Leonid Savin. Indo-Pacific region: USA in the space of two oceans. The New Great Game is shifting from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific region

The author of the article is General Robert B. Brown, US Army, Commander of the United States Ground Forces in the Pacific. The article was published in the March-April issue of Military Review. Translation into Russian was carried out by the SGS-mil team; when using, a link to the site is required.

The United States military is at a crossroads, facing both institutional and operational challenges. The nature of modern warfare continues to change at a rapid pace, requiring military leaders to re-evaluate some core beliefs. This situation has led to the testing and refinement of concepts, capabilities, and people so that the U.S. Armed Forces will be ready for the conflicts of today and tomorrow.

Without a doubt, any future conflict will become increasingly complex and distributed, involving multiple simultaneous actions in many domains - land, air, sea, space, as well as cyberspace. The emerging concept of multi-domain battle, some elements of which are described in a forthcoming white paper developed jointly by the Army and Marine Corps, addresses the increasing complexity of the battlefield and its requirement for future integration .

While still in development and experimentation, the concept is already affecting operational and resource decisions, especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

This article presents three themes that illustrate how we are thinking about implementing the multi-domain battle concept in the Pacific Command area of ​​responsibility. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which characterizes the need for a new operating concept to integrate the entire United States Armed Forces. She goes on to describe the concept of fighting in many areas, including three elements that help determine the desired effects: collaborative integration, technology, and people development. Finally, she presents a drawing of the definition of several areas, since the concept is already applicable at the tactical level.

Strategic Context of the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region

Given that the international situation in this region is weaker than ever, the concept of fighting in many areas is sorely needed. The region consists of thirty-six countries that are located in sixteen time zones; These countries make up more than half the world's population and twenty-four of the thirty-six megacities on Earth, and they also cover more than half of the planet's surface area.

The region is home to the world's three largest economies, seven largest militaries, and five of the seven mutual defense treaty partners with the United States. According to Admiral Harry B. Harris (" junior"), Commander of the United States Pacific Command, " annual global trade of approximately $5.3 trillion. The US is based on unimpeded access to maritime corridors [such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea] $1.2 trillion. of this maritime trade destined for or exported from the United States" Besides, " The Strait of Malacca alone handles more than 25 percent of oil tanker passages and 50 percent of all natural gas transits every day».

In addition, the area is prone to natural disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and other events that constitute “ more than 60 percent of the world's natural disasters" To put it simply and succinctly, global prosperity depends on stability and security in this vast and complex region.

These demographic and economic dynamics interact with the increased pace of technological change, adding to the political and military complexity already present in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Dramatic technological shifts driven by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology and big data are only intensifying military competition between geopolitical rivals.

Many of these new technology tools rely on the use of digital communications—seven billion devices connected to the Internet in 2016, and a projected fifty billion by 2020—only increase the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its dependence on space-based assets for connectivity .

Picture 1. Multinational forces marching in formation as a single unit on February 15, 2017, after the official opening ceremony of the exercise.CobraGold (“Golden Cobra”) 2017, inUtapao,Thailand. ExercisesCobraGold, now in its thirty-sixth year, is the largest security cooperation event in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theatre. This year's focus is on strengthening regional security and effectively responding to regional crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to address shared security challenges and responsibilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Technological shifts are also fueling and exacerbating security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, with some of the world's most intractable challenges among them. Challenges include:

‒ an increasingly bellicose North Korea, which shares increasingly effective missile technology with Iran;

‒ a rising China that challenges international rules and norms;

- revanchist Russia (Muscovy), which is increasingly trying to act in the Pacific with a provocative military position;

‒ continued nuclear support for tensions between India and Pakistan;

• ‒ intensification of the activities of violent extremist networks operating in partner countries and allies;

- political and diplomatic instability as a result of changes in the executive leadership of key regional allies and partners.

The most dangerous threat in the Asia-Pacific region comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals and intentions to undermine the international order. Complex failure capabilities and small military forces controlled by the state but supported by large military forces with internal lines of communication create the danger of a fait accompli .

As in the international regime, the military situation is also becoming increasingly dangerous. Rivals and enemies have learned lessons from the US military's successes and failures over the past few decades. They recognize that US strengths, based on power projection, joint operations and technological transition, have led to unprecedented tactical success .

Thus, rivals have developed capabilities and concepts that attempt to eliminate these advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield for the United States Military. This has led to participation in an increasingly contested global commons, with the loss of US military superiority in the air and sea due to technology and denial tactics. Whether adversaries take incremental or sudden action, the United States needs to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region or risk losing its position militarily, diplomatically, and economically. .

Because of these strategic trends, both positive and negative, U.S. and partner forces must maintain current military advantages and regain those that have been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the stability of the current international system depends on our ability to deter key actors from acting aggressively and harmfully. We must interrupt the enemy's decision cycles and present the enemy with multiple dilemmas that create uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. However, if aggression leads to conflict, we must be prepared to defeat our enemies unequivocally .

This approach is the driving force behind the concept of multi-domain combat, which is designed to overcome denial technologies and impact all domains (i.e., domains) together to create localized areas of force. These effects reactivate maneuver for the entire joint force operating in any region, thereby placing the enemy at a disadvantage so that US forces can gain the initiative in action .

Elements of the concept of battle in many areas

The concept of combat in many domains may at first sound like something new, not like a traditional joint operation. There is a deal of truth in it. However, what we are trying to achieve - effects in the intersection of areas - is not entirely new. For example, at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks used both land and naval forces to defeat the invading Persians . Much closer to modern times, the United States of America owes its independence to the effective use of American and French land and sea forces against the army of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Another historical example is the Vicksburg campaign during Civil War in USA. With the ability to control shipping on the Mississippi River, Vicksburg's Confederate artillery, infantry, and cavalry forces posed a formidable challenge to counter-access and defense denials to Union forces. Union General Ulysses S. Grant overcame this problem only by combining the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry, and infantry forces with the naval ships led by his staff officer Andrew Hull Foote.

The introduction of the airplane, submarine, and aircraft carrier into military operations during World War I, and the introduction of mobile radio communications and radar systems during World War II greatly increased the strategic commander's ability to operate in multiple domains simultaneously.

More recently, the development of the air-land battle in the 1980s, and then the air-land battle in 2013, has shown that military thinking is developing along the same general line - how to achieve decisive results. Even if they are outnumbered, including technologically, by integrating operations in multiple areas to present multiple dilemmas to enemies.

The different services regularly supported each other in all areas. So when Harris says he wants the Army to provide off-terrestrial effects, he's not asking to do so without precedent. From 1794 to 1950, the army was responsible for the defense of coasts and ports, and later for the air defense of its homeland. The Army Junior Officer Corps arose out of the need during World War I to have adequate numbers of technical specialists to staff the Army and submarine fleet. The idea or desire for combat effects of intersections in many areas is not new .

While all services are asked to carry out their missions in ways that are not much different from the past, there will be differences. We in the Army can no longer simply focus on land and leave air and sea to other services. The Marines, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard also can no longer focus only on " their» areas. We all need to better integrate planning, operations, management and control across all areas .

To achieve integration, a new approach is needed, new approach. The entire U.S. force must change its service culture to one of inclusion and openness, focusing on “ purple (or joint) first"mentality. The Army must further integrate a mission command image where each individual has the right to receive initiative based on his or her role and function. And he must focus on developing Leaders who thrive in ambiguity and chaos .

1. Joint integration

The concept of multi-domain warfare is expected to include three key areas: organization and processes, technology, and people. . Changes in organizations and processes will be aimed at providing different and more focused Army tools to the joint force to overcome the United States' loss of superiority or parity in certain domains, especially air, sea and cyberspace.

The Army (i.e., the Ground Forces) can no longer focus solely on the ground component. As part of a joint force, Army forces must provide other services in their areas to meet their operational challenges and vice versa. This means that change must be focused on greater capability, have cross-cutting effects across multiple domains, and be more focused and effective integration within the joint force. .

At United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), we are trying to do this on three fronts:

- Firstly, is about developing and experimenting with flexible management teams, adaptable and scalable modules, and flexible policies in key areas.

