Communist Party of the Russian Federation Crimean Republican branch. The shooting of the White House and the complete list of victims 1993 main events

Ilya Konstantinov, in 1993 - people's deputy, member of the Supreme Council, leader of the National Salvation Front

The constitution adopted after the shooting of the Supreme Council is an authoritarian constitution, I would say, monarchical. In it, the role of not only the legislative, but also the judicial authorities was sharply reduced, and the entire vertical of power was placed under the control of the president, under the control of the executive branch.

I would say more: Decree No. 1400 and the events that followed it, the bloody execution of parliament, not only put an end to the further development of parliamentarism in Russia for decades, but also, among other things, devalued the idea of ​​the rule of law. Today, Russians mostly view the constitution as a document that has no direct effect. Like a document that each new administration interprets in its own way. As for a document that is actually a fig leaf for an authoritarian regime. Moreover: the majority of our compatriots believe that it cannot be any other way in our country. These, in my opinion, are the most terrible consequences of the events of September-October 1993: the loss of the people’s faith in the law, the loss of the people’s faith in the rule of law, the loss of faith that we can build a society where there will be the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Council and its supporters had a chance to win. To do this, it was necessary to quickly formulate and offer to society a clear and popular political strategy, a strategy for the development of the country, alternative to the one proposed by Yeltsin’s team. And the Supreme Council and its leadership took a predominantly defensive position and thereby reduced the chances of victory to virtually zero.

Alexander Kulikov, State Duma deputy, member of the parliamentary commission investigating the events of September-October 1993

The fact that the current regime was born from the swaddling clothes that Yeltsin prepared is obvious to me. Everything that is vicious in the system of power today goes back to 1992-1993, when Yeltsin attempted three times to disperse the highest bodies of power: the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. He attempted to violate the constitution and establish a regime of personal absolute power.

It was November-December 1992, March 1993, in the end, it was October 1993, when he managed to do this by force, at the cost of the death of hundreds and hundreds of citizens of the Russian Federation who died at the hands of Yeltsin’s thugs.

Moreover, Russia has not yet emerged from this swamp of lawlessness, arbitrariness and violence of power: neither state institutions, nor the federal government as a whole, nor the law enforcement system, nor the judicial system.

We must admit: a sharp narrowing of the political rights of citizens, a sharp narrowing of the ability of public structures to conduct a dialogue with the authorities and control power, a sharp narrowing of the parliament’s ability to control the implementation of the laws they have adopted - this is what we have today. Absolutely uncontrolled presidential and executive power, uncontrollable by society.

In 1992-1993, Yeltsin was hampered by the parliament of the Russian Federation, which, good or bad, according to the constitution, carried out the will of the people and carried out its duties of control over the executive branch of Russia.

We must clearly distinguish the parliament of the RSFSR of 1990-1992, when it created the conditions for the collapse of the Soviet Union, adopted the “Declaration of Sovereignty”, approved Belovezhie, and so on. When he created the conditions for economic bacchanalia under the pretext of privatization. When he granted President Yeltsin special powers - the authority to issue regulatory documents, in particular, decrees, which in legal force were equal to the law. And this parliament in December 1992 tried to correct its mistake. Most deputies understood what the absolutization of power, artificially created by parliament itself, leads to. But nothing worked out for them, just as it didn’t work out in March 1993. And when in September 1993 the parliament removed Yeltsin from office, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court and the constitution, it was quickly dispersed, destroying - according to unofficial data, more than three thousand killed and wounded - those who defended the constitution.

It seems that the alignment of military forces, with the participation of law enforcement agencies, was such that Yeltsin had great capabilities to suppress resistance. And in political terms, the victory of the opposition was quite likely: more than 63 constituent entities of the Federation supported the Supreme Council and opposed the anti-constitutional decree No. 1400. In this case, the possibility of the Supreme Council, if everything moved peacefully, to win was more than obvious. I am convinced that Yeltsin’s analysts, including Western well-wishers, analyzed all this and gave Yeltsin the go-ahead to force a violent dispersal.

The executive branch was preparing for the military option quite openly, and information about this was simply in the air. I was then the chairman of the Council of People's Deputies of the city of Volzhsky, Volgograd region. On the eve of September 21, there was a meeting in Moscow, where Khasbulatov gathered the chairmen of the Soviets at all levels. And here, at this meeting, although it was not said publicly that Yeltsin was ready for such forceful actions, it was said that Yeltsin had an extremely negative attitude towards parliament.

The media, which were controlled by Chernomyrdin's government, also negatively reflected the role of parliament and people's deputies, and in general, Soviets at all levels. It was said that Yeltsin went to the Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divisions, but not in order to get acquainted with the personnel, but in order to test the power capabilities of these divisions. There was a smell of thunder in the air, although not a single word about military confrontation was uttered during the meeting of Soviet chairmen. They talked about economic problems, about the failed privatization that Chubais carried out on the basis of a presidential decree, about the need to apply economic reform, which was prepared by scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was said that Gaidar's shock therapy was a monstrous experiment that must be stopped once and for all.

