embellishing the results of the negotiations, designed to smooth over the unsuccessful event, it should be noted that the Geneva negotiations were blocked by the Abkhaz side, which did not want to change the “Moscow format” of the settlement for well-known reasons. According to some analysts, Russia was behind this position, having instructed the Abkhaz delegation.

Position of official Tbilisi in resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict became increasingly inconsistent. In the last days of 1997, having received Enver Kapba, the envoy of the President of Abkhazia, Eduard Shevardnadze, in a traditional radio interview, spoke very favorably about this meeting, noting that he “welcomes dialogue with any Abkhaz leader or with every Abkhaz.”

E. Kapba once worked in Tbilisi under E. Shevardnadze, heading a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Unlike his former boss, Kapba has not changed his beliefs and now heads the Communist Party of Abkhazia. Official information about the consultations was extremely sparse, but immediately after this there was a call from Tbilisi to use the forceful “Bosnian option” against Abkhazia. In this case, the fragile peace maintained in this region by the Russian “blue helmets” will be blown up overnight.

Moscow assessed extremist attempts in Abkhazia to move from a policy of peace to a policy of “enforcement of peace” extremely negatively. They were received very coolly by the international community.

However, the structures entrenched in the Georgian capital, claiming to be the “legitimate authorities of the “Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia”, are trying with all their might to tip the scales towards war. Having proclaimed the coming year “the year of the return of Abkhazia”, they announced a new political course. Its essence boils down to immediate convening an emergency session of the Georgian parliament, declaring at it a “state of emergency on the territory of Abkhazia”, strengthening the economic blockade of the “separatists”, switching to an emergency mode of operation of all government structures, etc.

At the same time, in Georgia there was a growing number of politicians speaking out for the use of elements of coercion for the final settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Recently, President Eduard Shevardnadze also announced the possibility of conducting a peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia according to the so-called “Bosnian format”.

According to the representative of the President of Abkhazia, Anri Dzhergenia: “Peace enforcement measures can be used when hostilities are ongoing or when the actions of one of the parties to the conflict lead to war. Our actions do not lead to war: we do not interfere with the organized return of refugees, we negotiate and do not commit any terrorist acts of sabotage against Georgia.

I do not believe that the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict poses a threat to the world community. Neither the “Bosnian option” nor any other model of forceful resolution of such conflicts has ever led to peace. The use of the “Bosnian option,” even if it is “sanctified” by the UN Security Council, will not be able to resolve the conflict and will in fact not be coercion for peace, but coercion for war.”

Russian-Georgian negotiations on border issues could lead to radical changes in the border security system along two lines. The first meeting of the Russian-Georgian working group on border issues, chaired by the First Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Georgia, Boris Pastukhov and Mikhail Ukdeba, held in Moscow, confirmed predictions that the differences between the two countries have gone extremely far.

The adopted document provides for radical changes, or rather even a rupture of the hitherto existing agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi of February 3, 1994, according to which the external borders of Georgia (320 km of the Georgian-Turkish and 254 km of the sea border) were guarded by Russian border troops. This situation, called the “two-line border security system” by the Federal Border Service, allowed Russia not to introduce extremely strict controls on the Russian-Georgian border itself, maintaining its relative “transparency”, as required by the agreements between the CIS members.

According to Russian Telegraph sources, the statement made at the end of consultations in Moscow that “a new stage of cooperation is beginning, associated with the transition of the state border of Georgia with Turkey under the full protection of the Georgian border service,” most likely does not imply the immediate withdrawal of units of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation from the territory republics. Moreover, in this case, the external borders of Georgia within Abkhazia, which is completely uncontrolled by Tbilisi, will be completely open. Russia is unlikely to agree to such a serious threat in the immediate vicinity of its own Black Sea borders.

However, the law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation have now been tasked with developing a set of measures to tighten the cover of the Russian-Georgian border itself in the event of the departure of units of the Federal Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation from Georgian territory. Experts believe that this will be quite difficult to do, but in general it is quite possible if funds previously spent on protecting Georgia’s external borders are used for this (Russia has spent over 250 billion rubles on this over the past four years) and redeployed to the “second border" the current composition of the border group "Georgia", which currently numbers 2,700 military personnel.

Of the 898 km of Russian-Georgian borders, only 81.4 km of the border passing through the territory of Chechnya can become a truly serious problem for Moscow. However, this tiny section (only about 0.1 percent of the total length of the state borders of the Russian Federation) has been causing Moscow a serious headache for several years now, and, despite the existence of the most exotic projects for its reliable closure (up to complete mining from the air), how -It will still not be possible to really change the situation here.

Russia will soon be faced with the need to make serious adjustments to the existing system of ensuring its national interests in the Caucasus, taking into account its changed position.

It is known that during the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, Chechnya helped the Abkhazians. Shamil Basayev's battalion received a baptism of fire in battles with the Georgians. Now the leadership of Chechnya decided to change allies and chose a good moment for this, when the struggle for oil transportation unfolded. Chechnya decided to join Georgia.

The Georgian-Abkhaz military conflict and its consequences largely changed the geopolitical realities in the Western Caucasus, aggravated many latent contradictions within and outside the region, and made the conflict zone an area of ​​rivalry among many interested parties; The current situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz border continues to be a very dangerous and destabilizing factor in the political process in the Caucasus.

There are two unresolved issues standing in the way of reconciliation.

The first is the forms of future relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is unlikely that anyone will be surprised that after the war, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of bloodless Abkhazia did not want to have any relations with Georgia. Any other options for the post-war development of Abkhazia - an independent state, an associated unity with Russia, a subject of the Russian Federation, a mandated territory under the auspices of the world community - were considered more natural and fair at that time (by many even now).

The principle of Georgia's territorial integrity continues to be the cornerstone of the universe. Let's be frank: the joint efforts of Russia, the UN and other observer mediators coordinated by Tbilisi have borne fruit. Abkhazia has almost been driven into a single state space with Georgia. The draft agreement, which Abkhazia is ready to sign, states that “the parties declare their agreement to live in the conditions of a common state within the borders of the former Georgian SSR on December 21, 1991.” The parties retain their Constitutions, and the relationship will be regulated by a special agreement, which defines the areas of joint competence in such government functions as foreign policy and foreign economic relations, the determination and implementation of defense policy, border service, customs service, energy, transport, communications, ecology , ensuring the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, national minorities.

The second problem is refugees. Everyone agrees that this problem is very complex, but in reality it is even more complex than it seems. Now all attention is focused on the Georgian refugees who fled their homes in Abkhazia in September 1993. But few people remember the first wave of refugees, the one that began pouring in from areas controlled by Georgian troops at that time in August 1992.

In the same way, everyone forgot about the refugees from Tkvarchela, who were transported by a special operation of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations from the city blockaded by the Georgian army, and yet then, in July 1993, photographs and reports about these exhausted and exhausted people circulated in many newspapers and flashed on TV. Almost all refugees of the first wave (among them Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians) lost their homes and property. Many cannot return to Abkhazia because there are bare walls where the house used to be; for the same reason, many of those who returned were forced to live in other people's houses and, therefore, remain refugees to this day. However, I hope no one doubts that refugees of the first wave also have the full right to return to their homes, to compensation for material damage, and legal protection. The problems of the first wave of refugees should be an integral part of the solution to the problem as a whole.

Vladislav Ardzinba is under strong pressure from Russia and European states, which are pushing him to determine the status of Abkhazia within the framework of a single Georgian state, and its own military-political potential does not allow Sukhumi to feel as confident as Stepanakert can afford itself. At the same time, Ardzinba, as a completely realistically thinking politician, perfectly understands the need for a constructive dialogue with the former metropolis, which presupposes significant concessions on his part, but cannot afford them in light of pressure from below, from field commanders and some parliamentarians. In these conditions, the results of the elections of a new parliament in Sukhumi may help expand the political basis for compromise on the part of the Abkhaz leadership. But the limits of such a compromise for the coming months are known and do not go beyond the framework of one or another form of confederal relations. At the same time, the Abkhazian authorities always have in mind another option for determining their fate, which brings their position closer to the views of Stepanakert.

In Georgia, the obvious (and already partly involved) points of Islamic influence on political processes are primarily Adjara and especially Abkhazia. There is no need to explain how important a role the attention of Turkey and the Middle Eastern Islamic states played in the outbreak and escalation of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. Expert data shows that the involvement of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples (including the famous Abkhaz battalion of Shamil Basayev) in this conflict was also not without Turkish planning. Considering the high level of intra-Georgian conflict associated with complex ethno-tribal striping, the Islamic factor is extremely serious for Georgia. At the same time, we note that Turkey’s playing role here turns out to be enormous also because it turns out to be the key holder of oil transportation and simply transport projects from the Caspian Sea through Transcaucasia.

Despite the fact that the 345th parachute regiment stationed in Gudauta, which forms the basis of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia, will be disbanded and must leave the Bambora military base by May 1, 1998, this base remains among those four objects which are included in the agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi. Meanwhile, the prospect of further developments in this area, taking into account the Abkhazians for the planned event, remains unclear. It is no secret that the 345th regiment played an important role in the dramatic events of 1992, when it helped Sukhumi win the war against Tbilisi.

Mandate for a peacekeeping operation by the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) in Abkhazia of the Republic of Georgia. KSPF were deployed on both sides of the Inguri River on June 17, 1994 in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, signed by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on May 14, 1994. According to the Agreement, “The function of the peacekeeping forces will be to make every effort to maintain the ceasefire and ensure its strict observance. In addition, their presence should facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, primarily to the Gali region. They will monitor the implementation of the Agreement and its Protocol in relation to the Security Zone (SA) and the Limited Arms Zone (LAZ). The CIS peacekeeping forces will operate under the command of the Interim Joint Command and the Commander of the Peacekeeping Forces.” In the Moscow Agreement, the parties asked the UN Security Council to expand the mandate of UN military observers with a view to their wider participation in the peacekeeping operation.

The initial mandate of the KSPM was adopted on May 15, 1995 and was further expanded and supplemented on December 31, 1995. During 1996, Georgia actively insisted on expanding the scope of the Mandate to the entire territory of Abkhazia and giving the KSPM police functions in order to restore the territorial integrity of this state. This activity of the Georgian leadership was a consequence of the freezing of the negotiation process to determine the status of Abkhazia, the difficulty of resolving the problem of the return of refugees, and the separatist activities of the Abkhaz leadership aimed at further secession and building an independent state. On May 15, 1996, by the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, minor changes were made to the mandate.

On October 17, 1996, by decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the stay of the KSPM was extended until January 31, 1997. This decision to a certain extent expanded the mandate of the KSKF (ensuring the safety of the return of refugees, ensuring the security of UNOMIG and other international organizations in the Security Zone, fighting terrorists).

The extension of the mandate of the KSKF was not ratified by the Parliament of Georgia (a legal requirement in accordance with which all decisions related to defense and security must be ratified) due to a number of requirements being put forward for the activities of the Russian peacekeeping forces. In this regard, according to some representatives of the Georgian Parliament, the presence of the KSPM in Abkhazia is illegitimate. The basis for this criticism was the policy of Russia, which, playing a more divisive rather than a peacekeeping role, promotes the Abkhaz separatists and, with its ambiguous activities, freezes the conflict resolution process. Some representatives of the Georgian Parliament consider Russia to be a party to this conflict and consider it unacceptable for it to continue to perform peacekeeping functions. During 1996, the Parliament of Georgia twice (in April and October 1996) considered issues related to the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the activities of the KSKF, as a result of which relevant resolutions were adopted (addition).

Command and control of the KSPF. In accordance with the Mandate, the commander of the KSPM acts on the basis of documents approved by the highest bodies of the CIS: the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth. When resolving current issues, the commander of the KSPM coordinates his actions with the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (who is the chairman of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS states). The operational leadership and management of the KSPM is in reality carried out by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation. This situation arises due to the fact that in the CIS there is no structure that could exercise operational management or control over the activities of the KSKF.

There is no such control on the part of Georgia either. KSPM do not report or provide information about their activities to the Government of Georgia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, etc. The powers of the Commander of Georgian military observers in the security zone are limited to monitoring the crossing of checkpoints in the security zone along the Inguri River (limited control on the Georgian side can only be exercised at the checkpoint in the Zugdidi sector of the security zone). There is also no structure/body designed to discuss issues related to the implementation of their functions by the KSKF with the participation of conflicting parties and mediators. Georgia has limited opportunities to influence the KSKF within the CIS. Control can be exercised indirectly through the Headquarters for Coordination of CIS Military Cooperation in Moscow and only when resolving the issue related to the extension and adjustment of the mandate. There are no international media offices in the security zone, which limits access to information and understanding of the real state of affairs in the conflict zone.

There is no structure that would exercise control over the return of refugees to Abkhazia and the implementation by the KSPF, in accordance with the Mandate, of functions to combat terrorist groups in the security zone.

Structure of KSPM and their characteristics. Commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, Major General Babenkov was appointed to this position after the Dushanbe Summit of the Council of Defense Ministers of the CIS States in 1996, after agreement with the Georgian side.

1
On January 7, 1997, at the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the issue of its approval was included on the agenda. Chief of Staff of the KSPM, Major General Yu. Tikhonov. Until December 1996, the peacekeeping forces were commanded by Lieutenant General V. Yakushev. The headquarters of the KSPM is located in a sanatorium in the city of Sukhumi. KSPM are armed with infantry fighting vehicles, T-72, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and small arms (see table). In accordance with the mandate, the number of KSPF is determined to be 2,500 people, but in reality today they number approximately 1,500 people and consist of 3 motorized rifle and 1 parachute battalions, a tank company, an artillery battalion, a separate helicopter detachment, and headquarters to control these forces. KSPM units operate in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors of the Security Zone, as well as in the Kodori Gorge. The battalion headquarters are located in the cities of Zugdidi and Gali, which manage the peacekeeping forces in their sector of the Security Zone. For management mobility, there is one operational group each, which is controlled by the deputy commanders of the KSPM (with the rank of colonel). If the situation in the sector worsens, the Headquarters of the Commander of the KSPM moves to this security sector to provide direct leadership. The placement of headquarters was agreed upon with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. The 12th Batumi (65% consisting of representatives of Adjarian nationality (contract soldiers) and the 102nd Leninakan (approximately 65% ​​consisting of representatives of Armenian nationality) motorized rifle battalions are deployed in the Zugdidi sector. In the Gali sector, the Totsky motorized rifle battalion (27th Guards motorized rifle division stationed in Totsk, intended to participate in peacekeeping activities) and the 7th Gudauta parachute battalion (345th Guards Airborne Regiment stationed in Gudauta, 7th Airborne Division). These are regular units of the Armed Forces Russian Federation, who have not previously undergone appropriate training for carrying out peacekeeping operations (excluding the Totsky battalion, which previously took part in a similar operation in Transnistria of the Republic of Moldova). On the spot, according to the command, instructor-methodological, demonstration classes were practiced, starting with the military-political situation in the zone conflict and ending with the actions of each soldier in a specific situation, which are no different from normal combat training. Battalions undergo a planned rotation determined for officers for 3 months (an indicator that Russia “passes” officers through conflict zones, each officer from the point of permanent deployment of the battalion visited 2-3 times as part of the KSPM), and for privates and non-commissioned personnel - 6 months . Units of the KSPM battalions perform the main service at the checkpoint and also carry out patrols. A weekly duty at the checkpoint has been established, with shifts on Mondays.

The salary for a senior officer, depending on the position, was approximately 1 million 800 thousand Russian rubles, for non-commissioned officers up to 200 thousand, for a soldier 180 thousand. Monetary support comes from the military units that sent units to the KSPM, which indicates that the peacekeeping operation is financed from the Russian military budget.

KSPM have the right to stop cars, inspect cargo, and carry out activities against terrorist and criminal groups. At night, comprehensive control over movement through checkpoints, which are located at key points in the Zone, is mandatory.

Noteworthy is the fact that in carrying out a peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, the activities of units are regulated by the General Military Charter of the RF Armed Forces, which does not stipulate the rights and obligations of Russian military personnel when carrying out peacekeeping activities (i.e., there is no separate charter of the RF Armed Forces).

There is no body within the structure of the KSPM that provides relevant training on site. This function is the responsibility of the command staff of the units.

Rights, responsibilities, conditions for the use of weapons are communicated to military units. The use of KSPF weapons is permitted in the event of an obvious attack on posts and locations of peacekeeping forces. In the event of an attack, any weapon can be used, including armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and infantry fighting vehicles. In normal circumstances, a preliminary warning sounds - the command Stop! I'll shoot! Peacekeeping forces! In addition, weapons are used to neutralize terrorist and criminal groups and seize their weapons warehouses.

All facts of violations of the terms of the agreement or threat notifications received from local authorities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and security are first verified with military intelligence data. At the same time, there is close cooperation between the KSPM and the relevant authorities of Abkhazia. After that, the situation is assessed in the operational group of the KSPM of this sector, a decision is made and an order is given. The effectiveness and efficiency of the peacekeeping operation is linked by the command of the KSPM with secrecy in the management of peacekeeping forces and obtaining information, which may indicate a certain degree of secrecy in the conduct of this peacekeeping operation and its rather combative nature than peacekeeping.

According to the representative of the KSPM of the Gali sector of the security, their units perform the following main tasks:

• separation of conflicting parties;
• countering terrorist and sabotage groups;
• counteraction to criminal and criminal elements.

The fight against criminal and criminal elements causes the greatest difficulty, since it is not typical for the Armed Forces.

Ambushes are used to combat terrorist groups. For this purpose, 4 reserve groups have been created in the Gali sector of the KSPM, two of which conduct operations using helicopters. In the event of a deterioration in the situation or an operation, all actions are based on the base posts of the KSPM, each of which has one reserve group.

Noteworthy is the fact that peacekeeping battalions are staffed by military personnel based on nationality and their location in the security zone. Thus, the aforementioned Leninakan and Batumi motorized rifle battalions are staffed by 65% ​​Armenians and 65% Adjarians. The issue of Armenians in Georgia is quite sensitive due to the presence of a large Armenian diaspora in eastern Georgia (500 thousand) and its traditional orientation towards Russia. The leaders of Adjara are in clear contradiction with the central leadership of Georgia, which allows the assertion that Russia is using this ethnic group to put pressure on Georgia. These facts may also indicate that Russia deliberately uses these units as a “buffer” to minimize Georgia’s possible forceful solution to disputes with Abkhazia, plays on internal interethnic contradictions, and supports leaders of ethnic groups who are opposed to the activities of central authorities Georgian authorities. On the other hand, it is possible to allow targeted military training of Adjarians in this battalion, as well as military training of Armenians in Georgia.

