Combat path. Combat path 53rd cavalry division innovative innovation

Created by order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated February 14, 1943 from the 55th Cavalry Division, which in turn was formed by combining the 73rd Separate Altai Cavalry and 55th Cavalry Divisions. The division included the 53rd, 55th and 57th Guards Cavalry Regiments, and from May 1943 also the 147th Guards Artillery and Mortar Regiment and the 60th Tank Regiment. The division was awarded the honorary title Mozyr on January 14, 1944. The division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner on July 24, 1944, and the Order of Suvorov, II degree, on April 27, 1945. The division was part of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps. For excellent fighting In the Berlin operation, the corps was awarded the Order of Lenin, and it was given the name “Brandenburg”.

Formation and beginning of the combat path of the 73rd Separate Altai Cavalry Division

By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 73rd separate cavalry division was formed in the Altai Territory in September 1941. Future fighters and division commanders arrived from many regions of the region and the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region. Many of them were participants in the Civil War, and there were also former soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Army and the Chapaev Division. By September 10, the formation of the division was completed. Colonel Alexey Fedorovich Shcherekin was appointed commander of the division.

On September 15, 1941, in a solemn atmosphere on the parade ground, the division regiments took the oath. Leaders of party and Soviet organizations present Red Banners to the regiments. The division command and its soldiers assure their fellow countrymen that they will carry these banners with honor through all battles with the enemy. Weeks of intense combat training passed, and on the night of November 8–9, the division embarked on echelons and moved west. Already at the end of December, the division entered the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

At the beginning of the combat journey, the division guarded the Shatura power plant, which supplied electricity to Moscow. While guarding the power plant, the division's personnel were intensely preparing for the upcoming battles.

On February 9, 1942, Colonel A.F. died suddenly from a cerebral hemorrhage. Shcherekin. Colonel Ivan Terentyevich Chalenko was appointed division commander. “He served in the First Cavalry from the very beginning of its history and was an adjutant to the army commander. A man of great courage, a division commander of the Budenov school, he often talked with soldiers and officers at rest stops about upcoming battles, taught them courage, the ability to beat the enemy following the example of the First Cavalry Army,” recalled K. Vladimirsky, former senior instructor of the political department of the 15th Cavalry Division . It was led by I.T. Chalenko's division will accomplish most of its feats.

The division's baptism of fire on the Bryansk Front in the summer of 1942

At the end of July 1942, the command transferred the division to the Bryansk Front. On August 2, the regiments of the 73rd Cavalry Division concentrated in the Terbunov forest and, with darkness, began to take over defense sectors from units of the 55th Cavalry Division, which had suffered heavy losses, so that by the morning of August 3, they completely occupied the defensive line. The division received its baptism of fire on August 4. At 5 o'clock in the morning after the artillery attack, the Germans went on the attack at full speed, knowing that there was no enemy in front of them. Our fighters showed restraint, allowed the Nazis to come within 100 meters and opened heavy fire. In this battle, Makar Lavrentievich Krasnikov, Prokopiy Ignatievich Grankin, Ivan Moiseevich Zenkov, Pyotr Moiseevich Malygin, Kuzma Aleksandrovich Lapshin, Ivan Timofeevich Zuev and many others distinguished themselves. The enemy fled in panic. On August 10, 1942, the 55th and 73rd Cavalry divisions were merged into one, called the 55th Cavalry, 8th Cavalry Corps.

Until the end of August, the situation on the division's defensive line was relatively calm. Among the personnel there were many hunters and excellent shooters. Private Evtey Dolgov, a former hunter and blacksmith, became especially famous. In a short period of time, his combat account accumulated more than 70 destroyed enemy soldiers. In one day, Evtey Dolgov destroyed 17 Nazis. Before dawn, he took up a pre-designated firing position not far from the enemy's front line. In the morning, a group of enemy soldiers appeared at the edge of the forest. The German officer, waving his arms, explained something to the soldiers. Dolgov killed him with the first shot. Taking advantage of the confusion among the Germans, the sniper killed three more enemy soldiers. During the day, the Germans tried several times to pull out the officer’s corpse, but each time they fell under well-aimed shots from Evtey Dolgov. Without haste and without making a mistake, he destroyed the enemy soldiers one by one. During the day, E. Dolgov fired seventeen shots, and all the bullets hit the target.

Participation of the division in the Battle of Stalingrad and the formation of the 15th Guards Cavalry Division

On October 9, 1942, the 55th Cavalry Division, operating as part of the 8th Corps, received orders for a long march and set out the next day. The cavalry corps was transferred to Stalingrad, where at that time an operation to defeat the enemy was being prepared.

On the morning of November 19, 1942, an appeal from the Front's Military Council was read to the division's personnel, and at the same time, the thunder of thousands of guns announced the start of Operation Uranus. Having entered the breakthrough of the enemy front together with units of the 8th Cavalry Corps, the division rapidly moved forward. By the evening of November 19, the cavalrymen reached the village of Ust-Medveditskaya, where the SS battalion was settled. Soon reinforcements approached the Germans - up to 2 infantry battalions and about 40 tanks. The battle was extremely stubborn. The cavalrymen had to fight for every house. By 3 o'clock in the afternoon, units of the division, having destroyed up to two infantry battalions and about 20 enemy tanks, captured Ust-Medveditskaya. Up to 120 prisoners, 2 ammunition warehouses, and a food warehouse were captured.

With heavy fighting, the division moved to the southwest and, together with other units, liberated large railway stations and powerful centers of enemy resistance - Oblivskaya, Chernyshevskaya, Morozovskaya, Tatsinskaya, Belaya Kalitva. In these battles, endurance, perseverance, strength of will, combat skill and determination were especially clearly demonstrated - the qualities of the Siberian-Altaians, with whom the enemy was reckoned.

Donbass raid. February 1943

Counteroffensive Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended with the liquidation of a large and one of the most combat-ready Wehrmacht groups on the Eastern Front. Developing success after the defeat of fascist troops at Stalingrad, units of the Red Army fought their way to the west. Kharkov and Belgorod were liberated, Soviet tanks were rapidly moving towards the Dnieper. It seemed that a little more, and the southern wing of the German armies would burst at the seams. But, unfortunately, this did not happen...

The German command, having regrouped its forces, prepared a counterattack and led the operation German field marshal E. von Manstein, who, by analogy with Field Marshal Model, can successfully be called “Hitler’s fireman.”

In turn, the Soviet command also planned a decisive operation in order to reach the Dnieper before the spring thaw. On January 30, 1943, the 3rd Guards Army of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive, captured a bridgehead on the Seversky Donets River, from where it fought towards Voroshilovgrad.

The 55th Cavalry Division, which fought for Voroshilovgrad as part of the 8th Cavalry Corps, also took part in this offensive. After taking the city, following the orders of the command, the division went on a raid behind enemy lines. “The raid took place in incredibly difficult conditions: the area was open, cut by ravines. There was a lot of snow that winter. It was severely frosty. Guns, cars, carts had to be dragged by hand. Even riding horses sometimes had difficulty getting out of the snowdrifts.” The actions of the cavalrymen behind enemy lines made a stunning impression on the Germans. The attacks of the 55th Division created an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety among them. And this, in turn, affected the behavior of enemy troops along the entire sector of the front.