Now, looking at the events of twenty years ago, it is obvious that Yeltsin had already made up his mind and was preparing to seize power by force. It was his side that unleashed the military-political conflict with the support of Western political circles - this is also obvious.

Speaking in parliament with a proposal to create an inter-factional commission to investigate those events, I noted that the real number of dead, wounded and missing in the autumn days of 1993 clearly does not fit in with the official data.

It is especially worth noting the regulatory documents signed as a sign of reconciliation. One of them is an act of amnesty, in which, in fact, the guilty are absolved from responsibility, and the innocent are amnestied. The innocent are those who did not want to obey Yeltsin’s unconstitutional decree.

In this sense, it is necessary to reconsider the political and legal assessments of that time. It is very important to restore in the memory of the current generation the events of that time, to preserve the memory of those people who remained in the position of the constitution and the law, who laid down their lives for this on October 3-4, 1993 in Moscow. Those people who have been forgotten. Their families need not only restoration of their good name, but also a concrete system of social support measures. Provide support both to the families of the victims and to those among the White House defenders who are alive and well. It is necessary to perpetuate the feat that they accomplished.

Lev Ponomarev, executive director of the organization “For Human Rights”, MP in 1993

When they say that Decree No. 1400 is unconstitutional, this is not entirely true. I was a member of the Supreme Council, a participant in the Congress of People's Deputies. And I know for sure that the source of the conflict was precisely the Supreme Council, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Constitutional Court, headed by Zorkin. Because a conflict arose there: the old constitution de facto ceased to be in force because the President of the Russian Federation, the head of state, was elected, but nevertheless the congress did not approve the amendments that were supposed to approve the new order. The people legitimized this position, elected a president, and the Congress of People's Deputies, led by the intriguer Khasbulatov (and he really began to intrigue: why shouldn't I lead Russia?) refused to accept the amendment to the law, which the Supreme Council had already adopted. In fact, only one amendment had to be adopted at the Congress of People's Deputies. Remove the phrase in which it was written that all issues of the Russian Federation are accountable to the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. It was necessary to separate the functions of the executive and representative powers. But he didn’t do this, he bribed the Congress of People’s Deputies. I was the initiator of the Constitutional Court resolving this conflict. I went to see Zorkin, but he was happy to try to join the populist campaign against Yeltsin.

It was truly populist because economic reforms were difficult and popular support against them could be easily obtained. Yes, the 1993 referendum supported Yeltsin. Then they voted to trust Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies. But Yeltsin exaggerated the results of this referendum - its certain weakness is known - and instead of preparing the country for the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies, which could have been made bloodless, using the information resource and everything else... The conflict between the Congress of People's Deputies and Yeltsin, and it is incorrect to say, that Yeltsin violated the Constitution could have been decided based on a referendum, and he could have done it. But he didn't do it. He was walking, “resting” and so on - then I went to see him, pulled him out of his next vacation.

And so the summer of 1993 was lost. And so, when he realized that it was the Congress and there would be impeachment, he hastily began to do something. By that time, everyone began to betray him. ...I called on the population of Moscow, Muscovites, to take to the streets and confront the rebels, I did this, I was at the Moscow City Council, I called on people to go to the Moscow City Council.

These events are tragic, no doubt. After 1993, my party, Democratic Russia, lost influence on Yeltsin, he was surrounded by six, and this was truly a tragic turn. But that evening, October 3, 1993, it was undoubtedly necessary to repulse the rebels. Because they were armed, they were the first to use force, in the building of this CMEA book, the city hall. They burst in, used force, beat us, they were the first to start shooting.

There were provocations, no doubt. It is difficult to understand provocations. Completely innocent victims died, about one hundred and thirty people died, young people who believed that they were going to defend parliament, and an armed Barkashov was sitting there. If the rebels had won then, the country would have been led by such wonderful people as Rutskoi, who declared himself president, like Khasbulatov. And so the question arises... Maybe Yeltsin would have been taken into custody, maybe he would have been arrested, shot, I don’t know... The country is led by Rutsky and Khasbulatov. I am absolutely sure that some of the military districts would not submit to this. And then the country would split. Nuclear country. When some of the military districts did not submit to Khasbulatov as the new head of state, it is easy to imagine what would have happened. There would be clashes between the armed masses, citizens, on the streets of Moscow, because a certain arsenal was at our disposal, and we were on the verge of starting to distribute weapons to citizens. They demanded that we hand out weapons when we stood next to the Mossovet.

Yeltsin found himself practically alone. Everyone betrayed him, except the people, maybe activists, party leaders. And many security officials betrayed him, believing that he had lost his position. Some generals went to surrender to Rutskoi. Although the military district in the Far East would not obey, not even Rutskoi, but Khasbulatov.

Material prepared by: Vladimir Titov, Roman Popkov, Maria Ponomareva

What happened in Moscow 25 years ago.

25 years ago, opponents of President Boris Yeltsin took to the streets to seize the White House. This developed into a bloody confrontation between soldiers and oppositionists, and the result of the events of October 3-4 was a new government and a new Constitution.