• - Secondly, much of this experimentation will be conducted as part of a redesigned exercise program designed to make all events collaborative and multinational, with a view to holding exercises in 2018." Pacific Fleet».
• - Third, we support increased innovation across all services in intercomponent and combatant command processes.

2. Technologies

Another key area is technological change. We must overcome and harness the speed of technological change rather than losing our coping capabilities through acquired slow programs . The Department of Defense and the Army have already established a framework for rapid materiel solutions with the Strategic Capabilities Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Response Office at Department of the Army Headquarters.

These directorates are doing a remarkable job of refocusing current technology on innovation in application, a key component to regaining our tactical advantage. USARPAC is closely associated with these efforts. This binding includes all the equipment in the exercises and experiments. As has been the case in this theater for many years, USARPAC is tapping into the great culture of " combat laboratories" that this team has developed over the last decade (or more).

The technology offers key tools for decision support, mortality and protection. We must use this technology to empower our men and women and increase their effectiveness .

3. Prepared people

The final area in which the concept of multi-domain combat is addressed is humans . The U.S. military must use its people to overcome the challenges of being outnumbered, outnumbered, and " find out"from enemies and adversaries.

People are America's greatest strategic advantage. To harness this advantage, the Armed Forces must develop flexible and adaptive Leaders through education and training . Rigorous iterations of decision making, including “ impossible» scripts or « black swans” that Soldiers do not expect can help develop critical thinking skills. Failure should be an option, in keeping with the principle that training exercises develop Leaders who will respond better to actual conflicts.

Leaders should also receive a degree of cultural education and training that will allow them to experience different ways of thinking . At USARPAC, we address both critical thinking and cultural understanding through a regional Leader Development program that is led by personnel and at the Army command level.

As Army advisory and advisory brigades become operational, we will also include personnel from units deployed to the Pacific in this educational and training resource to prepare them for operations in the region. .

Figure 2. Battlefield in many areas.

Combat in many areas (domains) in practice

The following fictional image illustrates the concept of combat in many areas, applied at the tactical level. This example based on a hypothetical location in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say there is a chain of islands or a coastal landmass whose location would make it a critical topography, affecting air or sea traffic or access to a strategic port. Possession of this function by some enemy would pose a serious threat to international order, stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say the enemy seized control of this function and announced that he was restricting commercial air and sea transport, denying access to any nation allied with the United States. Treaty obligations would require the United States to intervene militarily, although the enemy's arsenal of weapons and electronics is substantial.

A military option that applies the concept of multi-domain combat could involve the use of cyberspace and space assets to temporarily blind and disrupt enemy command and control systems so that Special Operations Forces can advance and gain a foothold along the island chain . They would then assist the amphibious assault force to secure the beachhead, airfield, and other major structures needed to establish a secure beachhead.

Immediately behind them there would be army vessels loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the runway (if necessary) and build good defensive positions. At the same time, Air Force C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft introduce a battalion group of ground forces, a high mobility artillery battery, and specially equipped anti-ship missile defenses. And batteries of indirect fire protection systems for short-range air defense. In addition, a battery of 155mm long-range howitzers would be unloaded using an empty aircraft to restore its capabilities for subsequent forced entry operations if necessary.

Within ninety-six hours, the main position would be dug out and ready for the Stryker Battalion Combat Team. With manned and unmanned Air Force systems, Navy ships and underwater unmanned aerial vehicles, and a suite of Army radar systems (such as the AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, or AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel).

And also the air threat detection system of the Joint Networked Ground Defense Sensor System against a possible missile attack to see beyond the horizon. There would be an overlapping, multi-domain sensor network that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, and apply lethal and electronic fire support across all domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—simultaneously.

The tactical team may be cut off from resupply or communications for an indefinite period of time. This is why this tactical force of approximately one thousand personnel will be able to sustain itself for thirty days, ten times the current doctrinal requirement of 72 hours for a unit of this size .

But with advances in mobile water purification, solar panels, wind turbines, and wave and tidal power, as well as additional printing devices for making spare parts, such a unit could be self-sufficient for much longer than even the larger ones of the previous century. They would still need fuel for their vehicles, but with unmanned aircraft and other autonomous platforms enhancing force protection, they could limit the need for vehicles, powered by fossil fuels, and supplement organic support with the Air Force's Precision Air Reconnaissance System.

Again, these units could operate in extremely harsh environments with limited resources and without a permanent land, sea, or air line of communication linking them to other friendly forces. However, these men and women would be ready, with exceptional Leaders carrying out the mission.

Practical conclusion about the concept of combat in many areas

Again, this is just a thought exercise based on how Army forces in the Pacific think about and experiment with fighting in many areas. Application of the concept may look different in other parts of the world or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

However, it is clear that regardless of geography or opponent, Army units must be well-led, well-trained and well-equipped to operate across multiple domains in support of the joint force. .

One way to achieve this is through holistic operational testing, in which the Army's command and support components work hand-in-hand with concept and doctrine developers at U.S. Army Command. This is happening in the Pacific today. We apply joint integration, technology and people to battle concepts across multiple domains by rigorously incorporating concepts and capabilities into all of our exercises, culminating in a major test at the 2018 Naval Support Ring in the Pacific. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate a multi-domain approach with our efforts to plan, equip and develop Leaders .

The Army should not be shy about resources and test these efforts. Many of the concepts and capabilities proposed in the Multi-Domain Battle Concept will be needed not only for future conflicts, but also for near-term conflicts that may require us to be prepared." to fight today». Make no mistake: Testing and implementing a multi-domain approach will enhance our readiness today, while also preparing our men and women to win wars if the country calls for it .

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Moscow, 05/28/2018

Andrey Kortunov, CEO RIAC

To say that the next one or two decades promise us many changes in world politics means to say nothing. Changes in the international sphere occur constantly and non-stop, sometimes almost imperceptibly, sometimes in the most dramatic forms. But the coming fifteen to twenty years, most likely, will become a special period: by their end, the foundations of a new world order should be determined for a much more distant future, until the end of this century. The article is published as part of a partnership with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Who will determine the rules of the game in the coming world order? What will be the main “currency” of power and influence? To what extent will the hierarchy of world leaders change? How will global governance be structured? A fierce struggle has already begun around these issues, the stakes in which are extremely high - both for individual states, and for entire regions, and for the entire world system. It is clear that the epicenter of the ongoing struggle is and will be the Eurasian continent. After all, it not only remains the main historical core and economic locomotive of the modern world, but also, not without reason, is considered as the main prize in the upcoming redivision of this world.

Today, two long-term “Eurasian projects” competing with each other are emerging more and more clearly. Behind each of them are the national interests of the leading players, a set of regional military-political and economic strategies, bilateral and multilateral international mechanisms, and corresponding ideological and conceptual design. For each project, coalitions are gathered, allies are mobilized, and resources are accumulated. The main battles were still ahead, but there was a distinct smell of gunpowder in the air.

The confrontation is likely to be long and tense. Tactical compromises between the two projects are possible and, most likely, even inevitable. But in the long term, the two projects are unlikely to be completely compatible. In the end, there can only be one winner, leaving the alternative to the fate of the dead-end direction of the historical evolution of the Eurasian continent.

Indo-Pacific, Quad and China Containment

The term “Indo-Pacific” came to geopolitics from biogeography, which studies the patterns of geographical distribution and distribution of animals, plants and microorganisms. Biologists have noticed that the vast area of ​​the world's oceans from the south of Japan to the north of Australia and from the Hawaiian Islands in the east to the Red Sea in the west has many common features and is essentially a single ecosystem.

About ten years ago, geopoliticians borrowed the biological term, giving it a different meaning. The right of “discoverers” of the geopolitical Indo-Pacific should be awarded to Indian and Japanese strategists who substantiated the feasibility of strengthening bilateral Indian-Japanese cooperation. But by now, especially after the Donald Trump administration came to power in Washington, the idea of ​​building the Indo-Pacific, having undergone significant metamorphoses, has acquired the appearance of a predominantly American strategy.

In fact, we are talking about the long-term construction of Eurasia along its external contour, through strengthening the cooperation of the predominantly “maritime” powers of the eastern and southern periphery of the Eurasian continent (from South Korea to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula) and the Pacific island states (from Japan to New Zealand). And the main goal of the new Eurasian project, as you might guess, is the political and military-strategic containment of China, the creation of a rigid “framework” that does not allow Beijing to take a dominant position in the region.