However, the enemy came to his senses and, in turn, went on the offensive. By this time, the 8th Cavalry Corps was fighting on the outskirts of the city of Debaltsevo. The Germans gathered large forces of infantry and tanks here, broke through on the flanks and began to tighten the encirclement around the corps. The cavalrymen desperately resisted, trying to break through to Debaltsevo. But it was not possible to complete this task. In fact, already on February 18, there was a threat of complete encirclement of the 8th Cavalry Corps. On February 23, 1943, corps commander, General M.D. Borisov gave the order to leave the encirclement. With battles, overcoming the resistance of the Germans, the cavalry began to go out to their own: “At 16:00 on February 23, the 55th Cavalry Division reached the Zapadnaya gully and broke through on its own. On the night of February 24, the united units of the 55th and 112th cavalry divisions along the Zapadnaya gully reached Malo-Nikolaevka and by the end of February 25 reached the location of the 14th Rifle Corps in the Orekhovo area. The 21st Cavalry Division fought its way to Uspenka. By the end of February 24, the 8th Cavalry Corps left the raid." During the breakthrough, the commander of the 112th division, Major General M.M., died in hand-to-hand combat. Shaimuratov.

On February 14, 1943, by Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 8th Cavalry Corps was awarded the title “Guards”, and it received the name 7th Guards Corps, and the 55th Altai Cavalry Division received the title of 15th Guards Cavalry Division.

Why Mozyr-Brandenburg?

Parts of the division, withdrawn from the raid behind enemy lines, almost without rest, began to move west in continuous battles.

In March 1943, the divisions took up defensive positions. During this period, the division command sent a special delegation to Altai, which was supposed to tell the workers of the region about the military affairs of their fellow countrymen. Members of the Guard delegation, Major Goreglyad, Guard Captain Lavrenov and others spoke at rallies and meetings with Altai workers.

Since mid-September, units of the 7th Guards Corps fought in the direction of the Dnieper. By this time, the 15th Guards Cavalry Division, equipped with new military equipment and replenished, was a powerful cavalry formation. The division now included artillery units and a tank regiment. After crossing the Dnieper and several days of fierce fighting, the division heads north.

The front command entrusts the cavalrymen with a responsible task: to deliver a surprise attack on the city of Mozyr with a deep roundabout maneuver. The unit advanced in the most difficult conditions of swampy terrain. On January 14, 1944, the division, together with other units of the Red Army, captured the city of Mozyr. For excellent military operations it is given the honorary name “Mozyrskaya”. In early April, the division was fighting in emergency conditions west of the Ubor River in the area of ​​​​the famous Pinsk swamps. At the beginning of April, the division received an order to make a forced march to the Kovel area.

By this time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Kovel area surrounded the German group. The enemy command hastily pulled up tanks and infantry units from other sectors of the front to save those surrounded. The cavalrymen had to get ahead of the enemy and thwart the impending attack on the flanks of the Soviet troops. On April 11, intense battles began with superior enemy forces. The Germans threw tanks at the lines defended by the guards, subjected their positions to massive air raids, but could not break the cavalrymen. This situation continued until mid-May. Then the cavalry corps transferred to the reserve of the 1st Belorussian Front. The guardsmen used June and the first half of July for combat training. On July 20, 1944, the division's regiments crossed the Western Bug and crossed the state border of the Soviet Union. The enemy retreated to the area of ​​the city of Kholm. On July 24, Lublin was cleared of the enemy. The cavalrymen immediately burst into the territory of the Majdanek death camp. The division received gratitude from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for excellent military operations.

Before the capture of Lublin on July 25, 1944, several tanks were captured near the town of Pyastki, in the area of ​​​​operation of one of the regiments of the 15th Guards Division. In one of the Tiger tanks was Lieutenant General Moser, who is the commandant of the Lublin Voivodeship. He was captured by our fellow countrymen - the Altai cavalrymen.

On August 8, 1944, parts of the division on the eastern bank of the Vistula were replaced by Polish troops. The cavalrymen were given a new combat mission - to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the Dęblin-Pulawa direction. On August 16, 1944, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its excellent actions during the liberation of the cities of Kholm and Lublin.

The 15th Guards Cavalry Division, together with troops located on the Pulawy bridgehead, prepared for the liberation of the Brandenburg province of Germany. This continued until January 14, 1945.

Commander of the 2nd Separate Guards (later - Order of the Red Star) Communications Division:

MOROZOV Alexander Maksimovich, Soviet front-line officer.
Born in 1919 in the city of Irbit Sverdlovsk region. Russian. Party affiliation: since 1938 - a member of the Komsomol, as of April 1943 - non-party, as of September 1943 - a candidate member of the CPSU (b), and as of August 1944 - a member of the CPSU (b). Was married: wife – A.Sh. Erofeeva (the initials of the first name and patronymic are not deciphered in the document).
Education:
- general – secondary: graduated from ten-year school;
- military - on January 31, 1939 he graduated from the Kiev Military (later - Red Banner) School of Communications named after M.I. Kalinina.
On military service entered voluntarily in 1936 through the Bryansk State Military Commission at that time in the Oryol, and now modern Bryansk region, becoming a cadet at the Kyiv Military School of Communications (since 1937 - a military school) named after M.I. Kalinina.
In 1936-1939. – cadet of the military educational institution of the Signal Corps. Upon release by order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0014 dated January 31, 1939, he was promoted to lieutenant with assignment, presumably, to the troops of the Central Asian Military District. Source – RGVA: f. 8489, op. 1, d. 112, l. 51.
He took the military oath on February 23, 1939.
By order of the SAVO troops No. 0749 dated December 2, 1940, he was appointed chief of communications (also assistant chief of staff) of the 67th mountain cavalry triple Red Banner Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Turkmen SSR regiment (Fergana military garrison) of the 21st mountain cavalry division.
In this capacity (including holding the military rank of “lieutenant”) and as of March 22, 1941. Source – RGVA: f. 8489, op. 1, d. 112, l. 51.
In 1940 and the first half of 1941, as a frontline warrior and Komsomol activist, he was repeatedly voiced from the pages of the daily Red Army newspaper of the SAVO “Frunzevets”.
By order of the SAVO troops No. 0098 dated June 17, 1941, “he was relieved of his position and sent for retraining to the Red Army Air Force troops - to the Krasnodar United aviation school" Source – RGVA: f. 32492, op. 2, d. 164, l. 109.
Direct participant of the Great Patriotic War since 1941.
On June 22 and October 10, 1942, while serving with the troops of the 50th Army of the Western Front, he received two minor concussions.
While serving with the 50th Army of the Western Front, he received two minor concussions - on June 22 and October 10, 1942.
Since December 1942 - commander of the 2nd separate guards (later - Order of the Red Star) communications division of the 2nd Guards Cavalry (later - Pomeranian Red Banner Order of Suvorov) corps, while as of April 1943 - guard captain by military rank, and as of September 1943 and August 1944 - already a guard major.
At the very beginning of April (but no later than the 5th) 1943, the head of communications of the 2nd Guards. CC Guard Lieutenant Colonel F.A. Anisimov was nominated for the medal “For Courage”: “t. Morozov A.M., being in the 2nd GKK [correctly – 2nd Guards. kk] since December [month] 1942 in the position of commander [commander] of a communications division, he showed himself to be an efficient, resourceful commander.
During the entire operation, Comrade Morozov personally organized the restoration of permanent lines directly behind the advancing units, which made it possible to communicate with all units using small means.
Comrade Morozov repeatedly personally supervised the targeting of the battle line, organized communications at the remote command post [command post] of the corps [commander]. Being all the time on the front lines, he skillfully organized work with the rear to provide the personnel with everything they needed.
Comrade Morozov deserves to be awarded the medal “For Courage”. Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 682526, no. 141, l. 188.
This idea was implemented in the lines of the order for the troops of the Central Front (II f) No. 31/n dated April 19, 1943. He was awarded his very first state award - the medal “For Courage”. Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 682526, no. 141, no. 98 and 101.
In the second half of September (but no later than the 24th) 1943, the head of communications of the 2nd Guards. CC Guard Colonel F.A. Anisimov was nominated for the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree: “t. Morozov, working as a commander [commander] of a communications division under the 2nd Guards. KK since March 1943 [correctly - since December 1942], showed himself to be an efficient, strong-willed commander who knows his job.
During his work in the 2nd Guards. KK managed to organize the provision of communications to the corps, despite a number of difficulties.
For skillful leadership in operations, he was previously awarded the medal “For Courage”.
In recent operations, being separated from the main forces, and completely isolated from the communications reserve, Comrade Morozov was able to provide command and control of small assets, thanks to his knowledge of the entire operational situation.
The personnel of the communications division, led by Comrade Morozov, show examples of work and devotion to the Motherland, for which more than half were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union.
For steadfastness and devotion, for skillful leadership of the division, providing the corps command with uninterrupted communications, Comrade Morozov is worthy of being awarded a government [correctly, state] award - the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree [correctly, the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree].” Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 686044, no. 478, l. 176.
This idea was implemented in the lines of the order for the troops of the Bryansk Front (III f) No. 100/n dated September 30, 1943: on behalf of the Motherland, he was awarded his second military award - the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree. Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 686044, no. 478, no. 73 and 77.
On August 14, 1944, the chief of communications of the 2nd Guards. CC Guard Colonel F.A. Anisimov was nominated for the Order of Alexander Nevsky: “t. Morozov during the period of offensive military operations of the corps to capture the [Polish] cities. Lukov, Siedlce [now Siedlce], Minsk-Mazowiecki [now Minsk-Mazowiecki] skillfully led the personnel of the communications division in providing the corps with communications. He managed to organize the work of his subordinates in such a way that at all stages of the battle there was timely, stable communication with higher headquarters, neighbors and subordinate [units].
Repeatedly personally went forward and organized communications at subsequent command posts of the corps headquarters. He also supervised the establishment of communications with subordinate units.
In a combat situation, he behaves boldly, energetically, and proactively.
He showed himself to be a well-versed officer.
Worthy of being awarded a government [correctly, state] award - the Order of Alexander Nevsky [correctly, the Order of Alexander Nevsky].” Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 690155, building 1358, l. 93.
This idea was implemented in the lines of the order for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (II f) No. 235/n dated September 8, 1944: on behalf of the Motherland, he was awarded his third military award - the Order of Alexander Nevsky. Source – TsAMO: f. 33, op. 690155, no. 1358, pp. 77 and 78.
Further fate is unknown.