Military support for the KSPF is provided from Russian military bases stationed in the region. Poor logistics support for the KSPM, in particular food, leads to frequent violations by the personnel of the KSPM units.

There are facts when the command of the KSPM turned to UNOMIG to provide assistance in providing diesel fuel for armored personnel carriers (once assistance was provided).

Characteristics of the Security Zone (SA) and Restricted Weapons Zone (RAZ). In accordance with the “Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces,” the security zone is an area 24 km in depth (two sectors, 12 km to the right and left of the Enguri River) and extends up to 80 km along the front. There should be no armed forces or heavy military equipment in the ZB.

According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, there are 13 checkpoints in each sector (total number 26).

Then follows the ZOV, which is 20 km deep from the ZB on both sides. According to the agreement, armed forces and heavy military equipment, including:

• all artillery pieces and mortars with a caliber over 80 mm;
• all tanks;
• all armored personnel carriers.

Local civil authorities operate in the ZB and ZOV. Maintaining the law in these zones is carried out by the police, who may be armed with personal weapons.

The Gali sector of the Western Territory is predominantly populated by Mingrelians and Georgians. Key administrative positions are occupied by Abkhazians (several administration representatives and 35 police officers). After the war, a large number of the sector's young population own firearms, which are used periodically. The Kalashnikov assault rifle is valued at one million Russian rubles.
In the Gali region there are partisan groups (approximately 8 groups), whose activities are directed against the administration of Abkhazia and the KSPM.
Some settlements in the Gali region have created their own self-defense groups in response to the ineffectiveness of the Abkhaz police in ensuring the safety of the population from criminal groups. Today, the administration of Abkhazia and the KSPM tolerate the existence of these unofficial self-defense groups.

UN Observer Mission in Georgia(UNOMIGUnited Nations Observer Mission in Georgia). UNOMIG was established in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 858 of August 24, 1993, but as a result of the offensive of Abkhaz armed formations along the front across the Gumista River and the capture of Sukhumi, this resolution lost its significance.

After UNOMIG's original mandate lapsed due to the resumption of hostilities in Abkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given a temporary mandate by Security Council resolution 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993 to maintain contacts with both parties to the conflict and with the military contingents of the Russian Federation and monitor the situation and report to headquarters, paying particular attention to any developments in connection with United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement. Following the signing of the Ceasefire and Separation of Forces Agreement by the Georgian and Abkhaz parties in May 1994, the Security Council, in its resolution 937 (1994) of 27 July 1994, authorized an increase in the strength of UNOMIG to 136 military observers. (http://www.un.org/russian/peace/pko/unomig/unmigmandat.htm)

UNOMIG's current mandate, which expired on 31 January 1997, included:
1. Monitoring and verification of the implementation of the Moscow Agreement of May 14, 1994;
2. Monitoring the peacekeeping operation of the KSKF in accordance with the implementation of the Moscow Agreement;
3. Verification, through observation and patrolling, of compliance by the conflicting parties with agreements on the non-deployment of armed forces and weapons in the ZB and ZOV;
4. Monitoring of storage sites for heavy weapons removed from the ZB and ZOV in cooperation with the KSPM.
5. Monitoring the withdrawal of units of the Georgian Armed Forces from the Kodori Gorge to the border of Abkhazia;
6. Patrolling the Kodori Gorge;
7. Conducting investigations, at the request of the parties or the KSPM or on its own initiative, allegations of violations of the Agreement and assistance in resolving these incidents;
8. Keeping the UN Secretary-General informed, especially about the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments;
9. Establishing close contacts with the conflicting parties and, in cooperation with the KSPF, and their representatives in the region, promoting the creation of favorable conditions for the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons.
UNOMIG, in accordance with the Mandate, conducts surveillance, dialogue with the local population, monitoring, investigations and patrols of ZB and ZOV. All incidents occurring in these zones must be investigated by the Mission. In practice, this ability is limited in the Gali sector due to the danger of mines. All violations emanating from the conflicting parties are protested and reported to the UN Secretariat on a daily basis. The mission is trying to do everything possible to build trust between the conflicting parties in the process of peaceful resolution and provides all possible support to the representatives of international organizations providing humanitarian assistance in the region.

UNOMIG was commanded by Swedish General Perr Kalstrom.

Reference as of 2006 Georgia-UNMIH. Location Georgia. Headquarters Sukhumi. Duration August 1993 – to 2008
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Ms. Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) (S/2002/643), (S/2002/644)

Number (as of January 31, 2006): military personnel - 134 (of which military observers - 122, police - 12); international civilian personnel - 104; local civilian personnel - 186 and UN volunteers - 2

Countries contributing military personnel
Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, France, Czech Republic, Sweden, Switzerland

Countries providing civilian police officers
Hungary, Germany, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland

Death toll
10 people: military personnel - 6; military observers - 2; international civilian personnel - 1; local civilian personnel - 1

Financial aspects
Funding method: accrual of contributions to be paid into the Special Account

Approved Budget for the period July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006: $36.38 million (gross)
(http://www.un.org/russian/peace/pko/unomig/unomigfacts.htm)

The presence of the UN in the region is an important disciplinary factor in terms of the CIS/Russia peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia, and gives Georgia the opportunity to maneuver in defending its national interests in resolving the conflict. In practice, the presence of UNOMIG in the conflict zone is the only international source of information about the nature of the CPKF peacekeeping activities. It is impossible not to take into account the high degree of respect and trust in the mission of military observers from the local population in the Security Zone on both sides of the Inguri River. In this regard, one should not discount the opinion of the administrative structures and the public of Georgia in connection with the need for more active involvement of this international organization in resolving the existing conflict and conducting a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the United Nations. Russia is trying in every possible way to neutralize the role and place of the UN in resolving the conflict, trying to cast doubt on the need for the UN presence in the region, as can be seen from the public statements of the KSKF command and the materials of inter-Ministry of Foreign Affairs consultations within the CIS.

The expanded mandate of UNOMIG, in addition to monitoring in the conflict zone, stipulates monitoring of the activities of the CPKF.

UNOMIG systematically prepared a weekly assessment and a situation report in the conflict zone.

UNOMIG does not have its own statistics system, which could negatively affect the reputation of the Military Observer Mission if the International Court of Justice in The Hague decides to investigate facts of genocide or individual crimes in the conflict zone. In fact, monitoring in the conflict zone is fully carried out and controlled by Russia.

It should be noted that there is no real coordination and leadership pyramid between UNOMIG and other UN bodies in Georgia. All these bodies act on an independent and uncoordinated basis.

It is necessary to pay attention to the emerging trend of competition between the UN and the OSCE in Georgia, which manifests itself in partial duplication of each other, in particular between the UN High Commissioners on National Minorities and the OSCE, in matters of resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. It is possible that this state of affairs is a consequence of criticism of the UN (which is controlled by Russia through the Security Council) from the Georgian leadership for its passive role in resolving the Abkhaz conflict and the desire to thus involve the OSCE for more active actions, where the Russian Federation does not have such a significant influence. This can be confirmed by the adoption in the Final Document of the OSCE Lisbon Summit (December 2-3, 1996) of a clause on the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian people in Abkhazia, as opposed to the desire of the Russian delegation to block this clause.

The nature of interaction between the KSPM and the Georgian and Abkhaz sides and with UNOMIG. Abkhazia represents observers, Georgia represents military observers at the checkpoint on the Inguri River. On a regular basis, meetings are held between the Deputy Commander of the Zugdidi sector of the KSPF and the Commander of the military observers of Georgia (Tengiz Oshkhereli settlement, the Observer Headquarters is located in the village of Chitatskari, military observers are represented at 13 posts in the Zugdidi sector of the Western Front).

On Wednesdays, weekly meetings are held between the relevant representatives of Abkhazia, Georgia, UNOMIG and the CIS KSPM on the Inguri River to discuss the situation and incidents in the security zone (usually of a short-term nature).

UNOMIG officers may visit KSPF posts at checkpoints.

Until 2008, a situation arose when the security of UNOMIG was ensured by the CIS KSPM, which placed them in a certain dependence. So, during the elections in Abkhazia, KSPM infantry fighting vehicles guarded the approaches to the UNOMIG headquarters in the Gali sector of the Security Zone, and a sniper of the peacekeeping forces was on combat duty near the building opposite the Mission headquarters in Gali. There have been repeated cases of KSPM armored personnel carriers escorting UNOMIG patrol vehicles. In this way, the principle of impartiality may be violated and the Mission may become dependent on the KSKF. There have been repeated cases when the desire of the UN Military Observer Mission to conduct patrols of certain areas of the Gali sector of the Security Zone was met with “warnings” from the KSPF that there were a large number of mines in these areas. In this way, the KSPM has the ability to partially restrict the movement of UNOMIG patrol vehicles and thereby limit monitoring.

According to the representative of the KSPM in the Gali sector, there is close cooperation between UNOMIG and the KSPM of this sector (which is not of an official nature), in particular the presence of operational communication between the deputy commander of the KSPM of the Gali sector and the commander of this UNOMIG sector (special radio channel, the same system with the Abkhaz side ), exchange of information, in particular about the activities of the KSPM. As a rule, information exchange occurs on Saturdays during joint meetings. According to UNOMIG representatives, these meetings and exchange of information are not regular. The issues of conducting KSPM operations against sabotage and terrorist groups are not in the field of discussion between KSPM and UNOMIG, so the Mission is deprived of the opportunity to monitor this area of ​​KSPM activity, limiting itself to event monitoring. Military observers (in the opinion of the command of the peacekeeping forces) cannot be involved in participation in operations directed against terrorists, since these are purely combat operations, and the observers do not have weapons. According to a representative of the KSPM command, the effectiveness of the peacekeepers also depends on covert control and obtaining information. Thus, the Russian military leadership in the conflict zone has a number of mechanisms limiting the activities of UNOMIG, which do not allow the latter to fully monitor the activities of the KSPF in the Security Zone.

The KSPM command maintains close ties with the head of the Gali district administration (representative of the Abkhaz administration, Ruslan Kishmaria), while the command provides assistance in administrative matters and in facilitating transport.

Russian policy in Georgia until 2008 When assessing the policy of the Russian Federation in relation to Georgia, it can be said that until 2008 Russia did not have a unified strategy both in relation to this country and in relation to the Caucasus region. The integrity of Russia’s policy can be judged conditionally, considering it as a set of corporate interests of various political forces in the State Duma, the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the financial, economic and regional elites of Russia, which do not always coincide but, in general, can agree on the issue of restoring individual influence Russia in this region.

In reality, there is a direct relationship between the conflict resolution process in Georgia and the concept of Russian national interests in the CIS. The Russian government links its “mediation/peacekeeping” mission with a number of requirements in relation to Georgia, which are as follows:

1) joint border protection;
2) Russian military bases on the territory of Georgia;
3) a single customs space;
4) in the future, a unified financial and credit system.

Among the above factors, military-strategic issues are of predominant importance, which leaves an imprint on the nature of bilateral relations (military bases in Batumi, Vaznan, Akhalkalaki, Gudauta 22 thousand people, 200 tanks, 570 armored vehicles, 220 BM-21 Grad. On the territory of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, border guards, Su-25 airfield, research center of the RF Ministry of Defense (closed, underground military institute, seismological center of the RF Ministry of Defense).The issue of the presence of Russian military bases in Abkhazia and Georgia is the subject of interstate negotiations (only subject to the territorial integrity of Georgia).

The predominance of the military component in Russian policy generally boils down to the long-term consolidation of the military presence in Georgia by legitimizing the presence of military bases and joint border protection. Having control over the process of resolving existing conflicts in Georgia, having a direct interest in strengthening its presence in the region and influencing separatist regimes. To a certain extent, it can be argued that Georgia, as a strategically important center of the Caucasus, has become an arena for Russia’s struggle with Turkey and other interested states for spheres of influence in the region. In the process of NATO expansion to the East, Russia's military pressure on Georgia will increase in order to consolidate its military presence and limit the activity of NATO member states, primarily Turkey.

Based on the above, Russia’s conservation of the process of resolving the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts is characteristic feature Russia's mediation/peacekeeping policy at this stage, designed to ensure the power of Georgia in the sphere of vital interests of the Russian Federation. This policy contributes to the orientation of separatist regimes towards Russia, which gives the latter additional opportunities to influence Georgia.

When assessing Russia's strategic interests, the role of international projects for the transportation of Caspian oil and the Trans-Caucasus transport corridor should be taken into account.

Russia’s interests in the Eastern Black Sea region were clearly defined by the director of the Institute of New Abroad, Konstantin Zatulin, who participated in the negotiations with the Abkhaz side in the delegation of the Russian Foreign Ministry and described Russia’s interests as the following:

Firstly, preventing a conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, primarily related to “the welfare of our last remaining Black Sea region.” Russian peacekeepers are present there for this purpose;
Secondly, “Our interest is that the border with Abkhazia be a border of friendship. Unfortunately, in the current international situation, under the current leadership of the country, we cannot accept Abkhazia into the Russian Federation. This will immediately lead to attempts to isolate Russia, ... but “this is possible given a fundamentally different state within the country.” “But we can and must make sure that Abkhazia becomes the location of our military units, so that Abkhazia becomes a zone of economic prosperity, where our business executives will invest money and acquire property. We must keep in mind that we have lost hundreds of kilometers of the Black Sea coast, and 320 kilometers of the Abkhaz coast will not be superfluous for us at all”;
“Third, the formal presence of Abkhazia within Georgia would guarantee relatively friendly relations with Georgia. Because, being part of Georgia, but relying on Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara would play the role of our main arguments in the internal Georgian political process. For fear of losing these territories again, Georgia would be forced to carry out a more respectful policy towards Russia... The guarantee of our interests in Georgia are the special rights of Abkhazia, Adjara and South Ossetia.”

We should also not forget that on the territory of Abkhazia the official monetary unit is the Russian ruble, i.e. Economically, Russia has already separated Abkhazia from Georgia.

The Russian leadership ignored repeated statements by the Georgian side regarding the inadmissibility of Russia's foreign economic activity with Abkhazia without the consent of the Georgian leadership. This can be confirmed by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1336 of November 19, 1996, signed by V. Chernomyrdin on the export of citrus fruits from Abkhazia and without agreement with the Georgian side in violation of the Decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS of January 19, 1996. A similar decision of the Government of the Russian Federation took place in the fall of 1995 to allow 15 thousand tons to enter Russia. citrus fruits. Russian border guards and the Russian Ministry of Transport played a direct role in ensuring this decision. In Russian banks. According to representatives of Georgia, correspondent accounts have been opened for banking institutions operating in Abkhazia, which are not registered by the National Bank of Georgia (a branch of the so-called Abkhazbank operates in Moscow). According to the Georgian side, according to banking channels, tens of millions of rubles are coming from Russia to Abkhazia to finance the activities of the separatist regime.

In accordance with Decree of the Government of Georgia dated May 24, 1995 No. 289-10, the Sukhumi seaport is closed for any international transport. By decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS dated January 19, 1996, an embargo was established on the import/export of products to Abkhazia. However, international maritime transport takes place with the direct involvement of the Russian military authorities in the region (providing these transports by Russian border guards). There are numerous facts, confirmed by the leader of Abkhazia V. Ardzimba, regarding the conscription of “citizens of Abkhazia” to serve in Russian border units stationed in this territory without the consent of the Government of Georgia.

In the issue of Abkhazia, it can be assumed (similarly to Transnistria) that certain circles in Russia are interested in assistance and state stimulation of separatist regimes that will ensure the foreign policy interests of this state and the presence of Russian capital uncontrolled by the leadership of the republics, protected by the presence of military bases in these territories . In this regard, military bases and “peacekeeping” forces of Russia, in addition to ensuring the security of existing separatist regimes, are directly involved in the implementation of Russia’s economic interests.

In the summer, members of the officers' families of the KSPM, according to the Georgian side, relax in sanatoriums in Abkhazia, which is unacceptable in the international practice of peacekeeping in conflict zones. Operational interaction between representatives of the Russian peacekeeping forces and Abkhaz authorities.

The fact that the commander of the KSPM was replaced is also indicative. On November 19, 1996, an order was signed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation to remove V. Yakushev from his position, to which the latter stated that he would leave it only after elections in Abkhazia. Before the elections in Abkhazia, according to the Georgian side, a verbal order was received from Moscow for the KSPM to assist Abkhazia in holding the elections. The KSPM prevented the implementation of the plebiscite by blocking checkpoints in the ZB (26 existing checkpoints + organization of 17 additional checkpoints).

The position of Georgian representatives on the issue of Russia's role in resolving conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia. The Georgian leadership has always more or less persistently put forward demands on Russia regarding changes in its policy towards the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. The situation worsened with the election of president Sakaashvili. The possibilities of strategic partnership (presence of military bases, joint border protection) are linked to the process of resolving existing conflicts and restoring the territorial integrity of the state.