The practical implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy goes both through strengthening US bilateral relations with countries in the region and through the creation of multilateral cooperation formats. The most important of the latter is the so-called “Quad” (quadrangle), designed to unite the four “democracies” of the Indo-Pacific region – the USA, Japan, Australia and India. Attempts to create the Quad have been going on for many years, but the administration of Donald Trump has given them additional impetus and has already achieved certain, albeit modest, successes in this direction. And this is against the backdrop of the current American leadership’s general disdain for international institutions and multilateral formats!

Of course, it would be premature to exaggerate the importance of Quad for the general situation in Eurasia at the moment. And the concept of the Indo-Pacific itself still remains more than amorphous. Its current Indian interpretation differs significantly from the American one, both in geography and in content. Some Indian experts interpret the Indo-Pacific as a historical sphere of Indian cultural and civilizational influence (something like the “Indian world” by analogy with the “Russian world”), others, on the contrary, propose to include China and even Russia in the design of the Indo-Pacific. And yet, the general vector of strategic design of the new Eurasia in Washington in the Indo-Pacific format is aimed at military-political containment of Beijing in one form or another.

“Community of Common Destiny”, RIC and the Consolidation of Eurasia

An alternative strategy for building a new Eurasia involves consolidating the continent not from the outside, but from the inside, not from the periphery to the center, but, on the contrary, from the center to the periphery. The role of the main “framework” of the continent should not be an external frame, but a whole system of complementary axes (transport and logistics corridors), pulling together the west and east, north and south of the vast and very heterogeneous Eurasian space. The general philosophy of this approach was outlined by Xi Jinping in November 2012 at the 18th CPC Congress. Although the Chinese leader gave the idea of ​​a “community of shared destiny” a universal meaning, extending it to international relations as a whole, in fact it was and still is primarily about the future of Eurasia.

Subsequently, this approach was developed in determining the goals of Beijing’s policy towards neighboring states (“peripheral diplomacy” of China). This approach is also visible in the promotion of various multilateral initiatives on a continental scale, in particular the Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership project. It is characteristic that participants in this latest project, in addition to the ASEAN countries, also included the traditional “maritime” allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region - South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Unlike the American Indo-Pacific, the “community of common destiny” does not imply strict allied obligations on the part of the participating countries, and China itself does not change its non-aligned status. Although, of course, China cannot completely avoid the security dimension when designing the future of Eurasia, the main thing in the Chinese approach is the economic and social development of all regions that make up the Eurasian continent, overcoming the current disparities in their standard of living and the degree of involvement in the continental and world economy. It is clear that the more energetically Washington builds an external military-political framework around China, the more military-political elements Beijing will put into the internal Eurasian “framework”.

Projecting the Chinese scheme onto the map of modern Eurasia, it is logical to assume that ideally the triangle “China – India – Russia” should become the basis of the frame of the new structure. The mechanism of cooperation in this triangle (RIC) has existed for a long time, although in recent years it has been partially absorbed by the broader formats of BRICS and the SCO. The basic triangle could be complemented by more complex multilateral structures covering the three most important Eurasian regions - Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and, in the future, also Western Asia (Middle East).

In an even more distant future, it could come to the integration into this new architecture of the westernmost periphery of the Eurasian continent - actually (Western and Central) Europe, as well as the easternmost periphery - the island states of the Pacific Ocean. Apparently, such large-scale tasks could be put into practice no earlier than the middle of this century.

Opening stage of the game: position on the board

At the moment, only the first moves have been made in the big game for the future of Eurasia; the game has not yet left the opening stage. And the task of the opening, as we know from chess, is to mobilize resources, bring your pieces to the most advantageous positions and prevent the development of the opponent’s pieces. Let's look at the geopolitical chessboard: what can we say about the position of the players at the moment?

It is obvious that neither of the two alternative projects for the construction of a new Eurasia has yet acquired the form of a detailed “road map”. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses, its own advantages and disadvantages. The strength of the American Indo-Pacific is the already existing and time-tested system of bilateral agreements between the United States and its many allies and partners in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Washington's undoubted advantage remains its predominant military power, primarily the potential of its naval and air forces.

The main weakness of the American project, in our opinion, is its shaky economic basis. The US refusal to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) objectively sharply narrows the American possibilities for the comprehensive implementation of the Indo-Pacific project and the economic containment of China. Considering that for most Eurasian countries, the tasks of socio-economic development come first, we can conclude that without an economic dimension, the project will have only limited effectiveness. When seventy years ago the United States set itself the goal of containing the USSR in Europe, along with the “Truman Doctrine,” they also proclaimed the “Marshall Plan,” which many historians still consider the most successful program of economic assistance in the history of mankind. And today, when the question of containing China in Asia has arisen, the United States is not only not ready to implement the “Marshall Plan” for the Indo-Pacific, but has already begun to consistently tighten its positions on the economic aspects of relations with its closest Asian allies and partners.

The Chinese project looks preferable in this sense - it has a solid economic basis. Or at least claims to create it. It is economics, and not security, that constitutes its main content, although, of course, the Chinese project also does not imply large-scale economic philanthropy in the spirit of the “Marshall Plan” of the middle of the last century. Moreover, Beijing, unlike Washington, has the luxury of long-term strategic planning, possessing the “strategic depth” that allows one to think in terms of decades rather than the current four-year political cycle.

China's main weakness is the fears of neighboring powers regarding economic, political and military-strategic Chinese hegemony in Eurasia. Current American hegemony on the periphery of the Eurasian continent seems to many of them less burdensome and more acceptable than Beijing's potential dominance. At the same time, it must be admitted that over the past one and a half to two years, Chinese diplomacy has achieved tangible success in interaction with its neighbors both in the northeast (North and South Korea) and in the southeast (Vietnam and ASEAN as a whole).

It is worth noting another important comparative advantage of the Chinese project compared to the American one. The Indo-Pacific one way or another presupposes a split of the Eurasian continent, since neither China, nor Russia, nor other “continental” states of Eurasia fit into this structure. And if you limit the project only to “maritime democracies”, then many more countries will have to be excluded from it - from Vietnam to the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. A “community of common destiny,” at least in principle, is capable of uniting all of Eurasia without any exceptions.

India as a decisive swing state

In the American electoral lexicon there is such a term as swing state. This term refers to a state where neither party has a clear advantage and the outcome of the vote is unclear. There are few such states in each election cycle, but they are the ones who determine who will ultimately become the owner of the White House. In the case of Eurasia, the role of the swing state falls to India.

It is hardly worth talking about the demographic, economic, strategic and geopolitical potential of this country, which will only grow over time. Without Delhi's participation, especially with opposition from the Indian leadership, neither the American nor the Chinese project can be fully implemented. The Chinese project of “common destiny” without India remains, at a minimum, incomplete and incomplete; it is turning from a continental one into a trans-regional one. And the American Indo-Pacific project, if India drops out of it, generally loses one of its two main pillars and is reduced to a scattering of separate and loosely interconnected agreements between the United States and its traditional Asian-Pacific partners. It would not be an exaggeration to say that today and especially tomorrow, for the United States, partnership with India is no less a priority than the alliance with Japan was during the Cold War.

And India, of course, is trying to maintain maximum room for maneuver and is in no hurry to make a choice. On the one hand, India has accumulated an impressive baggage of historical disputes and traditions of overt or hidden competition with China in Southeast and South Asia. The question of wounded national pride remains - the memory of India's unsuccessful border war with China in 1962. The question of its disadvantaged global status remains - India, unlike China, is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and Beijing, as far as can be judged, is not very willing to help Delhi in obtaining this membership. Suspicions remain about Beijing's possible support for Indian separatists.

Even more practical, and not entirely unfounded, concerns concern China’s economic, political and military-strategic expansion in the Indian Ocean. The “string of pearls” theory, popular in India, describes the Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean as a strategy of “encircling” India by creating a chain of bases and other military infrastructure of the PRC along the line Hong Kong - Hainan - Paracel Islands - Spratly Islands - Kampong Som (Cambodia) - Kra Channel (Thailand) - Sittwe and Coco Islands (Myanmar) - Hambantota (Sri Lanka) - Marao (Maldives) - Gwadar (Pakistan) - Al Ahdab (Iraq) - Lamu (Kenya) - Port Sudan. There are concerns about potential problems for India's access to the Pacific Ocean, which remains one of the most important transport arteries for Delhi. Delhi also faces complex problems in the economic sphere: India's overall trade deficit with China exceeded $50 billion a year; In addition, Beijing widely uses the practice of non-tariff restrictions on Indian pharmaceuticals, food and IT products.