Brief report on the formation and staffing of cavalry formations for 1942-43. and organizational measures taken for the cavalry during this period. Secret. Ex.1

I. Cadre cavalry in the initial period of the Patriotic War - 1941.

By the beginning of World War II, the cavalry of the Red Army consisted of four cavalry corps.

In the western districts:

2nd Cavalry Corps - corps commander Major General Belov. Composition: 5th and 9th cavalry divisions. Until January 22, 1941, the corps was stationed in the Odessa Military District in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Comrat region;

5th Cavalry Corps - corps commander Major General Kamkov. Composition: 3rd and 14th cavalry divisions. Until January 22, 1941, the corps was stationed in the area of ​​Slavuta and Zholkiew;

6th Cavalry Corps - corps commander Major General Nikitin. Composition: 6th and 35th cavalry divisions. The corps was stationed until 22.1.41 in Western Belarus - Lrmzha, Volkovysk, Graevo. The 6th Cavalry Corps died in the first days of the Patriotic War with the German occupiers in June-July 1941.

4th Cavalry Corps - corps commander Lieutenant General Shapkin. Composition: 18, 20 and 21 cavalry divisions. He was part of the troops of the Central Asian Military District. The corps headquarters was stationed in Tashkent.

Separate cavalry divisions - 8, 17, 24 and 32.

Divisions and corps left for the front in November 1941 and became part of: 20th Cavalry Division as part of the troops of the Kalinin Front; 21 cavalry division - to the Bryansk Front; 18th Mountain Cavalry Division - In January 1942, it was introduced into the 11th Cavalry Corps.

In the first period of the war, professional cavalry corps fought defensive and rearguard battles, holding back the enemy’s onslaught, covering the systematic withdrawal of rifle units and ensuring through their actions the mobilization of Red Army units.

In the period November-December 1941, in the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Belov performed a great task, which on November 26, 1941 was transformed into the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps for the defeat of the shock group of Guderian's 2nd Tank Army. (7)

When the Germans retreated from Moscow, a successful pursuit operation was carried out by the corps of Major General Dovator, for which it was transformed into the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps on December 25, 1941.

II. Formation of cavalry divisions during the war.

The enemy, rapidly advancing with mechanized mobile units, forced the Red Army units to retreat. The situation required the creation of cavalry mobile units in a short time (1-1.5 months) to operate behind enemy lines.

The organization of light cavalry divisions was aimed at defeating the enemy's rear and headquarters, seizing his communications, and disrupting the systematic delivery and supply of the enemy's front.

Conclusion: The combat experience of the 2nd and 5th cavalry corps in the Southwestern and Southern directions fully confirmed the feasibility of large cavalry formations, which are the main mobile operational asset in the hands of front commanders.

From the first days of the Patriotic War, the cavalry corps, with their daring maneuvers, played a decisive role and ensured the systematic withdrawal of parts of the South-Western and Southern directions. (10)

III. The first period of the formation of cavalry corps.

To strengthen the offensive combat power of the Red Army in 1942, by decision of the State Defense Committee, fifteen cavalry corps were formed in the first half of 1942 (January-May).

To staff fifteen cavalry corps it was required:

By the end of the formation periods established by the State Defense Committee, the staffing of the cavalry corps was not brought to the standard strength, since there was not a sufficient number of reserves (trained cavalrymen), and difficulties in armament did not make it possible to staff the mass of the formed cavalry corps in such a short time.

Staffing according to certain species armament was brought to only 10-15%, the average staffing level in the corps was 65-70%.

In order to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the cavalry, equipping it with qualitatively better men and horses, by resolutions of the State Defense Committee No. 0043 and No. 0054, a partial reorganization of cavalry formations was carried out in the period March-April 1942.

The 1st, 3rd, 9th, 10th, 12th, 14th and 16th cavalry corps were disbanded and used to replenish the remaining cavalry corps. After carrying out organizational measures to reduce the cavalry in March-April 1942, the total number of cavalry was:

The released personnel, cavalry and weapons from the (12) organizational events carried out are used to replenish the remaining cavalry corps.

The staffing of the cavalry corps in personnel, horses, as well as materiel for the month of June 1942 was:

IV. Replenishment of cavalry corps in 1942.

Replenishment for the formation of the cavalry corps in 1942 came mainly from the resources of the fronts and districts at the place of their deployment.

Replenishment to complete the cavalry corps operating at the fronts was received:

a) from reserve cavalry regiments, and with the reorganization of reserve cavalry regiments into reserve cavalry brigades, from the latter. In total, for the period from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1942, the following were received from spare parts: people - 294,331; horses – 88943;

b) from the disbandment of national cavalry units, the following were transferred to the cavalry unit: people - 56,254; horses – 51107. (13)

V. Reduction of cavalry in August 1942.

In order to further strengthen the combat effectiveness of the cavalry and staff it with qualitatively better human and equine personnel, by order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 00144 dated July 15, 1942. a secondary reduction of the cavalry was carried out - the following were disbanded:

a) control and corps units of the 2, 5 and 6 cavalry corps - 26, 28, 30(?), 33, 49, 60, 62 and 70 cavalry divisions. 11, 13, 17 (probably 16kk?) cavalry corps - 18, 24, 46, 25, 80, 87, 17, 73 cavalry divisions;

b) five national cavalry divisions - 27, 99, 104, 105, 107 - of the Central Asian Military District;

c) reserve cavalry regiments - 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 3, 1, 16, 21;

d) fifty-nine condepots and 15 repair commissions;

e) Tashkent and Chkalov cavalry schools.