1. October 1993 coup. Brief description of what happened

   On October 3-4, 1993, the October Putsch occurred - this is when the White House was shot, the Ostankino television center was captured, and tanks drove through the streets of Moscow. All this happened because of Yeltsin’s conflict with Vice President Alexander Rutsky and Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin won, the vice president was removed, and the Supreme Council was dissolved.

2. In 1992, Boris Yeltsin nominated Yegor Gaidar, who by that time was actively pursuing economic reforms, for the post of Chairman of the Government. However, the Supreme Council harshly criticized Gaidar's activities due to the high level of poverty and astronomical prices and chose Viktor Chernomyrdin as the new Chairman. In response, Yeltsin harshly criticized the deputies.

   Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov in 1991

3. Yeltsin suspended the Constitution, although it was illegal

   On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a “special procedure for governing the country.” Three days later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation declared Yeltsin’s actions unconstitutional and grounds for the president’s removal from office.

   On March 28, 617 deputies voted in favor of impeaching the president, with the required 689 votes. Yeltsin remained in power.

   On April 25, at a national referendum, the majority supported the president and the government and spoke in favor of holding early elections of people's deputies. On May 1, the first clashes between riot police and opponents of the president took place.

4. What is Decree No. 1400 and how did it aggravate the situation?

   On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin signed decree No. 1400 on the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council, although he did not have the right to do so. In response, the Supreme Council stated that this decree was contrary to the Constitution, therefore it would not be executed and Yeltsin would be deprived of his presidential powers. Yeltsin was supported by the Ministry of Defense and security forces.

   In the following weeks, members of the Supreme Council, people's deputies and Deputy Prime Minister Rutsky were virtually locked in the White House, where communications, electricity and water were cut off. The building was cordoned off by police and military personnel. The White House was guarded by opposition volunteers.

   X Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies in the White House, where electricity and water are turned off

5. Assault on Ostankino

   On October 3, supporters of the Armed Forces held a rally on October Square and then broke through the defenses of the White House. After Rutskoi’s calls, the protesters successfully seized the city hall building and moved to take the Ostankino television center.

   By the time the capture began, the television tower was guarded by 900 soldiers with military equipment. At some point, the first explosion was heard among the soldiers. It was immediately followed by indiscriminate shooting into the crowd, indiscriminately. When the oppositionists tried to hide in the neighboring Oak Grove, they were squeezed from both sides and began to be shot from armored personnel carriers and from weapon nests on the roof of Ostankino.

   During the assault on Ostankino, October 3, 1993.

   At the time of the assault, television broadcasting was stopped

6. White House shooting

   On the night of October 4, Yeltsin decides to take the White House with the help of armored vehicles. At 7 am the tanks began shooting at the government building.

   While the building was being shelled, snipers on the rooftops shot at the crowds of people near the White House.

   By five o'clock in the evening the resistance of the defenders was completely suppressed. Leaders of the opposition, including Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, were arrested. Yeltsin remained in power.

   White House October 4, 1993

7. How many people died during the October Putsch?

   According to official data, 46 people died during the storming of Ostankino, and approximately 165 people died during the shooting of the White House, but witnesses report that there were many more victims. Over the course of 20 years, different theories have appeared, in which the numbers vary from 500 to 2000 dead.

8. Results of the October Putsch

   The Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies ceased to exist. The entire system of Soviet power that had existed since 1917 was liquidated.

   Before the elections on December 12, 1993, all power was in the hands of Yeltsin. On that day, the modern Constitution was chosen, as well as the State Duma and the Federation Council.

9. What happened after the October Putsch?

   In February 1994, all those arrested in the October Putsch case were amnestied.

   Yeltsin served as president until the end of 1999. The constitution adopted after the coup in 1993 is still in force. According to the new government principles, the president has more powers than the government.

MOSCOW, October 4 – RIA Novosti. The October 1993 putsch was not accidental - it was prepared for two years and in the end actually killed people’s trust in power, says Sergei Filatov, president of the Foundation for Socio-Economic and Intellectual Programs, former head of President Yeltsin’s administration.

Twenty years ago, on October 3-4, 1993, clashes occurred in Moscow between supporters of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999). The confrontation between the two branches of Russian government, which had lasted since the collapse of the USSR - the executive represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislative one represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, over the pace of reforms and methods of building a new state passed on October 3-4, 1993 into an armed conflict and ended with tank shelling of the seat of parliament - the House of Soviets (White House).

The tension was rising

“What happened on October 3-4, 1993, was not predetermined in one day. It was an event that had been going on for two years. Over the course of two years, tension grew. And if you trace it at least through the congresses of people’s deputies, it becomes clear that this was a purposeful fight on the part of the Supreme Council against the reforms that the government was carrying out,” Filatov said at a multimedia round table on the topic: “October 1993 coup. Twenty years later...”, held at RIA Novosti on Friday.

According to him, the two top officials of the state - Boris Yeltsin and the head of the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov - failed to reach the “normal path of relationship.” Moreover, “absolute and deep mistrust” arose between the two top officials, he added.