On the other hand, within the framework of the Indo-Pacific project, India is unlikely to be able to avoid the position of a “junior partner” of the United States with all the costs arising from this position. Even if Washington is not ready to see Beijing as an equal international player, it is unlikely that it will readily offer this role to Delhi. Although the current Indian leadership is gradually moving away from many of the principles of Jawaharlal Nehru, including the basic principle of non-alignment, a complete break with the traditions on which the Indian state was created seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. The inconsistency of the American strategy and the rigidity with which the current administration negotiates economic issues even with its closest allies should give rise to great concerns among the Indian leadership. Of course, the US trade deficit with India is much smaller than the trade deficit with China, but it is not difficult to predict that Donald Trump's economic pressure on Narendra Modi will only increase over time.

The Indian political establishment as a whole supports Donald Trump’s policy of strengthening cooperation with America, but is extremely sensitive to the prospect of losing even part of his free hand on the world stage. And formal entry into some kind of military-political alliance under the auspices of the United States will certainly limit this freedom not only in the Chinese direction, but also in Delhi’s relations with other important partners for India, primarily with Moscow and Tehran.

In all likelihood, India will continue to hesitate. A lot will depend not only on the evolution of the strategic vision of the Indian elite, but also, no less, on the professionalism, flexibility, and adaptability of American and Chinese diplomacy. It seems that, given the peculiar negotiating style of the current American administration and numerous problems with making foreign policy decisions in general, at the moment China has, at a minimum, serious tactical advantages in the Indian direction.

However, the tactical advantages are clearly not enough to seriously increase the attractiveness of the “common destiny” project for India. China will have to make significant concessions on issues important to India - in the interpretation of the problem of international terrorism in Eurasia, on the issue of India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council, on issues of bilateral trade, etc. Apparently, Beijing will have to make some form to recognize Delhi's special role in South Asia - just as it recognizes Russia's special role in Central Asia. The later Beijing makes serious steps towards New Delhi, the more difficult it will be to bring India into the “community of shared destiny.”

Interests of Russia

Strictly speaking, the Indo-Pacific project has no direct relation to Russia at all. The current American strategy does not consider Moscow as a serious player not only in the Indian Ocean, but even in the Asia-Pacific region. Geographically, the Indo-Pacific zone does not extend north of Hokkaido and the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps this is why Washington turns a blind eye to the ongoing attempts at Japanese-Russian rapprochement under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and also ignores the political opposition of South Korea, which has been consistently sabotaging the regime of anti-Russian Western sanctions for several years now.

The only potential gain for Moscow in implementing the Indo-Pacific project is that if this project is successfully implemented, the value of partnership with Moscow for Beijing will objectively increase. In this sense, the confrontation between the “maritime” and “continental” parts of Eurasia is obviously preferable for Russia to the hypothetical option of close American-Chinese cooperation under the “G2” formula, which would obviously reduce the value of Moscow as a partner not only in the eyes of Washington, but also in the eyes of Beijing. But the costs of the new “Eurasian bipolarity” for Moscow, as can be assumed, will in any case outweigh the possible gains - Russian policy in Eurasia will lose flexibility, and many traditional partnerships - with Vietnam and India - will be jeopardized. A general decrease in stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which will become inevitable side effect implementation of the Indo-Pacific project will also create additional problems for Moscow.

“Community of a Shared Destiny” looks clearly a more promising project for Russia - for the very reason that in this project Russia can play the role of not a spectator in the hall or even an extra in the background of the stage, but one of the main characters. But is Moscow capable of playing this role? To do this, it is necessary for Russia to act not as one of the “spokes” attached to the central Chinese “Eurasian axis,” but as another, parallel to the “axis,” albeit of a smaller diameter. That is, Russia must enter the “community of a common destiny” not empty-handed, but with its own Eurasian integration project (EAEU).

Creating a parallel Russian “axis” is not so much a political task as a socio-economic one. Its solution is impossible without a transition to a new, more efficient and more attractive economic development model for neighbors. It would be a strategic mistake to consider the prospect of joining the “community of common destiny” as a viable alternative to long-overdue structural transformations in the Russian economy. Or hope that the Eurasian construct will allow Russia to somehow miraculously avoid the challenges of globalization. On the contrary, joining the “community” will place additional demands on the effectiveness of the Russian economic model and to the level of openness of the Russian economy. The obviously extra “axis” in the new design of the Eurasian mechanism hardly has a chance of any long-term existence - it will make the structure heavier, will be quickly detected and dismantled in one way or another.

In passing, we note that India faces the same challenge if the latter nevertheless leans in favor of the “community of a common destiny.” It would be logical for Delhi to perform a system-forming function in relation to South Asia, similar to the one that Russia should implement in Central Eurasia. Russia, for its part, is interested in maintaining and even strengthening India’s position in South Asia - not to contain China, but to create a more stable multipolar balance of forces and interests on the Eurasian continent. At the same time, the Indian leadership must proceed from the fact that the days of exclusive “spheres of interest” of great powers are a thing of the past, and it is no longer possible to count on the unconditional loyalty of even such close Indian neighbors and partners as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, and You will have to fight hard for their attention and favor.

From opening to middlegame

One of the main strategic behests of Henry Kissinger states: in any geopolitical triangle, the corner in the most advantageous position is the one whose relations with each of the other two corners are better than their relations with each other. Actually, it was on this idea that Kissinger’s by no means unsuccessful geopolitical strategy in the “USA-USSR-China” triangle in the early 70s of the last century was based. Following the behest of the classic of geopolitics, theoretically Russia should be interested in maintaining a certain level of tension in Sino-Indian relations in order to be at the top of the Russia-China-India triangle.

However, international relations of our time are built on different foundations. Geopolitics no longer works in the format in which it worked half a century ago. Russia cannot gain anything valuable from the aggravation of Sino-Indian contradictions. To be fair, it is worth noting that she is not trying to play on these contradictions - neither in multilateral formats nor in bilateral relations. However, Moscow has much more to do - Russian foreign policy should consider its highest priority (no less important than restoring relations with the West!) efforts to overcome Sino-Indian differences and strengthen Sino-Indian cooperation.

And here we can think about giving new meaning and new content to the RIC structure, which has been largely dissolved in the broader BRICS structure. Although meetings of the RIC at the level of foreign ministers have continued on a regular basis since September 2001, the documents adopted at them are extremely general, sometimes purely declarative in nature. Agreed trilateral documents on countering international terrorism, supporting stability in Afghanistan, and the need to strengthen global governance camouflage serious differences within the troika on many fundamental aspects of these and other problems.

Apparently, discussions in the RIC format should become more frank, specific and confidential. The main goal should be defined not as a formal fixation of coinciding positions on the most general issues, but as the identification of disagreements on specific problems and the search for mutually acceptable ways to overcome these disagreements. The work is extremely complex and delicate, but too important and urgent to be postponed until the indefinite future.

It would be possible to begin working out a new agenda for the RIC by deepening trilateral cooperation in those areas where the positions of Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi generally coincide or differ slightly. For example, on issues of energy regimes in Eurasia, climate change, and the problem of reforming international financial institutions. The new agenda should include a discussion of the practical steps of the three countries in such areas as the fight against “double standards” in human rights issues and the prevention of external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. The common concerns of Russia, China and India about the use of sanctions in international trade, the rise of protectionism and the crisis of many international organizations create additional opportunities for concerted or parallel actions.

Of course, sooner or later India and China will have to resolve numerous and very painful bilateral problems. For example, the Indian-Chinese border (which is more than 3,000 km!) remains a line of possible clashes. Clashes are also possible on the territory of third countries, as was once again demonstrated by the Doklam incident in October 2017. The potentially unstable border with China constrains a significant part of the Indian army, which under other circumstances could be redeployed to the border with Pakistan. The parties accuse each other of unjustified rigidity and unwillingness to compromise on resolving border problems.