After the organizational events on June 20, 1942. the remaining 1, 2, 3 Guards Cavalry Corps, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 18 Cavalry Corps, 23, 25, 39 Cavalry Divisions were mainly staffed to wartime levels.

VI. Reorganization of the cavalry during 1942.

During the period of reorganization of the cavalry (1942), the following were introduced in the cavalry divisions: a horse artillery division and a half-squadron of communications; in the saber squadrons, an anti-tank rifle platoon and a platoon of 50mm mortars, a separate engineer squadron, an air defense battery and a medical squadron were added.

In September 1942, reconnaissance divisions and food transport were formed in the divisions. The cavalry corps has a separate mortar division, an anti-tank fighter division, and a separate anti-aircraft machine gun squadron.

The situation required the rapid entry into battle of the newly formed cavalry corps; the time for their regular reorganization was on average 15-20 days. During this time, it was necessary to do a lot of work to staff personnel, horses and weapons and, in addition, conduct classes, complete what they did not have time to learn, teach new methods of combat, using the experience of war. All this created difficulties during the formation period, and the limited time created a rush, and a number of issues were not finalized.

VII. Difficulties during the formation period.

The formation took place in conditions of a fierce struggle against German fascism. Difficulties in providing food, a large shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers, and shortcomings in weapons.

During this period, only three guards corps (1, 2 and 3) were well equipped. The linear cavalry corps were not fully equipped and were especially poorly armed.

There were not enough officers and non-commissioned officers, although they were removed (cavalry officers) from other branches of the military, but naturally, the best cavalry officers were retained in other branches of the military.

There was no limit for the Red Army cavalry in terms of personnel and cavalry in 1942. The staffing requirement for cavalry was determined by the presence of cavalry corps and divisions, based on their staffing strength.

The general limit for cavalry was set by State Defense Committee Directive No. 3221ss at 213,076 people in 1943 after a partial reorganization and reduction of cavalry units. (15)

VIII. Organizational arrangements for staffing in the winter.

a) ten cavalry corps (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Guards Cavalry Corps; 4, 15 and 18 Cavalry Corps) consisting of twenty-six cavalry divisions (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 guards and 1, 7, 8, 20, 23, 30, 32, 61, 3 and 81 cd);

b) seven separate cavalry divisions (24, 3, 51, 58, 59, 97 and 110 cavalry divisions);

c) three separate cavalry regiments (245, 246 and 247 kp);

d) five reserve cavalry regiments (6, 9, 15, 87 and 147 zkp);

e) one reserve horse artillery regiment regiment (41zkap);

f) one KKKUKS named after S.M. Budyonny;

g) two cavalry schools (Tambov and Novocherkassk);

h) seven cavalry courses for training junior lieutenants.

Numerical composition: total cavalry personnel - 238,958 people, horses - 226,816.

In order to increase the firepower of cavalry corps and divisions, a petition was filed before the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR for the introduction of reinforcement units into the cavalry, as a result of which orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0012 and 0013 of December 31, 1942 were issued, according to which the following were introduced:

a) to the cavalry corps - a mechanized anti-tank fighter regiment (5 batteries of 76mm ZIS-3 guns - 20 guns); anti-aircraft machine gun squadron (12 DShK machine guns); the mortar regiment of the corps was reorganized into a mortar division (18 - 120mm mortars), 82mm mortars from the mortar regiment were removed and transferred to strengthen the mortar batteries of cavalry regiments; additionally, a commandant squadron, a field bakery and a corps exchange office were introduced into the corps;

b) to the cavalry division - an artillery and mortar regiment consisting of 2 batteries of 76mm ZIS-3 cannons and 3 batteries of 120mm mortars;

Tank regiment (39 tanks, of which 23 T-34 and 16 T-70);

Separate air defense division (27 DShK machine guns and 6 - 37mm or 25mm mechanized anti-aircraft guns);

Saddlery workshop for servicing parts.

Guards cavalry divisions were transferred to 3 regimental composition, and all divisions (guards and numbered) to a single staff. (16)

As a result of the measures taken, a unified staff organization of the cavalry was achieved. The combat power of cavalry corps and divisions has increased significantly.

According to the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 36669 dated February 19, 1943, the administration of the 19th Cavalry Corps with corps units was formed, and the 8th cavalry corps of the 18th Cavalry Corps (Far Eastern Front) and 51 separate cavalry divisions (Trans-Baikal Front) were also introduced into this corps.

Due to the withdrawal of 7 and 8 cavalry divisions from the Far Eastern Fleet, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 0016, on the basis of 246 and 247 separate cavalry regiments, 67 and 84 cavalry divisions were formed, which became part of the 18 Cavalry Corps, as well as by directive No. f2/3/2018 from 2/18/43 - 59th Cavalry Division (Transbaikal Front), replacing the 51kd withdrawn from the Transbaikal Front.

According to the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 46044 of February 3, 1943, the 58th Cavalry Division was formed on the basis of the 15th reserve cavalry regiment.

As a result of long, stubborn battles, the 4th and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps as part of the troops of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasian fronts, as well as the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps in the Stalingrad operation, suffered heavy losses.

To restore the corps, measures were taken to recruit Cossack volunteers and horse troops from local reserves, as a result of which the corps received:

a) from the Stavropol Territory to the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps - 5000 people, 3058 horses;

b) from Krasnodar region in the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps - people - 9842, horses - 5500;

c) from the Stalingrad and Rostov regions to the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps - 7344 people, 1046 horses.

In total, the corps received: 22,186 people, 9,604 horses.

IX. Organizational measures for staffing cavalry corps in the spring of 1943.

To complete the guards cavalry corps to full strength and increase their combat power, according to the resolution of the State Defense Committee No. 3251ss of April 25, 1943, measures were taken to disband the 4th and 19th cavalry corps, 7, 51, 58, 61 and 81st cavalry divisions and corps units , whose personnel, cavalry, as well as weapons and military equipment were used to replenish the 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 Guards Cavalry Corps. (17)

Based on the same resolution and order of NKO No. 022 dated May 1, 1943. Additional reinforcements were introduced into the cavalry corps: tank brigades, self-propelled artillery regiments, MZA regiments, guards mortar regiments and separate motor transport battalions.

The anti-aircraft machine gun squadrons of the cavalry corps were disbanded, the personnel, equipment and transport of which were used to form MZA regiments under the cavalry corps.

According to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of April 27, 1943 No. 46127, 46129, 46130, 46131, 46132 - 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 Guards Corps at the end of April this year. were withdrawn to the SVGK reserve as part of the troops of the Steppe Front. After the battles, the listed corps had very poor staffing and material security.

The 1st and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were in the reserve of the fronts - the first in the South-Western, the fourth in the Southern.

During the period they were in reserve, the Guards Cavalry Corps, according to plans approved by the Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Budyonny, received a large number of personnel, cavalry, weapons and military property, through receipt through the central Directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense at the request of the headquarters of the commander of the cavalry of the Red Army and through internal reorganization and transfer of personnel, cavalry of disbanded cavalry units and formations.

During the same period, the corps received reinforcement units allocated by decree of the State Defense Committee No. 321 of April 25, 1943:

X. Organizational measures for staffing cavalry corps in the summer of 1943.

In order to bring the regular strength of the cavalry in accordance with the limit established by the State Defense Committee No. 3621ss (213,076 people) and the NKO order No. 0098 dated June 21, 1943, the following was carried out:

a) disbandment of 24 separate cavalry divisions, 2 reserve cavalry brigades, five front-line courses for training junior lieutenants (Bryansk, Western, South-Western, Southern and Transcaucasian fronts) and cavalry courses for training junior lieutenants for guards cavalry units;

b) tank brigades, self-propelled artillery regiments, MZA regiments, guards mortar regiments (RS) and motor transport battalions were excluded from the 15th and 18th cavalry corps.