The attitude of Georgian experts (official and unofficial) to Russian peacekeeping and the role of the KSKF can be emphasized from the following:

• The Russian concept of peacekeeping boils down to the creation of an artificial border between Abkhazia and Georgia (Cyprus option). Russia plays a more divisive mission than a peacekeeping one, since the KSPF is not engaged in establishing order, identifying facts of human rights violations, citing a limited mandate, the lack of authority in the Mandate for carrying out police functions and the corresponding UN Security Council resolution;
• Russian/CIS peacekeeping forces entered the conflict zone on June 20, 1994, 8 months after the ceasefire (September 30, 1993), when the need for their presence and operation no longer played such a significant role;
• Russia intends to make Abkhazia its agent in the Caucasus.
• Georgia’s economic sanctions against Abkhazia do not work due to Russia’s fault, since the Russian Federation does not put pressure on the leadership of Abkhazia, but rather provides assistance;
• Russia takes responsibility in certain situations when it is beneficial for it. The UN Security Council and the CIS are two Russian mechanisms for manipulation. In connection with Georgia’s demand to expand the mandate of the KSKF, the Russian side is presenting an argument about the need for a corresponding UN Security Council resolution to conduct a coercive operation (at the same time, in Tajikistan, Russia, in fact, under the guise of peacekeeping, is conducting a military operation on the side of one party to the conflict without receiving a corresponding Security Council mandate UN);
• the need for Russia to conduct a peacekeeping operation is related to its interest in the existence of this conflict for various reasons, including the possibility of long-term influence and political pressure on the conflicting parties;
• The Georgian Parliament expressed no confidence in the CIS KSPM in October 1996;
• Georgia had no other choice regarding consent to the presence of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone due to the refusal by the UN Security Council to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation in this region;
• There is concern on the Georgian side regarding the corruption of the KSKF. In their opinion, more intensive rotation is necessary (especially in the Gali Sector of the Western Belgrade);
• a change in the leadership of the KSPM command will not lead to a fundamental change in the role and functions of the Russian peacekeeping forces and their successors will continue the course of V. Yakushev;
• Russia cannot be a mediator in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia because it is one of its parties;
• the possibility of transport movement in the ZB and ZOV is regulated by Russian peacekeepers, all mechanisms for monitoring the situation in the conflict zone (region) are in the hands of Russia, including the monitoring effect (an example of monitoring the situation in the region that goes beyond the scope of the peacekeeping function can be the shutdown of transfer stations in Security Zone on the Inguri River in November 1996, when the unified energy supply system of Georgia, united with Rosenergo, was faced with the threat of a breakdown of the entire system. were disconnected by the Abkhaz side (during the November elections). At the same time, a situation arose when frequency differences could lead to a breakdown of the entire Gruzenergo system. It was necessary to turn off the power system until the issue was resolved with the Russian side. At the same time, Rosenergo continued to provide electricity to Abkhazia, the payment for which is made by Georgia. Question “At the direction of whom in Russia were representatives of the Abkhaz side allowed into the transfer station in the Security Zone, guarded by Russian peacekeepers, to disconnect it from the unified power system?”);
• thousands of Georgians died, according to T. Nadaireshvili (Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia (Tbilisi), after the entry of the KSPM into the Security Zone. There are numerous offenses on the part of the KSPM (tribute from the Gali peasants for “ensuring security”, facts of the participation of the KSPM in ensuring the November elections in Abkhazia, blocking posts, forcing people to participate in elections, numerous statements and complaints from those living in the Gali sector of the Security Zone.) An exceptional issue for Georgia is delaying the return of refugees to their places of permanent residence. Delaying this issue can lead to a situation where refugees can take up weapons and the situation will get out of control;
• the trend towards arms and drug trafficking in conflict zones in the Caucasus, including Abkhazia, is increasing;
• the position of the Georgian Parliament of the UN should play a more active role in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia; the peacekeeping process should come under the auspices of this organization and the leadership of the peacekeeping process should not be allowed to be carried out by the Russian General Staff;
• The UN should become a mediator in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia. The role of a statistician does not suit Georgia, when the UN does not interfere in anything and is not responsible for anything?
• UNOMIG's mandate was tied to Russian peacekeeping forces, which negated the entire value of their mission and undermined the effectiveness of the Mission's role in the region.
• Russia uses the Leninakan motorized rifle battalion of the KSPM, which consists of 65% representatives of Armenian nationality and is located in the Zugdidi security sector, as a buffer or potential for conflict between Georgians and the large Armenian diaspora in this country (more than 500 thousand living compactly in the eastern regions of Georgia) . If Georgia opposes the numerous violations of this battalion or opposes itself to the KSPM, then a problem (tension) may arise between Georgians and Armenians in Georgia. In this way, a conflict similar to the Georgian-Abkhazian or Georgian-Ossetian one could be provoked. At the same time, representatives of the Georgian side point out the facts of the sale of weapons to the Armenian population of Georgia, in particular in Akhalkalaki, where Russian units are stationed. There are known facts of hidden selection by Russia of representatives of Armenian nationality for training and staffing joint border forces on the Georgian-Turkish border;
• The constant presence of the Turkish factor in relations between Russia and Georgia should be taken into account.

Issues of concern for the Georgian Foreign Ministry regarding the CIS and KSKF:

• in the CIS there is a significant part of agreements of a military nature, the implementation of which is given the greatest control;
• the tendency to transfer all statutory bodies of the Commonwealth to Moscow;
• the chairmanship of the CIS states is determined for a period of 1 year in the order of the Russian alphabet, but the Russian Federation has been presiding over the CIS for 5 years;
• Georgia considers the CIS an international organization, but at the same time opposes the substitution of direct ties between the Commonwealth member states and international organizations;
• the effectiveness of Russia's peacekeeping activities is questionable, but Georgia is currently forced to put up with this fact (the main condition is the return of refugees without any preconditions on the part of Abkhazia. The danger lies in the conservation of the conflict. It is necessary to expand the mandate of the CPKF to the entire territory of Abkhazia in order to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia , otherwise the function of these peacekeeping forces has exhausted itself;
• There is no direct control over the activities of the KSPM. There is indirect control through the Headquarters for the Coordination of Military Cooperation (Moscow);
• participation in the 1992 Tashkent Treaty is conditional. After 5 years, confirmation of participation is required, but Georgia did not provide such confirmation. Military and military-technical cooperation with Russia is carried out mainly on a bilateral basis;
• joint border protection is a forced step, since today Georgia is not capable of protecting its borders on its own;
• Georgia is a supporter of a balance of interests, and not a balance of power in the space of the former USSR, which implies maximum good neighborly relations;
• inconsistency of the CIS states in relation to previously made decisions on the inadmissibility of assistance to the separatists (the November decision of the Government of the Russian Federation on the export of citrus fruits from Abkhazia);
• the presence of the KSPM and Russian military bases is interconnected in terms of coordination and management of them from a single center of the Ministry of Defense\General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
• There is disintegration among the personnel of the peacekeeping forces and extortions from the local population.
• in the event of the withdrawal of the KSPF from the Security Zone, the dividing line should move from the Enguri River to the Gali River.
• With the end of the tenure of the CPKF, Russia proposes to raise the issue of the need for changes and adjustments to the mandate, and takes a “constructive position.”
• The Parliament of Georgia will consider the issue of Russian military bases on its territory only after the territorial integrity of the country is restored. The issue of military bases on the territory of Abkhazia is the subject of ongoing bilateral negotiations.

The additions to the new provisions of the Mandate have not yet been appropriately implemented in the exercise of the functions of the CPSC. Until November 1996, their activity was static. Since the November election period in Abkhazia, the KSPF began to strengthen checkpoints, patrols, use helicopters, and effectively monitor the activities of the Georgian and Abkhaz police. This new profile indicates the activation of the CPKF, but is limited due to the presence of logistical problems, limited communications facilities and the lack of appropriate training for peacekeeping units. Politically, Georgia is putting pressure on the KSPM to include the entire territory of Abkhazia in the new mandate and, accordingly, carry out police functions as peacekeeping forces. If these proposals are not approved in the new mandate, Georgia will insist on the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping forces from the conflict zone. Abkhazia, accordingly, seriously opposes giving the KSPM any police function on “its territory.” As a result, the threat of renewed armed conflict can come from any side.

Terrorist activities in the region, mainly in the south of the Gali sector of the Security Zone, where mainly citizens of Georgian and Megrelian nationality live, who are negatively opposed to the Abkhaz separatists, have acquired serious proportions. According to military observers, KPKF posts are very easy to penetrate. Terrorist groups have good intelligence and enjoy the support of the Georgian population. The targets of terrorist groups are the Abkhaz leadership (28 Abkhaz officials have been killed since 1994 alone), Abkhaz military facilities, administrative buildings, police stations, roads. The penetration of terrorist groups is carried out through the southern direction along the Inguri River. This is facilitated by the poor awareness of the KSPF and the lack of intelligence to track their movements. In March 1996, there was an increase in the activity of terrorist groups. September 30, 1993, the day of the fall of Sukhumi is recognized in Abkhazia as victory day. The week before its celebration sees the greatest terrorist activity.

From the information of the UNOMIG military observer, a representative of the Russian Armed Forces as part of the Mission in the Gali security sector, terrorist groups operating in the Gali sector are formed from refugees and undergo special training at the anti-terrorist center of the Georgian Armed Forces in the village of Torsa (training Georgian special forces), located on the Georgian side on border of the Restricted Arms Zone. The reliability of this information is questionable (on September 27, 1996, the so-called Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia lodged a protest with the command of the Russian peacekeeping forces in connection with terrorist acts allegedly committed by Georgian armed forces in the Gali and Ochamchira regions, which was followed by a denial from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 27, 1996 Georgia). The UNOMIG documentation of the Gali Sector of the ZB contains a letter from the head of the regional security service of Abkhazia (translated into English) to the chairman of the security service, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia, the head of the KSPM operational group and the commander of the UNOMIG Gali sector, which refers to the preparation by Georgian officials of terrorist groups with with the goal of destabilizing the situation in the Western Zone through the use of disinformation and carrying out terrorist acts. This activity, according to a representative of the security service of Abkhazia, was aimed at disrupting the November elections, as well as establishing control over the city of Gali and its leadership, in order to create conditions for the return of the leaders of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, who are currently in Tbilisi.

The activities of terrorist groups differ from criminal ones in the nature of their actions and objectives. Basically, these groups carry out their activities at night, do not participate in robberies, lead a secretive lifestyle, and hide in designated places.

Assessing the overall role of the KSKF, we can assume that Russia has occupied key positions (roads, bridges, communications in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors, as well as in the Kodori Gorge), which allows it to prevent Georgia from attempting a military solution to the issue of restoring the territorial integrity of the state.

The need for expanded international representation in the issue of conflict resolution in Georgia. This presence is necessary primarily in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts peacefully through negotiations.

In November 1998, the rotation of peacekeepers began in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The military contingent of the 433rd motorized rifle regiment named after the Don Cossacks of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Kovalenko went to the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to carry out peacekeeping tasks.

Peacekeepers have undergone special training that allows them to perform their duties efficiently.

The unit's military personnel have been serving in this "hot spot" since May 1995. More than three and a half thousand peacekeepers visited here, many of whom were awarded military awards.

In the Gali region, the situation was characterized by obvious instability. Observers monitoring developments in the immediate vicinity of this area note a steady trend of fierce competition between Abkhaz forces and Georgian partisans to gain real control over the territory. New facts of reprisals against local residents, inspired from the Abkhaz side, according to representatives of the Abkhaz Armed Forces in exile (by the way, the head of the Armed Forces Tamaz Nadareishvili moved his apparatus to Zugdidi and is now mainly located near the border with Abkhazia, forced the Georgian partisans from the White Legion formation "more and more often make daring and quite successful forays. A number of parliament members from the Abkhazia faction, in particular the leader of the faction German Patsatsiya, addressed the partisans with statements of support and approval. Not only the faction, but also government bodies in exile believe that people from Zurab Samushiya's battalion perform their "civic and patriotic duty."

The confrontation continues. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze announced on June 10, 1998 that, by decision of the National Security Council, Foreign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili again flew to Moscow to continue negotiations on Abkhaz issues with his Russian counterpart Yevgeny Primakov.

According to E. Shevardnadze, I. Menagarishvili received instructions to demand the immediate implementation of the Gagrin Agreement regarding the return of refugees to the Gali region. As the president noted, the Russian side on this issue is on a “progressive basis.”

“For the Georgian side, the terms for the return of refugees to the Gali region proposed by the Abkhaz authorities are unacceptable. Georgia will also not support the proposal put forward from Sukhumi to soften the border regime on the Psou River,” said E. Shevardnadze. In his opinion, the opening of the border on the Psou River and the restoration of traffic, including railway traffic, is directly related to the return of all refugees to the Gali region. “When this happens, and under the conditions of a mixed administration in the Gali region, then the issue of opening the border, which is the prerogative of Georgia and Russia, will be considered,” E. Shevardnadze emphasized.

On August 30, 1999, the Georgian National Security Council recommended that Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze extend the mandate of Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia.

The Georgian side is extending the mandate on the condition that Russian peacekeepers implement all decisions of the CIS heads adopted on Abkhazia, including on expanding the security zone to the entire Gali region. The National Security Council of Georgia, giving its recommendations to the president, made a reservation that if the Russian peacekeeping forces do not comply with the decisions of the CIS heads, one of the parties has the right to terminate the mandate of the peacekeepers in Abkhazia.

The world is far away. The abduction of four UN staff, including two military observers from Germany and one from Denmark, has drawn international attention to a largely forgotten hotbed of crisis. Germany, along with the USA, Great Britain, France and Russia, is one of the “five friends” of the Abkhaz peace process. The UN Security Council resolution on Abkhazia, adopted in July 2002, which called for Abkhazia to remain within Georgia as an autonomous republic, was based on proposals by diplomat Dieter Boden. From 1999 to 2002, he headed the UN mission in Georgia. In Abkhazia, the Bundeswehr lost its first soldier during shelling. In October 2001, a helicopter carrying a military doctor and a group of nine UN employees was shot down. The soldiers abducted last Thursday have a good chance of being released. In the latter case, the kidnappers demanded a ransom of three million US dollars for release. Georgian President Shevardnadze promised to join any negotiations with the kidnappers, as he said, “so as not to endanger the lives of military observers in any way.” On June 9, the whereabouts of four abducted people were established in Georgia. As it became known from government circles in Tbilisi, the terrorists who took the hostages were with their victims in one of the hard-to-reach villages in the Kodori Gorge. Since then, the leadership of the republic, where approximately 100,000 Abkhazians still live, has demanded complete independence. Over the years, interest in a political resolution of the conflict in cooperation with Western partners has been growing in Moscow. The entire Caucasus is a powder keg. There are not even 250 kilometers from the Abkhaz border to Chechnya. Almost every autumn, armed clashes break out in the Kodori Gorge, where UN employees were kidnapped, and in other areas. A political resolution of the conflict in the Black Sea is a distant prospect. Both Georgians and Abkhazians are considered extremely stubborn negotiators. Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer speaks in this regard about “a small, dirty war in Abkhazia.”

The coming to power of the leader of the National Movement of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who won the early presidential elections in Georgia on January 4, means a new round of the struggle for the reintegration of Abkhazia.

Answering questions from the Neue Zuercher Zeitung newspaper: Saakashvili emphasized that the region is under the control of Russian generals. It is open to other illegal activities. The Abkhaz conflict, on the one hand, is a matter of bilateral Russian-Georgian relations. But, on the other hand, we are also obliged to appeal to the Abkhaz population, since these separatist interests exist among them. The Abkhazian issue is, on the one hand, a consequence of the Russian-Georgian war in the early nineties, and, on the other, a product of ethnic conflict.

In the meantime, Georgian leaders find themselves under time pressure. They are unable to resolve relations with Sukhumi politically, since we long ago determined our course of independence; nothing else, neither expanded autonomy nor special status, is acceptable for Abkhazia. After a crushing defeat in the first war, Georgia twice made serious attempts to use force in 1998 and 2001, then these armed provocations were stopped. Tbilisi began to gain muscle. The Georgian army today is not at all what it was in the early 90s; it has changed qualitatively. Georgia's military budget is the largest in Transcaucasia, reaching $300 million and equal to the entire annual budget of the country during the times of Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian soldiers are trained by American instructors, and officers study abroad. Modern weapons and military equipment are flowing into the country. Military exercises are held regularly. It’s not for nothing that they are creating such an army. The American and Western patrons of Georgia simply will not allow starting another war when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is operating at full capacity. In general, now is a very difficult time for Abkhazia, you can expect any provocations and you must be ready to give a worthy rebuff.

On March 31, 2006, for the first time in the last ten years, the UN Security Council did not include in its resolution on the situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone a clause on the need to determine the status of Abkhazia within Georgia. In the final document, which provides for the extension of the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for another six months, this routine, but important for Tbilisi, passage is missing. The Georgian mission to the UN immediately saw this as Moscow's machinations. Permanent Representative of Georgia Revaz Adamia, in a letter sent to the Chairman of the UN Security Council, notes that Russia advocates giving independence to Abkhazia according to the “Kosovo scenario,” which is “completely unacceptable for the Georgian side and completely undermines the authority of the Russian Federation as an unbiased participant in the peace process.”

However, Adamia’s statement was clearly late, since the UN Security Council, having called on both sides in the resolution to help resolve existing problems, maintained the status quo of the settlement process (with the participation of Russian peacekeepers) for another six and a half months. And Adamia also could not express his dissenting opinion at the Security Council meeting, since he was not invited. And Adamia also blames Russia for this.

RF-Georgia. On Friday, March 31, 2006, in Sochi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, Colonel General Alexei Maslov, and the Deputy Minister of Defense of Georgia, Mamuka Kudava, signed Russian-Georgian agreements on the operating conditions, timing and procedure for the withdrawal of Russian military bases, as well as the transit of military cargo through the territory of Georgia. The agreements, the drafts of which were finally agreed upon and approved by the governments of both countries, set the deadline for the withdrawal of troops by the end of 2008, and also stipulated the issues of transit of military cargo and personnel through the territory of Georgia. They provide legal guarantees of stay Russian bases in Georgia, an effective solution to all problems related to preparations for the withdrawal, as well as guarantees of the security of Russian military property and its inviolability during transit through the territory of Georgia. In particular, security guarantees are necessary when transferring some military equipment to the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia.

The document provides:
The withdrawal of heavy military equipment from the 62nd RVB to Akhalkalaki will be carried out before the end of this year, and the entire base will be withdrawn no later than December 31, 2007.
the withdrawal of the 12th military base stationed in Batumi, as well as the directorate of the Group of Russian Forces in Transcaucasia, should be carried out during 2008.

The Georgian side, according to the documents, undertakes to provide Russia with the opportunity to supply the materiel necessary to ensure the withdrawal by aircraft of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as well as the opportunity to transport weapons, military equipment and other materiel by rail and road transport. In addition, a simplified procedure for the entry of Russian Navy ships into Georgian ports for the removal of weapons, military equipment and property should be ensured. A mixed Russian-Georgian commission working in Tbilisi will monitor the implementation of these agreements and resolve controversial issues.