There is little Russia can do to help its partners resolve remaining territorial issues. But it would be worth recalling that two decades ago the situation on the Russian-Chinese border (even longer than the Sino-Indian border) also caused a lot of concern on both sides. The level of militarization of the border between Russia and China was even higher than the level of militarization of the Sino-Indian border. After all, Moscow and Beijing were able to achieve a radical change in this situation, and even in an extremely short time! Maybe the Russian-Chinese experience of the beginning of the century will be somehow useful for Beijing and Delhi today?

Endgame: US loss?

Is the “shared destiny” project anti-American? Does its implementation mean a strategic defeat for the United States? Undoubtedly, most American experts will give unequivocally affirmative answers to these questions. But, in our opinion, these answers are not so obvious. First, the “common destiny” project can only succeed if it relies primarily on the basic internal needs of the countries of Eurasia, and not on their collective desire to resist the United States or anyone else. This project should not be a mirror image of the Indo-Pacific; as a mirror image of the American plan, it has no prospects.

Secondly, if we abstract from geopolitical metaphysics, leaving aside discussions about the eternal civilizational dualism of Land and Sea, “tellurocracy” and “thallassocracy,” then we must admit that ultimately a stable, predictable, economically established Eurasia meets American interests. The implementation of the “common destiny” project does not at all exclude the preservation of the principle of freedom of navigation in the Pacific and Indian oceans, which includes freedom of movement for the naval and air forces of countries not belonging to the Eurasian continent.

The implementation of this project also does not exclude maintaining the openness of the new Eurasia to the rest of the world in matters of trade, investment and migration. If Americans want to look for supporters of protectionism and opponents of the liberal world economic order, then it is not at all necessary to look at the Beijing Dongcheng (“Eastern City”) district, where, as you know, the powerful Ministry of Commerce of the PRC is located. It is easier to find protectionists in Washington, at 1800 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Almost a year has passed since Donald Trump came to power in the United States. To what extent has US policy toward Asia changed, and to what extent has it remained consistent? Preliminary conclusions can already be drawn, especially considering that Trump went on a 12-day tour in the first half of November 2017, visiting five Asian countries. On October 18, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson gave a keynote speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. This speech preceded his visit to India and was devoted to US-Indian relations, but actually contained a number of policy statements about US Asian policy in general. Finally, a new Strategy was announced in December national security in the USA, in which a considerable place is devoted to the Asia-Pacific direction.

Creation of the Indo-Pacific

One of the most noticeable changes is in the names. As you know, the Barack Obama administration initially called its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region a “pivot” ( pivot), and then by “rebalancing” ( rebalancing).Given Trump's dislike of almost everything associated with the previous administration, it is not surprising that the term rebalancing has disappeared from the vocabulary of top officials of the White House, State Department and Pentagon. It has not yet been replaced by an officially approved name. Nevertheless, a term has emerged that is heard most frequently in speeches by Trump, Rex Tillerson and other senior American leaders on Asian issues. This is "Indo-Pacific" ( Indo-Pacific), or the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, I would conditionally call the US line in Asia emerging under Trump the “Indo-Pacific strategy.”

The Indo-Pacific concept was not invented by the Trump administration and has been in circulation for about ten years. It was also used under Obama, although not as actively. One of the first uses of the concept “Indo-Pacific Region” (IPR) in a political-strategic sense was recorded in 2007 in an article by Indian author Gurpreet Khurana. Since then, quite quickly the concept Indo-Pacific has turned from exoticism into a noticeable element of international political discourse. In Washington's interpretation, the Indo-Pacific region is a vast space “from the western coast of India to the western coast of the United States.” Tillerson emphasizes: “The Indo-Pacific – including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the countries that surround them – will be the most important part of the globe in the 21st century.” The United States of America needs the IPR primarily in order to balance the obvious rise of China in East Asia. It is East Asia that is the natural axis of the Asia-Pacific region. This means, to paraphrase the famous saying of Halford Mackinder, whoever controls East Asia controls the Asia-Pacific region, and subsequently, perhaps, the whole world. Expanding the geopolitical picture beyond the East Asian coast and shifting it towards the Indian Ocean allows the introduction of new players who will “erode” China’s influence. These hopes rest primarily on India. It is also noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific region corresponds almost exactly to the area of ​​​​responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

Region-building, that is, the purposeful creation of political regions, is not such a rare phenomenon in international relations. You can recall the “Euro-Atlantic” (aka “North Atlantic”) - a concept that was designed to ensure the unbreakable unity of the USA and Western Europe. The same Asia-Pacific region, which now has a competitor in the form of engineering and technology, is also largely an artificial formation. As Oleg Arin, the author of the book “The Asia-Pacific Region: Myths, Illusions and Reality,” rightly notes, the narrative about the Asia-Pacific region, created in the 1970s and 80s, was largely caused by the need for an ideological and political justification for maintaining and strengthening the dominant position of the United States in Pacific Ocean and East Asia. Russia also does not remain aloof from such region-building games to ensure its geopolitical interests. A striking example is the promotion of the geoconcept of Eurasia and the project of the Eurasian Union. Time will tell how successful the attempt to construct the Indo-Pacific region will be.

For Russia, the idea of ​​engineering technology does not promise bright prospects. The Pacific Ocean, of course, will not disappear anywhere, and Russia will not cease to be a Pacific power, but a shift in geopolitical emphasis to the west from the Strait of Malacca will most likely weaken Moscow’s influence in the region: in the Pacific Ocean our position has never been particularly strong, let alone in Indian they are practically absent. Therefore, one should be careful about borrowing the term ITR into the official Russian lexicon. It’s probably worth remaining faithful to the APR, although, again, it is also of Western origin. It is noteworthy that the Americans talk about a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Underneath this Firstly, implies rejection of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which, according to Washington, poses a threat to China's geo-economic dominance in Asia. Secondly, is the freedom for American and friendly navies and air forces to operate ( sail, fly and operate) in all parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans in accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation. China's attempts to assert sovereignty over the South China Sea, as well as its territorial dispute with Japan, are seen as a direct attack on the principle of "freedom and openness." Accusations against China of “undermining the sovereignty of neighboring countries,” using “predatory economic methods,” and turning other countries into its “satellites” also fit into the context of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Despite all the current hysteria associated with Russia and Moscow’s alleged interference in the American elections, Washington sees the main long-term geopolitical threat not in it, but in China. The identification of China as a key rival to the United States occurred back in the early 2000s, when George W. Bush declared China its main “strategic competitor.” Since then, regardless of the change of presidential administrations, Washington has been quite consistently pursuing a policy of limiting the growth of Beijing's strategic influence. This is also recorded in Trump’s National Security Strategy. Among the main rivals of the United States, the document names China first, followed by Russia. In the list of regional priorities of the American foreign policy The strategy puts the Indo-Pacific first, where the main challenge is again China. Europe - where, of course, Russia is named the main threat - is placed in second place. And the general tone of the document, in which the challenge emanating from China is portrayed more verbosely and in brighter colors than the “Russian threat,” leaves no doubt about the priorities of US strategic planning.

As mentioned above, it is India that the United States would like to assign to the role of the main counterweight to China in Asia. Objectively, only India, in terms of its aggregate indicators, is capable of balancing the Chinese giant. By 2050, the Indian economy could become the second largest in the world in terms of GDP. By 2030, India's population is expected to surpass China's, and the Indian population, with a median age of just 25, will be much younger than China's steadily aging population, which should impact economic growth, innovation levels, and so on. Already today, the growth rate of the Indian economy exceeds that of China.

Of course, Americans also rely on common “democratic values.” Here is a typical quote from Tillerson's speech: "The USA and India in everything to a greater extent are becoming global partners with increasingly similar strategic interests. Indians and Americans don't just share a common commitment to democracy. We have a common vision for the future... Our nations serve as two pillars of stability - on both sides of the globe... We will never have the same relationship with China, an undemocratic society, that we can have with a large democratic country.". Such rhetoric indicates that Washington no longer sees a fading and insecure Japan as its main promising partner in Asia, but a growing and increasingly ambitious India. The Trump administration has clearly indicated that it intends to strengthen strategic relations with India in every possible way, both in political, diplomatic and military spheres, including joint exercises, supplies of weapons and military technologies. It should be noted that the Trump administration's India policy shows complete continuity with both the Obama and Bush administrations. It was under Bush Jr. that active rapprochement between Washington and Delhi began, which continued under Obama.