Political scientist Leonid Polyakov also agreed with this opinion.

“In fact, the putsch of 1993 is a postponement of the State Emergency Committee of 1991. In 1991, these people, seeing hundreds of thousands of Muscovites who surrounded the White House, the leaders of the State Emergency Committee were simply, as they say, afraid. At first they themselves frightened them by bringing tanks into the capital , and then they themselves were afraid of what they had done. But those forces that stood behind it, and the people who sincerely believed in what turned out to be destroyed in August 91, they did not go away. And two years followed, the most difficult, the most difficult in our history, which included the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the state... By October 1993, this explosive potential had accumulated,” Polyakov noted.

conclusions

Conclusions from the events of 1993, according to Filatov, can be drawn both positive and negative.

“The fact that we eliminated dual power is positive, the fact that we adopted the Constitution is positive. And the fact that we actually killed people’s trust in power and this continued for the rest of the 20 years is an obvious fact that we have to restore to this day We can’t,” he says.

In turn, political scientist Polyakov expressed hope that the events of 1993 were “the last Russian revolution.”

Film about the events of 1993

During the round table, a film about the events of October 1993 was presented, filmed by RIA Novosti specialists in a web documentary format, which has received worldwide recognition due to the fact that the viewer has the opportunity to interact with the content and has greater freedom of action than the viewer of a plot with a linear form of storytelling, where the course of history is predetermined by the director. This is the third RIA Novosti film in 2013 in an interactive format.

“For each of the participants in these events, it was part of his life, part of his inner story. And it was these people we wanted to talk about in our film, interactive video; to make it possible to see through their eyes, through their emotions, through their memories those difficult days. Because now it seems like some rather distant and somewhat unusual event in our country. I really hope that it will continue to be so, because tanks shooting from the embankment at the White House is an absolutely terrible sight. And, probably, for every Muscovite and every resident of Russia, it was something absolutely incredible,” RIA Novosti Deputy Editor-in-Chief Ilya Lazarev shared his memories.

The film contains photographs of people who were later found by RIA Novosti and who spoke about their memories of those events.

“We brought photographs to life and tried to bring some episodes of the video into our present time... Our colleagues, directors, spent three months working on this format - this is a very difficult story. You can watch the film episodically, linearly, but the main story and task is to make it immersive this atmosphere, draw your own conclusions, but rather just get to know the people who lived through this story and let it pass through them,” added Lazarev.

As a result of the tragic events of October 3-4, 1993 in Moscow, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation were liquidated. Before the election of the Federal Assembly and the adoption of the new Constitution, direct presidential rule was established in the Russian Federation. By decree of October 7, 1993 “On legal regulation during the period of phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” the President established that before the start of the work of the Federal Assembly, issues of a budgetary and financial nature, land reform, property, civil service and social employment of the population, previously resolved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation , are now carried out by the President of the Russian Federation. By another decree of October 7, “On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,” the president actually abolished this body. Boris Yeltsin also issued a number of decrees ending the activities of representative authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation and local Soviets.

On December 12, 1993, a new Constitution of Russia was adopted, in which such a government body as the Congress of People's Deputies was no longer mentioned.

September 21, 1993 Yeltsin a coup d'état was carried out. In accordance with the Constitution and the opinion of the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin and security ministers are legally removed from their duties. Rutskoy and the new ministers began to fulfill the duties assigned to them by law. The defenders of parliament had practically no weapons! In total, automatic weapons were issued: 74 AKS-74U assault rifles, 5 RPK-74 assault rifles. Starting from September 24th, Yeltsin almost every night he tried to organize an armed assault on parliament; the massacre was postponed and postponed until the next night due to circumstances beyond his control.

The first official warning that the White House would be stormed if they refused to comply was made on September 24th. On the same day, the X (extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies decided on simultaneous re-elections of deputies and the president no later than March 1994.

The Russian House of Soviets was surrounded by " Bruno's spiral", machine gunners and armored personnel carriers, a complete blockade of parliament was carried out: on September 21, all types of communications were turned off, on September 23, light, heat and hot water were turned off, on September 28, the entrance of people and the entry of vehicles, the supply of food and medicine was completely blocked (for example, September 27), Ambulances were not allowed through, even to people with, for example, diagnoses: “acute cerebrovascular accident” (09/27), “cervical spine fracture” (09/28), “unstable angina” (10/1). The temperature in the building dropped below 8 degrees, outside during the day - to -9 and -12 degrees Celsius.