Transit of personnel and family members of military personnel is carried out without weapons and ammunition. Transit of military equipment must be carried out without ammunition and with a supply of fuel not exceeding the capacity of the fuel tanks. In addition, the Russian side undertakes not to transfer military cargo transiting through the territory of Georgia to a third party. According to Interfax-AVN, it is planned to allocate about 2.2 billion rubles from the federal budget in 2006-2008 for the implementation of this agreement.

The document stipulates that it will remain in effect until December 31, 2008, unless either party notifies the other through diplomatic channels of its intention to terminate this agreement due to a material violation by the other party. In this case, the agreement must be terminated 30 days from the date of receipt of the relevant notice.

5 Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: causes, history and consequences

On the southern borders of Russia, Christianity coexists with Islam, and the Slavs coexist with Georgians, Armenians, Turkic and Iranian peoples. The result is an incredible mixture of peoples and religions. The Abkhaz, a Turkic-speaking and largely Muslim people, fell under Georgian rule a millennium ago. Georgia itself was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th century.

Abkhazia, like Chechnya, fought with Russia in the 19th century, and after the revolution in Russia it also established Soviet power. However, due to the weakness of Russia at that time, the Georgian Mensheviks overthrew Soviet power in Abkhazia and annexed it to Georgia. With the Sovietization of Georgia (February 1921), the independent Abkhazian Soviet Republic was formed (March 3, 1921) and concluded an agreement with Georgia, becoming part of it. In April 1925, the Abkhaz Congress of Soviets approved the Constitution of the republic. As soon as the political possibility of joining Russia arose (after the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine), the Abkhazians began a political struggle for their annexation to the Krasnodar Territory. But the leader of Georgia, Mzhavanadze, confidently promised to annex all those dissatisfied to the Krasnoyarsk Territory.

10 years later, already under Eduard Shevardnadze, the Abkhazians again became more active politically, but the Georgian president took control of the situation. At the end of the 80s, an armed confrontation between Abkhazians and Georgians began, but the dying USSR was able to stop the blood. The collapse of the USSR and the weakness of Russia gave Georgia a second chance, as in the 20s, to again annex Abkhazia.

On March 31, 1991, a referendum was held in Georgia, including Abkhazia, on the restoration of state sovereignty. In the Abkhaz ASSR, 61.27% of voters took part in the referendum, 97.73% of whom voted for the state sovereignty of Georgia, which amounted to 59.84% of the total number of voters in Abkhazia. Only 1.42% of those who took part in the vote, that is, 1.37% of the total number of voters, voted against. Throughout Georgia, 90.79% of voters took part in the referendum, 99.08% of whom voted for the restoration of state sovereignty of Georgia. Based on the results of the referendum, the Supreme Council of Georgia on April 9, 1991 proclaimed the Declaration on the restoration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia.

So, in 1991, Georgia regained its independence. But its first leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, elected by the people, was forcibly removed from his post, and his supporters fought against government forces for a long time. And so in 1992, Abkhaz separatists declared independence, despite the fact that only 18 percent of the people living in Abkhazia belong to the indigenous nationality.

Abkhazia is an autonomy within Georgia, most of whose territory was not controlled by the Tbilisi authorities as a result of the ethnic conflict of 1992-1994. An independent republic was proclaimed in Sukhumi (it is not recognized by the world community, but the Sukhumi authorities have an army, police and other attributes of statehood. The next elections to the parliament of Abkhazia that took place in March 2002 were regarded by the UN mission in Georgia as illegitimate).

The war in Abkhazia was complicated by the intervention of Russian troops stationed at military bases in the autonomous republic. Georgia agreed to provide Russia with four military bases on its territory, unofficially conditioning this decision on the fact that Russia must take a certain (pro-Georgian) position in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts. In exchange for Russian military assistance, Georgia agreed to join the CIS. However, according to the Georgian side, Russia did not fulfill its obligations and did not help Tbilisi enough. At the same time, irregular armed formations directed by the radical Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (in particular, one of such units was commanded by the then little-known Shamil Basayev) acted on the side of the Abkhaz formations.

In 1994, the Abkhazians pushed Georgian troops out of the republic. From 1996 until the fall of 2001, there were no large-scale armed clashes in Abkhazia. However, sporadic clashes occur all the time. On the militarized Georgian-Abkhaz border, smugglers and drug dealers seem to feel free, and in the Kodori Gorge, the only region of Abkhazia over which Georgia has established partial control, the so-called “power line business”—that is, extortion—is thriving.” for the protection of the Kavkasia power line from Russia.

The situation around Abkhazia gradually began to escalate in 2001. In September, information was leaked about Georgia’s possible use of force to resolve the Abkhaz problem. Partial mobilization was announced in Abkhazia, local television spoke about the beginning of hostilities. On September 25, more than 400 Chechen militants infiltrated the Kodori Gorge area, which is controlled by the Georgian side (it was alleged that they arrived in Georgian army trucks, accompanied by Georgian police). Clashes occurred, after which regular Georgian troops were brought into Kodori. This was a violation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. The UN opposed their presence there because it is another factor of instability in the region, and Abkhazia refuses any negotiations on a settlement, demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Georgian armed forces.

Russian peacekeepers and UN observers are currently stationed in Abkhazia, but both groups are forced to limit their activities for fear of being hit by mines or coming under guerrilla fire. In total, there are 107 military observers from 23 countries in the conflict zone, who, together with CIS peacekeepers, are trying to ensure security. Patrolling along the demarcation line is carried out daily. As of June 2002, over eight years, 93 Russian servicemen from the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) were killed in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Another 248 Russian peacekeepers received gunshot and shrapnel wounds. Razorenova M., Dzindzibadze K. Abkhaz conflict in Georgian periodicals // http://www.abkhazeti.ru/pages/42.html.

For Western politicians, Georgia's arguments about the need to protect its territorial sovereignty sound quite convincing. The United States supports all efforts aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Georgia. The keys to resolving the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict lie in Russia. However, much of Russia's experience has been with counterinsurgency operations rather than peacekeeping operations.

The public has already become accustomed to reports from the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict zone about the mine explosion of regular buses and equipment of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, the death of civilians and Russian peacekeepers, the mining of roads by Georgian saboteurs from formations such as the “White Legion” and “Forest Brothers” in Gali , Tkuarchal and Ochamchira regions, shelling of checkpoints, etc. Against the background of the events of the bloody Abkhaz-Georgian war of 1992-1993. such an environment is sometimes characterized by a false calm. Meanwhile, judging by the materials of the Russian, Georgian and Abkhaz press, as well as the sentiments of the local population, tension in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict zone is growing.

The threat to the integrity of Russia from Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus is very real, since there is a high ethnic population density, problems of historical development, a large number of unaccounted for weapons, etc. Russia's geopolitical rivals skillfully take advantage of this.

The main problem of Abkhazia is that it does not fit into the world order of the 21st century. according to the US scenario, that the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict threatens the implementation of US plans to organize the Silk Road in the North Caucasus and the functioning of the oil pipeline. Firstly, Abkhazia is located next to these routes; secondly, pro-Russian sentiments are very strong in this republic; thirdly, the precedent of Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia violates the integrity of this republic. The Abkhazians, in turn, flatly refuse to stay. The desire to weaken Russia's influence in the Caucasus region is seen in the build-up of NATO's military presence in the Black Sea zone. So, if in 1990 there were five ships of NATO states here, then in 1996 there were already 27. In the spring of 1998, joint exercises of the Georgian and Turkish navies were held in the waters of Poti and Batumi.

The open press is currently considering three possible scenarios for the development of military operations in this region. In all three, the main ideas are the same: to achieve the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the security zone, replace them with NATO ones or from CIS countries friendly to the West, and then draw in the alliance’s contingents. Seize at least part of the Gali region, install an “Abkhazian government in exile” there, which will ask for help from the West. Neutralize Russia's actions and hold this part of Abkhaz territory until NATO forces approach. Subsequently, completely absorb Abkhazia and deploy NATO bases on its territory. As a result, Russia loses control over Transcaucasia, and then over the entire North Caucasus.

The statement of the current US President that “the NATO operation against Yugoslavia can be repeated at any time and anywhere in the world” seems very significant for Abkhazia and the South of Russia.

It seems that the solution to the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict is not in the use of military force, but in focused, patient negotiations. And in this regard, the role of Moscow as a long-time friend and partner of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as well as the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict zone, is sharply increasing. The departure of the Russian border guards showed that the fuse of a new regional war in this area is smoldering, the mine war on the part of Georgian saboteurs has intensified, and Abkhaz-Georgian maritime incidents have begun with shelling and seizures of seiners.

We must also keep in mind the determination of the military-political leadership of Abkhazia to repel aggression. The open press has already made a statement by representatives of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus about launching attacks on the territory of Georgia from the territory of the Caucasian republics in the event of a new Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. They claim that their attacks will lead to the split of Georgia into 4-6 parts.

In short, a new Abkhaz-Georgian military conflict, if it happens, will be an obvious threat to Russia on its southern borders.

In general, a regional conflict is the result of a competitive interaction between two or more political actors challenging each other for the distribution of power, territory or resources. This interaction can be carried out in different ways: diplomatic negotiations, the inclusion of a third party, armed intervention, etc.

A regional war is a limited conflict, the cause of which is unresolved contradictions on a regional scale. It is localized within the boundaries of the region, but its political and economic consequences can affect far beyond these borders. In such a conflict, the participation of countries not related to this region is possible (supply of military equipment, sending advisers or volunteers)

The new era that came with the collapse of the Soviet Union is characterized by many signs, the saddest of which can be called a whole series of conflicts that flared up in the post-Soviet space.

The curtailment of Russia’s external influence, carried out first in the name of “universal human values” (which in practice meant the interests of our strategic competitors), then for the sake of reducing the budget deficit, ultimately bore fruit: Russia lost significant influence outside the territory of the former USSR. Even representatives of countries that are most favorable to Russia tend to deny its right to protect all its citizens.

Russia's weakness in the international arena has caused a sharp narrowing of the agenda in negotiations with the United States and Europe, which, in turn, increases the importance of regional conflicts. After all, the pressure of global competition is the “great constant” of modern historical development, and states that are not strong enough to participate in global processes face this competition at a lower, regional level. Those who do not want to defend their interests on distant borders will be forced to defend them on the nearest approaches.

Over the past 15 years, the security of the South Caucasus region has been threatened by the unresolved conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and instability in Chechnya and Dagestan. International terrorist networks and religious extremism use separatist movements to practice acts of sabotage and recruit new mercenaries. Russia has faced this threat in the form of international terrorism, attempts to provoke conflicts in areas densely populated by certain ethnic minorities, and the export of radical religious movements in the southern regions of the country bordering the North Caucasus. This determines Russia's active participation in resolving regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

Poverty, unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts, authoritarianism and informational secrecy of local communities are the roots of international terrorism and religious extremism. Therefore, measures to promote economic development, affirm the principles of democracy and human rights, and resolve long-standing conflicts in unstable regions are also very important from the mediating peacekeeping side.

Among the potential prerequisites for new interethnic conflicts in the CIS countries are youth unemployment, land shortages, and lumpenization of a significant part of the population. All this can be the reasons for social instability and regional conflicts, nationalism, political speculation, strengthening the position of conservatism and traditionalism. Due to these circumstances, in our opinion, Central Asia and the Caucasus remain the most conflict-ridden regions. The rapid growth of the population, especially its working-age part, will contribute to the displacement of the newcomer population.

In the Russian Federation, interethnic tension still persists in a number of regions due to the fact that the issues of the federal structure and equalization of the rights of the subjects of the federation have not yet been resolved. Considering that Russia is formed both on territorial and ethno-national grounds, the rejection of the ethno-territorial principle of Russian federalism in favor of extraterritorial cultural-national contradictions can lead to conflicts. But this problem also requires separate consideration.

Literature

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14. Olegin A. NATO: maximum efficiency with minimal means // Domestic Notes, 2002, No. 4-5. pp. 61-70.

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19. Yamskov A. Interethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia. Prerequisites for emergence and development trends // Political studies. No. 2. -- M. 1991.

Appendix A

Main events and dates in the history of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict

1918, June - under the pretext of fighting the Bolshevik forces, troops of the Georgian Democratic Republic enter Abkhazia.

1931, February 11 - The VI Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia “approved” the decision to transform the SSR Abkhazia into an autonomous SSR within the Georgian SSR. 1956

July 10 -- Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee On errors and shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which condemned the “distortions of national policy” in Abkhazia.

1957, April - unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

1967, April - mass protests by Abkhazians demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

1978, May, September - mass protests by Abkhazians demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR.

1989, March 18 -- 30,000th gathering of Abkhazians. An appeal was adopted to the highest authorities of the USSR to return Abkhazia to the status of a (union) Soviet socialist republic.

1989, July 15-16 - bloody clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi (16 dead).

1990, August 25 -- The Armed Forces of Abkhazia adopts the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The split between the Abkhaz deputies and the Georgian faction of the Supreme Council, which opposed the Declaration.

1991, September 25 - elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia; The formation of the deputy corps is carried out on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.

1992, early February - political tension in Abkhazia due to the fact that, under the pretext of fighting supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, units of the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia.

1992, May 5 - the highest point of growing contradictions between the Abkhaz and Georgian factions of the Armed Forces. The Georgian faction leaves the meeting. The full parliament no longer met.

1992, June - the process of creating armed formations is underway in Abkhazia: a regiment of internal troops of Abkhazia and local Georgian units.

1992, July 23 -- The Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopts a resolution to terminate the 1978 Constitution of Abkhazia. and the enactment of the 1925 constitution, which fixed the pre-autonomous status of Abkhazia.

1993, December 1 - during the peace negotiations that began in Geneva, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed.

1994, April 4 - A Statement on Measures for the Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and an Agreement on Refugees and the Procedure for Their Return were signed in Moscow.

1994, summer - a peacekeeping operation of Russian troops began to unfold in the conflict zone.

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In 1810, Abkhazia - without direct connection with the Georgian principalities - made an independent decision to join the Russian Empire. Georgia and Abkhazia did not exist as administrative units of the empire at that time, but there were two provinces - Kutaisi and Tiflis. As soon as the Russian Empire collapsed, Georgia became an independent country for some time. The first thing the newly independent Georgia did was to intervene in Abkhazia. In 1918, the Georgian army occupied Abkhazia and arrested members of the Great Council - a gathering of the Abkhaz people. Robberies and murders began. The Georgians, however, did not rest on this and in the same 1918 captured the Sochi district, which then included Gagra.

During Soviet times, Abkhazians were suspicious of Georgia's intention to rule Abkhazia. Abkhazia was part of Georgia for a long and painful time. First it was called an independent Abkhaz Republic, then a treaty Abkhaz SSR within Georgia, then, finally, an autonomous republic. With the final establishment of the Stalinist and Beria regime in Georgia, the creeping colonization of Abkhazia and the elimination of the attributes of self-government began, starting with the physical destruction of its leaders. All this was accompanied by the displacement of the Abkhaz language and Abkhaz ethnonyms.

Having adopted the “Act of Restoring State Independence of Georgia” on April 9, 1991 and recognizing itself as the legal successor of the Georgian Democratic Republic of the 1918–1921 model, the new Georgia made a choice in favor of a state that protects and expresses exclusively Georgian ethnic interests and revived the illegitimacy of its own state and interethnic conflicts in new round. The question of Abkhazia joining it remained open in 1918–1921, and the Abkhaz ASSR (as well as the South Ossetian Autonomous Okrug) was included in the Georgian SSR already in the Soviet period.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which lasted more than a year (August 14, 1992 - September 30, 1993), burdened by historical, political and ideological contradictions, quickly moved into the stage of military confrontation, which immediately escalated into a full-scale regional war.

An integral part of the Georgianization policy was a targeted resettlement policy. During the period of the 1940s - early 1950s, tens of thousands of Georgians were resettled from the interior regions of Georgia to Abkhazia, whose relocation was carried out by the specially created organization "Gruzpereselenstroy", which was generously supplied from the state budget even during the Patriotic War. As a result of the migration “infusion”, the Georgian community became the largest in Abkhazia. From 1926 to 1979, the number of Georgians in Abkhazia increased from 68 to 213 thousand people.

In 1989, the following people lived in Abkhazia: 93,267 Abkhazians, 239,872 Georgians, 76,541 Armenians, 74,914 Russians, 14,664 Greeks (total 525,061 people).

The ideological basis for the policy of Georgianization was the theory put forward by some Georgian historians, who declared Abkhazia to be the ancestral territory of Georgia, and the Abkhazians to be one of the ethnic branches of the Georgians.

Protests by individual representatives of the Abkhaz intelligentsia against the course of the authorities were heard back in the Stalin era, but the emergence of organized forms of resistance to assimilation dates back to the period after Stalin’s rule. In the late 1950s, this resistance was led by patriotic members of the intelligentsia. Mass rallies and demonstrations demanding Abkhazia's secession from Georgia and entry into the RSFSR took place in 1957, 1964, 1967, 1978.

National movements that have been gaining strength since the 1950s have developed their own ideology. In Georgia, the idea of ​​achieving independence with the subsequent unitarization of the republic became increasingly popular, in Abkhazia - a break with Georgia, separation from it, which, under the conditions of “perestroika” freedoms of the late 1980s, resulted in open demands to grant Abkhazia the status of a union republic of the USSR.

On March 18, 1989, in the village of Lykhny, a gathering of thousands of Abkhaz people took place, at which an appeal to the highest authorities of the USSR was adopted to return Abkhazia to the status of a republic of union significance that it had once lost. This was the reason for the bloody Georgian-Abkhaz clashes on the banks of the Galizga River, near Ochamchira, during which 14 people died (9 Georgians and 5 Abkhazians). Since that time, tension has hardly subsided. Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia took on an increasingly confrontational character, which was aggravated by the growth of chauvinistic and unitarist tendencies in the socio-political life of Georgia.

The reason for the start of the military operation was the statement of the State Council that the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia Roman Gventsadze and 12 other people were taken hostage and held on the territory of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz side categorically rejected accusations of hostage-taking and called what was happening “a prepared occupation of sovereign Abkhazia.”