The question remains, however, how ready India itself is for such a mission as the US’s main strategic partner in Asia, since this role inevitably means some degree of confrontation with China. In general, Delhi behaves quite cautiously towards China and there is no reason yet to say that India has abandoned its traditional line of “strategic autonomy,” which implies avoiding too close alliances with great powers. It is significant that Delhi is not ready to participate in “patrolling” the South China Sea to maintain the principle of freedom of navigation, which the Americans would really like from India.

“Networkization” of military-political alliances

Allied relations with other states are one of the most important tools for preserving and strengthening Pax Americana in key geopolitical regions, including Asia. As you know, during the presidential campaign, candidate Trump spoke very critically about US alliances in Europe and Asia, questioning their benefits for America. Alliances with Japan and South Korea have been criticized. In this wave, many even began to predict, if not the end, then the weakening of the US’s cornerstone Asian alliances. However, this did not happen in 2017. Moreover, in the case of Japan, there is even a strengthening of allied relations, which is explained by the personal friendship of Trump and Shinzo Abe, as well as the factor of the increased “North Korean threat.”

As for South Korea, Trump’s personal relations with President Moon Jae-in are not as close as with Abe, but institutionally the military-political alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea looks quite strong today, which is also facilitated by the North Korean factor. If the US-South Korean alliance begins to weaken, it will most likely happen on the initiative not of Washington, but of Seoul, which increasingly feels its economic and geopolitical dependence on China and is trying not to irritate its giant neighbor once again (as evidenced by this in November 2017 Seoul promised Beijing not to deploy additional THAAD systems on South Korean territory, not to participate in the regional and global missile defense systems being created by the United States, and not to enter into a trilateral military-political alliance with the United States and Japan).

In addition, under Trump, steps were taken to restore military-political relations with Thailand, a treaty ally of the United States, relations with which significantly worsened under Obama after the military junta came to power in Bangkok. Traditionally, in the San Francisco system there were only bilateral vertical connections - between Washington and the junior allies, while horizontal connections between the latter were practically absent. Neither the US nor its Pacific clients were particularly interested in moving beyond the time-tested “axle and spoke” model ( hub and spokes). However, since the 2000s, American diplomacy has set a course for promoting military-political cooperation between “spokes”—junior allies and partners. It is developing in both bilateral and multilateral formats. In addition to its traditional allies, the United States is actively involving new partners in these strategic relationships, primarily India and Vietnam. In some cases (for example, in the Japan-USA-Australia triangle) Washington is a direct participant and leader. In others (for example, India-Australia-Japan, Philippines-Japan, South Korea-Australia) Americans are formally absent, but in these cases there is little doubt that the process is happening with the blessing of Washington.

The most developed is the Australian-American-Japanese triangle, which officially began in 2002 with the launch of the Senior Level Security Dialogue officials. Since 2006, it has been held at the ministerial level and is called the Tripartite Strategic Dialogue. Since 2011, a US-India-Japan trilateral dialogue (at the deputy minister level) has been held, and in September 2015 the first trilateral meeting at the ministerial level took place. Since 2015, Japan has joined the large-scale US-Indian naval exercise Malabar as the third permanent participant. In June 2015, the first trilateral meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of India, Japan and Australia took place in New Delhi. Thus, the “axis and spokes” system is gradually transformed into a “network”, the nodes of which are connected by numerous connections, although with varying degrees of formalization and intensity. The main “hub” of the network, which manages its construction and operation, remains the United States.

Under Trump, the “networking” trend has continued and developed further. On the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2017, another trilateral summit of the US President, the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia took place, confirming the viability of the tripartite coalition. But the most significant event was the meeting in Manila of the Quartet format ( Quad), consisting of the USA, Japan and Australia and India. The United States and Japan have been promoting the idea of ​​the Quartet for quite some time, but did not receive support from Canberra and New Delhi, which did not want to once again provoke China: everyone understands that the Quartet has a distinct flavor of containing China. That is why the first meeting in a quadrilateral format, which took place in 2007 at the initiative of Japan (this was during Shinzo Abe’s first prime ministerial term), was not continued. And now the four are being revived, although so far this has not been a meeting at the level of state leaders or ministers, but only of senior officials. It is significant that in the communiqué following the meeting, all four parties declared their commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

From "free" trade to "fair" trade

If the US military-political strategy in the Asia-Pacific region has remained essentially the same, the same cannot be said about the sphere of trade and economic relations, where the protectionist inclinations of the Trump administration are fully manifested. The Trump administration's emphasis is not on "free trade" ( free trade), and to “fair trade” ( fair trade). Trump, as you know, withdrew the United States from the multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership concluded by the Obama administration and made it clear that the United States would give priority to bilateral trade and economic agreements, since this format gives America much more leverage in negotiations. By abandoning the TPP, the Trump administration chose obvious and short-term trade advantages over the long-term prospect of creating an economic regime in the Asia-Pacific region – and in the world as a whole – based on the model of liberal post-industrial capitalism, which until recently was the basis of US foreign economic policy. It is not yet entirely clear how exactly the exit from the TPP, as well as the US desire to change the free trade agreement with South Korea, will affect Washington’s strategic positions in the region, whether they will lead to a weakening of US influence and strengthening of China’s position, how quickly and to what extent.

North Korea factor

Finally, North Korea has become another fundamentally new factor influencing US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Trump's coming to power coincided with the moment when the North Korean nuclear missile program began to pose a real threat to the United States (the DPRK's probable or soon expected possession of an intercontinental ballistic missile, thermonuclear warhead, etc.). Trump, like any American president in his place, must respond to this. North Korea has become one of the main items on the American agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, which also affected relations with China. Washington proceeds from the fact that only Beijing, which essentially controls the vast majority of North Korea’s foreign economic contacts, is capable of forcing Pyongyang to back down. The Americans are counting on the Chinese to apply tough economic sanctions to North Korea and, perhaps, to use some additional leverage they have against the North Korean regime. Dependence on Beijing on the North Korean issue forces Trump to seek friendship with Xi Jinping. This is one of the main reasons why Trump abruptly abandoned his anti-China campaign rhetoric.

In exchange for cooperation on North Korea, the White House is willing to make concessions to China on trade and perhaps even on Taiwan and the South China Sea. It is significant that in the first months of the Trump administration, the United States significantly conducted several “freedom of navigation operations” ( FONOPs) in close proximity to Chinese-controlled islets in the South China Sea, but as the Korean crisis worsened, these operations ceased (at least there is no public information about them). The Trump administration clearly does not want to quarrel with Beijing and is not making serious attempts to block Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. A number of American analysts believe that Washington, even under Obama, has actually come to terms with Chinese expansion in the South China Sea and are calling on the Trump administration to resist much more decisively, including by militarizing the South China Sea through the supply of modern American weapons to China’s opponents in Southeast Asia. But Trump is unlikely to agree to this as long as North Korea is perceived as the main immediate threat and hopes remain for China’s help in eliminating it.

Not everyone in Washington believes that China is ready to help solve the North Korean problem. Thus, a prominent conservative Republican senator and Trump ally, Tom Cotton, who is tipped for the post of CIA director, is confident that China is playing a double game. In his opinion, the presence of a nuclear North Korea is beneficial to Beijing, as it diverts US attention from economic expansion and other hostile actions taken by China. It must be admitted that there is a rational grain in these statements. On the one hand, North Korea is a headache for China. But, on the other hand, it can be used as a trump card in bargaining with the United States on other issues important to China. Therefore, Beijing is unlikely to be interested in a complete and final solution to the North Korean issue.

Conclusion

So, in 2017 - the first year of the Trump administration - US policy in the Asia-Pacific region was characterized by both significant elements of continuity that it received from previous administrations and differences. Continuity - identification of China as the main geopolitical challenge for America, a bet on India as the most important potential balancer for China, as well as a course towards strengthening and expanding Washington’s network of alliances and military-political partnerships, where the most notable event was the revival of the Quartet (USA, Japan , Australia, India). This network is again aimed at long-term strategic containment of China. The most significant changes have occurred in the area of ​​trade policy: a turn from the ideology of “free trade” and the liberal-globalization agenda based on multilateral regional blocs to protectionism, an emphasis on bilateral agreements and the associated withdrawal from the TPP.