“Conclusions: In medical terms, the emergency situation in the White House arose not on October 4, but on September 27, when several thousand people, due to their convictions, did not leave the besieged area, were on duty around the clock at the barricades in any weather, deprived of basic amenities due to power outages , communications, heating, subject to constant nervous and physical stress, were, by the will of the leadership of the Main Medical Directorate of Moscow and the Center for Emergency Medicine, deprived of the right to medical care. We can't call it anything other than malfeasance. We assert that if the State Medical University and the Center for Emergency Medicine organized the timely delivery of medicines necessary for medical care. equipment, organized constant duty in the cordoned off zone, and not outside, ambulance teams, even if they were simply neutral in providing assistance to the victims, the number of victims during the events of October 3-4 would have been significantly less.” (Information material on the state of medical support for defenders of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation from September 21 to October 4, 1993. From a report prepared by doctors of the Rescue Center of the Moscow Medical Academy named after I.M. Sechenov)

On September 29, the government of the Russian Federation and Moscow presented an ultimatum - everyone must leave the House of Soviets by October 4, otherwise there will be “grave consequences.” On September 30, 62 constituent entities of the Federation supported parliament and presented Yeltsin with an ultimatum demanding simultaneous re-elections. The decisive meeting of the Federation Council is scheduled for 18.00 on October 3. The continuation of negotiations under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church was scheduled for 16.00 on October 3.

Yeltsin spoke out against the idea of ​​early simultaneous re-elections. Chernomyrdin also refused the demand for a peaceful solution, saying that they had “another solution.” Solution shoot parliament October 4 was decided between September 29 and 30, preparations were carried out openly. September 30th Shahray appointed head of the group for legal support of Decree No. 1400 with instructions to complete the work by October 4. October 1 Poltoranin sent a letter to the editors-in-chief with an order demanding “to treat with understanding the measures that the President will take on October 4th” and “not to dramatize their possible consequences.” On the afternoon of October 3, all Moscow hospitals, at the direction of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate, received telephone messages from the Moscow Main Medical Directorate about the planned arrival of the wounded.

The shooting of parliament had to be justified by a specially prepared provocation; by order of “acting Peerage" to the MVD officers was entrusted with the stick war provoke demonstrators to retaliatory violence. On October 3, between a third and half a million unarmed citizens came out in support of parliament from Moscow's Oktyabrskaya Square. Demonstrators in an organized column went to the White House and Ostankino. After the demonstrators broke through to the White House, machine-gun fire was opened on people on the main staircase and at the 20th entrance of parliament. The Ministry of Internal Affairs submachine gunners from the mayor's office, on orders, launched an attack on the White House. Shooting from the city hall and the Mir Hotel at the doors of the White House killed 7 people and wounded 34. This was the first mass shooting and the beginning of the storming of parliament. The unexpected pause of 15 hours was caused both by the defection of two companies of the Sofrinsky brigade to the side of parliament, along with 200 OMSDON military personnel, and by the decisive actions of the demonstrators.

At 15.00 on October 3, Erin ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs to open fire on hundreds of thousands of unarmed people. At 16.00 Yeltsin signed decree No. 1575 and exempted the army from criminal liability for violations of the law, A Grachev ordered army units to join the executioners from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Shooting of parliament supporters was sanctioned by Yeltsin and the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and everything that followed from 16.00 on October 3 no longer mattered.

At 16.05 after the shelling of parliament and the killing of the first people Rutskoy gave the order to storm the city hall and go to Ostankino. City Hall (from the moment the first demonstrator entered its doors) was taken without a single shot being fired. On October 3, a categorical order was in effect Rutskogo And Achalova O non-use of weapons. Bloodshed at City Hall was avoided thanks to Makashov. The road to Ostankino was blocked by superior armed units of the Dzerzhinsky Ministry of Internal Affairs division in trucks and armored personnel carriers. A convoy of demonstrators stopped in front of them. By order of the commander of the VV A.S. Kulikova The Ministry of Internal Affairs troops voluntarily allowed this column to pass. The Ministry of Internal Affairs knew that there were only two dozen people with weapons in the column.

Having missed the column at Ostankino, near Chekhov Street, the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops in trucks and 10 Vityaz armored personnel carriers overtook the column of demonstrators and went ahead into an ambush at Ostankino, where they positioned themselves behind the technical center building. On October 3, at the Ostankino television center, from 5:45 pm to 7:10 pm, a peaceful rally was held for an hour and a half demanding the provision of airtime to parliament. Demonstrators made no attempts to storm or enter the television center building. Despite the requirement Makashova enter into negotiations Bragin didn't show up. Demonstrators with official credentials warned everyone about responsibility for any shot, paying special attention to special forces. They were informed that there was an unarmed demonstration of two hundred thousand people. Makashov guaranteed the commander of the Vityaz armored personnel carrier group that not a single shot would be fired from the demonstrators.

By the time the execution began at Ostankino, there were less than 4 thousand unarmed demonstrators who arrived by vehicle; they were guarded by 18 armed people. The television center was guarded by 25 armored personnel carriers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and more than 510 (690) machine gunners of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At about 19.00, the management of the police guard of the ASK-3 technical center, on their own initiative, entered into negotiations, where they announced Makashov about readiness to come under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council and transfer the technical center to its official representatives. The police officer was seized on the street by an officer from Dzerzhinsky's division and was forcibly held in the technical center building. The Vityaz special forces opposing the police avoided negotiations. After a truck rammed the entrance doors to the technical center, General Makashov without a weapon, he went out into the lobby alone to negotiate. He invited the special forces not to interfere with the legitimate authorities and gave them time to freely leave the building. He sternly warned about the inadmissibility of any shot.