On August 14, 1992, in the midst of the holiday season, detachments of the Georgian National Guard numbering up to 3,000 people under the command of Tengiz Kitovani, under the pretext of pursuing detachments of supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, entered the territory of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz armed forces resisted, but in a few days the National Guard units occupied almost the entire territory of Abkhazia, including Sukhumi and Gagra, since all the weapons of the Abkhaz army consisted of small arms, homemade armored cars and old hail-breaking cannons. The government led by the Chairman of the Supreme Council Vladislav Ardzinba was forced to move to Gudauta.

On August 15, the Georgians landed an amphibious assault in the Gagra region, pushing a small detachment of the Abkhaz coast guard into the mountains that was trying to resist.

The first tank of the Abkhaz militia was captured on the very first day of the war. Several more armored vehicles were captured from August 31 to September 2 during the failed tank breakthrough of Georgian troops towards the city of Gudauta. More than 40 armored vehicles became trophies of the Abkhaz army after the defeat of the Gagra group of Georgians.

However, further events began to develop not according to the Tbilisi scenario. Having retreated from Sukhumi, the Abkhaz units gained a foothold on the left bank of the river. Gumista, which marked the line of the Western Front. In the rear of the Georgian troops, mainly in the territory of the Ochamchira region, the Eastern Front was formed, which became a hotbed of the partisan movement. The most important factor in its appearance was the volunteer movement in defense of Abkhazia that arose from the very first days of the conflict and was gaining strength.

Among the volunteers were representatives of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which declared the readiness of Chechens, Kabardians, Ingush, Circassians, Adygeis, together with their ethnically related Abkhazians, to oppose the Georgians. The detachment of Chechen volunteers was led by Shamil Basayev. In Abkhazia, Basayev performed well during the battles with Georgian units, and was appointed commander of the Gagra Front, corps commander, deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia, and adviser to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Abkhazia. Basayev's detachment was in the vanguard of the Abkhaz troops during the assault on the city of Gagra. Received the rank of lieutenant colonel. For special services, the President of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, awarded Basayev the Order of “Hero of Abkhazia.” At the beginning of 1993, Basayev returned to Grozny and formed a separate combat detachment of Chechens who took part in hostilities on the territory of Abkhazia (later became known as the “Abkhaz battalion”).

The creation, training, arming and sending of militia groups to Abkhazia could not go unnoticed by the Russian authorities, but the Russian leadership chose not to interfere.

Every day the conflict increasingly took on the character of a real war, which became an unpleasant surprise for the Tbilisi leadership, which was counting on a show of force or a blitzkrieg.

In agreement with Tbilisi, Russia came up with a peacekeeping initiative. On September 3, 1992, a meeting between Boris Yeltsin, Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba took place in Moscow. Difficult negotiations ended with the signing of a final document, which provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops, the exchange of prisoners of war, ensuring the return of refugees, who by that time numbered several tens of thousands of people, and the resumption of the activities of Abkhaz authorities throughout the republic. However, not a single point of the agreement was fulfilled; Georgian troops continued to remain in their previous positions. The fighting resumed.

On October 2-6, the Gagrinsky bridgehead was liquidated. Georgian troops were defeated, Abkhaz units reached the Russian-Abkhaz border on the river. Psou, thereby breaking through the military blockade around Gudauta. By the end of 1992, the situation with the high-mountain mining town of Tkvarcheli, which, with the outbreak of the conflict, found itself practically cut off from the rest of Abkhazia, worsened. Communication with Gudauta was maintained only with the help of a humanitarian air corridor, but after the Georgian side shot down a helicopter carrying refugees from the blockaded city on December 14, 1992, all communication with the outside world was interrupted. The residents of Tkvarcheli were saved from hunger and suffering by the humanitarian action of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, carried out in the summer of 1993.

In the summer, fighting intensified. On July 2, the Abkhazians landed an amphibious assault on the coastline of the Eastern Front. On the Western Front, having crossed Gumista, Abkhaz troops, one after another, liberated the settlements on the right bank north of Sukhumi, approaching the near approaches of the city.

The desperate situation in which the Georgian troops found themselves forced the Russian government to put pressure on the Abkhaz side. On July 27, a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Sochi.

On September 16-27, 1993, a battle broke out, which went down in the history of the conflict as the “Battle for Sukhum.” The Abkhazians violated the truce and resumed their offensive. To strengthen their group, the Georgians tried to transfer troops to Sukhumi on civilian aircraft. The Abkhazians, having launched a real hunt for civil aviation, managed to shoot down several planes landing at Sukhumi airport with anti-aircraft guns on boats. A significant role was also played by the Abkhazians receiving from Russia a certain amount of artillery pieces and mortars, providing them with the necessary ammunition and training combat crews.

On September 27, Sukhumi was taken by Abkhazian and North Caucasian detachments (in which many future Chechen terrorists, including Shamil Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev, gained combat experience). The evacuation of the Georgian military and civilian population was carried out by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, although large masses of refugees also tried to escape from Sukhumi to the east, through the Kodori Gorge, and along the coast. There are several conflicting versions as to how Eduard Shevardnadze himself managed to get out of the besieged city, however, both Abkhazians and Georgians agree that he abandoned his troops and civilians to the mercy of fate.

After the capture of Sukhumi, 17 ministers of the pro-Georgian government of Abkhazia, led by J. Shartava, were captured and executed.

By September 30, 1993, Abkhaz and North Caucasian armed formations already controlled the entire territory of the autonomy. About 250 thousand ethnic Georgians, in fear of a real or perceived threat from the victors, fled - leaving their homes and leaving on their own through mountain passes or being taken to Georgia by sea. Only a small part of them were able to return home after a few years.

The defeat in Abkhazia led to a decline in the morale of the Georgian army. At the same time, armed groups of supporters of the ousted President Gamsakhurdia, who enjoyed great support in western Georgia, became more active. Part of the Georgian troops went over to his side. The Georgian-Abkhaz war lasted 413 days and ended on September 30, 1993

Since 1994, 1,500 Russian peacekeepers have been stationed on the banks of the Inguri. After the start of the peacekeeping operation of Russian troops, 60-65 thousand refugees returned to the border Gali region of Abkhazia. There are 100–120 thousand refugees left in Georgia.

Following Georgia's lead, at the beginning of 1994 Russia established an economic blockade of Abkhazia, wanting to get the republic to recognize its inclusion in Georgia.

Negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable settlement between Georgia and Abkhazia began two months after the end of hostilities. Their first round took place in Geneva, where a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on December 1, 1993. The parties pledged “not to use force or the threat of force against each other during the period of ongoing negotiations to achieve a full-scale political settlement of the conflict.” An agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners of war on the “all for all” principle, on obligations to resolve the refugee problem, and on the start of the work of groups of experts to develop recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia.

At the final stage of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in September 1993 alone, the Abkhazians captured 70 armored vehicles. In addition, in the same month, more than 80 artillery mounts of various calibers, 5 BM-21 Grad mounts, 42 120- and 80-mm caliber mortars, as well as ZU-23 and S-60 anti-aircraft guns and a huge number of ammunition for them.

However, the Abkhaz military did not hide the fact that reserve officers of the former Soviet Army provided great assistance in training the artillery personnel of the Abkhaz army in 1993.

Abkhaz pilots made more than 400 combat missions during the war. In addition, they delivered military supplies to the Eastern Front, took out the wounded, women, children and old people from besieged Tkvarcheli.

In September 1992, in Pitsunda, an initiative group led by L. Katiba began to form the Abkhaz Navy from the few vessels that ended up in the hands of the militia. These were the pleasure ships “Komsomolets Abkhazia”, “Sukhum”, boats “Raduga-5” and “Raduga-08”, as well as a self-propelled sea barge.

The first operation of the Abkhaz Navy can be called participation in the liberation of Gagra and its environs. The further period of formation of the Abkhazian Navy is closely connected with the names of R. Nanba and Yu. Achba. The first was a midshipman in the Russian Navy. The second - before demobilization in 1985, he served as a captain of the 2nd rank in the USSR Navy, commanding a combat unit of a nuclear submarine of the Northern Fleet. After he managed to escape from occupied Sukhumi in January 1993, he headed the Abkhaz Navy. Despite the fact that there were a larger number of watercraft on the Georgian side, it was the Abkhaz naval sailors who dominated the waters of Abkhazia.

The conflict brought many surprises to the leadership of official Tbilisi. No one, and especially the initiators of the campaign - the Shevardnadze-Kitovani-Ioseliani triumvirate operating at that time - expected that the campaign would not be limited to two or three days of skirmishes with the subsequent suppression of Abkhaz separatism, but would end only a year later with defeat and disorderly flight from Sukhumi

The defeat was almost the highest point of public disappointment for Georgia, destroying the last hopes for the expected state and cultural renaissance of the country. The loss of Abkhazia also debunked another, seemingly unshakable, constant of public identity - the idea of ​​a single, indivisible, unitary Georgia, within which the only possibility of its independent existence was seen.

A big surprise for the Georgians was the support provided to Abkhazia by the North Caucasian peoples, primarily the Circassians related to the Abkhazians (Kabardians, Adygeans, Circassians), as well as Chechens, Ossetians, Cossacks, etc.

To explain to themselves and the world what had happened, the Georgians used various propaganda tricks in order to belittle the contribution to the victory of the Abkhazians themselves, who allegedly enjoyed unlimited support from the “red-brown forces of imperial revenge”, and themselves constituted a minority in their army, recruited mainly from “militants, mercenaries, Chechens-Basayevites, Afghans, career officers of the Russian army, fighters of the Armenian battalion named after Bagramyan and other international rabble.”

Since the summer of 1994, Russian battalions have been carrying out a peacekeeping and separation mission in Abkhazia. The Georgian side has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the peacekeepers, who, according to Tbilisi, did practically nothing to begin the process of the mass return of Georgian refugees and actually served as border forces.

On May 30, 1997, the Georgian parliament decided to withdraw Russian peacekeepers after July 31, 1997, if the latter do not fulfill the functions assigned to them. Of course, this decision remained on paper.

The position of official Tbilisi in resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict has always been inconsistent. In the last days of 1997, having received Enver Kapba, the envoy of the President of Abkhazia, Shevardnadze spoke favorably of this meeting, noting that he “welcomes dialogue with any Abkhaz leader or with every Abkhaz.”

However, following this, there was a call from Tbilisi to use the forceful “Bosnian option” against Abkhazia. In Georgia, a growing number of politicians spoke out in favor of using elements of force to achieve a final settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Shevardnadze himself announced the possibility of conducting a peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia according to the so-called “Bosnian format”.

Nevertheless, the 345th Parachute Regiment, stationed in Gudauta and forming the backbone of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia, was disbanded and left the Bambora military base before May 1, 1998. The prospect of further developments in this area after the withdrawal of the regiment remained unclear. It is no secret that the 345th Regiment played an important role in the dramatic events of 1992, when it helped Sukhumi win the war against Tbilisi.

The Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Abkhazia (CPKF) were deployed on both sides of the Inguri River on June 17, 1994, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, signed by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides on May 14, 1994.

The headquarters of the KSPM was located in a sanatorium in the city of Sukhumi. KSPM were armed with infantry fighting vehicles, T-72, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and small arms. In accordance with the mandate, the number of KSPF was determined to be 2,500 people, but in reality before the start of the Russian-Georgian war they numbered approximately 1,500 people and consisted of 3 motorized rifle and 1 parachute battalions, a tank company, an artillery division, a separate helicopter detachment, headquarters for control these forces. KSPM units operated in the security zones of the Gali and Zugdidi sectors. The battalion headquarters were located in the cities of Zugdidi and Gali and supervised the peacekeeping forces in their sector of the security zone. For control mobility, there was one operational group each, which was controlled by the deputy commanders of the KSPM.

The 12th Batumi (65% consisting of representatives of Adjarian nationality) and 102nd Leninakan (approximately 65% ​​consisting of representatives of Armenian nationality) motorized rifle battalions were stationed in the Zugdidi sector. In the Gali sector - a motorized rifle battalion of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, intended to participate in peacekeeping activities, and the 7th Gudauta Airborne Battalion (345th Guards Airborne Regiment, 7th Airborne Division). Units of the KSPM battalions performed the main service at the checkpoint and also carried out patrols. KSPM had the right to stop cars, inspect cargo, and carry out activities against terrorist and criminal groups.

In accordance with the “Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces,” a security zone was declared to be an area of ​​24 km in depth (two sectors, 12 km to the right and left of the Enguri River) and up to 80 km along the front. There should have been no armed forces or heavy military equipment in the security zone.

This was followed by a limited weapons zone, which was 20 km deep from the security zone on both sides. According to the agreement, armed forces and heavy military equipment (all artillery pieces and mortars over 80 mm in caliber, tanks and armored personnel carriers) were not to be located in this zone.

Despite this, before the start of the last war, terrorist activity in the region, mainly in the south of the Gali sector of the security zone, where predominantly citizens of Georgian and Mingrelian nationality lived, who were negatively opposed to the Abkhaz authorities, acquired serious proportions. KSPM posts were very easy to penetrate. The terrorist groups had good intelligence and enjoyed the support of the Georgian population. The targets of terrorist groups were the Abkhaz leadership (28 Abkhaz officials have been killed since 1994 alone), Abkhaz military facilities, administrative buildings, police stations, and roads. The penetration of terrorist groups was carried out through the southern direction along the Inguri River. This was facilitated by the poor awareness of the KSPF and the lack of intelligence to track their movements.

Terrorist groups operating in the Gali sector were formed from refugees and underwent special training at the anti-terrorist center of the Georgian army in the village of Torsa (training Georgian special forces), located on the Georgian side on the border of the limited weapons zone.

Assessing the overall role of the KSKF, it can be stated that Russia occupied key positions (roads, bridges, communications in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors), which obviously prevented Georgia from attempting a military solution to the issue of “restoring the territorial integrity of the state.” KSPM ensured the security of state construction of independent Abkhazia.

In November 1998, the rotation of peacekeepers began in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The military contingent of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Kovalenko went to the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to carry out peacekeeping tasks. The military personnel of the unit have served in this “hot spot” since May 1995. More than three and a half thousand peacekeepers visited here, many of whom were awarded military awards. At the end of 2005, the unit was replaced by a battalion of the Russian 15th separate peacekeeping brigade.

It should be noted that for five years after the end of the conflict, Abkhazia existed under a virtual blockade by both Georgia and Russia. Then, however (especially with the coming to power of Vladimir Putin), Russia, contrary to the decision of the CIS summit prohibiting any contacts with the separatists, began to gradually restore cross-border economic and transport ties with Abkhazia. Russian authorities claimed that all contacts between Russia and Abkhazia were carried out at a private, non-state level. The Georgian leadership considered the actions taken by Russia to be “connivance with the separatist regime.” “Significant support for the separatist regime,” according to Georgia, was the payment of Russian pensions and benefits to the population, which became possible after the granting of Russian citizenship to a significant part (more than 90%) of the population of Abkhazia as part of the exchange of Soviet passports.

At the beginning of September 2004, railway traffic along the Sukhumi - Moscow route, interrupted in 1992, resumed. To restore the road to Abkhazia, special equipment was delivered from Rostov-on-Don, including three carriages of sleepers. 105 km of railway track and more than 10 km of tunnels were restored.

At the end of September 2004, regular bus service was established between Sochi and Sukhumi. At the same time, the Russian-Georgian border on the Georgian Military Road was, on the contrary, closed for some time after the terrorist attack in Beslan.

M. Saakashvili's coming to power in 2004 meant an increase in tension. Saakashvili did not hide his adventurist plans and constantly emphasized that the region “is under the control of Russian generals and is open to other illegal activities.”

It should be noted that the only region of Abkhazia that was controlled by Georgia (until August 2008) was the Kodori Gorge. This gorge makes up a third of the territory of Abkhazia. During the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992–1993, Svan militia units were formed here and fought on the side of Georgia against the Abkhazians. The most influential field commander was Emzar Kvitsiani, who led the Monadire detachment. Largely thanks to him, the Abkhazians were not able to establish control over the territory of the gorge.

Under the terms of the peace agreements signed in 1993, the territory of the Kodori Gorge, which provided a convenient springboard for an attack on Abkhazia, was under the constant control of peacekeeping forces and the UN observation mission in Georgia.

Local field commanders accepted the jurisdiction of the Georgian government only formally. In fact, the Kodori Gorge has turned into an uncontrolled territory. The Monadire detachment, which guarded the dividing line between Georgia and Abkhazia, has been considered a battalion of the Georgian armed forces since 1998, but was actually subordinate to Kvitsiani personally. The name of Kvitsiani was associated with periodic kidnappings in the Kodori Gorge of UN mission employees and high-ranking Georgian officials that occurred in 1996–1999, until Kvitsiani was appointed the Georgian president’s plenipotentiary in this region.

In 2001, through the territory of the Kodori Gorge, with the assistance of Kvitsiani, a failed attempt was made to invade Abkhazia by a detachment of Chechen militants led by Ruslan Gelayev. Later, the local Svan residents entered into an agreement with the Abkhaz on non-aggression and on preventing armed formations from entering the upper Kodori zone, and for this the Svans received assistance from the Abkhaz authorities in the economic and social sphere.

In 2003, during the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, Kvitsiani supported Eduard Shevardnadze, in connection with which he was removed from his post in December 2004, and in April 2005, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili signed an order to disband his unit, which, however, was not carried out.

On July 22, 2006, Kvitsiani rebelled against the Georgian government, demanding the resignation of the heads of law enforcement agencies. On July 25, in violation of the 1993 Dagomys Agreements, Georgian troops were brought into the Kodori Gorge. In Georgia it was announced that Kvitsiani himself and the remnants of his detachment had taken refuge in Russian territory.

On July 27, Saakashvili announced the completion of the operation in Kodori, after which he announced that the government and parliament of Abkhazia in exile, which had been in Tbilisi since 1993, would move to the gorge. The leader of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, said that if this happens, Abkhazia will not only withdraw from all negotiations with Georgia, but also “reserves the right to prevent the installation of a puppet government in the gorge.”

On July 31, US Deputy Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Matthew Bryza, who visited Tbilisi after negotiations with the Georgian leadership, called the special operation in the Kodori Gorge “legitimate,” which, in his opinion, was aimed “against criminal elements in order to protect the rights and interests of Georgian citizens.” Bryza assured that the United States supports the actions of the Georgian authorities.