In order to strengthen the cavalry units of the Red Army with transport means, improve the management of special units and their staffing organization, according to the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army No. org/3/138057 dated 14.8.43. - introduced into the corps: ferry parks of 33 people in each sapper squadron of the cavalry division.

The staff of the corps artillery commander has been strengthened - a technical unit has been created headed by the head of the division's ABT service. Mounted reconnaissance platoons and trumpet platoons were introduced into the cavalry regiments.

According to the same directive, tank brigades of the cavalry corps were replaced by tank regiments according to staff No. 010/455 (260 people), which are included in the corps according to special instructions, and the self-propelled artillery regiments of the corps were transferred from staff No. 08/191 to staff No. 010/455 (260 people).

According to the directive of the General Staff of the KA No.org/2/1322 dated July 23, 1943. The Directorate of the 18th Cavalry Corps and the 67th Cavalry Division was disbanded.

Reorganization of cavalry spare parts to create better conditions preparation of marching reinforcements to the front. Spare cavalry units consisted of six separate reserve cavalry regiments and one separate reserve cavalry artillery regiment, stationed on the territory of the Moscow Military District, South Urals Military District, Siberian Military District, Privodnyi Military District, Don and Transcaucasian Fronts.

The regular organization of the reserve cavalry regiments was overloaded with ordinary variable composition of the platoon, squadron and battery, which did not provide high-quality combat training for marching (19) replacements and there was no opportunity to train specialists - machine gunners, mortarmen, and anti-tank rifle crews. In this regard, the reserve cavalry regiments, according to the directive of the General Staff of the KA No. org / 3/2029 of March 10, 1943, were reorganized into reserve cavalry brigades according to the state No. 06/340: 1 reserve cavalry brigade (87zkp) - MVO; 2nd reserve cavalry brigade (9zkp) - YuzhUrVO; 3rd reserve cavalry brigade (6zkp) – Siberian Military District; 4th reserve cavalry brigade (147zkp) - SAVO; 5th reserve cavalry brigade (15zkp) - North Caucasus Military District; 6th reserve cavalry brigade (1zkp) - PriVO. According to the state No. 06/341 - 7 reserve horse artillery brigade (41zkap) - PriVO.

During the period from February 1 to August 1, 1943, reserve brigades sent marching reinforcements to the guards cavalry corps operating at the front:

1. Saber squadrons and batteries – 158.

2. People – 30693.

3. Horses – 14735.

To increase the front's trained marching reinforcements, according to the directive of the General Staff of the KA No. org/3/135973 of July 1, 1943, the 15th separate reserve cavalry regiment was formed with the deployment of Tuymaza (YuzhUrVO). on the basis of the disbanded 2nd reserve cavalry brigade.

XI. For cavalry universities.

To create better conditions for retraining officers, the staff of the Red Banner Higher Officer Cavalry School was revised, approved by the directive of the General Staff of the KA No. org/7/137960 dated 6.8.43, on the basis of which the school was reorganized and transferred to these staffs.

The existing front-line cavalry courses did not provide high-quality training for junior lieutenants. In this regard, by order of NKO No. 0098 dated June 21, 1943, all front-line cavalry courses and courses for training junior lieutenants for guards cavalry units were disbanded.

To replace the disbanded courses, according to the directive of the General Staff of the KA No. org/7/136070s, the 2nd Tambov Cavalry School was formed with a deployment in Tambov. (20)

In order to create better conditions for the training of cavalry officers, new staffs were developed (No. 017/444), approved by the directive of the General Staff of the KA No. org/7/136170 dated July 6, 1943, on the basis of which the reorganization was carried out, and cavalry schools were transferred to a new staff.

XII. Difficulties during the reorganization of the cavalry corps in 1943.

During the ongoing reorganization of the cavalry corps, significant difficulties arose in matters of reorganization and staffing:

1. A large shortage of personnel, especially the lack of trained specialists for the newly introduced reinforcement units (artillerymen, tank crews, etc.).

2. Delay in transporting people, horses and equipment by rail.

3. A large shortage of horse resources, which had to be purchased abroad.

4. Late arrival of weapons, equipment of tanks and vehicles for ongoing organizational events. The delay in the receipt of these material resources by part of the corps affected the training of personnel and the putting together of newly formed units.

5. Large shortages of grain fodder for the horse train were allowed.

XIII. The grade and breed of horses entering the cavalry corps in the period 1942-1943.

Basically, about 200,000 horses were taken from National economy.

Horse breeds:

North Caucasus Military District – Don, Kabardian, Karachay, Kalmyk;

HVO – local Ukrainian;

MVO and OrVO - mestizos improved by the trotter of the Oryol breed;

YuzhUrVO - Orenburg;

SAVO - Akhal-Teke, Lokai, Karabair and their mestizos;

SibVO – Siberian horse, Kuznetsk, Oirat;

Ural Military District - Vyatka, Bashkir.

Horse composition coming from the People's Commissariat of State Farms of the Union, improved on the basis of the English thoroughbred horse. (21)

From VKZ (military stud farms) – half-bred and improved.

In addition, imported horses were purchased for the cavalry units of the Red Army: about 45,000 - in the Mongolian People's Republic (very small, but hardy); up to 20,000 - in China (also of the Mongolian type); 5000 - in the Tuvan People's Republic (height 132-138cm).

XIV. Autumn-winter period of 1943 (September-December months of 1943).

In the autumn-winter period of 1943, all guards cavalry corps and divisions were maintained under a single staff, which made it easier to plan and distribute available resources.

In the autumn-winter combat operations, all guards cavalry corps were used at the fronts to maximum tension, as a result of which they suffered heavy losses in personnel, cavalry and equipment.

In the period September–December 1943 there were seven guards corps (1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6 and 7 guards cavalry corps), 15 cavalry corps and three separate cavalry divisions (38, 59 and 84).

Replenishment for the replenishment of the cavalry corps was received:

a) personnel and cavalry, mainly from reserve cavalry brigades, at the expense of trained and assembled marching squadrons and batteries;

b) specialists (radio operators, signalmen, drivers) of the corps were replenished according to the orders of the GUF KA (main directorate for formations of the Red Army);

c) from the resources of the fronts, at the expense of cavalrymen recovering from hospitals after being wounded and the disbandment of non-standard cavalry units;

d) due to the partial disbandment of individual cavalry divisions (24kd, 2nd reserve cavalry brigade and front-line courses for junior lieutenants of the Western, Southwestern and Transcaucasian fronts).

In the period September - December 1943, the cavalry corps were staffed exclusively at the expense of reserve cavalry brigades, which, during the period of their organization from April 1943, provided 27,236 people and 20,719 horses to replenish the cavalry corps. Reinforcements to cavalry corps are sent by separate marching squadrons (teams) in echelons. On average, it takes 15-25 days to transfer personnel and horses from reserve cavalry brigades to active cavalry corps. The distance from reserve cavalry brigades to active cavalry corps is on average 1500-4500 km (Kovrov, Alma-Ata). From the Transbaikal Front - 7000 km, Far Eastern Front - 9000 km.

The withdrawal of cavalry corps to the reserve of the front or army created unfavorable conditions for their replenishment and bringing them into combat readiness in the shortest possible time. Using examples of the manning of the 2nd and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, which were in the reserve armies of the Belorussian Front in November-December 1943, we can conclude that cavalry corps, being in the front-line or army reserve, very often receive various combat missions related to transitions or are abandoned into battle without completing recruitment.

The weapons and military equipment sent by the Center to the army (front) for the cavalry corps do not always reach their intended destination, since the army commanders consider the cavalry corps temporarily subordinate to them, and the property intended for the cavalry corps is transferred to the rifle divisions. (23)

All this creates difficulties in replenishing and staffing cavalry corps that are in the front-line or army reserve.