The first shot was fired at Ostankino from the roof of the television center ASK-1 special forces "Vityaz"! They shot without warning. The order to open fire was personally given by Major General VV Pavel Golubets. A demonstrator at the entrance to the ASK-3 technical center was seriously wounded by a shot. The technical center police from the end of the building announced for the second time that they had gone over to the side of parliament and called Makashova. Two minutes after the first shot, special forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the ASK-3 hall threw two or three grenades at the feet of the crowd and began to shoot people on Korolev Street from two buildings in a coordinated manner. From the technical center they fired to kill with machine guns and machine guns, and four machine gunners fired from the roof of the television center. A group of people at the entrance to ASK-3 was completely destroyed, only one person survived there.

More than half of the armed guards of the convoy were killed on the spot; those who survived during the lull left Ostankino through the grove by 21.00. Makashov did not give the order to return fire and none of the demonstrators fired. The shooting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs soldiers at unarmed people, the wounded and orderlies continued until the approach of a two hundred thousand peaceful demonstration. Shooting at emerging and moving targets at night in conditions of limited visibility - the head of shooting at the site is a lieutenant colonel Lysyuk. After the shooting of demonstrators near the ASK-3 building (technical center), a two hundred thousand strong column of unarmed demonstrators from Oktyabrskaya Square approached the building of the ASK-1 television center. The peaceful demonstration was met with machine gun and machine gun fire at point-blank range.

Six delegates-demonstrators from officers and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs came to negotiations with Vityaz and demanded an immediate ceasefire, explaining that there were only unarmed people on the street. The “Vityazis” ceased fire for half an hour and, as a condition for continuing negotiations, demanded that everyone leave the fence of the television center building. As soon as the deceived people left the fence, they began to methodically shoot them with small arms and armored personnel carriers. The execution continued until 5.45 on October 4th. Single shots were heard until 12.00. They shot the wounded, the orderlies, and the ambulances. The storming and shooting of parliament on October 4, 1993 began suddenly, without any announcement or prior warning. The attackers made no offers to surrender or remove the women and children from the building. No ultimatums of surrender were issued to parliament. The first bursts from the armored personnel carrier killed about 40 unarmed people.

According to Rutskogo, in the “White House” at the time of the attack there were up to 10 thousand people, including women and children. Repeated demands Rutskogo stopping fire on the “White House” and allowing women and children to be taken out of the building of the House of Soviets had no effect on the stormers - the fire did not stop for 10 hours! During this time, the leaders of the action did not make a single offer to the people shot in the House of Soviets to surrender; they were not given the opportunity to remove women and children from under fire, which they had to do under fire, with losses.

On October 4, armored vehicles and troops were sent to shoot the parliament with an unprecedented and unjustified advantage: For each machine gun of the defenders of parliament, exactly three units of armored vehicles were thrown into battle - two cannons and two tank machine guns (one heavy machine gun and one machine gun Kalashnikov), one sniper each. To kill an individual child, woman or man in the House of Soviets, an entire platoon or squad of drunken machine gunners was assigned. Only about 121-145 people did not give up and escaped from the “White House” alive, of which about 71 (95) people escaped through underground communications on October 4th and 5th in different directions, about 50 people fought their way through the top 4- October 1st in the direction of the Krasnopresnenskaya metro station.

There is no statute of limitations for murder! On October 4th the order was in force Erina-Kulikova(Ministry of Internal Affairs), Gracheva(My Barsukova(GUO): – destroy those in the “White House”! Orders for complete destruction and shooting to kill were openly transmitted over radios by the assault commanders. Barsukov officially ordered Alpha to destroy those in the White House, Grachev- tank crews, Tula and Taman residents, Erin- Riot police and Dzerzhinsk residents. Korzhakov After the prisoners were taken to the stairs of the White House, he publicly demanded that the defenders of parliament be shot: “ I have an order to eliminate everyone in uniform!”

After the deputies left with the Alpha, this order was carried out exactly. All remaining defenders of the parliament were destroyed, with the exception of those arrested on the afternoon of October 5 in the basement - four police officers of the OSN Department of Security and several local workers, as well as sixteen defenders from the barrier of the 14th entrance (arrested at 3.30 on October 5 on the 6th floor of the White House ). The bodies of those executed were secretly removed and destroyed.

Proof that the order was carried out is that, according to official data, not a single wounded person or corpse was found in the parliament building. Those killed on the street, collected by medical teams, were officially declared as dead in the “White House” Y. Kholkhina and A. Shestakova. Recognizing the fact of the mass murder of the people remaining in the “White House” and the fact of the secret removal and burial of their bodies, it is impossible to answer the question about the exact number of people killed without a special investigation. In any case, we are talking about hundreds of executed in the White House building.