On July 31, the first representatives of the North Caucasian republics of Russia (some of whom participated in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1992–1993) appeared in Abkhazia, offering assistance to the Abkhaz leaders from Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia in order to protect Russian interests in Abkhazia. President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh, having met with them, asked not to “create confusion and not interfere with the professional military.” According to him, over the past year Abkhazia has prepared well militarily to organize its own defense. In his opinion, the Kodori Gorge itself does not pose a danger to Abkhazia - the Georgian army will not be able to pass through the Kodori Gorge, despite all its strategic importance, because it is not suitable for the passage of military equipment. Bagapsh said that the Abkhaz leadership is most concerned about the situation in the Gali region (populated predominantly by Mingrelian Georgians) and the possibility of an attack from the sea. At the same time, the deployment of the Abkhaz government-in-exile in the Kodori Gorge was perceived as a political threat that could hinder the potential international recognition of an independent Abkhazia.

The Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia believed that the group of troops in the gorge was being built up by Georgia not for war, but in order to protect the government in exile and prepare a bridgehead - according to the Abkhazians, units of engineering troops, signalmen, and reconnaissance troops are stationed in the gorge. Meanwhile, Abkhazia strengthened its military group at the entrance to the gorge. Reservists were called up.

On August 2, the transfer of many members of the government and parliament of Abkhazia in exile to the Kodori Gorge was completed. Due to Tbilisi’s demand to allow representatives of the “legitimate government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic” into negotiations with Sukhumi, the Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations were disrupted. The Abkhaz side stated that under no circumstances would it sit down at the negotiating table if representatives of the “autonomists” were at the same table.

As stated by Prime Minister of Georgia Zurab Nogaideli, the government of the “Abkhaz Autonomous Republic” will be located in the village of Chkhalta (the last Georgian village of the Kodori Gorge before the posts of Russian peacekeepers separating the Georgian and Abkhaz formations), and the “Supreme Council of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic” will be located in the village of Azhara ( administrative center of the Kodori Gorge).

On October 13, 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a new draft resolution on Georgia submitted by Russia. The resolution contained a condemnation of Georgia for escalating the situation in the Kodori Gorge and a call for the implementation of all international agreements. The resolution also provided for the extension until April 15, 2007 of the mandate of UN military observers in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and called on the Georgian side to comply, including in the Kodori Gorge, with the provisions of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. In early October, Moscow twice introduced draft resolutions on Georgia, but due to resistance from the United States, they were never adopted. Previously, Russia managed to convince the UN of the need to resume patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge, interrupted in the summer of 2003, with the participation of Russian peacekeepers, which the Georgian side actively objected to.

On March 11, 2007, the puppet “Abkhazian government in exile” accused Russian peacekeepers of working with the armed forces of Abkhazia to mine the crossings from the Gali region of Abkhazia to the Zugdidi region of Georgia - according to them, this is being done in order to ensure the turnout of the Georgian population of the Gali region district for repeat elections to the parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia.

On the night of March 12, the upper part of the Kodori Gorge - the villages of Chkhalta, Azhara and Gentsvishi - came under fire. The Georgian side immediately informed the command of the Russian peacekeepers and representatives of the UN military observer mission about the incident. The Georgian Ministry of Defense has transferred the country's armed forces to barracks status. Units of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs were put on high alert. At night, the transfer of combat helicopters began from Tbilisi to the base in the Senate (west of Georgia).

As of early August 2008, the Kodori Gorge remained the only territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia. A day after the start of the active phase of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in 2008 - August 9 - the Abkhazian armed forces began an operation to oust the remaining Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge. Despite statements by the Georgian side about their readiness to repel any attack by the Abkhaz armed forces, by August 12, 2008, the Kodori Gorge came under the control of Abkhazia. On August 13, Abkhazia officially announced the completion of the operation, after which active hostilities ended.

At the start of the operation, there were 1.5 thousand Georgian soldiers in the Kodori Gorge, 5 strong points and air defense systems. The operation of the Abkhaz army was a reaction to the refusal of the Georgians to leave the gorge voluntarily. Only Abkhaz soldiers and reservists of the republic’s armed forces took part in it. In the operation to oust the Georgian military from the Kodori Gorge, the Abkhaz army used heavy artillery and aviation.

At the start of the operation, the Abkhaz armed forces were represented by three motorized rifle brigades (each with 3–4 motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion), an artillery regiment, engineering, mountain rifle and reconnaissance battalions, air defense units, two anti-tank missile battalions, separate special forces groups, aviation units, three boat divisions, units of marines, combat swimmers, and coastal artillery. For rapid mobilization, reserve brigades were formed from reservists. The number of personnel is 5 thousand people (up to 10 thousand together with formations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, security forces, border troops, customs, and up to 28 thousand with full mobilization). These forces were dispersed across three military districts - Eastern (Ochamchira), Central (Sukhumi) and Western (Pitsunda).

The ground forces are armed with about 70 tanks (2/3 of them are T-72, the rest are mainly T-55), 85 guns and mortars, including 152-mm howitzers and self-propelled guns, 116 armored vehicles. Aviation units: one MiG-23 fighter, two Su-25 attack aircraft, three L-39 combat training vehicles, three An-2, one Yak-52, two Mi-8Ti helicopters, two Mi-8. The naval forces include 2 divisions of naval boats (8 units of the “Grif” type, 2 units of the “Kulik” type, 2 units of Project 1204 boats, several units of the “Nevka” and “Strizh” type).

On August 22, the Chief of the General Staff of the Abkhaz Armed Forces, Anatoly Zaitsev, said that the Georgian army, after the complete capture of South Ossetia, planned to launch an offensive military operation against Abkhazia in 3 hours. According to him, Georgia’s plans were as follows: “A powerful air strike was launched, the first echelon of troops was landed from the sea in the amount of 800 people on high-speed boats, then again 800 people were supposed to land in Sukhumi, and 6 thousand people were supposed to strike artillery and rocket systems, with a firing range of 45 km, at our mountain rifle battalions in the Kodori Gorge and checkpoints of Russian peacekeeping forces. The Georgians assumed that our units and checkpoints of the “blue helmets” would be demolished by heavy fire in this narrow gorge, and after that the Georgian group began to advance in the direction of Sukhumi.”

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was brought to an end by the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation (August 26, 2008) and a number of other states.

The Abkhazian kingdom arose in the 8th century. In the second half of the 9th century it became part of Georgia. In the 13th century, Abkhazia was conquered by the Mongol-Tatars, from the 16th century it was dependent on Turkey, and in 1810 it became part of Russia. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia recognized the territory of independent Georgia up to the Psou River, that is, in fact, Abkhazia as part of the newly formed Democratic Republic of Georgia.

This was enshrined in the Russian-Georgian agreement of May 7, 1920, which states that “the state border between Georgia and Russia runs from the Black Sea along the Psou River to Mount Akhakhcha” (the Abkhaz section of the modern Russian-Georgian border).

On February 25, 1921, a Bolshevik coup took place in Georgia, and on March 4, 1921, Soviet power was established in Abkhazia.

Since December 16, 1921, the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic has been part of the Georgian SSR (since February 1931 - as an autonomous republic; since December 1990 - the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic). Both then, and during the existence of the Transcaucasian Federation (the unification of the Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in 1922-1936), and within the USSR, Abkhazia was considered as part of Georgia. The independence of Abkhazia is not confirmed by the Constitutions of either the Transcaucasian Federation or the USSR.

In 1931, the constitutional status of Abkhazia began to correspond to its actual legal status and was defined as an “autonomous republic within Georgia.” In accordance with the provisions of the Constitutions of both 1936 and 1977, autonomous entities were integral parts of the union republics and, naturally, did not have the right to secede from the union republic, especially from the USSR.

Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrentiy Beria, reduced the share of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language, Abkhaz writing was transferred to a Georgian graphic basis (translated to a Russian basis in 1954).

Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhazian population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967 and - the largest - in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30,000-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians (16 dead). The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.

A new aggravation of the situation in Abkhazia occurred in connection with the announcement by the Georgian authorities of the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918, which declared Georgia a unitary state and excluded the existence of territorial autonomies. In Abkhazia, this was perceived as the beginning of a course towards complete assimilation of the small Abkhaz ethnic group, which by that time constituted a minority of the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

On August 25, 1990, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which led to a split between the Abkhaz deputies and the Georgian faction of the Supreme Council, which opposed the Declaration.

On March 31, 1991, a referendum was held in Georgia, including Abkhazia, on the restoration of state sovereignty. In the Abkhaz ASSR, 61.27% of voters took part in the referendum, 97.73% of whom voted for the state sovereignty of Georgia, which amounted to 59.84% of the total number of voters in Abkhazia. Only 1.42% of those who took part in the vote, that is, 1.37% of the total number of voters, voted against. Throughout Georgia, 90.79% of voters took part in the referendum, 99.08% of whom voted for the restoration of state sovereignty of Georgia. Based on the results of the referendum, the Supreme Council of Georgia on April 9, 1991 proclaimed the Declaration on the restoration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia.

After April 9, 1991, the Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopted normative acts in accordance with the legal framework of Georgia, and also introduced changes to the Constitution of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, to the Basic Law of Autonomy, which recognizes Abkhazia as an autonomous unit within Georgia, and the provision on being part of Georgia was not changed .

On September 25, 1991, elections were held in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, a deputy corps was formed on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.

At the beginning of February 1992, political tensions in Abkhazia escalated due to the fact that, under the pretext of fighting supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, units of the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia. The growing contradictions between the Abkhaz and Georgian factions of the Armed Forces reached their highest point on May 5, 1992, when the Georgian faction left the meeting. This parliament no longer met in its entirety.

Since June 1992, the process of creating armed formations began in Abkhazia: a regiment of internal troops of Abkhazia and local Georgian units.

On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Court of Abkhazia adopted a resolution on the termination of the 1978 Constitution of Abkhazia and the introduction of the 1925 Constitution, which fixed the pre-autonomous status of Abkhazia. This was not recognized by the central leadership of Georgia.

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict began with the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia A. Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and maintain its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and ultimately gain independence.

On the part of the central government were the National Guard, paramilitary formations and individual volunteers, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - the armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.

According to official data, approximately 16 thousand people died during the hostilities, including 4 thousand Abkhazians, 10 thousand Georgians and 2 thousand volunteers from various republics of the North Caucasus and South Ossetia.

Of the 537 thousand population of pre-war Abkhazia (as of January 1, 1990), of which 44% were Georgians, 17% Abkhazians, 16% Russians and 15% Armenians, 200-250 thousand people. (mostly of Georgian nationality) became refugees. Huge economic damage was caused to the economy of Abkhazia. The damage caused to Abkhazia by the war and subsequent events is estimated at $10.7 billion.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, an Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was signed between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides through the mediation of Russia. Based on this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task is to maintain the regime of non-renewal of fire.

A collective peacekeeping force, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, controls a 30-kilometer security zone in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone. About three thousand peacekeepers are constantly in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of Heads of State of the CIS decides to extend their mandate.

In 1997, under the auspices of the UN, within the framework of the Geneva negotiation process, the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council for the Resolution of the Conflict was created, which includes three representatives each from the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. Representatives of the UN and the Russian Federation also participate in the work of the council as a facilitating party. In 2001, its work was suspended due to the worsening of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. On May 15, 2006, the Coordination Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides resumed its work.

On April 2, 2002, the Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers were entrusted with patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia). However, in June 2003, several UN mission employees were kidnapped there, after which patrols were suspended until the beginning of 2006.

The situation around the Kodori Gorge escalated on July 23, 2006 after anti-government statements by the former representative of the President of Georgia in the gorge, Emzar Kvitsiani, who until 2005 headed the paramilitary detachment "Hunter", formed from local residents to guard the Georgian-Abkhaz border. Kvitsiani demanded the dismissal of Georgia’s security ministers, who, according to him, are engaged in arbitrariness, and threatened official Tbilisi with actions of civil disobedience, and, in extreme cases, armed resistance.

On July 25, 2006, a military operation began in the Kodori Gorge, which official Tbilisi called a “police special operation.” On July 27, authorities reported that Emzar Kvitsiani, along with several dozen of his supporters, were blocked in the mountains. The Georgian military and police began large-scale cleansing operations in the villages of Kodori. Apart from those supporters of Emzar Kvitsiani who were captured by the Georgian military (according to some sources, about 80 people), most of the rebels voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.

On July 27, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced on national television that the Abkhaz government in exile would be stationed in the Kodori Gorge, which would exercise the jurisdiction of the central authorities of Georgia there. “This government of Abkhazia, expelled from Sukhumi in September 1993 and since then working in Tbilisi, is now declared the temporary administrative legitimate body of Abkhazia,” Saakashvili said.

The Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi do not recognize the “government in exile” and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On August 3, 2006, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced “the completion of the active phase of the anti-criminal police special operation in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.”

On September 26, 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili announced that this region of Abkhazia, now controlled by the Georgian government, would be called Upper Abkhazia and that from September 27, the government of the Abkhaz Autonomy, previously operating in Tbilisi, would begin to function there. This date was not chosen by chance - September 27, the day of the fall of Sukhumi, is celebrated in Tbilisi as a tragedy, in Sukhumi as a holiday. After the expulsion of the rebellious field commander Emzar Kvitsiani from the Kodori Gorge in August, the Georgian authorities announced the full restoration of their jurisdiction over the gorge and their intention to locate the structures of the Abkhaz autonomy there. The reaction of “Lower Abkhazia” to this intention turned out to be painful and harsh. Sukhumi warned Tbilisi that it would do everything to prevent Tbilisi officials from entering the Kodori Gorge.

On October 13, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1716, which contains “a call on both sides to refrain from any actions that could impede the peace process,” and the UN Security Council “expresses its concern regarding the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Gorge in July 2006 in connection with all violations of the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and Disengagement of May 14, 1994, as well as other Georgian-Abkhaz agreements regarding the Kodori Gorge.”

The civil war in Georgia, like the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowed Russia to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus, a view shared by many foreign politicians until recently. But it is interesting to note that at the very beginning of the development of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, the United States paid little attention to the problem of its settlement, despite the repeated expressions of initiative to develop closer relations with Washington by Eduard Shevardnadze. But after September 11, the situation changed dramatically. A line called the axis of evil has appeared on the political map of the world. There are endless calls: Let's defeat the world's evil!, Crusade against terrorism!. All these exclamations at the moment no longer hurt the ears so much, and ordinary people simply do not pay attention. After all, the fight against something or someone has simply become an integral part of modern political life. But now there is increased interest in Georgia, also associated with the fact that Russia has accused Georgia of state terrorism. But in order to give an accurate assessment of the current situation in the zone of strategic interests of both Russia and now the United States, it is necessary to consider the historical aspect of this conflict, as well as the positions and goals pursued by each side.

First of all, in our opinion, we should once again return to the so-called oil problem, namely the reconstruction of the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which will make it possible to pump up to 3 million tons of oil per year. After all, Georgia sought to pump a huge flow of oil from Azerbaijan, which was planned to be transported from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, and as is known, the main part of the Baku-Supsa (port of Georgia) oil pipeline, 950 km long. is functioning, but its modernization is planned. However, participation in the restoration and improvement of the pipeline does not guarantee that participants will receive not only their invested money back, but also control and profit. And this is where politics comes to the fore, or in other words, the subordination of Georgia to the political influence of the consortium member countries, which became possible thanks to the collapse of the USSR. It is in this context that interethnic tensions in Georgia must be viewed.

As you know, in Georgia there is an autonomous republic of Adjara, whose population is approximately 400 thousand people. It is here that the port of Batumi is located, which houses the only oil refinery in Transcaucasia. And this is a sufficient reason for Adjarian separatism. Georgian leaders understood that the loss of control over Adjara could greatly undermine the economy of Tbilisi. Therefore, having come to power, M. Saakashvili did everything possible to prevent the strengthening of the influence of the leader of the autonomy, Aslan Abashidze.

Firstly, Adjara is completely dependent on the center for energy;

secondly, Tbilisi does not allow the development of a network of power plants in this region.

In addition, the center is creating a most favored nation regime for another Georgian port - Poti, refusing to grant Batumi the status of a free economic zone, and also preventing the development of oil fields near Batumi.

A very important point is that it was Russian troops that played a big role in the modern history of Adjara, which began in April 1991 with the return of Aslan Abashidze to Batumi.

He returned to Adjara when fermentation began - the first demands for the expulsion of the Russian occupiers were heard, slogans of Adjara for Adjarians were heard. 8 days after his arrival, an attempt was made on A. Abashidze. That same night, supporters of the new head of the autonomy disarmed all legal and illegal formations in Adjara. However, Abashidze did not hide the fact that Russian troops were a guarantor of peace and stability for him. But, according to a journalist from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, this guarantor will exist until a situation is created in Georgia in which we can safely talk about the real need to withdraw the rest of the Russian troops from the republic. And such a situation was created because not only the oil companies that were going to control the oil pipeline, but also the politicians of these countries were interested in it.

One of the reasons for the withdrawal of Russian troops is the conflict with Abkhazia, which is trying to gain independence from Georgia. It is known that then, during the battles for Sukhumi, the Abkhazians completely liberated the regions of Abkhazia that had previously been captured by the Georgians. In addition, they occupied the strategically important Gali region, where the only hydroelectric power station in this region is located, supplying electricity to almost a third of Georgia and all of Abkhazia.

The Gali region, home to about 70 thousand people, is separated from Georgia by the Inguri River. It was on this site that the famous hydroelectric power station was built in Soviet times, the control panel of which remained on the Abkhaz side. The Abkhazians would cut off the electricity going to Georgia, but this would cut off power to Adjara and part of Turkey, from where most essential goods come to Abkhazia.