XV. The degree of training of personnel and horses entering the cavalry corps.

Reinforcements for cavalry corps arrive with varying training periods. those who previously served in the army from one to two years - up to 30%, from four months to one year - up to 20%, those who did not serve in the army - up to 45%. The degree of training of incoming reinforcements is insufficient, due to the fact that the staffing of reserve cavalry brigades occurs mainly due to untrained personnel, which in 2 month period training cannot acquire sufficient skills as a cavalryman.

Horses supplied to the cavalry from the national economy, as well as imported horses, are not prepared for service in the ranks.

1. The existing staffing structure of cavalry units and formations requires organizational changes.

It is necessary to reorganize the artillery of the guards cavalry corps and divisions in the direction of increasing its firepower, especially anti-tank and air defense systems.

Increase the number of line units, since with the existing 12-row platoon composition, in combat practice there is a burden of equipment and a lack of manpower to consolidate the success achieved.

Improve the organization of units and communications units of the guards cavalry for uninterrupted control of the battle.

2. Practice has shown that it is advisable to withdraw at least two corps to the reserve of the Supreme High Command for restoration within the rear borders of the fronts, to areas that ensure an uninterrupted supply of grain fodder and have good transportation routes to supply stations.

It is inappropriate to withdraw corps for restoration to the reserve of fronts (armies), since in these cases it becomes more difficult to replenish them through the central departments of NPOs and the readiness period is delayed.

3. To create better conditions for manning a variable composition and reduce the depth of supply to the corps of replenishment, it is necessary to bring the 3rd and 4th reserve cavalry brigades closer to the front through redeployment. (24)

4. In order to create a reserve of horses and staff the guards cavalry corps operating at the front, it is necessary to immediately resolve the issue from which sources we will take horses, since the horse resources available in the reserve cavalry brigades have been exhausted.

Chief of Staff of the Guard, Major General Martyanov

Head of the 3rd Department, Major General S. Timokhin (both signatures)

Connection history:

Formed in July 1941 in the North Caucasus Military District near Armavir. The division included the 4th, 37th (Colonel Lasovsky), 43rd (Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov), 47th cavalry regiments. The core of the division was the Cossacks of the Kuban villages of Prochnookopskaya, Labinskaya, Kurgannaya, Sovetskaya, Voznesenskaya, Otradnaya. Senior officers were sent from regular cavalry units, from academies and schools. The bulk of junior officers, almost all political workers, as well as all sergeants and enlisted personnel came from the reserves. The division was staffed mainly by Cossacks from the Krasnodar Territory and the North. Ossetia.

On July 13, 1941, the newly formed cavalry division received an order from the commander of the North Caucasus Military District: to load up and join the Active Army. There was no time to train and coordinate the division; the Motherland was going through difficult days. At Rostov, the trains crossed the Don and rushed further north - past the coal and metallurgical giants of Donbass. We passed Kharkov, Kursk, Orel. The echelons were heading towards the capital of the Motherland - Moscow.

Having unloaded at Staraya Toropa station, between Rzhev and Velikiye Luki, the division received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, to move to the area of ​​Lake Shchuchye, where large forces of motorized formations from 3TGr broke through on July 15th.

By evening, the last echelon arrived and unloaded, and the entire division concentrated in the forest. Preparations for the trip began. Patrols were sent out to establish contact with the enemy and to communicate with their troops. Staff officers checked the readiness of regiments and squadrons for battle. Early in the morning of the 19th the order to march was received. The 37th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to the vanguard. The cavalry went on a campaign through dense forests, among peat bogs, past Lake Verezhun. The division's route lay to the crossing of the Mezha River near the village of Zhaboedovo. By the end of the next day, the division reached the northern bank of the Mezha River and stopped for a long rest in the forest. According to the headquarters of the 29th Army, the advanced units of the Soviet rifle formations were supposed to be located at the Kanat, Ordynka line. However, the patrols sent forward did not find their troops anywhere.

The division commander decided to organize deep reconnaissance and by force establish an enemy group on the southern bank of Mezha. Soon the division approached the Mezhe River near the village of Ordynka, where the scouts found a ford. The vanguard regiment crossed the river on the move and continued the march; soon the cavalry came into combat contact with enemy units. Tank units from the enemy's 19th Tank Division operated here. Having discovered the actions of our cavalry, the Germans launched a counterattack and forced the cavalrymen, who had suffered heavy losses, to retreat to the north. direction. Having left the battle, the division gathered, moved along the northern shore of Mezha in the direction of Lake Emlen and stopped here for the day.

July 27 - August 8 '41 The division, together with the 53rd cavalry division, operated in the Zhaboyedovo area and carried out reconnaissance of enemy intentions in a vast forest area at the junction of the 29th and 30th armies of the Western Front. The German and Soviet units were separated by the Mezha River. To the north The cavalrymen were stationed on the shore, and the Germans were in populated areas on the south. On August 8, both divisions were united under the command of Major General Dovator into the CavGroup.

After resting in the area of ​​Lake Emlen, both divisions of Dovator’s group moved on a raid behind enemy lines in the Dukhovshchinsky direction. Operations behind enemy lines were expected to be light. The artillery was left at the division's location. Having gone out into the raid, passing secretly through an almost impassable swamp and dense forest, both divisions crossed the Mezha River on August 16 and concentrated in the Ponizovye and Ustye areas. There were strong enemy garrisons here.

On August 23, together with 53kd, taking advantage of thick fog, the division broke through the enemy barrier in the Ponizovye area and reached the enemy’s rear. The remnants of the German 490pp fled into the surrounding forests. From August 23 to September 1, both divisions operated behind enemy lines from Dukhovshchina. The cavalrymen destroyed enemy headquarters, communication lines, bridges, and sowed panic behind enemy lines. By September 1, both divisions again concentrated in the Yuganov forests and, having made a breakthrough, joined the main forces of the Western Front.

During the raid, 150 vehicles, 4 armored vehicles and 2 tanks were destroyed and large trophies were captured. A partisan detachment was sent behind enemy lines.

By dawn on September 19, 1941, the cavalry, having received a new combat order, made a forty-kilometer march and, as an advance detachment, reached the Borki, Zharkovsky line. The patrols were sent forward with the task of establishing an enemy group on the southern bank of the Mezhi River. Until October 2, Dovatov’s cavalry group continued to ensure the junction of the 29th and 30th armies of the front in the Kotovo area and carry out reconnaissance of enemy actions.

At dawn on October 2, enemy artillery opened heavy fire on the location of the advance detachment of the cavalry group. Half an hour later, the enemy, with a strength of up to an infantry regiment, went on the attack. For six hours, the cavalrymen fought off continuous attacks by enemy infantry. As soon as information was received about the start of the enemy's offensive, the main forces of the 50th Cavalry Division advanced to the Mezhe River.

Early in the morning of October 4, enemy artillery resumed shelling the cavalry positions. In the interfluve of the West. Dvina and Mezhi were operated by the enemy's 110th Infantry Division, which launched an offensive along the northern. banks of the Mezha River in the north. Large enemy forces also launched an attack on Bely and occupied this city on October 4. The 53rd Cavalry Division was sent there. The 50th was left alone and relied only on its own strength.

After three days of fighting in the Mezhi River valley, the 50th Cavalry Division retreated to the Olenin-Bely highway and for another four days repelled enemy attempts to bypass the right flank of the army. On October 9, the approaching rifle units replaced the division, and the cavalry set out in the direction of Vyazovakh, where the 53rd Cavalry Division was already moving from Bely. An order was received from the commander of the Western Front to withdraw the cavalry group to reserve for replenishment.