October 3-5th mercenaries Yeltsin They died only from their own bullets! Almost all of those killed, according to official data, from among those who shot the parliament or demonstrators in Ostankino were killed in units Erina(Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Barsukova(GUO). Official data on losses and the number of troops participating in the coup d'etat and massacres: State Department of Defense (18,000) - only 1 killed: killed by a sniper of the State Department of the Russian Federation from a room completely controlled by the State Department of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs! Moscow Region (more than 9,000) - a total of 6 killed, of which 6 were killed by Yeltsin’s units (1 - riot police, 1 - Ministry of Internal Affairs from an armored personnel carrier, 3 - Main Directorate of Defense, 1 - captured and, apparently, shot on the orders of the commanders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or State Department of Defense )! Ministry of Internal Affairs and Internal Troops (more than 40,000) - a total of 5 killed (and one mortally wounded), of which 3 were killed or died due to the fault of Yeltsin’s units, 2 were not identified, 1, together with the entire crew of the armored personnel carrier, was destroyed from a grenade launcher 119 pdp.

The defenders of parliament practically did not shoot! Not a single one is known to have died from their bullets! The circumstances of the death of only 2 military personnel - mercenaries - have not been clarified.

Yeltsin's decree No. 1400 is an act of coup d'etat!!!

The truth about the 1993 White House shooting

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The events from September 21 to October 4, 1993 continue to be a hot-button, controversial topic that often causes controversy. Today, researchers of the October putsch adhere to a variety of points of view on what happened, its causes and consequences, as well as its political essence and significance for the state and people. The official interpretation of events comes down to justifying the actions of Boris Yeltsin’s supporters, as evidenced by the numerous awards and titles held by his supporters and criminal cases against members of the opposition.

The most obscure page of the Russian Federation cannot be assessed unambiguously. Today there are two radically opposing opinions about the essence of the dispersal of the Supreme Council. Some believe that the president’s actions can be regarded as a coup d’état and a crime, while others consider him the “savior of Russian democracy” and the inspirer of economic and social reforms. One way to clarify the historical situation is to study documents and legal assessment of events.

On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin issued decree No. 1400 “On phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation,” ordering the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation (according to the Constitution, the highest body of state power in Russia) to cease their activities. The head of state invited the deputies to return to work in the institutions where they worked before their election and take part in the elections to the new legislative body - the Federal Assembly. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, convened for an emergency meeting, decided that this decree violates the Constitution of Russia in twelve places. And, according to the Constitution, this is the basis for the removal of President Boris Yeltsin from office. The Constitution clearly defined the competence of state bodies, including the Supreme Council and the President. The Congress of People's Deputies, in accordance with Chapter 13, was recognized as the highest body of state power and was given the right to repeal acts of both the Supreme Council (the country's legislative body) and the President (the head of state and the Council of Ministers). The legislative power was personified by the Supreme Council. The frequency of its meetings was determined from 2 times a year, and extraordinary convocations were also allowed on the initiative of the Presidium or the Chairman. The powers of the Supreme Council were quite broad.

Chapter 13/1 included provisions on the President of the Republic. Its competence was significantly narrower than that of the current edition. Thus, the head of state had legislative initiative and was recognized as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was given the right of veto, but was obliged to report annually on the results of his work to parliament. In addition, deputies had the right to demand an extraordinary report from the President if certain requirements were met. However, the main instrument of influence on the head of state was the right of impeachment, which the people's representatives could put forward at the Congress on the basis of the conclusion of the Constitutional Court. The President did not have the right to dissolve the Supreme Council. It should be noted that from a legal point of view, Russia before the coup and the adoption of the new Constitution should be called a parliamentary republic, since the predominance of power in the legislative assembly is obvious from the analysis and comparison of chapters 13 and 13/1. Article 121/6 openly prohibited the use of presidential powers to change the political system. Upon taking office, Boris Yeltsin took an oath to observe and protect the norms of the Constitution, therefore, he was obliged to respect its provisions.

At the same time, an unspoken conflict arose between the Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Khasbulatov and President Boris Yeltsin. Of course, there is no need to talk about a confrontation between only two officials in the case under consideration, since this was a real dual power, generated by the thoughtless inclusion of the position of a sole head of state in the system of public administration while maintaining the broad competence of parliament. As a result of the struggle between the Supreme Council and the Government headed by the President, the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993 broke out, and the work of government bodies became ineffective. Back in March 1993, deputies, most of whom were leftists - communists, agrarians, Baburin’s “Russia” and the “Fatherland” faction, tried to remove the president from power through impeachment, but this failed.

Despite the fact that the actions of Yelitsin’s opponents were carried out taking into account all the norms and requirements of the law, Boris Nikolaevich did not want to recognize them. Korzhakov’s memoirs can serve as clear evidence of this. A Yeltsin supporter talks about how a plan was developed to use chloropicrin (an irritant chemical) against deputies in the event of a voting result unfavorable to the President. From a legal point of view, this fact alone can be qualified as a crime. After the failure of the impeachment attempt, the Congress scheduled a referendum with 4 questions for April 25 - the referendum gave the most favorable results for the President.