The hydroelectric power station system includes a canal running through Abkhaz territory along the Inguri at a distance of 12-16 km from the river. The space between the river and the canal plus the same territory on the Georgian side is the zone of the CIS peacekeeping forces, and according to the quadrilateral agreement (between Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and the OSCE), neither Abkhazian nor Georgian troops should be sent there. But the CIS peacekeeping forces are just a name. In fact, only Russia sent in its peacekeeping forces. It was then that the Georgian Zviad Gamsakhurdia lost his post, and E. Shevardnadze came to power in Georgia. The seizure of the Gali region allowed Shevardnadze to accuse Abkhazia of aggression and insist on sanctions against it, which resulted in its complete blockade. But the blockade and restrictions on the rights of Russian peacekeeping forces greatly contributed to prolonging and deepening the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia, as well as drawing the population of the Gali region into it. Let us dwell in more detail on the analysis of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

So, let us recall that as a result of the weakening of the power of the center, nationalist sentiments intensified in the country. Thus, the national radical leader E. Gamsakhurdia came to power in Georgia. To end what he saw as colonial dependence on Russia, the Georgian leader fueled inter-ethnic conflicts, pitting both Moscow and national minorities against him. Eventually, national minorities took up arms to secede (Abkhazians in Georgia) or unite with their fellow tribesmen living on the other side of the border (Ossetians in Georgia). The elites of the titular nations in Georgia and Azerbaijan were determined to stop the looming threat of dismemberment of their country. The result was a full-scale war.

When Georgia announced its complete separation from the Soviet Union in April 1991, Western governments were in no hurry to establish diplomatic relations with it. Since in this situation the question was raised about the incompetence of Zviad Gamsakhurdia to act as a democratically elected president. The refusal of the leaders of Western countries to recognize the first government of post-Soviet Georgia was also due to the fact that there was still hope for a democratic reform of the Soviet federal system and Gamsakhurdia’s radical policies, which were unpredictable.

By pursuing a policy of confrontation, Gamsakhurdia thereby isolated his country from the international community. As a result, Gamsakhurdia also lost internal support, which led to his removal from the presidency in 1992. In December, he turned to Western countries for help and declared his readiness to include Georgia in the CIS, which he had categorically refused to do previously. The West did not respond to the request of the Georgian President, as did Russia, which stated that the Georgian President: first of all, should resolve his internal problems. It should be emphasized that the leaders of the coup hoped that Shevardnadze would be able to provide the country with international recognition and internal legitimacy. These hopes were largely based on the belief that the man who had made such an important contribution to German unification and the end of the Cold War would certainly be able to bring Georgia closer to the West. It was assumed that in the relatively near future Georgia would join the EU.

The Abkhazians' anxiety about preserving their own identity intensified as the nationalist sentiments of the Georgian government grew. After all, Georgian ultranationalists called the Abkhazians uninvited guests, strangers who settled on the territory of Georgia without permission, a fifth column that Russia uses to create and maintain its fiefdom in Transcaucasia. The strategic importance of Abkhazia (as well as South Ossetia) for the Russian Federation increased Georgian concerns about Moscow's goals. The Georgian leadership also had suspicions that Russia was providing assistance to these two states. What goals did Russia pursue in helping Abkhazia?

So, let's consider the answer to this question from the point of view of the geostrategic importance of this territory: Abkhazia is located directly on the Black Sea, has fertile lands, coal reserves, and popular resorts are located on its territory. The M-27 military highway and the railway passing through the territory of Abkhazia are important transport communications for the logistical support of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus, in Georgia itself or in Armenia. Through Abkhazia, Russia gains access to the western region of Transcaucasia - the Suram Pass divides Georgia into western and eastern parts - and further through Adjara to Turkey. South Ossetia plays the same role as a connecting corridor, but leading to the central part of Transcaucasia, since the Georgian Military Road connecting Russia and Georgia passes through it. Both regions have close ties with the peoples of the North Caucasus, and armed groups from this region crossed the Russian-Georgian border to help the Abkhazians in battles with Georgian troops. Friction in relations between Georgians, on the one hand, and Ossetians and Abkhazians, on the other, has a long history. But the political line of the first president of Georgia increased the conflict nature of the situation.

Gamsakhurdia was subsequently replaced by Shevardnadze, whom Moscow considered a more acceptable leader, since he had long held a leadership position in the power hierarchy of the Soviet Union. But it cannot be said that Shevardnadze was a protege of Moscow.

In parallel, we note that a comparison of the Transcaucasus with Central Asia shows that the orientation of the local ruling elites was important for Russia. For example, Georgia during the presidency of Gamsakhurdia and Azerbaijan under Elchibey presented a striking contrast against this background. Neither of these two leaders came from the Soviet ruling elite. On the contrary, during the years of the USSR they were both nationalist dissidents, they were determined to help raise national consciousness and reduce dependence on Russia. Gamsakhurdia refused to annex Georgia to the CIS, led by Russia, and fought for the creation of a union of Caucasian peoples. Moscow welcomed the fact that Shevardnadze took Gamsakhurdia's place. Shevardnadze was much more suited to the role of a Central Asian leader in the sense that he belonged to the Soviet ruling elite at both the republican and federal levels. Russia also saw its weapon in the person of the new President of Georgia. But as it turned out, Shevardnadze’s gaze was directed to the West.

By the time Shevardnadze came to power, Georgian nationalist formations, namely the Kitovani National Guard and Mkhedrioni Jaba Ioseliani, were fomenting interethnic conflict. Shevardnadze did not actually control any of these formations. In both breakaway regions, various ultranationalist groups emerged, against which Georgian troops were sent under the pretext of freeing Georgian officials kidnapped by Gamsakhurdia's supporters and held in the Gallic region of Abkhazia. Another pretext for the invasion was the need to protect the railway running along the coast towards Russia, since trains traveling along it were often looted. Georgian commanders planned to occupy the entire territory of Abkhazia. According to reports, Shevardnadze was afraid to take responsibility for this operation, but he had to do it, since there was a real threat of losing the presidency. The Abkhazians received military support from volunteers from the North Caucasus and from Russian troops stationed on the territory of this autonomous republic. Shevardnadze also consolidated his power by removing Kitovani as defense minister in May 1993 and sending him to prison in October 1996 for attempting to reignite the war in Abkhazia and send troops there.

Thus, the instability in the periphery surrounding Russia, characterized by ethnic clashes and the unstable position of governments in power, created the conditions for Russian intervention in local conflicts to achieve its own goals. What goals did the Russian Federation pursue?

· Ensure that instability from the Transcaucasus does not spread to the North Caucasus and does not aggravate the already tense situation in this region generated by Chechen separatism. After all, Gamsakhurdia’s cooperation with the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev caused particular concern in Moscow, since the Georgian leader planned to create an anti-Russian union of Caucasian states;

· Prevent foreign powers, in particular Turkey and Iran, from becoming dominant in the Transcaucasus after the withdrawal of Russian army units from all states in the region except Armenia;

· Ensure that Transcaucasia will continue to serve as a strategic point of support for Russia in relation to Iran and Turkey.

· To ensure the fulfillment of these goals, parts of the Russian army stationed in Abkhazia supplied weapons to the Abkhaz militias and allowed them to use the airfields and military bases at their disposal (in Bombor and Gudauta) to conduct operations against Georgian troops.

Thus, in the war that Tbilisi waged with Gamsakhurdia's forces in western Georgia, Russia initially refrained from supporting the Georgian government, but once Georgia decided to join the CIS on October 8, 1993, Moscow began to assist the central authorities by helping to suppress the rebellion.

Back in July 1993, Russian mediation led to a ceasefire between the Abkhazians and Georgians, which stopped the war. But a month later hostilities resumed. Shevardnadze made a number of attempts to agree on the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in the region so that Russia would not have the main role in resolving the conflict. The Georgian president was also pushed to this by the local opposition, which opposed the participation of Russian military personnel in peacekeeping efforts. But due to the categorical refusal of the UN and Western powers to increase spending on numerous peacekeeping operations, Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to the introduction of CIS troops with the simultaneous presence of UN observers. On May 10, 1994, he addressed the Council of Heads of State of the CIS with a request to introduce peacekeeping forces into the conflict zone. The same request came from the Abkhaz leader V. Ardzinba.

On May 14, the solemn signing of the agreement “On a ceasefire and separation of forces in Abkhazia” took place in Moscow (see appendix). Based on this document and the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, since June 1994, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces, numbering 1,800 people, have been stationed in Abkhazia. It was assumed that by the fall of 1994, units of the CIS member troops would also join the peacekeeping operation of the Russian troops. It is important to emphasize that until recently it was carried out entirely by the Russian military contingent. Despite the speech of the national opposition accusing Russia of seeking to consolidate the dismemberment of the country and restore the empire, the majority of Georgians supported the measures taken and the policy of a peaceful settlement; according to a public opinion poll in 1994, 75% were in favor. The mandate and conditions of Russian participation are determined by the Agreement on a ceasefire in Abkhazia and the mechanism for monitoring its compliance dated July 27, 1993 and the decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS On approval of the mandate to conduct a peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone in Abkhazia and Georgia dated October 21, 1994 . According to which, the main tasks of the Russian peacekeeping contingent are:

· Blocking the conflict area;

· Monitoring the withdrawal of troops and their disarmament;

· Security of important facilities and communications;

· Escort of humanitarian cargo;

The most that was done without Russia's participation was the formation of a UN group to monitor the situation - the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In addition, a commission was created from representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia and the UN with the aim of developing an agreement on the issue of the return of Georgian refugees. But it must be emphasized that it is Russia that plays an important role in this process in resolving the conflict peacefully. In order to maintain peace in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia initially achieved more significant concessions. Shevardnadze tried in every possible way to accuse Russia of helping Abkhaz militants, of seeking to undermine the position of the Georgian government, and of trying to penetrate the country’s military leadership. But, despite resistance from the political elite, Shevardnadze decided to allow Georgia to join the CIS in October 1993, and the parliament ratified it the following year. In February 1994, Shevardnadze signed a friendship treaty with Russia. In March 1995, Georgia and Russia entered into an agreement on military cooperation, according to which Russia received the right to own four military bases free of charge for 25 years and station its troops of up to 25 thousand people in them: in Batumi (Adjara), Vaziani (next to Tbilisi), Gudauta, (north of Sukhumi, in Abkhazia) and Akhalkalaki, which is in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region near the northern section of the border with Turkey and Armenia. In this regard, let us recall the events last days. Thus, on May 15, 2005, the official authorities of Georgia, in the form of an ultimatum, declared the need to withdraw Russian troops from Georgian territory and dismantle Russian military bases. To which Russia responded with a refusal, one of the reasons for which is the impossibility of a quick withdrawal of troops due to possible large material losses (citing the example of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany). At the moment, we are talking at least about the redeployment of Russian military bases to the territory of North Ossetia.

Despite Russia's mediation in resolving the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, the main reason for the protracted nature of the peaceful settlement of the problem is the diametric opposite of the positions of the parties. Georgia insists on the restoration of Abkhazia as part of the Georgian state, the Abkhaz side insists on recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and the establishment of equal interstate relations with Georgia. The point of view of the Georgian government boils down to the following: Georgian society from the very beginning perceived this conflict not only in the context of preserving the territorial integrity of the country, but also as a continuation of the struggle for independence. The origins and consequences of this conflict today are perceived in Georgian society as an unbroken chain of efforts by Moscow to take Abkhazia away from Georgia. Also particularly popular is the idea of ​​comparing the psychological state of an ordinary Georgian with the state of a Frenchman who would lose the Cote d'Azur, or an American who would be left without California.

At the same time, we note that among the circles of modern Abkhaz leaders, hardliners predominate. Therefore, it is almost impossible to obtain Abkhazia’s consent to the concession that Georgia offered (autonomy status for its republic within the framework of the Georgian state). A kind of evidence of Abkhazia’s determination to defend its right to independence was the holding of elections to the legislative body of this republic in November 1996, despite the objections of Georgia and the international community, as well as the failed presidential elections in Abkhazia in 2004. Abkhazia, for its part, proposed creating a confederation in which both countries would have equal status. But because Georgia is dominated by militant parliamentarians, the Abkhaz government is in exile. The Georgian government has expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of Russian troops to protect Georgian refugees who have been able to return to Abkhazia, and has pressed for stronger Russian action against Abkhaz militants.

From the very beginning, both Shevardnadze and the current President of Georgia Saakashvili and the Georgian parliament made repeated demands to withdraw the CIS peacekeeping forces if they did not comply with the decision made at the CIS summit in March 1997 to expand the zone of the peacekeeping operation to the Gali region, adjacent to the Inguri River from the north, and ensuring law and order there. The obvious reason for this decision was the desire to facilitate the return of Georgian refugees. At the same time, the Georgian government claims that only a small number of refugees have returned home. According to the Abkhaz side, Georgia's demand to expand the powers of the peacekeeping contingent was a ploy, the purpose of which was to force it to abandon the heavily fortified defense line running along the Gallic Canal.

In this situation, Russia faced a difficult choice. Russian support for Georgia and attempts to force Abkhazia to submit to someone else's will could lead to increased anti-Russian sentiment in the region. If Abkhazia nevertheless agrees to accept the status of autonomy instead of full independence, then Georgia will ensure less independence from Moscow, and Russia’s strategic position will no longer be so strong.

According to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to Russia, the disappointment from the Abkhaz syndrome was so great that many Georgians began to look to the West with hope. Subsequently, the topic of Georgia's Western orientation became another irritant in Russian-Georgian relations. But the Georgian government’s turn to the West is explained by another reason, namely, for state building, Georgia chose the model of Western liberalism. This model is universal and not limited to geographical categories. According to this point of view, states are built and successfully developed on its principles not only in Europe and America, but also on other continents. And the development of a market economy and a pluralistic political system in Russia is equated to the same path of development. Why is Georgia's orientation towards America causing discontent? Official Tbilisi has repeatedly stated that respect for Western values ​​is not directed against anyone: We believe that Russia should not interpret this assessment differently, moreover, declaring Europe a priority of its foreign policy.

In connection with political conflicts, everyone forgets about the natural problems that arise in abandoned territories. Thus, ground vibrations of a relatively narrow coastal strip of the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia can cause destructive storms. Methane has accumulated in large quantities in the abandoned mines of Tkuarchal, which can explode at any moment. An error in aiming high-precision weapons could lead to depressurization of the nuclear burial ground on the territory of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology, where the first Soviet atomic bomb was “forged.” Radiation dust with the movement of air masses will quickly spread along the entire Black Sea coast and reach countries from whose airfields NATO aircraft will take off. A special conversation about the Inguri hydroelectric power station. According to documents, the Inguri hydroelectric complex is the property of Russia. The dam is now in disrepair. If it is destroyed, a flow of several cubic kilometers of water will wash away everything in its path.

Moreover, Russia is objectively interested in stabilizing the situation in Georgia itself. This will largely ensure stability in the entire Caucasus region and prevent the escalation of interethnic conflicts affecting the national security of the Russian Federation.

The obvious loss by Russia of its positions and influence in the Transcaucasus, the apparent increase in the threat to Russia from the south, the build-up of the Western, primarily American and Turkish, political, economic and military presence in the Caucasus pose Russia with the need to pay close attention to issues of ensuring security, primarily military , in the South, preserving potential allies, among which Georgia could occupy a prominent place. From its territory, via sea, air and land communications, Russia enters the countries of Southern Europe, Asia Minor, the Near and Middle East.

It seems that the solution to the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict is not in the use of military force, but in focused, patient negotiations. And in this regard, the role of Moscow as a long-time friend and partner of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as well as the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict zone, is sharply increasing. The departure of the Russian border guards showed that the fuse of a new regional war in this area is smoldering, the mine war on the part of Georgian saboteurs has intensified, and Abkhaz-Georgian maritime incidents have begun with shelling and seizures of seiners. More recently, Türkiye was involved in one of the maritime incidents.

We must also keep in mind the determination of the military-political leadership of Abkhazia to repel aggression. The open press has already made a statement by representatives of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus about launching attacks on the territory of Georgia from the territory of the Caucasian republics in the event of a new Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. They claim that their attacks will lead to the split of Georgia into 4-6 parts. The statement of the chief of the general staff of the Abkhaz army about the issue of inflicting unacceptable damage on Georgia in the first 48-72 hours after the start of the aggression seems very serious.

The latest operation of Russian peacekeeping forces on the territory of the CIS was the operation in Abkhazia, which began in July 1994. By this time, the Russian military was bogged down in the Guzin-Abkhaz conflict to an even greater extent than in Tajikistan.

Throughout the conflict, official Moscow maintained neutrality, condemned human rights violations and imposed sanctions against both warring parties. At the same time, the Russian units that Russia inherited after the division of the allied armed forces were in the conflict zone from the very beginning and provided unofficial support to the Abkhaz formations. According to numerous testimonies, it was Russian planes that bombed Georgian positions, and Russian ships carried out the landing of Abkhaz troops. At the same time, official sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian troops protect only themselves and respond only with return fire. After the Sochi Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1993, they tried to give these troops post-facto peacekeeping status. Hoping that their presence could become a deterrent, the Russian government took on the role of guarantor of the implementation of the agreements reached. Additionally, the UN promised to allocate 50 military observers and indeed sent some of them to the region.

However, when Abkhazia violated these agreements and its forces began to storm the capital of the autonomy, the city of Sukhumi, it turned out that Russian troops did not have the authority to force the truce agreements to be carried out. It soon became clear that Georgia also did not want the presence of Russian peacekeeping forces on its territory.

And it is unknown whether the Russian peacekeeping operation would have taken place had the armed struggle not broken out with renewed vigor in the Georgian territory adjacent to Abkhazia between supporters of the ousted President Z. Gamsakhurdia and the troops supporting the new government. Having supported E. Shevardnadze, Russian troops in October 1993 took control of the most important transport communications of Georgia and blocked the road to the capital for scattered detachments of supporters of Z. Gamsakhurdia. On October 23, E. Shevardnadze decided to authorize Georgia's entry into the CIS. Tbilisi has given permission to maintain Russian military bases in Georgia. A fundamental decision was also made to agree to a peacekeeping operation by Russian troops in Abkhazia. On December 1, 1993, the Abkhaz and Georgian delegations signed an “Agreement of Mutual Understanding.” On May 9, 1994, UN Secretary-General Boutras Ghali presented a report to the Security Council in which he expressed the opinion that there were no necessary conditions in Georgia for the deployment of UN troops. He expressed the opinion that until the arrival of UN troops, peacekeeping tasks could be carried out by Russian troops, who could then become part of the UN contingent.