Having united, both divisions headed to the Osuga station, located on the Rzhev-Vyazma railway, but the enemy managed to forestall the cavalry. German motorized units, having captured Zhirkovsky Hill, Novo-Dugino and Sychevka, developed an offensive towards Rzhev. The cavalry retreated to the Medvedovsky forest. The dispatched patrols brought disappointing news: along the highway along the railway track, motorized columns of the enemy were moving north, and from the west, pursuing units were attacking the rearguards.

On the night of October 11, the cavalry group approached the highway. The 3rd German Panzer Group captured Rzhev and Zubtsov; Columns of tanks and motorized infantry moved along the roads further to the East - to Pogoreloe Gorodishche, Shakhovskaya, Volokolamsk. Our troops retreated to Moscow with heavy defensive battles.

The cavalry group made a forced march to the area of ​​the Knyazhi Gory station, but the enemy again forestalled it. The horsemen were forced to move on without stopping. Making their way along remote country roads, the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions made surprise raids on enemy barriers that occupied road junctions and continued to march to link up with their troops.

On October 12, in the Volokolamsk region, cavalrymen of Dovator’s group broke into the location of 16A of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky. The 50kd consisted of no more than 500 sabers.

On October 13, the division as part of the cavalry group concentrated in the forests east of Volokolamsk. Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky ordered the group commander, General Dovator, to take up defense on the right flank of the 16th Army, in the strip from the Volga Reservoir to Yaropolets. At this line, the cavalrymen repelled several enemy attempts to cross to the eastern bank of the Lama River.

General Dovator's cavalry group concentrated in the Novo-Petrovskoye area, covering from the south the left flank of General Panfilov's 316th Infantry Division, which was defending on the Volokolamsk Highway. Located several kilometers in the rear of its troops, the cavalry was putting its units in order after three months of almost continuous battles and campaigns.

On November 5, 1941, the division received an order as part of Dovator's cavalry group to take up defense on the northern bank of the Lama River and prevent the enemy from breaking through from the south to the Volokolamsk highway. Fulfilling the order, the division saddled the highway overlooking the Volokolamsk highway from the direction of Ruza.

At dawn on November 16, 1941, the “general” offensive of the Nazi troops against Moscow began. The main attack on the enemy’s northern flank was carried out by the 4th and 3rd tank groups. In the area where this blow was delivered, the 316th Rifle Division of General Panfilov, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of General Katukov and parts of the cavalry group of General Dovator were defending.

In the zone of the 316th SD (since November 18, it became the 8th Guards Infantry Division) and Dovator’s cavalry units, units of the enemy’s XXXXVIMK 3TGr (2, 11, 5, 10 TD, MD SS “R”) were advancing. Following a barrage of artillery fire, the enemy began an offensive in the zone of the 50th Cavalry Division, where the 43rd and 37th Cavalry Regiments were defending in Morozov and Ivantsov. Up to 30 tanks attacked the forward squadrons. Following the tanks, infantry emerged from the forest.

Attack followed attack. The enemy chains ran up and rolled back again under fire. The enemy retreated and rushed forward again, to the houses of Morozov and Ivantsov, which were burning brightly in the ensuing darkness, where the squadrons that had withdrawn from the bank of the Lama continued to defend themselves. By evening the cavalrymen had shot all the ammunition. Enemy attacks did not stop.

In the evening, the enemy still managed to break into the burning pile of ruins, which in the morning was called the village of Ivantsovo. The commander of the 37th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Lasovsky, led his soldiers five hundred meters to the north. The right-flank 43rd Cavalry Regiment held the ruins of Morozov for another half hour, but, having been outflanked on both flanks, it found itself under the threat of encirclement. The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov, ordered the squadrons to retreat behind a deep ravine that stretched northeast of the village. The regiment again took up defensive positions at the edge of the forest. The enemy managed to capture the entire front line of defense of the 50th Cavalry Division.

Having brought up reserves, the enemy's 5th Tank Division continued persistent attacks against General Pliev's cavalrymen defending between the Volokolamsk Highway and the Lama River. At the end of the day, enemy infantry bypassed Morozovo and Ivantsovo and, accompanied by seven tanks, rushed to Matrenino, where the division headquarters was located. Communication with headquarters was interrupted. The 37th and 43rd cavalry regiments were surrounded.

Lieutenant Colonels Lasovsky and Smirnov abandoned their positions, which had become unnecessary, and concentrated their squadrons in the forest east of Ivantsovo. It was decided to go to Chismena and look for the division headquarters. The rear guards remained there. We had to go on foot, hungry, in summer uniform. They broke through the Volokolamsk highway in battle. We stopped for the night in a village. Before dawn, the regiments reached the command post of the 50th Cavalry Division.

It was the fourth day of continuous fierce battle for Moscow. The battle reached particular intensity on November 19. On this day, the cavalry repelled up to twenty enemy attacks. At 15:00 on November 20, a combat order was received from the commander of the 16th Army, General Rokossovsky: the cavalry group should withdraw beyond the Volokolamsk Highway, covering the right flank of the 8th Guards (formerly 316th) Rifle Division.

Dovator ordered the rear detachments to be left to cover the retreat, and the main forces of the divisions to be immediately withdrawn to new lines. Under the cover of rear detachments, the cavalry group retreated beyond the Volokolamsk Highway, on November 22 it was withdrawn from the battle formations of rifle formations and concentrated in the Nudol area.

On November 22, the division became part of the newly formed 3rd Cavalry Corps. At dawn on November 23, 1941, the division commander received an order from corps commander Dovator to move to the Solnechnogorsk area with a forced march. At 9 o'clock in the morning the division was already moving in regimental columns through Nudol to the crossing of the Istra Reservoir, located near the village of Pyatnitsa.

On November 24, 1941, the 3rd Cavalry Corps launched a counterattack against the enemy. The main blow was delivered by the 50th Cavalry Division. The right-flank 37th Cavalry Regiment, having advanced two kilometers, was delayed by enemy infantry fire. The 47th Cavalry Regiment, advancing on the division's left flank, also made little progress.

Then General Pliev brought into battle a reserve regiment with both tank battalions. Dismounted squadrons burst into Selishchevo. The enemy launched an infantry battalion into a counterattack, but was crushed by the cavalrymen, who for the first time went on the attack along with the new Ural T-34 tanks.

The squadrons of the 43rd Cavalry Regiment bypassed Martynovo from the north, where the enemy continued to offer stubborn resistance, and broke into the Nazis' location. After a fierce street battle, the second battalion of the 240th German Infantry Regiment was defeated.

The cavalry strike was a complete surprise for the enemy. The fascist German command began to quickly pull up reserves from Solnechnogorsk. Junkers appeared in the sky. The enemy brought into battle the main forces of the 23rd and 106th infantry divisions and about 50 tanks. Two enemy battalions with eight tanks attacked the left flank of the division and began to enter the rear of the cavalrymen. General Pliev led the last squadron remaining in his reserve and, with the support of tanks, led it in a counterattack. The enemy was driven back. The horsemen began to go on the defensive at the reached line.

A sudden attack by the cavalry thwarted the advance of a large enemy group from Solnechnogorsk towards Moscow. The Nazis were driven back, suffered significant losses and lost an entire day, which was used by the Soviet command. The lead battalions of the 7th Guards Rifle Division began to unload at Povarovo station to take up defensive positions on the Leningradskoe Highway.

For another two days the cavalrymen held their positions. The enemy, having brought the 2nd Tank Division and large aviation forces into the battle, launched one attack after another, but all in vain. On November 26, the enemy managed to advance somewhat along the Leningradskoe Highway and wedge itself between the 53rd Cavalry Division and the battalions of the 7th Guards Rifle Division. Enemy tanks and motorized infantry captured Esipovo and Peshki.