Yeltsin's supporters loudly claim that people's trust was almost absolute. Well, in refutation, let’s just present the numbers. So, the results were as follows:
- trust the President - 58.7% of voters (the figure is huge, but far from absolute);
- approve of the President’s policy – ​​53% of voters;
- early presidential elections were considered necessary - 41.2%;
- 49.5% voted for early elections of deputies to the Supreme Council.

Thus, despite the high percentage of citizens who trust the current president and his policies, a significant proportion were in favor of his re-election. The development of the crisis of public administration is evidenced by almost equal indicators on the issues of re-election of both deputies and the President. However, historically the population of our country has gravitated towards a single leader, and not towards an abstract majority in parliament or another collegial body. The results of the referendum not only allowed Yeltsin to avoid removal, but also predetermined all further events. The President realized that he had the support of the population and with even greater persistence began to seek expansion of powers.

The President openly told the public about the reluctance of deputies to support his socio-economic policies. From a legal point of view, such a claim looks absurd, since domestic and foreign policy, in accordance with the provisions of the current Constitution, was determined by the Congress of People's Deputies. In his address, Yeltsin focused the attention of citizens on his desire to maintain law and order, but at the same time he read out the now well-known Decree 1400, which violated all the legal foundations of the young state.

So, let's pay attention to the text of this decree. In addition to the official accusations of parliament’s delay in making decisions and unwillingness to participate in the economic transformation of the state, the text also contained an indication of the fact that the current Constitution does not contain provisions on introducing amendments to it. Analysis of the document itself confirms this statement; the basic law of the state turned out to be unfinished, and this circumstance became clear at the most critical moment. Boris Nikolaevich considered it possible, and by the way very convenient in his situation, to take on the function of a reformer of the legal basis, which caused the indignation of his opponents. As a result, an attempt to convene a Congress, as well as a meeting of the Constitutional Court.

The main purpose of issuing a decree is to introduce changes and additions to the text of the current Constitution. The decree cites specific constitutional articles to justify the President’s action, but each of these norms is presented only to create the appearance of legality of the decision. Yeltsin attempted a coup d'etat, and, as time has shown, it was a success. We do not undertake to evaluate the actions of Boris Yeltsin, but from the point of view of the law in force at that time, he committed a crime against the foundations of statehood. The insignificance of the decree was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court, but in September 1993 there was no longer any talk of the rule of law in the country. The conflict went beyond the legal framework, and only the strength and support of the crowd were used as arguments.

Describing street clashes, the blockade of the Supreme Council building, and the storming of a television center is hardly appropriate in a short publication. We will limit ourselves to only a brief description of the results of the September unrest and the October denouement.

On September 21, Yeltsin addresses citizens and publicly announces his decision to deprive the Supreme Council of its powers. The deputies were asked to disperse, but the assembled Congress of People's Deputies, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court, terminated the powers of the President and transferred temporary presidential powers to Vice-President A. V. Rutskoy. Considering that the decision to impeach was made in compliance with the requirements of the law, then from the evening of September 21, all Yeltsin’s orders cannot be considered legitimate. They are based solely on the disposition of citizens towards him, as well as power superiority.

On September 22, the confrontation continues. Since the 21st, the supply of electricity, heat and water to the building of the Supreme Council has been cut off, and the sewage system has been cut off. The situation has been heating up all day. On September 23, Yeltsin issues decrees promising material benefits. a large one-time remuneration for deputies, the seizure of the property of the Supreme Council and the appointment of early presidential elections, which was subsequently cancelled. None of these decrees can be called legitimate, since Boris Nikolaevich no longer had legal authority. However, the confrontation is growing, neither side intends to give up its positions, and personal ambitions come into play.

Next, peaceful demonstrators first appear on the streets, and then supporters of both sides arm themselves. The first casualties among the civilian population, barricades on the streets, pogroms, columns with armored personnel carriers and other attributes of an armed conflict are present in the capital until October 4-5.

As a result, the Supreme Council was taken by storm and ceased to exist as a state body. Power in the country passed to the strong leader Boris Yeltsin. Thus, the events of September - October 1993 can be called a seizure of power or a coup d'etat. The author will not talk about the appropriateness of Yeltsin’s actions in this article, since a separate publication should be devoted to this issue. In conclusion, we present only one fact that is difficult to dispute. At the next elections, the population again gave their votes to B. Yeltsin, and stability came to the country for several years.

A unique video recording made by an unknown person tells the story of participants in the events of September-October 1993.
From the first frames, the story begins with a participant in the column of the Taman Division, showing where the column was fired upon, what actions were taken, then showing his actions in the current situation, who was wounded where, where they were moving.
In particular, he tells how in the morning in the area of ​​the Krasnaya Presnya stadium, due to lack of coordination of actions, armed clashes occurred between the “Tamans” and the armored personnel carriers of the “Dzerzhinsky” (OMSDON of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the former Dzerzhinsky Special Purpose Division). There were dead and wounded, both among soldiers and among random passers-by.
Moreover, the video recording was made 2 months after the events and traces of that shootout are visible in the video.
A unique video recording, a must watch for anyone who wants to know much more about the events of the shooting of the White House. ()

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