A new factor that made noticeable adjustments to the US Asia-Pacific policy was North Korea. Largely due to the need to enlist Beijing's support in pressuring North Korea, Trump has traded anger for mercy in relations with China. However, the big question remains how US-China relations will develop if China's actions on North Korea do not lead to the result desired by Washington or if the White House begins to suspect Beijing of a double game and unwillingness to finally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In this case, a sharp and significant deterioration in relations between the United States and China cannot be ruled out.

Indo-Pacific Front: why did a new region appear on the geopolitical map and what does this promise for Russia?

After this, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific region,” which had previously been quite marginal, began to be increasingly used in the American foreign policy lexicon. Now the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” has become entrenched in official American documents and in the rhetoric of most major powers in this very region.

In Russia, new terms were traditionally treated with suspicion. What do the emergence of these new concepts and strategies mean and what does it change for Russian policy in Asia?

Ten years of foursome

The emphasis on the strategic nature of interaction between the four countries and their very choice clearly pointed to the main goal of the format - if not to build a system to contain China, then at least to send it a signal that its growth will be accompanied by the emergence of a counterweight. Beijing caught the signal and, on the eve of the group’s first official meeting, organized a demarche for each of the four countries. A month later, Abe left his post, and Australia quickly lost interest in the quadrilateral format.

Returning to power in 2012, Shinzo Abe brought back the idea of ​​the Quartet, this time calling it the “Asian democratic security diamond.” The Chinese threat was again stated as the raison d'être for the strategic interaction of the four maritime democracies. In the first paragraphs of his policy article, Abe directly pointed out alarming trends in the East China and South China Seas. China, according to Abe, intended to turn the latter into “ Beijing Lake" based on the model of the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk in the hands of the USSR.

However, the new four-sided format was reminiscent of a Japanese rock garden, where no matter which way you look, one stone eludes the eye. In practical terms, either Australia or India necessarily fell out of specific cooperation projects (however, the four countries have experience in real naval cooperation, but even before the conceptual design: in 2004 they worked together to eliminate the consequences of the tsunami).

Nevertheless, in recent years the idea of ​​closer interaction between the Quartet has been in the air. The increased activity of China and the rapid growth of its military potential, obeying the logic of the balance of power, inevitably had to cause opposition. Attempts at a symmetrical American response in the form of a policy of pivoting to Asia and rebalancing to Asia seem to have had almost the opposite effect.

In the new paradigm, “local” powers must take more responsibility for balancing China. This, perhaps, can explain the lively reaction of observers to an ordinary meeting of the Quartet in Manila: the resulting excitement speaks not so much that something important had happened, but rather that something like this had long been expected as an inevitable reaction to more China's bold and confident use of its objectively increased power.

By the end of 2017 - beginning of 2018, the conditions were ripe for a new birth of the Quartet. In Japan, Shinzo Abe again won elections and reaffirmed his mandate to rule, with the clear intention of leaving behind a country that poses serious strategic competition to China: hence his strategy of “proactive peacekeeping” and persistent attempts to achieve a revision of the anti-war clause of the Japanese Constitution.

Australia wants to balance economic dependence on China with its own active strategic posture and greater participation in maintaining at least a semblance of regional rules of the game. Recent scandals over Chinese influence in Australian politics only increase local elites' suspicion of Beijing.

India appears to be beginning to reach the point where interest in what is happening in the Western Pacific is no longer idle.

The glue connecting the new and old format this time could be the United States, for which the revival of interest in the Quartet could not come at a better time. All last year The Trump administration has been criticized for its weak Asia policy. IN best case scenario it was described as flying on autopilot: in essence, the United States was doing everything the Obama administration did, only a little less consciously.

At worst, Trump was said to have “abandoned” Asia and left it to China when he withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and began demanding greater responsibility from Japan and South Korea for the well-being of their military alliances with the United States. A particular subject of criticism was Trump’s tolerant attitude towards leaders of Asian countries who are problematic from the point of view of the ideals of democracy and human rights, such as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte or Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak.

The Quartet meeting in Manila gave Trump's strategy in Asia new hope, and by the end of the year the administration was seriously committed to promoting the concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" (FIO). The new concept is firmly entrenched in both oral rhetoric and conceptual documents: the recent US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy talk about building a “free and open IT and TR” as a priority goal of American foreign policy.

Words and meanings

In the Russian expert tradition, American lexical constructions are viewed with suspicion. The uneasiness around the term “Indo-Pacific” is somewhat similar to how there was once a resentment of the concept of the “greater Middle East.” It is understood that the unification of countries into the mental construct of a region must necessarily entail political consequences, and since the construct was built by Russia’s foreign policy competitors, therefore, it is hostile to its interests.

True, as often happens, Russia itself does not shy away from using such “terminological weapons,” for example, putting forward the concept of “greater Eurasia,” where the processes of interstate interaction should revolve around Russia and China or anyone else, just not the United States.

However, it is also unwise to deny the logical consequences of uniting countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The term itself has been used in the Australian foreign policy lexicon for quite some time. Due to the peculiarities of geography, Australian strategists see not so much the four cardinal directions we are accustomed to, but rather diverging semicircles. In defense

In the 2016 White Paper, the Indo-Pacific region is precisely the furthest and largest of these semicircles.

The integration of ITR into a single analytical entity highlights the growing economic and strategic interconnection between the Indian and Pacific Ocean spaces. For example, the US Pacific Command (US PACOM) has most of the Indian Ocean as its area of ​​responsibility - up to a line extending south from India's western border. Therefore, the term “Indo-Asia-Pacific region” has also been present in the PACOM lexicon for quite some time.

There is also an obvious geopolitical signal in the adoption of the new term. In the Indo-Pacific region, China is not the only rising power. The US has been pushing India for years to take on a role commensurate with its demographic and economic potential. American political scientists credit Barack Obama for giving India the status of a “major defense partner.” It is possible that in the next 15 years we will see India being given the status of a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA).

The revival of the Quartet as the main defender of that same “free and open” ITR is apparently a new way to build a more elegant and subtle system of containing China’s regional ambitions. Military alliances are not the most effective tool if countries in the region want to maintain constructive trade and economic relations with China.

Many countries in Asia also want to maintain as much foreign policy autonomy as possible as the American presence in Asia fluctuates from administration to administration. Therefore, there is a natural desire to shift part of the responsibility to local powers, whose affiliation with the region will make them more legitimate agents of “smart containment” of China (remember the concept of leading from behind). But whatever the Quartet becomes, it will definitely not be a military alliance.

The new Indo-Pacific Quartet will be built not on values, but on interests and will have a more flexible structure. In this sense, it somewhat continues the logic of ex-US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s “principled security network,” an initiative that did not take off much during the rebalancing. The pragmatic nature of the new quadripartite format is emphasized by the fact that no one is talking about “maritime democracies”. Instead of this phrase, the formula “like-minded states” is actively used.

The Quartet will inevitably acquire a second circle of regional partners, among which there are not many model democracies left, so it is not entirely convenient to introduce extra criteria. Such partners, apparently, will be in the first row of Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Visiting Vietnam shortly after the publication of the new NSC, US Defense Secretary James Mattis already called Vietnam a “like-minded partner” of the United States. Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam are likely to be interested in the opportunity to strengthen their ability to deter China's ambitions, for example in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Such a resort to formats with a narrow circle of participants may have the unintended consequence of another weakening of the multilateral security mechanisms around ASEAN (EAC, ARF, ADAM+). ASEAN’s notorious “central role” in the security system in the Asia-Pacific region is already often reduced to organizing summits, meetings and seminars and does not work well in the event of real crises in the region, be it the South China Sea or the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar.

The enthusiasm of countries like Vietnam and Singapore for the “power” format in its original idea of ​​the US-India-Japan-Australia format will become new evidence of the weakness of the same regional “rules-based order” that the “quartet” seems to be going to defend. It turns out that the supremacy of international law will be defended not by multilateral mechanisms that are universal for participation, but by semi-closed “coalitions of the willing.”