The corps commander transferred the 50th Cavalry Division with both tank battalions to the right flank. The enemy group that had broken through was driven back by a strike from horsemen, tankers and guards riflemen. The Soviet command received three days of precious time as a result of a bold strike and staunch defense of the cavalrymen and infantrymen. During this time, the front-line reserves took up defensive positions, covered the Leningradskoye Highway and again blocked the Nazi troops’ path to Moscow.

The autumn of 1941 was approaching. The enemy was preparing a new attack on Moscow. Under these conditions, it was decided to organize a cavalry raid in its rear, similar to the one in Civil War General Mamontov committed against the Red rear.
A proposal to repeat such a raid against the Germans was made by Lieutenant General of the Red Army, who in 1919, with the rank of captain, himself participated in the Mamontov raid. The proposal was accepted, but Shapkin himself at that moment had to enter Iran at the head of the 4th Cavalry Corps, and transporting the corps to the western front was considered inappropriate. Instead, a Separate Cavalry Group was created from the 50th and 53rd cavalry divisions, recruited from the Kuban Cossacks. The group was headed by Colonel Lev Mikhailovich Dovator, who had recently been awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the fact that on July 16, having discovered an enemy motorized mechanized detachment, he gathered scattered units and with them hit the enemy and knocked him out of the village of Krasnoye.
On August 10, the Military Council of the Western Front assigned Dovator the task of going behind enemy lines in the Demidov-Dukhovshchina area; paralyze the enemy’s communications, destroying transport, warehouses, headquarters and communications, and also find out the attitude of the population towards the Red Army in the territory occupied by the enemy.
On August 11 and 12, the group prepared to carry out the assigned task and on the 14th, after a 50-kilometer trek through wooded and swampy terrain, they concentrated in the Nizhneye Karakovo - Budnitsa - Shveikino area. Intelligence established the presence of the enemy in Filino - Boyarshchino - Rozhino - Kotovo.

Along the southern bank of the Mezhi River, northwest of Dukhovshchina, the enemy did not have a continuous front. The 129th Infantry Division, defending on the Dukhovshchinsky highway, occupied settlements on roads controlled by mobile groups of motorized infantry with tanks.
The Third Battalion, 430th Regiment, 129th Infantry Division occupied the resistance center at Ustye. The village was adapted for defense. At an altitude of 194.9 and in the village of Podvyazye there was a resistance center of the second battalion. The fire positions of the third division of the 129th artillery regiment, which supported the 430th infantry regiment, were located in the forest.
For two days the divisions conducted reconnaissance. Small reconnaissance groups and patrols reported that it was impossible to pass through the place of the planned breakthrough between Podvyazye and Ustye, since the junction of these two strong points was supposedly densely mined and well covered by fire. But the intelligence information turned out to be unreliable, since they did not come close to the strongholds.
The dovator summoned the commanders of divisions and regiments. He took them to the edge of the forest near strongholds and spent the whole day observing the enemy’s defenses. Reconnaissance was able to establish that the junction between Podvyazye and Ustye was not covered or guarded by anyone. Here a verbal combat order was given to go behind enemy lines.
The 37th Cavalry Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lasovsky was assigned to the vanguard for the breakthrough.

The vanguard quickly crossed the river, but greatly damaged the bottom. The crossing took a long time. The horses stumbled on the bottom, loosened by hundreds of hooves, many of them lost their balance, fell and swam. The riders jumped into the water; and holding on to the stirrups and horse tails, they swam side by side. The Germans did not detect the cavalry crossing, and the group came close to the enemy defenses.

In the first echelon operated the 50th Cavalry Division under the command of Brigade Commander Kondrat Semyonovich Melnik, and in the second - the 53rd Cavalry Division of Colonel Issa Aleksandrovich Pliev. The 37th Cavalry Regiment remained in the vanguard. Soon the horsemen came into combat contact with enemy units.

The appearance of the Red Army cavalry, which went 100 km behind enemy lines, caused panic among the Germans. The Cossacks intercepted communications, disrupted communications, captured radio stations, burned enemy warehouses, and cut down fascist soldiers and officers. Hitler's command issued a special order to exterminate the Cossack detachment. The next day this order fell into the hands of our cavalrymen. Making their way through swamps and dense forests, the Cossacks appeared where the Nazis least expected them.

On August 23, 1941, Dovator’s group with a swift strike breaks through the enemy’s defenses and rushes into the large forest on the Dukhovshchinsky highway.

On August 27, the cavalry group approached the Velizh - Dukhovshchina highway, which was one of the most important communications of the 9th German Army. The patrols fanned out in all directions, looking for targets for raids. And several squadrons were sent to the highway and neighboring roads to defeat enemy convoys.

In one of the battles, the Cossacks defeated another enemy battalion, destroyed 3 guns, captured 4 mortars, 9 heavy machine guns, a radio station, burned vehicles and warehouses with uniforms and food. Then the Cossacks raided a fascist convoy and destroyed 138 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 58 trucks, three cars, and three fuel tanks.
Dovator tried to report the situation to the headquarters of the 29th Army, but the cavalry group had gone so far from its troops that its radio stations could not contact army headquarters. Ammunition and food were running out. Dovator decided to retreat, but before leaving, to raid the enemy headquarters. He knew that General Strauss had left Ribshev with his headquarters and only the topographic department, which had accidentally been delayed, and a fleet of trucks remained there. On the night of August 29, having previously conducted reconnaissance, the cavalry raided Ribshevo and defeated the enemy guard battalion. A huge warehouse of topographic maps and several dozen trucks were burned. After this, the cavalry group concentrated in the forest. The enemy surrounded this entire area with troops transferred from the front. His aircraft systematically bombed the forests in squares. Heavy bombs exploded with a roar in the thicket, trees fell, forming rubble on the roads. The cavalry group set off on the return journey. At dawn, planes detected her movement and air attacks began. The enemy’s tanks and motorized infantry moved along the roads, following the retreating cavalrymen, tightening the encirclement and pressing the cavalry into a huge swamp. The situation was very serious. By September 1, the cavalry, having left the enemy through the swamp, made another forty-kilometer march and concentrated in the forest south of the village of Ustye. As soon as it got dark, the cavalrymen attacked the enemy without firing a shot, defeated the first battalion of the 430th enemy infantry regiment, broke through the enemy position, passed the battle formations of their rifle formations and, having completed their task, on September 2, Dovator’s group reached their own in the Chichat area.
During Dovator's raid behind enemy lines, the cavalry group destroyed: up to 3,000 German soldiers, 19 officers, 150 various vehicles, 4 armored vehicles, 2 tanks, 4 guns, 6 mortars, 3 heavy machine guns; captured: 65 light machine guns, 67 horses, many rifles and machine guns; two battalion headquarters and one regiment headquarters were destroyed.
In September - October 1941, after Dovator was awarded the military rank of major general, his soldiers participated in heavy defensive battles on the distant approaches to Moscow - on the Mezha River, along the Lama River (from Yaropolets to the Moscow Sea), heroically repelling enemy attacks. In November 1941, the corps of Major General Dovator, together with the 8th Guards named after Major General I.V. Panfilov division, 1st Guards Tank Brigade under General M.E. Katukov and other troops of the 16th Army fought stubborn defensive battles in the Volokolamsk direction in the Kryukov area.
General Dovator, without rest or rest, constantly visited the active units of the corps, maintaining the morale of the horsemen who fought courageously on the outskirts of Moscow.
On November 20, the Separate Cavalry Group was reorganized into the 3rd Cavalry Corps, which was reorganized into the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps on November 26.
On December 11, 1941, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Major General L.M. Dovatora was transferred to the Kubinka area. He walked 150 km along the rear of the Nazi troops, pursuing their retreating units, and on December 19 he reached the Ruza River. On this day, while examining enemy positions with binoculars before the battle, Major General Dovator was mortally wounded by a machine gun burst.