For the first time, the deployment of peacekeeping forces was preceded by lengthy preparations. Both sides tentatively accepted proposals for a complete cessation of hostilities. Russia achieved UN recognition of its operation as a CIS operation. The mandate of the peacekeeping forces was developed in detail, drawing on UN experience, and the area of ​​responsibility was limited to the Gali region, adjacent to the interior regions of Georgia. Monitoring the situation in the conflict zone was to be carried out by UN observers. After a number of approvals, by June 26, 1994, Russian peacekeepers entered Abkhazia.

In the first months, combined battalions of the Akhalkalaki and Batumi divisions of the Russian army were also additionally introduced into the conflict zone. Local residents also serve in these two divisions, now Russian military bases. Until recently, among them were citizens of Georgia.

As a result, the following layout of the peacekeeping forces was adopted. Three battalions were located on the territory of Abkhazia, one battalion was located in Mingrelia, in the city of Zugdidi, neighboring Abkhazia. The commander and headquarters of the peacekeeping forces are located in Sukhumi, and the deputy commander is in the Georgian regional center, the city of Zugdidi. The first task of the Russian forces was to separate the sides and organize checkpoints on the Gumista River, which became the demarcation line. Within a short time, the peacekeepers managed to take control of the bridges and main fords, but groups of Abkhaz and Georgian militants still periodically penetrate to the opposite sides of the river and disturb the population.

The next task was the demilitarization of the Kodori Gorge in the mountains - the last section of Abkhazia inhabited by the Georgian Svans and controlled by the Georgian government. After lengthy negotiations, it was possible to reduce the level of confrontation by eliminating heavy weapons from the arsenals of both sides and separating the detachments. At the same time, although it turned out to be impossible to carry out complete demilitarization of the gorge, the number of shellings fell several times.

Peacekeeping forces also began large-scale mine clearance operations, allowing residents of Abkhazia to engage in agricultural activities. Mine clearance was extremely difficult due to the lack of mining maps, however, during the first month of deployment of the peacekeeping forces, mine clearance was carried out in a 10-kilometer strip of their zone of responsibility. The peacekeeping forces also took protection of the Inguri hydroelectric power station, which supplies the region with electricity.

However, the peacekeepers failed to fulfill the most important task from Georgia's point of view - ensuring the process of returning refugees. It should be noted that many in Georgia perceived the concluded agreements as Russia’s obligation to forcefully create the opportunity for the return of refugees. Meanwhile, Russian troops are only obliged to ensure security upon return. The Abkhaz authorities did their best to prevent the return of refugees beyond Little Gali. In the territory of this region, until recently, law and order had to be maintained by the Abkhaz police, whose employees had recently taken part in the armed conflict. As a result, refugees who returned to their homes are not only at risk of attack by numerous criminal groups, but also experience harassment from Abkhaz police officers. Cases are described when such actions occurred in front of Russian military personnel, who did not take any measures to stop them. At the same time, the command of the peacekeeping forces justified their subordinates by the absence of police functions in the peacekeepers’ mandate.

Only once did Russian peacekeepers try to act at their own risk, as they had been accustomed to do before in other operations. In early September 1994, the Deputy Minister of Defense, who, among other things, oversaw the Russian peacekeeping forces, Colonel General Georgy Kondratyev, who was in the region and outraged by the death of Russian officers in the territory controlled by Abkhaz forces and the reluctance of the Abkhaz side to accept Georgian refugees, took a desperate step. He stated that on September 14, and then moved this date to September 16, Russian troops would begin an operation to return refugees, “giving armed rebuff to all those who would try to prevent this.” 27. On September 15, the Abkhaz police in the Gali region were blocked by the Russian military and They also blocked the routes for the approach of forces urgently transferred from other regions of Abkhazia. However, on September 16, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the operation and, on instructions from Boris Yeltsin, flew to Georgia. A meeting was scheduled between the leaders of Russia and Georgia. The Abkhaz side announced its readiness to consider the cases of returning refugees from October 1. Soon, Georgy Kondratyev returned to Moscow to serve as Deputy Minister of Defense, which he remained until the outbreak of the armed conflict in Chechnya.

From the very beginning of the operation, the lack of police functions of the peacekeeping forces in their area of ​​​​responsibility has been criticized. It should be recognized that Georgian politicians began to put forward demands for the provision of such functions starting in the spring of 1995, even more so in the hope that peacekeeping forces would help quickly restore control over the territory of Abkhazia. The authorities of Abkhazia constantly advocate the maximum limitation of the functions of peacekeepers. In their opinion, the population, including returning Georgian refugees, should be protected from thieves and bandits by the law enforcement agencies of the republic.

Official Moscow has repeatedly declared its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

According to Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, “Russia, of course, can help resolve this conflict, but to do this it will first need to take on a completely overwhelming role. This is the restoration of Georgian statehood. Now, when Georgian statehood has weakened to the limit, when in fact the government of Tbilisi controls only a small part of the territory around Tbilisi and when Georgia has de facto broken up into several principalities, and in many of them there is no power at all, it can hardly count on that that someone will join this country.”

Are there any great chances for Abkhazia to become part of Russia or become an associated state with it?

Most experts agree that Abkhazia’s intentions to establish a confederation with Russia or become part of the Russian Federation have no legal basis.

For example, this opinion was expressed in 2003 by Alexander Kalita, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Security and Defense. According to Kalita, the statements of the Vice-President of Abkhazia Valery Arshba that Abkhazia is preparing documents aimed at the actual entry of the republic into Russia are “an action more political than legal.”

The senator emphasized that Russia “recognizes Georgia and Abkhazia as part of Georgia, and this was recently confirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.” The issue of Abkhazia joining Russia or the creation of a confederation can be considered at the state level only if Georgia agrees to Abkhazia’s secession from its membership, emphasized A. Kalita. In his opinion, the statements of the leaders of Abkhazia do not contribute to strengthening stability in the region.

The chairman of the temporary commission of the Georgian parliament on refugee affairs, Shota Malashkhia, believes that Russia has destroyed the legal basis for carrying out a peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia.

“Russia itself destroyed the legal basis for the peacekeepers’ mission when it unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS agreement. Based on this, the Georgian side has additional arguments to implement the resolution adopted last year on the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from the Abkhaz conflict zone,” Shota Malashkhia said on the Imedi radio station.

Georgia's achievement, in his opinion, is that the country's legal position at the international level is fair.

“The mistakes that the previous Georgian government had have been corrected, so our fair demands for the return of refugees, the inviolability of their property, etc. must be recognized by the international community. Russia does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because legally it is acting incorrectly,” Malashkhia said.

According to him, the Georgian side will give an answer with an emphasis on the legal side of the issue.

“Moreover, the legal side concerns various levels. Our response will certainly address all the violations with which Russia made its decision. Firstly, all decisions in the CIS are made by consensus and at the organization’s summit, and Russia withdrew from the sanctions agreement unilaterally. And then, by withdrawing from one agreement, Russia thereby actually abandons a whole series of agreements,” says the chairman of the temporary commission of the Georgian parliament on refugee affairs.

In addition, according to Malashkhia, “there are many inaccuracies in the decision that contradict the latest report of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the UN on ethnic sanctions.”

“We will work in all these areas. Within 6 months, Georgia's demands will be reflected in a UN resolution, and Russia will have more problems than Georgia. If we behave correctly, if we implement everything that we intend, this statement by Russia on the lifting of sanctions will remain a declaration,” Malashkhia noted.

The chairman of the temporary commission of the Georgian parliament on refugee affairs said that the Georgian leadership does not want there to be a humanitarian blockade on the territory of Abkhazia; the Georgian government is trying to cooperate with the Abkhaz side on various programs, but, unfortunately, without a response.

“The separatist regime itself does not want to solve the problems. It is easily managed, receives significant subsidies, which are shared “at the top,” and the problem remains. The de facto authorities of the unrecognized republic are trying to remain in power as long as possible, while using Russian resources. With all its actions, Russia proves that it is not a party, but a participant in the conflict, and it has its own interests and ties with the unrecognized republic of Abkhazia. In this case, there will be a different conversation with her,” says Malashkhia.

Based on the above, I would like to draw the main conclusion. Events taking place in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, according to domestic analysts, negatively affect the state of national security of the Russian Federation. An escalation of the conflict could destabilize the situation in the region. The country's political leadership is required to have a carefully balanced foreign policy aimed (together with the international community) at an exclusively peaceful resolution of the conflict. In addition, it is important to prevent infringement of Russia’s national interests in this region.

The South Caucasus has always been of interest to big powers. Here their interests often collided: this happened historically. Political realism is to fit organically into the political processes taking place in the Caucasus region. At the same time, ensuring fundamental national interests requires the correct identification and consistent implementation of priority tasks aimed primarily at protecting the national security and economic development of the country.

In February 1810 With his highest manifesto, Emperor Alexander I announced the annexation of the Abkhazian principality to the Russian Empire. Thus, in 2010 marks 200 years since the establishment of historical ties, which today determine the vector of foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Abkhazia.

The opportunity to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia, above all, gives us the opportunity to maintain and develop economic and cultural ties with related peoples of the North Caucasus and southern Russia. And finally, the Russian state is the most important economic partner of our republic, and of the entire region as a whole. It is in Russia that the population of Abkhazia sees a force capable of protecting against external threats. This was clearly confirmed by the massive appeal of citizens of Abkhazia asking for Russian citizenship.

The acquisition of Russian citizenship by the majority of the population of Abkhazia gives real hope for the protection of the Russian state. In addition, for thirteen years, Russian peacekeeping forces continue to be the guarantors of the non-resumption of hostilities.

Thus, we can say that Abkhazia is actually under the protectorate of Russia. This is exactly how we should understand President Putin’s words that Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fate of its citizens living in Abkhazia.

In this regard, in relations between Russia and Abkhazia, the most viable model of cooperation today may be the United States and Taiwan, which have concluded a number of interstate agreements, including military ones. President Bush stated that if China invaded Taiwan, he would definitely have to deal with the US military (The Times, April 26, 2001). “I hope,” says Margaret Thatcher in her book Statecraft, “that the United States will go further and provide Taiwan with an effective regional missile defense system.” (Margaret Thatcher. M.: Alpina Publisher, 2003, p. 232.)

We hope that Russia, like the United States, will firmly state that Abkhazia, neither now nor in the future, can be recognized as solely an “internal” problem of Georgia. We consider this model of relations between Russia and Abkhazia as temporary and transitional, which should prepare a qualitatively new level of relations between our countries. And we have formulated such proposals. They imply the conclusion of associated relationships. These proposals were first announced by President Ardzinba, then they were reflected in the appeal of the Parliament of Abkhazia to the State Duma of Russia. They imply the conclusion of interstate agreements in the military-political, customs, border, as well as in the economic and cultural fields.

Having considered the appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia to the President of the Russian Federation and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and on the establishment of associated relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia, the State Duma noted that Russia has a deep historical, political and humanitarian interest in a fair resolution of the problems of the Abkhazian a people with whom Russians are connected by numerous close ties. The statement notes that the Address of the RA Parliament is a reasoned document, worked out from a legal, scientific and historical point of view. State Duma deputies believe that the Appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia to the President and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on recognition of the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and on the establishment of associated relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia reflects the true aspirations of the population of Abkhazia and should be fully taken into account by the international community for the sake of ensuring human rights, peace and security in the region and a fair resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

Deputies of the State Duma also expressed support for the efforts of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin and the Government of the Russian Federation to improve the economic situation of Abkhazia and lift restrictions on its foreign economic activity, to provide the residents of Abkhazia with the achievements of Russian and world culture, education, to protect the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation and Russian compatriots living on the territory of Abkhazia. Such a consistent and firm policy, meeting, first of all, the enduring interests of Russia in the Caucasus, which for centuries has been and remains a zone of its exclusive political dominance, will become fundamentally important factor ensuring stability in the region. This is becoming especially relevant on the eve of the upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi.

Over the past sixty years, the world order system has changed twice. After the end of the Second World War, the process of the emergence of dozens of independent states took place for twenty years. Often these events were accompanied by long, bloody wars. Ultimately, all these self-proclaimed states were recognized by the world community and became members of the UN. Since 1991, similar processes have been taking place in the world and there are no fair arguments against the fact that the states that emerged as a result of the modernization of the world order should also be recognized by the world community. The political-territorial content of the “first principle” of the Helsinki Final Act, on which the USSR especially insisted, has long lost its force and significance. The Soviet Union also left the world stage. There is no Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, Germany has united.

The issue of recognition of Kosovo's independence is currently being widely discussed. At the same time, statements are made about the impossibility of extending this approach to other unrecognized states. In this regard, the position of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin demonstrates the only objective approach. Recognition of the independence of Kosovo and the use of this fact as a precedent for solving a number of similar problems, in addition to demonstrating the objectivity of the main active parties in world politics, will help to immediately cut the Gordian knot of many accumulated problems that cannot be resolved either peacefully or militarily. Of course, for some countries this decision will be painful, but it will merely formalize a legally accomplished fact.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently adopted a resolution condemning the massive human rights violations committed under totalitarian communist regimes. It says that the peoples of the former USSR suffered most from these crimes. Abkhazia, as one of many repressed peoples, also calls on the UN Security Council, OSCE, EU, and the International community to show consistency and objectivity in relation to Abkhazia, which became an autonomous Georgia solely by the will of Stalin in 1931.

Before the collapse of the USSR, Abkhazia repeatedly raised the question of restoring the status of a union republic, lost at the behest of Stalin, and not only did not intend to secede, but voted for preserving the USSR at the All-Union March Referendum.

The situation changed after Georgia declared independence. As is known, the norm proclaimed in the Soviet Constitution, which provided for the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR, was not provided with an appropriate mechanism. In this regard, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1990 adopted a law regulating the procedure for the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR. In accordance with this law, the autonomous entities that were part of the union republics raising the question of secession from the Union could independently resolve this issue (by the way, the Constitution of Yugoslavia did not provide for such a right for the autonomy of Kosovo). By voting to preserve the USSR, Abkhazia answered this question in the most democratic way - by popular vote.

However, Georgia carried out its exit from the USSR completely ignoring all these factors. After leaving the Union, the Georgian leadership declared all legal acts adopted in Georgia during Soviet rule to be null and void. Thus, Georgia itself ended relations with Abkhazia. It is important to note that Abkhazia did not take part in the referendum that declared the independence of Georgia. Thus, after Georgia left the USSR, Abkhazia, from the point of view of the Soviet legislation in force at that time, actually remained part of the USSR. After the legal formalization of the collapse of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, Abkhazia ceased to be part of the USSR. Thus, since the end of 1990, Abkhazia has been both factually and legally an independent state.

Since that time, the Republic of Abkhazia has constantly demonstrated its stability and vitality. Three times, in 1992-1993, 1998 and 2001 the people of Abkhazia defended their right to self-determination with arms in hand. Over the years of independent existence under conditions of blockade and constant political pressure, Abkhazia demonstrates that it has emerged as a state with a peace-loving policy, democratic principles, a developing economy, respect for individual rights and a careful attitude towards environment. These circumstances favor the recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation, and after it by other states of the world.

In this regard, it is necessary to develop a mechanism for recognizing the independence of Abkhazia that would fully meet the interests of both parties, without causing excessive irritation to the leading international partners of the Russian Federation.

Within the framework of this mechanism, it seems possible to stage-by-stage implement a number of activities that, subject to comprehensive and timely implementation, would lead to the designated goal. Among the bilateral activities, the following should be highlighted:

Development of the initiative of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to recognize the right of the peoples of Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia to self-determination, enshrined in the resolutions of the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted in the fall of 2006;

Conclusion of a number of interstate agreements on key issues of interaction between Russia and Abkhazia;

Integration of Abkhazia into the legal space of the Russian Federation through the harmonization of legislation, as well as its connection to national projects of the Russian Federation on the basis of concluded interstate agreements.

By recognizing the independence of the Republic of Abkhazia, the PMR and the Republic of South Ossetia, Russia will thereby complete the political and legal formalization of the collapse of the USSR and confirm its status as the legal successor of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Russia will have the opportunity to create a “belt of good neighborliness”, including Abkhazia, Transnistria and South Ossetia as states loyal to the Russian Federation.

Such actions by Russia will undoubtedly be approved by the population of the North Caucasus and the South of Russia, who have repeatedly declared support for the independence of Abkhazia. Thus, Russia will gain additional potential to influence the situation in this region.

To implement this scenario, practically no additional material costs are required from the Russian Federation. The economy of Abkhazia today is already closely connected with Russia, which is practically its only trade and economic partner, creditor and main foreign owner of property on the territory of the Republic.

Russian business will also not require any additional guarantees of the inviolability of property and protection of investments in Abkhazia, since the transactions were formalized under the laws of de facto independent states, which, naturally, will not change after the legal recognition of independence.

The Russian side gains access to important transit transport corridors and infrastructure facilities, including the Black Sea strip in close proximity to the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics.

Issues of the Russian military presence in this strategically important region will be moved beyond the international agenda into the plane of bilateral Russian-Abkhaz relations.

It should be noted that some significant milestones on the path of consistent, step-by-step progress have been successfully overcome. These undoubtedly include the entry of Abkhazia into the ruble zone, the provision of Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia, a visa-free regime and the beginning of the influx of Russian investments into the economy of Abkhazia

At the same time, in the context of the events developing around Kosovo, the proposed project for the gradual recognition of the independence of Abkhazia is limited in time. If Russia does not react decisively, adequately and quickly in the event of recognition of Kosovo's independence, then the favorable moment may be missed and when this topic ceases to be relevant, references to it will not be perceived accordingly.

The modern world builds the foundations of its life according to the rules of strict, often cynical rationality, and in interstate relations all abstractions recede into the background, giving way to the enduring fundamental interests of influential actors in international politics.

Modern international law does not provide for any legal provisions that in any way limit the right of states to recognize newly formed states, even if the secession occurred without the consent of the former mother country.

In exercising its right to recognize Abkhazia, Russia will, first of all, proceed from the need to protect its political and economic interests, and also be guided by political and economic expediency. Such an action by Russia, aimed at restoring historical justice, will be justified from the point of view of high morality; it will also be firmly based on the will of the people expressed in a popular referendum.