The Indo-Pacific Quartet sees not only the security sphere as a field for coordinating its activities. We are also talking about strengthening competitiveness in the “interconnectedness” that is so popular today. Here, the United States and its partners apparently want to play on the same field as China with its Belt and Road initiative. The American statement following the quadripartite meeting in Manila spoke of strengthening “interconnectedness based on international law and standards and with prudent funding.”

Already in February 2018, it became known that the Quartet was discussing some kind of infrastructure plan, “alternative” to the Belt and Road. It is interesting that infrastructure construction is placed on a par with security issues and is perceived as a clearly strategic area.

The Quad's economic wing could emerge at a time when concerns about Chinese investment are growing around the world, from the European Union and Africa to Southeast Asia and Australia. Large Chinese projects are perceived as buying loyalty by the main competitor of the “leaders of the free world.” Apparently, the Quartet expects that recipient countries will inevitably want to diversify their sources of investment in infrastructure.

We do not have specific outlines of what the “quartet” will be. The highest-level meeting of US, Indian, Japanese and Australian representatives since the Manila workshop was a January panel on maritime security with the four admiral commanders of the Quad navies at the Raisin Dialogue in Delhi.

After all the speeches, it was obvious that the four admirals did not have a common understanding of the formats for future interaction. By the way, the United States was represented by the head of the Pacific Command, Harry Harris, who was recently nominated as ambassador to Australia - such an appointment should apparently strengthen the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration.

Nevertheless, new meetings in a quadrilateral format are inevitable, as reported by Japanese interlocutors. The first breakthrough event in the real interaction of the Quartet could be Australia's permanent participation in the trilateral Malabar exercises (this has not happened so far due to India's cautious position).
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Further text on the topic “What does all this mean for Russia and its position in Asia?”, which was not copied

The term Indo-Pacific and its derivatives are increasingly found in English-language scientific articles, speeches by government officials and the media.

The Indo-Pacific region is a vast maritime area that includes the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their adjacent shores. According to the authors of the idea, the new geographical concept should reflect the growth and interpenetration of the spheres of influence of China and India, as well as a significant increase in maritime trade flows, especially energy supplies, between East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.

The concept of the “Indo-Pacific region” in the political and strategic sense was first used in 2007 in an article by Indian author Gurpreet Khurana. It is curious that it was also used previously, but denoted a biogeographical region of the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, as well as the western and central Pacific Ocean, which is characterized by the commonality of many marine species. Rapidly, literally over the last one or two years, the concept of Indo-Pacific has turned from exotic into a noticeable element of international political discourse. This suggests that the new geo-concept is being promoted purposefully and energetically.

Who promotes engineering and technology?

Who might be interested in the Indo-Pacific region? It is noteworthy that today Australia, India and the USA, as well as Japan, are promoting ITR with the greatest enthusiasm.

India's interest is understandable. The region of the same name, “our own,” of course, flatters the great-power pride of the Indians and increases the prestige of the country. If Delhi's membership in the Asia-Pacific region has often been disputed, then the ITR should no longer leave any doubt about it. The Indo-Pacific concept legitimizes India's growing strategic interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

The United States of America needs the IPR primarily in order to balance the obvious rise of China in East Asia. It is East Asia that is the natural axis of the Asia-Pacific region. This means, to paraphrase the famous saying of Halford Mackinder, whoever controls East Asia rules the Asia-Pacific region, and subsequently, perhaps, the whole world. Expanding the geopolitical picture beyond the East Asian coast and shifting it towards the Indian Ocean allows the introduction of new players who will “erode” China’s influence. These hopes, of course, rest primarily on India. It is also noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific region corresponds almost exactly to the area of ​​​​responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

As for Australia, a country located at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the new geographical formula gives Canberra the chance to be at the very center of a reformulated Asia-Pacific region and to get rid of some of the marginality and peripherality of its regional identity. It was Australian analysts who showed today greatest activity in developing the idea of ​​engineering technology. They also make no secret of the fact that one of the goals of the new region is to justify the need to maintain the leading strategic role of Canberra’s main ally, Washington, in Indo-Pacific Asia.

Apparently, the idea of ​​engineering technology is also close to Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocates for Australia, India, Japan and the United States to form a “strategic diamond” configuration to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.

Region-building, that is, the purposeful creation of political regions, is not such a rare phenomenon in international relations. You can recall the “Euro-Atlantic” (aka “North Atlantic”) - a concept that was designed to ensure the unbreakable unity of the USA and Western Europe. The same Asia-Pacific region, which now has a competitor in the form of engineering and technology, is also largely an artificial formation. As Oleg Arin, the author of the book “The Asia-Pacific Region: Myths, Illusions and Reality,” rightly notes, the narrative about the Asia-Pacific region, created in the 1970s and 80s, was largely caused by the need for an ideological and political justification for maintaining and strengthening the dominant position of the United States in Pacific Ocean and East Asia. By the way, Russia also does not remain aloof from such region-building projects to ensure its geopolitical interests. A striking example is the promotion of the geoconcept of Eurasia and the project of the Eurasian Union.

Time will tell how successful the attempt to construct the Indo-Pacific region will be. Obviously, not everyone will like this geopolitical construct. First of all, of course, China doesn't like it.

For Russia, the idea of ​​engineering technology also does not promise bright prospects. The Pacific Ocean, of course, will not disappear anywhere, and Russia will not cease to be a Pacific power, but a shift in geopolitical emphasis to the west from the Strait of Malacca will most likely weaken Moscow’s influence in the region: in the Pacific Ocean our position has never been particularly strong, let alone in Indian they are practically absent.

Beijing – Delhi: a new axis of world politics?

If the Indo-Pacific region does transform from a fashionable verbal construct into a geopolitical reality, it will determine the state of world politics and economics, and its supporting axis will be relations between China and India.

China, with a GDP of $12.4 trillion (at purchasing power parity), is today second only to the United States in terms of economic power. India’s indicators look more modest: its GDP is almost three times smaller than China’s, amounting to “only” $4.7 trillion (4th place in the world). India still lags behind China in terms of economic growth. If China has been demonstrating growth of 8–10% per year for a long time, then the growth rate of Indian GDP since the late 1990s has been about 7%, and in 2012 it completely decreased to 5.4%.

The Indian economy is still noticeably inferior to the Chinese economy in most respects, but it has one very important potential advantage - demographic. The fact is that China will soon enter a phase of rapid population aging, when the number of people retiring will significantly exceed the number of new workers. According to the latest census, since 2010 the working-age population (from 16 to 60 years old) in China began to decline, which was a natural consequence of the low birth rate. At the same time, the number of elderly citizens is growing, increasing the burden on the country's financial system. This factor will become a fundamental constraint on the further rapid growth of the Chinese economy and will create serious challenges for it.

India, on the contrary, is entering the most favorable demographic phase, when the age structure is dominated by young and middle-aged people. According to UN experts, by 2030, China's population will begin to decline, and India will become the most populous country in the world. This will most likely affect the balance of their economic potentials: the pace of development of China will slow down, and India will begin to rush forward.

It is safe to predict that the Delhi-Beijing dyad, along with the Beijing-Washington axis, will act as the most important bilateral relations in world politics of the 21st century. What happens between the two Asian giants will directly or indirectly affect everyone else. If India and China are able to come to an agreement, forming an “Asian alliance,” they can easily lay claim to world hegemony.

However, such a scenario looks unlikely. Beijing and Delhi today act more as rivals than strategic partners. And apparently, their competition will intensify. Delhi has not forgotten the humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war, when the Indian army was routed by the Chinese. The Indians categorically do not like the alliance between China and Pakistan; they are alarmed by the growing presence of the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. In turn, the Chinese are unhappy with India's increasing penetration into Southeast Asia, which Beijing considers its sphere of influence. Beijing is also extremely concerned about the strengthening of cooperation between Delhi and Washington.

The main reason for the flaring rivalry between the two Asian colossi is, perhaps, that they have ceased to be the self-sufficient, self-centered civilizations that they were for millennia, and have turned into ambitious great powers that are actively asserting themselves on the international stage. We can only hope that the competition between India and China will have a peaceful and constructive outcome.